**"Deoband Madrassah Movement:
Countercultural Trends and Tendencies"**

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This thesis is presented for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy of
The University of Western Australia

School of Social Sciences
(Political Science and International Relations)

2014

ABSTRACT

Deoband Madrassah Movement (DMM) has been interpreted mainly from two perspectives. The first perspective depicts it as a movement striving to establish an Islamic state governed by the *Shariah*. The second interpretation views the DMM as a religious reform movement mostly concerned with the perfection of faith of ordinary Muslims. This thesis introduces a third perspective by studying the DMM in a countercultural context. Taking lead from Milton Yinger"s theory of counterculture, this thesis highlights the conflict of Deobandi movement with the popular social customs as well as religious and cultural practices of majority of Muslims in the subcontinent, with a special focus on Pakistan. The thesis has studied the DMM at three levels. The first level adopts an historical approach to identify countercultural inclinations of the DMM at various points of time since its inception in 1866. This level also highlights the countercultural tendencies of different Deobandi political groups. The second level of research involves a review of latest Deobandi literature to verify the presence of countercultural currents in the DMM during the recent years. The third level compares the values and attitudes of students from a Deobandi madrassah and a mainstream educational institution to further substantiate the findings of the first two stages of research. Based on the observations and findings of these three levels of research, this thesis concludes that there have been enough countercultural trends and tendencies in the DMM to suggest that this movement holds a countercultural character. However, this research in no way disregards the existing interpretations about the DMM. As such, this thesis does not suggest that DMM is an exclusive countercultural movement. Rather, it introduces a countercultural narrative to interpret and understand the DMM and hence broadens the scope of theoretical framework for research on Islamic movements.

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INTRODUCTION

This research identifies countercultural trends and tendencies in the Deoband Madrassah Movement (DMM) during its 150-year long history, with a particular focus on Pakistan. Religious schools or madaris (plural of Arabic madrassah: place of learning) of Pakistan have acquired greater significance after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Since then, there has been a substantial increase in the literature concerning Pakistani madaris. However, most of that literature has focused on madaris from the perspective of securitization. According to Malik (2008, p.1), „few of those studies are well grounded in empirical research - in fact most of them lack research altogether". The majority of the recent studies on madaris suffer from „sensationalized overgeneralization" and do not take into account the history of the religious education and the factors influencing the demand and supply of madaris (Malik, 2008, p.1). Recent research on madaris has also been „predicated on observational accounts and anecdotes" (Ali, 2009, p.85), while ignoring the social context and historical background (Riaz, 2008, p.36).

The major focus of post-9/11 madrassah literature has been the rise in the number of madaris and their possible links to extremism. Just before 9/11, western media had already started highlighting madrassah-terrorism nexus in the backdrop of the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan. In the year 2000, three articles, one each by Jessica Stern, Jeffery Goldberg and Stephen Cohen specifically focused on Pakistani madaris and their links with jihad and terrorism. Immediately after 9/11, the intensity of this discourse increased and Peter Singer (2001) pointed out that madaris were displacing the public education system and some of these had „extremely close ties with radical militant groups and played a critical role in sustaining the international terrorist network". Andre Coulson (2003) called madaris as „weapons of mass instruction". Even the 9/11 Commission Report referred to madaris as „incubators of violent extremism". Ali Riaz (2008, pp.39-40), who studied coverage of nine western media outlets between 12th September 2001 and 31st March, 2005, identified two thematic similarities with regard to portrayal of Pakistani madaris: depiction of madrassah children as an enemy-in-the-making and framing of the madrassah environment as repressive.

At the same time, some revisionist literature on madaris has also appeared after 9/11 to question the sensationalism of some of the media reports as well as academic essays. Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey (2005) studied the background of 75 terrorists behind major attacks on western targets and concluded that only nine of them had madrassah linkage. Earlier, Mark Sageman (2004) had reached a similar conclusion in a study of 137 terrorists, out of which only 23 (17%) had attended Islamic religious schools. William Dalrymple (2005) also provided a somewhat positive account of madaris in South Asia by highlighting the contribution of these institutions with respect to education and shelter for the poor children. Akbar S. Ahmed (2002) also regarded madaris to be a ‚cheaper, more accessible and more Islamic alternative to education while Mumtaz Ahmad (2003) stressed the apolitical tone of the traditional curriculum of madaris. A World Bank-funded study tried to downplay the sensationalism against Pakistani madaris by stating that madrassah enrolment may be less than 1% of total students (Andrabi et al, 2005). These findings actually refuted the much-discussed 2002 report of International Crisis Group, which had claimed that about one third of all students in Pakistan were enrolled in madaris. Recent academic works by Hefner and Zaman (2007), Jamal Malik (2008), Ali Riaz (2008) and Saleem Ali (2009) have tried to interpret madaris in the overall historical context with particular focus on the growth, evolution, syllabus and sectarian outlook of South Asian madaris.

Before 9/11, madaris in the subcontinent were studied mostly in the context of a religious reform movement. After 9/11, almost all the literature on madaris has tried to explain these institutions from the political perspective while focusing on issues like extremism and terrorism. Although both these approaches are very vital, there is still some need to study these madaris at a deeper level in order to understand the whole madrassah phenomenon in the Indian subcontinent generally and in Pakistan particularly. So far, no such research has been conducted to explain this phenomenon in the socio-cultural context. This thesis has tried to bridge that research gap by studying the madrassah phenomenon from a countercultural perspective.

This thesis studies the growth and evolution of the Deobandi denomination of madaris, which forms bulk of the total madaris in Pakistan. The percentage of Deobandi madaris is placed between 60 per cent (Akbar, 2010) and 70 per cent (Rehman, 2008) of total madaris in the country. According to Rehman (2008, p.64), other madrassah

denominations in Pakistan include Barelwi (16%), Ahle Hadith (4%), Shia (4%) and *Jamaat-e-Islami* (5%).

However, it is interesting to note that the above-mentioned percentage of madaris is not compatible with the overall sectarian composition of Pakistani society. According to cursory estimates about the sectarian divide in Pakistan, around 60% of Pakistani Muslims represent the Barelwi sect. About 20-25% belongs to the Deobandi sect and less than 5% to the Ahle Hadith sect. Shia Islam is represented by 10-15% of Pakistani Muslims (Akbar, 2010). However, these statistics are not acceptable for the said sects, each of which claims for itself far greater share among the Pakistani Muslims.

Furthermore, the aforementioned sectarian composition is not watertight in the sense that a huge majority of Sunni Muslims in Pakistan does not claim strict adherence to any particular sectarian denomination. Rather, they follow a tolerant and broad-minded version of Islam, which is strongly linked to the spiritual and *sufi* religious traditions of the region. This charitable version of Islam can broadly be called folk Islam, which has a predominant presence in villages and small towns where more than 75 % Pakistanis live. Apart from that, this folk Islam also enjoys a significant following among the urban areas of Pakistan (Jafferlot, 2002, p.232-34). Therefore, one may argue that this folk Islam represents the mainstream Muslim society in Pakistan. The norms, values and practices of this folk Islam have largely been represented by the Barelwi school of thought. According to Ahmad (1991, p.158), folk Islam has „an emphasis on *sufism*, veneration of saints, idolization of the Prophet and one‟s spiritual preceptors, and popular and festive display of syncretic religious rituals‟.

It is quite remarkable that the Deobandis have not only maintained far more madaris than their share in the population but have also managed to influence both the state and the society in Pakistan despite being a minority sect. Similarly, all the madaris that have been linked to jihad or terrorism also belong to Deobandi sect. This dubious distinction of the Deobandi madaris makes them to qualify as the actinic focus of this thesis, which studies the Deobandi Islam in a countercultural context.

The Deoband Madrassah Movement (DMM) was launched in 1866 to protect the religious capital of Indian Muslims (Arshad, 2005, p.29) in the backdrop of the fall of Muslim rule and introduction of a secular education system by the British in India. That was a time when after the defeat in the war of 1857, the Muslims had lost hope of

gaining any political power in India and there was a general feeling of social isolation, a condition which Westhues (1972, p.19) considers to be a source of countercultures. A counterculture is a set of norms and values of a group that contradict the prevalent norms and values of the society of which that group is a part (Yinger, 1982, p.3). Unable to attack the power structure, the DMM founders decided to convert their social isolation in physical isolation by setting up peculiar chain of madaris. Through the establishment of these madaris, the followers of the DMM were actually setting up isolated communities where they could preach and practice their own value system, which was perceived to be threatened by the British and Hindu cultures on the one hand and the socio-cultural practices of the folk Islam on the other. Taking inspiration from Shah Waliullah‟s 18th century movement, the DMM aimed to oppose and reform social customs and cultural practices of the Indian Muslims.

Existing literature on the DMM has explained this movement mainly from two perspectives (Pemberton, 2009). First is the political interpretation, which focuses on the efforts of the DMM to establish an Islamic state governed by the *Shariah*. Second perspective is based on „interiorization‟ thesis, which sees the DMM as a religious reform movement more concerned with the perfection of faith and moral development of ordinary Muslims and less with assertion of political agenda (Pemberton, 2009). Taking lead from the „interiorization‟ perspective, this research introduces a third perspective by interpreting the DMM from a socio-cultural standpoint. It focuses on the conflict of Deobandi movement with the social customs and cultural practices of folk Islam in the subcontinent. This conflict has been the outcome of DMM‟s aim „to resuscitate classical Islam to rid the Muslims of theological corruptions, the ritual degradations and the material exploitation to which they have fallen prey‟ (Smith, 1943, p.320).

Without discounting the interpretations offered by the existing three perspectives on the DMM, this thesis identifies countercultural inclinations of this movement by studying it in the context of Milton Yinger‟s theory of counterculture. Yinger (1960) defined the concept of counterculture as a „normative system of a group which contains, as a primary element, a theme of conflict with the values of the total society‟.
This thesis has addressed the following major research question:
How could the Deoband Madrassah Movement be understood from a countercultural perspective?

Based on the hypothesis that there had been seeds of a counterculture in the origin of the Deoband Madrassah Movement in 1866, this major question has been answered through following two secondary questions.

i. What has been the pattern of countercultural tendencies in the Deoband Madrassah Movement (DMM) from its origin to the partition of India (1866-1947) on the one hand, and in Pakistan since 1947, on the other?

ii. How do the values and attitudes of the Deobandis differ from those of the mainstream Muslim society in Pakistan?

These sub-questions have been researched in two stages. At the first stage, the research questions were addressed through a detailed survey and analysis of the available literature on the DMM. The second stage of research involved fieldwork, which included a) review of three Deobandi journals to identify countercultural trends in the DMM during recent years; and b) semi-structured qualitative interviews of students of a Deobandi madrassah and mainstream Post-graduate College in order to compare their values and attitudes.

Organization of the Thesis

This thesis has been organized into eight chapters as detailed below.

Chapter 1: Research Context: Literature Review & Theoretical Framework

This chapter has been divided into three sections. The first section focuses on the origin of madaris in Islam as well as the background and emergence of the DMM in the sub-continent with a particular focus on Pakistan. The second section looks into the various viewpoints about the objectives and goals of the DMM as elucidated in the published research on the movement. The last section discusses social and religious movement theories before explaining the theoretical context for this thesis, which is based on Milton Yinger"s counterculture theory. Apart from explaining Yinger"s theory, this section also describes the research methodology.

Chapter 2: Background of the DMM: Seeds of a Counterculture

This chapter traces the links of the DMM to Shah Waliullah"s 18th century movement and latter"s countercultural trends that were passed on to the DMM. The main topics of this chapter are the ideology and legacy of Waliullah"s movement as well as direct

affiliations of DMM founders with the former. This chapter also illustrates how the DMM actually became just a narrower version of that earlier movement, which was itself influenced by the *Salafi* movement of Ibn Abdul Wahhab of Arabia.

Chapter 3: Origin of the DMM: Ascetic Countercultural Trends
This chapter defines the factors that caused the DMM leaders to withdraw from the mainstream society in the wake of the rise of the British Raj after the fall of Mughal Empire in 1857. While discussing this „inward turn" of the DMM that focused on cultivating a perfect Islamic life and practice instead of any involvement in the external exigencies of British rule and impending modernity, this chapter proposes that DMM during its early years behaved like what Milton Yinger has called as „ascetic" counterculture.

Chapter 4: DMM in United India: Activist Countercultural Approach
This chapter argues that the DMM gradually adopted an activist approach by preaching its values on the one hand and opposing the customs and traditions of the folk Islam in India on the other. This chapter also highlights the countercultural activism of the DMM in the political arena where it placed itself against the political groups who represented the mainstream Muslim society in India. Most importantly, this chapter also examines the Deobandi opposition to the popular movement for Pakistan from a countercultural perspective. Further, this chapter also touches upon the initiative of some Deobandi leaders to form *Tablighi Jamaat* (proselytizing group), which behaved somewhat like a „mystic" counterculture.

Chapter 5: DMM in Pakistan: Countercultural Politics and Extremism
While highlighting the differences between the Deobandi movement and the popular folk Islam, this chapter discusses in detail the role of the DMM in Pakistan from 1947 to the present. The factors leading to different phases and trends in the DMM have also been spotlighted here. This chapter also focuses on the shifting stances of the Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI) – major Deobandi political party in Pakistan. A significant shift in DMM"s approach towards extremism after its involvement in the Afghan „jihad" (1979-89) provides the pivot for this chapter. The terrorist trends in the DMM have also been identified to suggest a fourth variety of counterculture (i.e. Extremist Counterculture) in addition to the three types proposed by Milton Yinger.

Chapter 6: Deobandi Islam: Countering the Folk Islam and Popular Customs

This chapter provides the details of the beliefs and practices of the DMM that contradict the values and norms of the majority of the Muslims in Pakistan. The chapter explores how the DMM employed Islamic theology to castigate the established religious and socio-cultural values and practices of the folk Islam followed by the majority of Pakistani Muslims. In this chapter, Deobandi arguments against prevalent religious practices, popular customs and even sports and entertainment activities have been juxtaposed with the counterarguments of non-Deobandi scholars to highlight the countercultural disposition of the DMM.

Chapter 7: DMM versus Mainstream Society: Review of Deobandi Journals

This chapter reviews three prominent Deobandi journals published by big madaris in three of the four provinces of Pakistan. The major focus of this review is on four themes i.e. popular values and practices, politics, educational system and the role of women in society. This review exhibits the countercultural character of the Deobandi Movement by spotlighting a sharp contrast between the values and beliefs of the DMM and the mainstream Muslim society in Pakistan.

Chapter 8: Us against Them: Comparison of Madrassah and College Students

This chapter compares the values and attitudes of the students of a Deobandi madrassah and a mainstream post-graduate college in the light of the qualitative interviews conducted during the fieldwork for this research. The findings of this fieldwork further substantiate the countercultural constitution of the DMM specifically with reference to the four themes covered in Chapter 7.

Conclusion

This epilogue not only recaps the major findings of the thesis but also indicates towards possible avenues for future research on the Deobandi movement.

1   RESEARCH CONTEXT: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

'They see their values and conceptions of the good life disappearing, and they can find no way within the system to restore them'.

Milton Yinger in „Countercultures: The Promise and Peril of a World Turned Upside Down"
(1982, p.210)

This chapter spells out the research ambience and schema for this thesis. The chapter has been divided into three sections. First section discusses a brief history of madaris on the one hand and the DMM on the other. The second section presents different viewpoints in the existing literature about the interpretation of the DMM. The last section puts forward the theoretical context as well as the research methodology.

1.1   History of Madaris

The Arabic word madrassah (plural: madaris) literally means a school (Riaz, 2008, p.2) or a place of learning (Malik, 2008, p.1). It originates from the word *dars*, which means a lesson or instruction. In the Arabic-speaking societies, the word madrassah can be applied to a wide variety of institutions (Berkey, 2007, p.40). However, in non-Arabic speaking regions, this word is generally used to refer to a special kind of institution devoted to training of „*ulama* (religious scholars, plural of *alim*) through instruction about the Quran, Hadith (traditions of the Prophet), *fiqh* (jurisprudence) and Islamic law (Riaz, 2008, p.2).

The tradition of madrassah is as old as the history of Islam itself. Although the word madrassah was not used as such, a study circle or *halaqah* was established for learning in the mosque of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him, PBUH) in the city of Madinah. The ones who participated in that *halaqah* used to sit on an elevated platform called *al-Suffah* and were called *Ashab al-Suffah* (Arshad, 2005, p.21). Even during the life time of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), nine such *halaqahs* had been established inside Madinah (Khalid, 2002, p.89). These non-formal educational arrangements, based in the mosques or in the homes of the Prophet"s companions, were the precursors of madaris and continued during the era of first four caliphs and even later (Riaz, 2008, pp.53-4). Imdad Sabri has pointed out the existence of a systematic educational system at primary level during caliph Umar"s reign (632-44 CE) whereby educational

requirements of the Muslims were fulfilled through the institution of a *maktab* or *kuttab*, that was attached to a local mosque (Arshad, 2005, p.23).

A.L. Tibawi has added that „the *maktab* could be held in a private house, shop or any other place and was presided over by a *mu'allim* (teacher)" and aimed at the „removal of illiteracy and the teaching of reckoning, grammar, poetry, history (*akhbar*) and above all, the Quran" (quoted in Riaz, 2008, p.55). During the first four centuries (7th through 10th century CE) of Islamic education, majority of the Muslims who sought instruction, stopped at the *maktab* level and the seekers of the higher knowledge had to join circles of well-known scholars and mystics because madaris did not exist as independent institutions.

It is hard to trace the exact period when madaris started to appear as independent and exclusive educational institutions. It is generally agreed that the Madrassah al-Nizamiya of Baghdad, established in 1067, is the first institutionalized madrassah (Khalid, 2002, p.91; Malik, 2008, p.4; Rizvi, 2005, p.68; Saleem, 2004, p.11). This madrassah was established by Nizam ul-Mulk Tusi (1017-92), who was the *vizir* (prime minister) of the Seljuk Turk Sultan Alp Arsalan under Abbasid Caliphate. However, Arshad (2005, p.22) and Riaz (2008, p.54) have mentioned several madaris, which had been established well before Madrassah al-Nizamiya. Riaz (2008, p.54) has actually traced the history of institutionalized madaris even to the reign of Abbasid caliph al-Mamun (786-833 CE).

Although Madrassah al-Nizamiya is not the first institutionalized madrassah in the history of Islamic education, its founder Nizam ul-Mulk Tusi holds the distinction of providing a model for other madaris. He established a chain of madaris in several cities in the Seljuk sultanate, which stretched from the Hindu Kush to Eastern Anatolia and from Central Asia to Persian Gulf (Arjomand, 1999). He also set up *Auqaf* (plural of Arabic *waqf*: trust) for these madaris in order to ensure income generation, which in turn provided independence and autonomy to these institutions (Arshad, 2005, pp.22-3). This tradition later became the standard practice and helped in spreading the network of madaris in the regions under Muslim rule. These madaris were typically patronized by the ruling elite. Apart from the pursuit of knowledge, the rapid rise in the number of madaris after the 10th century was also associated with at least three other

factors: rivalry between Shias and Sunnis; contention between various Sunni schools of thought (*madhabs*); and philosophical debates between the rationalist Mutazilites and orthodox Asharites (Riaz, 2008, p.56).

As far as the Indian subcontinent is concerned, it is hard to find a discernible pattern among the Islamic educational institutions before the rise of Mughal Empire in the 16th century. After the Muslims started arriving in the region during early 8th century, mosque and *khanqah* (*sufi* hospice or monastery) were initially the centres of informal religious education. The first formal madrassah was set up in 1191 in Ajmer by Muizzuddin Muhammad Ghauri (d.1206), founder of Turkish rule in India (Khalid, 2002, p.93; Riaz, 2008, p.58). Saleem Ali (2009. P. 18) has pointed out that the first recorded madrassah in the subcontinent was the Madrassah Firozi in Multan established by Nasiruddin Qabacha. The earliest madaris in the subcontinent were reportedly established in the regions of Sindh and Multan (Arshad, 2005, p.24) when Arab scholars migrated here following Muhammad Bin Qasim''s invasion of Sindh leading to establishment of new cities like Mansura during the early 8th century.

In Delhi, Shams-ud-din Iltutmish (d.1236) established the first madrassah, which was named Madrassah Muizziah in the memory of Sultan Ghauri (Arshad, 2005, p.24). Qutbuddin Aibak (d.1210) of Slave Dynasty and Muhammad Ibn Tughluq (d.1351) and Feroze Shah (d.1388) of Tughluq Dynasty were the most enthusiastic founders of madaris in the subcontinent (Arshad, 2005, p.24; Khalid, 2002, p.93; Riaz, 2008, p.58). According to Miqrizi, during the reign of Muhammad Ibn Tughluq (1324-51), there were about one thousand madaris present in Delhi alone (Rizwi, 2005, vol.i, p.72). However, that figure seems to be unrealistic because even today when the Muslim population of Delhi has enormously increased since 14th century, there are less than 1200 madaris there. Apparently, Miqrizi included in his calculation of madaris, the *maktabs* attached to mosques, which provided basic Islamic education with special focus on recitation of the Quran.

Most of the early madaris in the Indian subcontinent were established by the rulers of different dynasties as well as regional kingdoms, which emerged in the wake of weakening of the Delhi Sultanate in 15th century. Thus the curricula of these madaris varied to reflect the background of the scholars and saints who influenced a particular

ruler. Despite having no single educational model, these early madaris had some common features: operational autonomy; freedom to choose syllabus; instruction of both revealed or transmitted (*manqulat*) and rational (*ma'qulat*) sciences; and producing graduates who were to serve in the royal courts and state administration (Riaz, 2008, pp.60-1).

After the establishment of Mughal Empire, there was a marked increase in the number of madaris owing to the political stability and the royal policy to support education and learning. Muslim education during the Mughal period (1556-1858) can be divided into three categories; elementary, secondary and higher education. Elementary or primary education was provided at the *maktab*, which was almost invariably attached to a mosque. Occasionally, *maktabs* were based in private houses. Secondary education was imparted at *khanqah*, *dargah* (shrine) or sometimes at mosques. These institutions, which focused on mystical and theological ideas, acted as supplements and feeders to the madaris, which in turn imparted higher education. These madaris were present in important towns and cities and provided advanced studies in three types of sciences: *illahi* or divine sciences consisting of theology and the means of acquiring the knowledge of God; *riazi* or mathematical sciences which also included astronomy, music and mechanics; and *tabi'i* or physical sciences (Ojha, 1975, pp.76-80).

The curriculum of madaris (i.e. higher education) during the first half of Mughal era put great emphasis on the study of rational sciences (*ma'qulat*), which took „new importance" and „great strides towards popularity" during Emperor Akbar"s reign (Ikram and Bilgrami quoted in Riaz, 2008, p.64). This emphasis on rationalist content continued under Emperor Jahangir despite efforts by some *ulama* like Shaikh Abdul-Haqq Muhaddis Dehlwi, who tried to revive the *manqulat* (revealed) tradition. Later, Aurangzeb, who is considered the most orthodox Mughal ruler, patronized the Farangi Mahall madrassah in Lucknow as a major institution of learning.

Farangi Mahall madrassah tradition also stressed *ma'qulat* more than *manqulat*. In fact, Mulla Nizamuddin Sihalvi (d.1748) of this tradition expanded and compiled the curriculum of madaris by including a number of books on *ma'qulat* while Quran (two commentaries) and Hadith (one abridgement) were given marginal focus (Metcalf, 1982, p.31). The Farangi Mahall syllabus known as *Dars-i-Nizami* has since dominated the religious education in the subcontinent, of course, with some modifications. Nadwi

(1970, p.300) considered the modern *Dars-i-Nizami* to be an inferior form of the original syllabus, which focused more on the subjects than on books. However, Robinson (2001) has pointed out that *Dars-i-Nizami* was not like a strict syllabus; rather it was more like a method of teaching whereby the teachers introduced books according to the ability of students rather than teaching them all the suggested books for a particular subject (Sanyal, 2008, p.25).

In a period marked by political instability, Farangi Mahall became one of the largest centres of learning by the early 18th century. While preparing *qadhis* (judges) and *muftis* (jurists) for the Muslim courts, this school also revived the tradition of combining scholarly and mystic learning (Metcalf, 1982, pp.31-2), a tradition which had been eclipsed during the early period of Mughal rule that was marked by growing influence of the *ulama* vis-à-vis the *sufis* (Riaz, 2008, p.61). Another revival which occurred during the same period was related to *manqulat* tradition, which was given more weightage in the curriculum of madaris. This revival was made possible by Shah Waliullah (1703-62), who not only emphasized teaching of *tafsir* (exegesis) of the Quran but also included *Sihah-i-Sittah* (six authentic collections of Hadith) in the syllabus for his Madrassah Rahimia in Delhi. While urging the need and value of study of *manqulat* in bringing people closer to the teachings of Islam, Shah Waliullah, a contemporary of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab of Nejd, explicitly dismissed *ma'qulat* as mere intellectual exercises and a source of confusion (Metcalf, 1982, p.38).

Unlike Farangi Mahall, Waliullah‟s madrassah advocated a more independent and political role for *ulama* vis-à-vis the rulers. At a time marked by decline of Mughal Empire and rise of Maratha power, Waliullah launched a movement from his madrassah to restore Muslim rule under a central authority. To achieve this, he developed a two-pronged strategy. First, he influenced the ruling elite through his teachings and wrote to Nizam ul-Mulk of Hyderabad, Najib ud-Daulah of Rohilkhand and even to Ahmad Shah Abdali of Afghanistan to take initiative to revive a stable Muslim rule (Metcalf, 1982, p.35). Second, Waliullah influenced the general Muslim population through a class of *ulama* which was prepared through the madaris set up in different parts of India (Sindhi, 2008, pp.45-6). First initiative of Waliullah proved to be short-lived and vain. However, his intellectual work on religious thought succeeded in creating a class of *ulama* which was to play an important role in future Islamic education as well as Muslim politics in the subcontinent.

After Waliullah's death in 1762, the focus of his movement became narrow as his original ideas of *tatbiq* (intellectual synthesis), *ijtihad* and religious harmony were ignored by his descendents. The movement gradually adopted *taqlid* (strict following) of Hanafi *madhab* and contributed to disharmony among the Muslims through its criticism of Shias on the one hand and Sunni folk Islam on the other. For example, Waliullah in his book „*Izaltul Khifa'* had tried to remove some misunderstandings between Shias and Sunnis but his son Abdul Aziz in his book „*Tohfa-e-Athna' Ashari*" aggressively dismissed the Shia Islam. Similarly, Waliullah had, in his will, called on his heirs to forsake „the customs of Arabs (pre-Islamic Arabia) and *hunud* (the Hindus)" (Ikram, 2011, p. 572), but Abdul Aziz made it a point to issue some *fatawa* (plural of *fatwa*: religious edict) about proper conduct on the tombs of saints.

Later on, condemnation of the popular customs of Indian Muslims became the major thrust of this movement especially after Waliullah's grandson Muhammad Ismail wrote *taqwiatul Iman*, a book inspired by Ibn Abdul Wahhab's *Al Tawhid*, which advocated a very strict and puritan concept of monotheism (Sindhi, 2008, p.70). This book by Ismail created a storm of protest by mainstream *ulama* and is still considered a controversial book (Faruqi, 1963, p.18). While stating that God alone was entitled to worship and homage, Ismail denounced all practices and beliefs that seemed to compromise the faith in *tawhid* (transcendent unity of God). Three sources were identified as threat to *tawhid*: false *sufism*; Shia Islam; and popular customs (Metcalf, 1982, pp. 56-7). By aggressively attacking these sources, the movement adopted a „practical approach" that eclipsed the original intellectual approach of Shah Waliullah.

As shall be discussed in the next chapter, Waliullah's intellectual tradition finally came to an end when his great grandson Muhammad Ishaq left the family madrassah in Delhi and migrated to Makkah in 1842 (Sindhi, 2008, p.98), leaving behind a group of dedicated students who were supposed to keep the movement alive. This group included Abdul Ghani Dehlwi, Mamluk Ali and Syed Nazir Ahmed (Metcalf, 1982, p.71; Sindhi, 2008, p.98). The first two persons were to play a vital role in the genesis of the DMM while the third was to establish a distinctive sect called Ahle Hadith- a group which is *ghair muqallid* (who do not observe *taqlid* or following of any of the four *madhabs* i.e. Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki and Hambli). As compared to the DMM, the Ahle Hadith school of thought is considered more close to the teachings of Ibn Abdul Wahhab of Nejd.

1.2 History of the DMM

As the East India Company started to take control of the subcontinent after assuming power in Bengal in 1765, they initially kept the old education system intact. Madaris and *maktabs* continued to operate with the state support. Persian remained the official language and for „the first fifty years of the Company‟s rule, the Musalmans [sic] had the lion‟s share of state patronage‟ (Hunter, 1871, p.141). Even when the Company established an educational institution for Muslims in Bengal in 1780, it was called Calcutta Aliya Madrassah and it adopted *Dars-e-Nizami* curriculum till 1791 when some changes were introduced (Riaz, 2008, p.68). The 1831 Charter of the East India Company indicated for the first time that English was to be introduced in Indian educational system alongside vernacular languages.

In 1835, Thomas Macaulay‟s Education Minute was approved to introduce English as well as western education system in India that resulted in discontinuation of government support for madaris and other traditional educational institutions (Riaz, 2008, p.69). Before that, the Company, as an effort to increase its revenues, had acquired the *auqaf* (trusts) of madaris (Arshad, 2005, p.26), a step which virtually made it very difficult to run these institutions. After English replaced Persian as official language and medium of higher courts in 1835 and once Governor General Henry Hardinge decided in 1844 that only those with western-style education and knowledge of English were eligible for state sector jobs, the employability of madrassah graduates reduced remarkably (Riaz, 2008, p.70). On the other hand, the rise of western-style government schools with a rapid growth in attendance was equally remarkable (Robinson, 1974, p.35).

The steps taken by the East India Company during the decade after 1835 reflected a shift in its earlier policy since 1765, which was marked by moderation as well as determination to let Muslim power expire by slow natural decay (Hunter, 1871, p.117). As the previous policy helped averting any rebellion by the Muslims, the deviation from that policy after 1835 was likely to stir the sentiments of local populations, especially those who were linked to traditional institutions, both social and political. The result of the new policy was the War of Independence or the Mutiny in 1857, which was represented by both Muslim and Hindu populations. That rebellion failed and consequently the British rule was established all over India. British response to that rebellion was ruthless especially against the Muslims who, as last rulers of India, were

disproportionately blamed for their part in the Mutiny. The whole population of Delhi was expelled for some time, thousands of Muslims were shot, several mosques were desecrated and many madaris were razed (Metcalf, 1982, p.84-85).

An important casualty related to the Mutiny of 1857 was Delhi College, which was established by the British in 1825. That college was set up on the recommendations of the General Committee on Public Instruction, which lamented the state of the private madaris. The goal of the college was the education of respectable people in order to enable them to find suitable jobs (Metcalf, 1982, p. 72). There were two branches of the College, English and Oriental. The head of the Arabian Department of the Oriental branch, Mamluk Ali, was closely associated with the Waliullah family. He was taught by a student of Abdul Aziz (Rizwi, 2005, vol.i, p.97). Among the students of Mamluk Ali were Muhammad Qasim and Rasheed Ahmed who were to launch a madrassah movement from Deoband in 1866.

After the failure of the 1857 war and the removal of even the symbolic presence of Mughal Empire in India, the original dream of the *ulama* of Waliullah tradition to have an Islamic state, was completely shattered and they were somehow persuaded that the British were invincible. Further, they also realized that the introduction of western education system and marginalization of madaris had endangered the intellectual tradition of Waliullah. Similarly, the British decision of 1864 to do away with the posts of Muhammaden Law officers (Hunter, 1871, p. 118) was considered a direct blow to the Islamic way of life. In addition to that, the activities of the Christian missionaries were seen with suspicion in terms of threat to the Muslim culture in India.

The above-mentioned factors put those *ulama* in a completely defensive mode. Their proactive role for the expansion of Islam was replaced by a reactionary activity of „protecting and preserving the Muslim cultural and religious life - an activity which manifested itself in a new form, inward-looking and primarily concerned with the Islamic quality of individual lives‟ (Metcalf, 1982, pp.85-86). Madrassah at Deoband established in 1866 (some books have mentioned the year as 1867) was the outcome of this reactionary approach, which has been considered as a continuation of Shah Waliullah‟s movement under a different strategy (Sindhi, 2008, p.98: Shahjahanpuri, 2004, p.120).

Deoband is a small town in district Saharanpur in North India. It is located at 144 kilometres to the North West of Delhi. The origin of the madrassah at Deoband was quite modest. It was started with just one teacher and one student, both named Mahmood, who started their first lesson under the pomegranate tree in the courtyard of a small mosque called *Chhatta masjid*. Muhammad Qasim of Nanautah and Rasheed Ahmed of Gangoh, supported by several of their companions from Delhi College, were the founding fathers of this madrassah, which was to become the precursor of a big movement in the coming years.

The major aim of the founders of this madrassah was to save the religion as well as the religious capital of Muslims in India (Arshad, 2005, p.29) while taking extra care to avoid any conflict with the British rulers (Metcalf, 1982, p.85). This madrassah was to be run by small public donations from the Muslims while no government funds were to be accepted (Khalid, 2002, p.100; Durrani, 2001, p.34).

Although the modest beginning of the madrassah at Deoband pointed towards an informal system of education, the founders had planned to establish it on the British bureaucratic style for educational institutions (Metcalf, 1982, p.93). According to Sindhi (2008, p.98), that madrassah was founded on the model of Delhi College. Therefore, it was to have a fixed institutional character with permanent salaried staff, distinct class rooms and library, fixed course of study and regular examinations and convocations (Berkey, 2007, p.49). The administration of the madrassah worked at three levels: *sarprast* or rector who acted as patron and guide; *mohtamim* or the chancellor who was chief administrative officer; and *sadr mudarris* or the principal who was to look after the instruction (Metcalf, 1982, p.95). So, long before this madrassah was called Darul Ulum (a term used for higher level of religious education) in 1879, its establishment was already structured on the pattern of a university.

Since the vision of the founders of madrassah at Deoband was focused on protection and preservation of Muslim culture in India, only one madrassah could not be enough to achieve that goal. Therefore, several new madaris were set up initially in the Upper Doab region of North India. By the end of 1880, at least 15 madaris had already been operational on the pattern of the mother school at Deoband. By the end of the 19th century, more than fifty madaris had been established under the DMM.

Following the practice of Farangi Mahall and Shah Waliullah schools, the DMM upheld the tradition of combining the role of saint and scholar in the person of religious leader. However, the religious leaders belonging to the DMM stressed upon a responsible, reformist interpretation of the faith for their followers while dismissing any intercession or miraculous intervention for the latter (Metcalf, 1982, p.140). In terms of Arthur Buehler"s distinction, DMM"s spiritual leaders were to be „teaching" *shaikhs* as opposed to the traditional „mediating" *shaikhs* (Naeem, 2009). Owing to this distinction, the DMM was able to detach itself from the traditional folk Islam that centred on *sufi* saints and their *khanqahs* and shrines. The Deobandis thus abandoned the popular *sufi* traditions and institutions of the subcontinent in favour of their own madaris through which their particular version of Islam was to be preserved and preached.

While isolating itself from the institutional set-up of the folk Islam, the DMM simultaneously opposed the popular beliefs and practices of the Indian Muslims. These included celebration of the birthday of the Prophet (*Milad-un-Nabi)*, annual festival of the saints (*urs*), distribution of sweets upon completion of the Quran and the belief that the Prophet shared God"s knowledge of the unknown (*ilm-e-ghaib*). The *ulama* belonging to the DMM also opposed elaborate marriage, birth and funeral ceremonies on the pretext that these were un-Islamic. This Deobandi opposition was in line with the „practical" tradition of Waliuulah"s movement as shall be explained in the following two chapters.

For their opposition of the practices of the folk Islam, the DMM *ulama* faced severe criticism from their opponents. The fiercest opposition to Deobandi Islam came from *Ahle Sunnat wal Jamaat* or Barelwi movement, which was launched in 1880s under the leadership of Ahmad Raza Khan of Bareilley (Rohilkhand) whose father had earlier been refuting the ideas of Syed Ahmed and Muhammad Ismail. Ahmad Raza (1856-1921) continued that tradition and issued *fatwa* that Qasim and Rasheed of DMM were no longer Muslims due to showing disrespect to the Prophet (Metcalf, 1982, p.309).

The Barelwi school of thought later established its own madaris to counter the DMM. Although the Barelwis shared the Hanafi *madhab* with the Deobandis, the former accepted the prevailing customs among the Indian Muslims and also championed the cause of saint worship (Faruqi, 1963, p.127) as well as veneration of the Prophet. As

opposed to the DMM, the Barelwis „wanted to preserve Islam unchanged: not Islam as was idealized in texts or the historical past, but Islam as it had evolved to the present" (Metcalf, 1982, p.296). As such, the Barelwis upheld the folk Islam followed by the majority of the Muslims of the subcontinent.

Despite opposition from the *ulama* of other schools of thought, the DMM managed to establish itself in India. The growth of the DMM was mainly caused by two factors: a core of *ashraaf* (social elite) donors; and effective use of modern communication methods like printing press, mail and money order services. Since the initial students and staff were mostly *ashraaf*, they were able to attract donors from that class, which included government servants, religious leaders, traders and land holders. This urban class was most adversely affected by the fall of the Muslim rule on the one hand and the subsequent policies of the colonial rulers on the other (Metcalf, 1982, pp.252-53).

The DMM was now supposed to provide them with a sense of cultural pride and self-esteem. However, this pattern changed by the end of the 19th century when the student body of the DMM was dominated by the children from the lower classes (*ajlaaf*) of rural areas, whose objective was to get better employment and enhanced social status. The effective use of modern communication allowed the DMM to consolidate the core of donors through sending letters of invitation and publishing the list of sponsors along with their individual contributions. Posters and pamphlets distributed by the DMM also helped in attracting more students.

Another factor which contributed to the growth of the DMM was the deliberate decision of its founders to stay away from political issues in an effort to avoid any conflict with the British government. In fact, the DMM occasionally showed some signs of loyalty to the British by celebrating coronation events and offering prayers for Queen's health (Metcalf, 1982, pp.154-55). However, this loyalty appeared to be a calculated move by the founders who did not want to give offence to the colonial rulers. As shall be discussed in Chapter 4, the DMM largely stayed away from any political activity from its inception in 1866 till 1920s. It was only through joining the religious party called *Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind* (JUH-Association of Indian Theologians) that DMM finally decided to take part in political activities in early 1920s. Later, the Deobandis opposed the Pakistan Movement, which was launched in 1940 by the All India Muslim League (AIML), a party representing the majority of Indian Muslims.

It is quite enigmatic that the DMM which earlier appeared to follow the ideal of Shah Waliullah about getting an Islamic state, had suddenly taken a volte face when the possibility of creation of such a state was about to be realized in the shape of Pakistan. Instead of owning that idea and going all out for it, the DMM did the opposite and joined the Hindu-dominated Congress party to work against the creation of Pakistan.

During the Pakistan Movement, the All India Muslim League had claimed to be the sole representative of entire Muslim community of the subcontinent. By 1945, the popularity of the League and the idea of Pakistan had greatly increased. Spiritual leaders of different *sufi* orders had already supported Pakistan. Most of the Barelwi *ulama* were also in favour of Pakistan and even one section of Farangi Mahall *ulama* declared their support for the idea. However, an important group of Indian *ulama* represented by the DMM and JUH was still campaigning, in alliance with Indian National Congress, against the idea of Pakistan. *Jamaat-e-Islami* of Maulana Maududi was opposing Pakistan as well as the views of JUH. In this scenario, the Muslim League contacted different *ulama* of JUH to get their support and finally succeeded in winning over Shabbir Ahmed Usmani who in 1946 was elected president of a new Deobandi party called All India *Jamiatul Ulama-e-Islam* (AIJUI). This party later got official support from the government of the newly established state of Pakistan (Binder, 1961, p.31). This party was to later provide guidance and support to the Deobandi madaris in Pakistan.

Till the creation of Pakistan in 1947, most of the Deobandi madaris were established in those areas which were to become part of India after independence. During first 35 years of the DMM, almost 50 madaris were established; out of which only four were set up in areas which are now part of Pakistan (Metcalf, 1982, p. 134). There is no exact figure available about the number of Deobandi madaris in those areas at the time of partition; however, Hafiz Nazar Ahmed (1960) has stated that there were 134 madaris of all denominations just before partition. At that time, several small Deobandi madaris were operating in big cities like Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar (Metcalf, 1982, p.134). In the year 1947, some important Deobandi madaris were established including Jamia Ashrafia of Lahore, Khairul Madaris of Multan, Jamia Rasheedia of Sahiwal, Darul Ulum Al-Islamia of Hyderabad and Darul Ulum Haqqania of Akora Khatak (Shahjahanpuri, 2004, p.129) as shown in Figure 1.1 below. This trend continued under the leadership of JUI. By 1960, a total of 464 madaris had been established in Pakistan,

out of which at least 50% can be estimated to be Deobandi in the light of the later trend of share of different denominations of madaris.

Figure 1.1 Cities of (West) Pakistan where Deobandi Madaris were established in the year 1947

Since Pakistan is a predominantly Sunni country, most of the madaris belong to that sect. Less than 2% madaris represent the Shia sect. Within the Sunnis, there are three sub-sects (Deobandi, Barelwi and Ahle Hadith), which have their own brands of madaris. Apart from that, the *Jamaat-e-Islami* has also its own madaris, which promote a non-sectarian approach. Each of these denominations has its own umbrella organization or central board as shown in Figure 1.2.

Table 1.1 Umbrella Organizations of Madaris in Pakistan

Name of the Sect/Sub-Sect	Name of Umbrella Organization	Date Established
Deobandi	*Wifaqul Madaris Al-Arabiyya*	1959
Barelwi	*Tanzeemul Madaris*	1959
Ahle Hadith	*Wifaqul Madaris Al-Salfia*	1955
Jamaat-e-Islami	*Rabtat ul Madaris Al-Islamia*	1983
Shia	*Wifaqul Madaris Shia*	1959

Source: Khalid (2002, p.143)

Although the number of madaris in Pakistan has always been on the rise, there was a remarkable increase in that number during the 1980s in the wake of Afghan resistance against the Soviet occupation. Mostly Deobandi madaris benefitted from this increase and since then their share has always been more than 60% of the total madaris. The remarkable rise of madaris in Pakistan continued even after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. During the period 1988-2002, more than 5,000 new Deobandi madaris were established reflecting an increase of almost 300%. Figure 1.3 shows denomination-wise increase in the number of madaris in Pakistan.

Table 1.2 Increase in Number of Madaris in Pakistan

Denomination/Sect	Number of *Madaris*		Increase 1988-2000 (%)
	1988	2002	
Deobandi	1,779	7,000	294
Barelwi	717	1,585	121
Ahle Hadith	161	376	134
Jamaat-e-Islami/Others	97	500	415
Shia	47	419	792

According to latest available figures, there were about 30-35 thousand madaris in Pakistan in 2009 (Akbar, 2010, p.147). Out of these, 60-70% belonged to Deobandi sect while 20-25% to Barelwi and 2-3% to Ahle Hadith sects. About 3% madaris belonged to *Jamaat-e-Islami* and the share of Shia madaris was less than 2%. In 2014, the website of the umbrella organization of the DMM, *Wifaqul Madaris Al-Arabiyya* (WMA), claimed to have an affiliation of 17,687 madaris with an enrolment of about 2.2 million. More than one third of these madaris only provided initial or primary level education, which focused mostly on reading and memorizing of the Quran. WMA is declared to be an educational and non-political organization whose aims and objectives include: developing and updating curriculum for affiliated madaris; holding examinations and issuing certificates and degrees; training the teachers; and taking effective measures to protect Deobandi madaris.

As regards the madaris curriculum, Darul Ulum at Deoband originally scheduled a course of ten years which was later reduced to six years (Metcalf, 1982, p.100). The school taught basically the *Dars-e-Nizami*- the madaris curriculum devised by Farangi

Mahall school of thought in Lucknow. However, the Deobandis reduced the Farangi Mahall"s emphasis on rational studies (*ma'qulat*) and offered six Hadith books in line with Shah Waliullah"s tradition.

Although all denominations of madaris in Pakistan call their Bachelor level course as *Dars-e-Nizami*, there is some difference in terms of recommended books as well as interpretations of the texts. Even within the same denomination, madaris do not strictly follow a standardized curriculum. Notwithstanding such variations, the typical curriculum of Pakistani madaris spans eight years and holds some common elements as shown in Figure 1.4.

Table 1.3 Overview of Curriculum of Madaris in Pakistan

Year 1	Biography of the Prophet (*Seerat*), Conjugation-Grammar (*Sarf*), Syntax (*Nahw*), Arabic Literature, Chirography (*Khush-Navisi*), Chant illation (*Tajvid*)
Year 2	Conjugation-Grammar, Syntax, Arabic Literature, Jurisprudence (*Fiqh*), Logic, Chirography, Chant illation
Year 3	Quranic Exegesis, Jurisprudence, Syntax, Arabic Literature, Hadith, Logic, Islamic Brotherhood, Chant illation, External Study (Tareekh-e-Millat and Khilafat-e-Rashida Indian and Islamic movements)
Year 4	Quranic Exegesis, Jurisprudence, Principles of Jurisprudence, Rhetoric, Hadith, Logic, History, Chantillation, Modern Sciences (Sciences of cities of Arabia, Geography of the Arab Peninsula and other Islamic countries)
Year 5	Quranic Exegesis, Jurisprudence, Principles of Jurisprudence, Rhetoric, Beliefs (*Aqa'id*), Logic, Arabic Literature, Chant illation, External Study (History of Indian Kings)
Year 6	Interpretation of the Quran, Jurisprudence, Principles of Interpretation & Jurisprudence, Arabic Literature, Philosophy, Chant illation, Study of Prophet"s Traditions
Year 7	Sayings of the Prophet, Jurisprudence, Beliefs, Responsibility (Fara'iz), Chant illation, External Study (Urdu texts)
Year 8	Ten books by various authors focusing on the sayings of the Prophet

The above-mentioned courses covered in *Dars-e-Nizami* syllabus are taught after the enrolled student has passed the primary level education from a *maktab* or a mainstream school. Several madrassah boards have included in their curricula some „secular‟ subjects in addition to *Dars-e-Nizami* as shall be discussed in Chapter 5.

The eight year course of *Dars-e-Nizami* is equivalent to a bachelor‟s degree called *Shahdatul Aliya*. After this, a two-year post-graduate degree of *Shahdatul Alamiya* is offered in bigger madaris. A few madaris even offer studies beyond this level which is called *Takhassus* or specialization. A comparison of the levels of madaris education with those of the mainstream education system is given in Figure 1.5.

Table 1.4 Comparisons of Degrees of Madaris and Mainstream Education

Level in Madaris	Duration	Madrassah *Sanad* (Diploma)	Equivalence to Mainstream Certificate
Ibtadaiya (*Naazra/Tajvid*)	4-5 Yrs	*Shahadatul Tahfizul Quran*	Primary/5th Grade
Mutawassata	2-3 Yrs	*Shahadatul Mutwassat*	Middle/8th Grade
Sanviya Aama	2 Yrs	*Shahadatul Sanviya Aama*	Matric/10th grade
Sanviya Khasa	2 Yrs	*Shahadatul Sanviya Khasa*	Intermediate/F.A
Aliya	2 Yrs	*Shahadatul Aliya*	Bachelors
Aalmiya	2 Yrs	*Shahadatul Alamiya*	Masters

Source: Fair, 2009, p.52

Coming back to the sectarian divide, there is at least one political group or party in Pakistan to represent and propagate each of the above-mentioned denominations in the political arena. The Shia sect is represented by groups like *Majlis-e-Wahdat-e-Muslimeen* (MWM), Islami Tehreek Pakistan and Hazara Democratic Party. Barelwi political groups include *Sunni Tehreek, Jamiat Ulama-e-Pakistan* or JUP (Noorani), JUP (*Sawad-e-Azam*) and *Sunni Ittehad Council*. *Jamaat-e-Islami* is more of a political party than a sect. Deobandis are active in politics through *Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam* (JUI) and *Ahle Sunnat wal Jamaat* (ASWJ). Ahle Hadith sect is represented by *Jamiat Ahle*

Hadith, which is further divided into two sub-groups. JUI and *Jamaat-e-Islami* are the most active religio-political parties among these groups. JUI is further divided into three factions: major faction is called JUI (F) headed by Maulana Fazul Rehman, while minor factions are JUI (*Nazariyati*) under Maulana Asmatullah and JUI (S) under Maulana Samiul Haq, who also runs Darul Ulum Haqqania, the alma mater of several Afghan Taliban leaders. The politics of Deobandi groups is the subject of Chapter 5.

It is pertinent to add here that the DMM in Pakistan kept alive the original spirit of Darul Ulum Deoband by focusing on „practical tradition" of Shah Waliullah"s movement regarding the need for an Islamic state as well as reform of customs and practices of the Muslims. Further, the links of the DMM with Afghanistan since 1979 are also reminiscent of the approach of Waliullah and his followers. However, the DMM in Pakistan seems to have ignored the intellectual tradition of Waliullah. Even on the „practical tradition", the DMM has shown signs of a marked decline in the sense that opposition of prevailing practices of the Muslim society has gradually intensified to the extent of intolerance and violent reaction against the followers of such practices. In that sense, the DMM has pitched itself against the mainstream Muslim society which mostly follows the traditional folk Islam long preached by *sufi* saints of the subcontinent.

Apart from condemning several customs and practices of folk Islam in Pakistan, the DMM"s approach towards Shia Islam has also moved from radical to fanatic. This extremist approach has led to the rise of several sectarian organizations, which have been supported directly or indirectly by the DMM. This extremist trend in the DMM has been the direct outcome of its involvement in Afghan „jihad" against the Soviets as well as its subsequent links with the Taliban who also followed Deobandi Islam. In fact, many Taliban leaders studied in the Deobandi madaris established by the DMM in the Pak-Afghan border areas to cater to the children of millions of Afghan refugees. Besides that, many Deobandi madaris sent their Pakistani students to Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban (Rashid, 2008, pp.91-92) with the connivance of Pakistan"s military intelligence agencies who helped set up military training camps on the Pak-Afghan border to train madrassah students and other volunteers who were to take part in „jihad".

The Afghanistan connection gave the DMM access to money, weapons and military training. Owing to this newly-acquired strength, some sections of the DMM decided to put their radical ideas into practice through the use of force. The rise of many extremist sectarian Deobandi parties like *Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan* (SSP) and *Lashkar-e-Jhangwi* (LeJ) can be explained in this backdrop. At first, these sub-groups of the DMM asked for declaration of Shias as non-Muslims and later physically attacked the latter as shall be explained in Chapter 5.

During the last decade, Deobandi extremist organizations have been alleged to be involved in the attacks on major *sufi* shrines in Pakistan. These shrines are visited daily by thousands of devotees who pay homage to the saints through various rituals which are considered as *shirk* by DMM *ulama*. Some Deobandi sectarian organizations have also joined hands with *Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan* (TTP), an extremist organization, which is largely a Deobandi outfit. TTP was established in 2007 by two dozen tribal militias and other groups from Punjab and Kashmir with the aim to take over Pakistan and turn it into a *Shariah* state ruled by them (Rashid, 2010, p.239). Details are given in Chapter 5.

1.3   Theoretical Context of the Thesis

In modern times, there have been many Islamic movements that resulted in the wake of the decline of Muslim states. The earliest among these movements was that of Ibn Abdul Wahhab (1703-1792) and the currently best known is the one culminating in the Iranian revolution of 1979 (Metcalf, 1982, p.3). There is no single convenient rubric under which these movements could be placed. Depending on what has been seen as central, these have been called movements of primary resistance, social reform, religious syncretism, nationalism, modernization and even reaction and rebellion (Metcalf, 1982, p.3). Several Islamic movements have also been explained through the theories of social movement.

Study of religious movements from the perspective of „social movement theory" has been a recent phenomenon. Specialists in the fields of religious and social movements have, more often than not, failed to recognize the common grounds in which the two types of movements are rooted, opting instead to address different problems and formulate separate paradigms (Hannigan, 1991). Despite the fact that the two commanding figures in modern sociology, Durkheim and Weber, situated religion

within the wider study of social change, there has long been an ideological opposition to the inclusion of religious movements as a legitimate topic for study within the field of social movements. According to this view, religion is seen as the pillar of the status quo, and religious movements are treated as withdrawals from, rather than encounters with, social change. Taking lead from Karl Marx's well known maxim about religion being the „opiate of the masses", Adorno (1974) supported the view that religion is a „false" alternative to collective political action. More contemporary attempts by Turner and Killian (1972), Smelser (1962) as well as Rose (1982, p.17) to classify social movements have also treated the religious movements separately while relegating the latter to a marginal form (Hannigan, 1991).

In recent decades, a theoretical renaissance has been occurring to identify much in common between the social and religious movements both structurally and ideologically. According to Hannigan (1991), social movement theorists have been exploring a variety of new approaches that seek to reconcile traditional, resource mobilization and action-oriented paradigms so as to explain more fully how and why social movements arise (Cohen, 1985). At the same time, religious movements have also opened up to several promising re-conceptualizations, notably those that view religious movements primarily as sources of personal empowerment (Beckford, 1983) and those that treat contemporary religious movements as part of a more extensive world order (Wuthnow,1982) or „globalization" process (Robertson, 1989). However, this new synthesis between religious and social movements is mostly rooted in and orientated towards the highly differentiated, technologically advanced, and politically open societies of the west, a fact that undermines its ability to account adequately for the dynamics of social activisms in the societies of the global South especially in Muslim countries. According to Bayat (2005), it is still debatable how far the prevailing social movement theories are able to account for the complexities of socio-religious movements in contemporary Muslim societies.

As mentioned above, Islamic movements had been excluded, until recently, from the mode of inquiry developed by social movement theorists in the west. The scholars who have lately attempted to bring Islamic activism into the realm of „social movement theory" often present the contemporary Islamic movements as highly homogenous and coherent social units which are to be identified by the discourse of their ideologues. Beyond the perspectives of the ideologues, there are two types of interpretations that

have attempted to explain the spread of Islamic activism in modern times. The first type focuses on the „modernist" interpretations, which portray Islamism as reactive movements carried by traditional people, the intellectuals and the urban poor, against western-style modernization. These movements are said to be anti-democratic and regressive by character. The idea of „clash of civilizations", proposed by Bernard Lewis and popularized by Samuel Huntington, manifests the framework within which the „anti-modern" character of such movements in their encounter with the western modernity is assessed. The second type of interpretation views Islamic movements as the manifestation of, and a reaction to, post-modernity. In this framework these movements represent a quest for difference, cultural autonomy, alternative polity and morality versus the universalizing secular modernity (Bayat, 2005).

There seems to be a good deal of plausibility in such representations, which offered important vantage points from which to view and interpret the movements of Maulana Maududi in Pakistan, Syed Qutb in Egypt, Ayatollah Khomeini and Ali Shariati in Iran and Abdul Salaam Yassin in Morcco. However, much of the research on social movement dynamics has been presented almost entirely in terms of the effect the external factors on a social movement, notably the structure of political opportunity whereas the relevant civil societies, behaviour, attitudes, cultural symbols and value systems have mostly been ignored (Bayat, 2005). Similarly, there is a strong tendency in the dominant interpretations to deduce the character of Islamist movements from „Islam", which they often regard as a fixed and unique doctrine linked to the idea of a unitary Muslim *umma*. This view, in a sense, ignores the influence of national cultures on the perception and practice of Islam across different national boundaries despite the fact that by now it has been established that there is not one but many Islams (Bayat, 2005).

Metcalf (1982, p.5) has also highlighted the above-mentioned limitations by stating that Islamic movements in modern times have differed in their approach and outlook, depending on the particular cultural and political constraints within which the Muslims of a concerned region have found themselves. However, the traditional trend in studying the Islamic movements has taken a position whereby the vitality and creativity in Islam is a high cultural phenomenon limited to the classical age and found in the Middle East. In this regard, the DMM has not been an exception as discussed in the following sub-section.

1.3.1 DMM and Social Movements

As far as Indian subcontinent is concerned, it had more than its share of the Islamic movements. That is why Albert Hourani declared 18th century to be an „Indian century" of Islam. One reason behind the spread of Islamic movements in South Asia may be the extreme form in which the political loss took place when the Mughal Empire disappeared. A second reason surely is the particular form of colonial control established by the British, whose interests sustained the old elites and simultaneously strengthened communal cleavages as well as dissemination of high forms of Hindu and Muslim culture. In dramatic contrast to this, the French in colonial North Africa co-opted the old religious elites while undermining the autonomy and vitality of traditional religious institutions (Metcalf, 1982, pp.7-8).

Islamic movements in South Asia were mainly the result of three responses to the weakening of Muslim rule and the ensuing political instability during the 18th century (Metcalf, 1982, pp.8-9). One response came from the *ulama* of the imperial capital of Delhi under the leadership of Shah Waliullah and his family. This movement later gave birth to Deobandi and Ahle Hadith movements in 19th century. Another response came from the *ulama* of Farangi Mahall tradition in Lucknow, who, not unlike the Delhi *ulama*, aimed to preserve religious learning and maintain the old relationship between the ruler and the scholar. The third response was from the shrine-based *sufis* and *pirs* of the Punjab and Sindh. Originally led by the politically motivated landlord *pirs*, this response became in 19th century the Barelwi movement, which was mainly concerned with preserving the popular values and practices of folk Islam by opposing the ideas of Deobandi and Ahle Hadith movements.

As regards the DMM, it has been interpreted differently by different scholars. This diversity of opinion can be identified even within the writings of the Deobandi scholars. The original constitution of the madrassah at Deoband included in its objectives the teaching of Islamic education as well as propagation and protection of Islam while simultaneously avoiding the influence of colonial government (Rizwi, 2005, vol.i, p.142). The official history of the Darul Ulum Deoband describes that the movement was launched for the survival and protection of religious and collective life of Muslims in the subcontinent (Rizwi, 2005, vol.i, p.156). According to Muhammad Yaqub, the first principal of the Darul Ulum Deoband, „this madrassah was set up for the revival of Islamic knowledge...[at a time] when it appeared as if Islamic studies

would vanish" (Rizwi, 2005, vol.i, p.143). Deobandi scholars have not only given their movement the credit for revival and renaissance of Islam in India but also for freedom of India from the British rule (Rizwi, 2005, vol.i, pp.506-15).

Non-Deobandi scholars have mostly interpreted the DMM from „modernist" perspectives. Metcalf (1982) has termed the DMM as an Islamic reform and revival movement, which was launched in the wake of rise of British rule and Christian missionaries on the one hand and Hindu fundamentalist movements on the other. Murphy (2013, p.25) has also regarded the DMM as a revivalist and reformist movement that espoused „a more literal and markedly austere interpretation of Islam". Arshad (2005, p.29) thinks that the DMM, like Aligarh educational movement, was the product of a defeatist mindset in the post-Mutiny period and its founders stressed only on saving the religion and religious capital of the Indian Muslims. Ahmed Rashid (2008, p.88) is of the view that the Deobandis aimed to train a new generation of learned Muslims who would revive Islamic values based on intellectual learning, spiritual experience, *Shariah* law and *Tariqah* (spiritual path).

Saleem Ali (2009, p.22) has stated two goals of the DMM: „(i) providing a more puritanical interpretation of Islam that would eschew the accretion of other diluting influences such as ritual visits to shrine (ii) to organize a religious educational movement against British occupation". However, Ali (2009, p.84) has simultaneously added that presently madaris establishment in Pakistan is quite conscious of being an inertial institution and acting as a „cultural conservatory". Riaz (2008, p.73) has observed that the objective of the DMM was to correct the defective state of Islam and Muslim life in India. This correction was to begin with the revival of faith and piety.

According to Riaz, the Deobandis were „scripturalists" in their orientation and considered that Indian Muslims were facing threats not only from colonial rulers but also from within the community. The latter threat included: modernist efforts of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan of Aligarh; practices of folk Islam including *sufi* tradition; and Shias. Jonathan Berkey (2007, p.49) has also termed the Deoband model as „scripturalist" as it focuses on the Quran and Hadith and promotes „the idea that through them [Quran and Hadith] rather than through the extensive medieval apparatus of commentary, one could discern the precise parameters" of the Muslim community and Islam. Berkey has also pointed out that by jettisoning much of the informal pattern of

the traditional Muslim education, the DMM model (inspired by fixed British education model) undermined the highly personalized and poly-vocal tradition of transmitting religious knowledge, which had encouraged flexibility and creativity in medieval Islamic educational and intellectual life.

Faruqi (1963, pp.24-25) has linked the DMM to the safeguarding of Indian Muslim"s religion and culture, which were threatened by the British official educational system. Khalid (2002) has also described the DMM as a religious educational movement, which was launched in reaction to British education system and as a result of that it is still averse to modern education. On the other hand, Rahman and Bukhari (2006) are of the view that madaris in Pakistan have never been considered as part of the educational system and the state has always treated them as religious or social institutions.

Zaman (2007, pp.61-82) has explained the DMM phenomenon in the backdrop of madrassah learning as a tradition as well as an instrument for expanding *ulama'*s sphere of influence. Alam (2003) has pointed out how the DMM model served the *ulama* as „a tool for hegemony and control over the masses" through which they could transform the ordinary Muslims into pious „personally responsible Muslims". According to Robinson (1971, p.273-4), the DMM was launched to revive and strengthen the Islamic Sciences with an emphasis on strict adherence to S*hariah*. Smith (1943, p.320) stated that DMM"s „aim is to resuscitate classical Islam to rid the Muslims of theological corruptions, the ritual degradations and the material exploitation to which they have fallen prey since the British occupation".

Hussain (2007, p.78) has termed the Deobandis as „akin to Saudi Wahhabis". According to him, the founders of the DMM drew their spiritual guidance from Waliullah and the movement, which originally sought to revive puritan Islam, later became radicalized after the call for „jihad" against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (Hussain, 2007, p.64). Barelwi movement, which came into being as a reaction to the Deobandis, has also termed the latter as Wahhabis for their attack on the Barelwi-supported „meditational, custom-laden Islam closely tied to the intercession of the *pirs* (saints) of the shrines, that was characteristic of the area[subcontinent]" (Metcalf, 1982, p.296).

Rashid (2002, pp.121-2), though defining Deobandism and Wahhabism separately, has found some commonality between the two in terms of their „tradition, which sees the seizure of power only as a way to impose *Shariah* and transform social behaviour‟. This Deobandi-Wahhabi tradition is different from the „Ikhwan-based movements, which seek to [first] seize state power and then transform each country into an Islamic political state‟. According to Rashid (2002, p.44), Deobandism, which helped radicalize Islamic thought in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia, is characterized by three features: abhorring Shia Islam; restricting role of women in society; and reintroducing jihad in the latter half of the 20th century.

To sum it up, the DMM has been explained mainly from two perspectives. First is the political interpretation, which focuses on the efforts of the DMM to establish an Islamic state and implement *Shariah*. The second perspective is based on „interiorization‟ thesis, which sees the DMM as a religious reform movement more concerned with perfection of faith and moral development of ordinary Muslims, and less with assertion of political agenda (Pemberton, 2009). Most of the literature on DMM has focused on the first interpretation. Barbara Metcalf‟s 1982 work seems to have addressed the second perspective by stating that the „interiorization‟ process after the disastrous 1857 uprising made the *ulama* to undertake „an inward turn focusing on cultivating a perfect Islamic life and practice instead of involving themselves with the external exigencies of British Rule and impending modernity‟(Naeem, 2009). Zaman (2003) has critiqued Metcalf‟s views stressing the continuing participation of *ulama* in the public sphere as well as their engagement with the modern world. However, Naeem (2009) has found a middle ground by pointing out that Metcalf‟s work focused on the early period of the DMM (1866-1900) while Zaman‟s major focus has been the period after 1900. Naeem (2009) has also hinted that Metcalf‟s thesis does not exclude the political and public activities of the DMM and as such it is not a pure „interiorization‟ thesis. In that sense, there appears to be a research gap with respect to interpretation of the DMM from a purely sociological rather than a political perspective. This thesis aims to fill that gap by focusing on the socio-cultural milieu of the DMM.

Keeping in view the above discussion about the DMM as well as the limitations regarding the study of Islamic movements in the context of „social movement theory‟, one may argue that the DMM is not an archetypal social movement. According to Gecas (20028), a social movement is „typically identified as representing and

advocating one or a few specific values, such as equal rights, pro-choice, pro-environment". The DMM, on the other hand, was apparently launched to protect the whole Islamic value system. As a matter of fact, the goals of the DMM, unlike a social movement, were never defined clearly. It is also interesting to note that the phenomena involved in social movements generally do not reflect an alternative culture in their purview (Westhues, 1972, p.22). On the other hand, one of the major objectives of the DMM was to preserve and purify the culture of Indian Muslims.

Furthermore, the history of the DMM does not fit in with the well-recognized four stages of a typical social movement lifecycle i.e. Emergence; Coalescence; Bureaucratization; and Decline or Institutionalization. Unbefitting the emergence stage, the origin of the DMM did not owe to „widespread discontent" (Hopper, 1950) against some policies or social values. Rather, the DMM was a continuation of an earlier movement of Shah Waliullah as reported by both the Deobandi (Sindhi, 2008, p.108; Rizwi, 2005, vol.i, p.27; Shahjahanpuri, 2004, p.120; Gilani, n.d. vol.i, p.254) and non-Deobandi (Hussain, 2007, p.78; Metcalf, 1982, pp.71-72; Faruqi, 1963, pp.24-5; Smith, 1943, p.320) writers. Similarly, the DMM did not pass through the coalescence stage, which is characterized by mass demonstrations to express the public discontent (Christiansen, 2009). On the contrary, DMM preferred to isolate itself from the mainstream society by initially restricting itself behind the walls of its madaris through an inward-looking approach (Metcalf, 1982, pp.85-86). As regards the bureaucratization, the DMM did introduce this concept at the level of individual madaris (Metcalf (1978) but as a movement its madaris continued to enjoy a lot of independence and autonomy from the Darul Ulum at Deoband due to lack of any centralized bureaucratic system. This situation still continues in Pakistan where Deobandi madaris are loosely affiliated with their umbrella board mostly for conducting the examinations. Similarly, various Deobandi political and sectarian groups operate independently. The fourth stage of social movement lifecycle, it is marked by repression, co-optation, success and failure (Miller, 1999). These features can also not be consistently applied to interpret the DMM in terms of its decline or institutionalization.

As regards four major theories of social movement i.e. collective behaviour, resource mobilisation, new social movement and action-identity approaches, these concepts can also not be employed to understand and explain the DMM. Each of these theories was

developed for the analysis of a quite distinct kind of social movement in a particular social and political context. For example, the `collective behaviour' approach has been used to interpret social movements of totalitarian type like fascist and communist movements. The `resource mobilisation' approach is mainly employed for the analysis of movements for citizen rights of the 1960s and 1970s and special interest groups like feminist, anti-nuclear and other movements of semi-integrated minorities. The ‚action-identity' approach is generally associated with analysis of social and political movements of late 1960s and 1970s e.g. anti-nuclear mobilisations and urban protests. The `new social movements' approach analyses movements of the 1970s and 1980s like ecological, anti-nuclear and feminism (Mamay, 1991). The earlier-described genesis and evolution of the DMM are not in keeping with these theories of social movement.

1.3.2 DMM and Countercultural Context

Despite the above-mentioned incongruence between the DMM and a typical social movement, the former still shares a few features with the latter. Taking lead from the definition by De la Porta & Diani (2006, p.20), DMM is ‚involved in conflictual relations with clearly identified opponents" (i.e. followers of folk Islam); is linked by informal network (of madaris); and holds a collective identity. However, it is interesting to note that the DMM does not openly declare its conflict with folk Islam and prefers to indirectly criticize the beliefs and practices of the mainstream Muslim society in Pakistan. Further, the madaris under this movement are practically independent and autonomous in their operations. As such, DMM at the maximum can be considered a loose form of social movement. According to Scott (1990, cited in Haenfler, 2004), social movements exist on a continuum of structure, with fully bureaucratized, formal organizations on the one extreme and very diffuse movements on the other. Therefore, the DMM can at best be termed as a diffuse social movement, if at all.

However, it is quite difficult to develop a conceptual framework to study the DMM as a diffuse movement because ‚theoretical development of examples at the diffuse extreme is less common [and the] precise role of collective identity in diffuse, culture-based movements has yet to be fully explained" (Haenfler, 2004). In this regard, one may refer to the literature that explains social movements from countercultural perspective. The leading contributors to such literature on counterculture are Milton Yinger and Kenneth Westhues. Yinger (1960) defined the concept of counterculture as a

„normative system of a group which contains, as a primary element, a theme of conflict with the values of the total society". Later on, Yinger (1982, p.3) further refined the concept and defined counterculture „as a set of norms and values of a group that sharply contradict the dominant norms and values of the society of which that group is a part". It is pertinent to add here that the DMM has also been involved in condemning the social and cultural norms of the Muslims of the subcontinent. Further, the Deobandi madaris in Pakistan fit more closely with Westhues" depiction of a counterculture, which he described as „a social island existing in society"s sea" (1972, p.20).

In view of the above considerations, this thesis aims to study the DMM in a countercultural context in order to understand it at a deeper level. Without discounting the political role as well as impact of the DMM, this thesis shall explore whether or not the countercultural tendencies have been manifested in the DMM, and if yes, then the extent to which this is the case. As such, this research aims to add a new perspective to the study of Islamic movement in general and the DMM in particular.

1.3.3 What is a Counterculture?

The term counterculture is generally considered to be coined by Theodore Roszak who used it to illuminate the 1960s phenomenon of „youthful dissent", which included „the mind-blown bohemianism of the beats and hippies… [and]…the hard-headed political activism of the student New Left" (1968, p.56). Sweeping through the continental Europe and the United States, this youth movement was marked by rejection of the model of both the socialist as well as capitalist societies and search for new forms of social organization (Klineberg et al, 1979). Roszak found the rising culture of the youth „so radically disaffiliated from the mainstream assumptions of our society" that he referred that phenomenon as a „counterculture" (1968, p.42). According to Roszak, the revolt of the youth was there to counter the technocracy, which he defined as „the society in which those who govern, justify themselves by appeal to technical experts who, in turn, justify themselves by appeal to scientific forms of knowledge" (1968, p.8). Against the backdrop of the youth movement, Musgrove has further suggested that countercultures are linked to „steep population growth and intensive migration associated with great economic transformations" (1974, p.196).

Despite the fact that Roszak (1968) is generally given the credit for coining the term counterculture, the concept was actually introduced quite earlier by Milton Yinger

(1960), at a time prior to the youth movement. The origin of the word „counterculture"
can be traced back to Parsons (1951, p.522) who mentioned it as a flippant substitute
for subculture. But the term counterculture later became so closely associated with the
phenomenon of youth dissent in 1960s that it almost became a synonym for that
movement. That emergence of the youth revolt was so forceful, and received so much
attention from the western media and academia, that the concept of counterculture,
which was intently attached to this revolt, lost an independent interpretation. Therefore,
as the youth movement gradually declined in 1970s, the term counterculture lost its
significance.

This marginalization of the concept of counterculture was so remarkable that it has
even been suggested to be nothing more than an early explanation of a disorganized
phenomenon (Jonsson, 1981, p.178). For instance, Bash (1972) was so critical that he
declared that counterculture was „neither a theoretical nor an empirical term but rather
an interpretation of an observable" (Jonsson, 1981, p.179). Similarly, Buchdahl (1977)
suggested that the term counterculture was „merely a sign that was applied over-hastily
to a complex and continuing process of cultural change".

Since the term „counterculture" became associated primarily with the youth movement
of the 1960s, scholars endeavoured to interpret the concept in that narrow context as the
movement progressed, evolved and declined. Later on, the concept became even more
marginalized when other terms were introduced in the 1970s to explicate the changes in
the phenomenon of the youth movement especially with respect to its relationship with
the mainstream society. Those terms included: utopian community, deviant adaptation,
subculture, Aquarian Frontier, New Age, soft revolution and Human Potential
Movement (Jonsson, 1981, pp.179-80). Charles Reich (1970, p.217) has called it
„Consciousness III" which has led to „Greening of America" (1970, p.349). He has
suggested that Consciousness I was marked by individualism and capitalism while
Consciousness II was represented by the rise of the corporate state after World War II.
With the introduction of so many terms in the literature on youth movement, the
independent concept of counterculture gradually became more indistinct.

Although there is a lot of literature available on counterculture, almost all of that can be
termed as „period piece" in the sense that it has been written against the backdrop of
youth culture in the 1960s. Westhues (1972, p.8) has noted that most of the literature on

counterculture „is straightforward description of the contemporary youth scene, and the reader is left by default with the impression that this is the only counterculture that the world has ever known". However, Milton Yinger, who introduced the concept in 1960 under the name of „contra-culture", has conducted a detailed study of different countercultures in the western world, to show that „countercultures are not simply bizarre and marginal sets of standards and activities, but important elements in the process of social change" (1982, p.ix).

By employing an historical approach, Yinger has been able to identify and explain the presence of countercultures in the fields of politics, religion and economics. In politics, Yinger (1982, pp.200-205) has discussed as countercultures the „new left" movement on the one hand and the „far right" groups like Ku Klux Klan on the other. Similarly, he has also identified in this regard several anarchist groups like the „Situationists" in France, „Kommune I" in Germany and the „Provos" in the Netherlands. Among the disadvantaged, Yinger (1982, pp. 179-184) has described several African American movements like Black Muslims, Nation of Islam and Black Panthers as countercultural. As regards the counterculture in economics, Yinger (1982, p.212) has built his argument around four themes that seemed to dominate attacks on economic institutions: concentration of economic power through control by few of the major means of production; great inequality in income distribution; materialism- overemphasis on the human value of possession; and technocracy. For Yinger, Marxism in its fullest sense contained all these four themes to qualify as an economic counterculture. Among other economic countercultures, Yinger has included „anti-technology", „no-work" or „anti-work" groups as well as protest movements against state capitalism of 1960s and 1970s.

De-modernizing movements of 1930s in Japan and Germany have also been linked to economic countercultures. While referring to numerous movements in Germany during the Hitlerian period that equated „modern" with alien, Jewish and western as opposed to traditional German folk, Yinger (1982, p.218) has pointed out that such countercultural movements occurred because Germany, like Japan, had implemented industrialization into a society that still contained many feudal qualities. It is interesting to note that Yinger (1982, p.222) has termed the emerging breed of 1970s businessmen in the U.S. as „countercultural capitalists" who attended schools for „entrepreneurs". During the last four decades, such capitalists have become part of the dominant culture and can no more be called counterculturalists. This development is just in line with Yinger's

assertion (1982, p.46) that „what is countercultural today may also be tomorrow, or it may disappear, or it may flow into the dominant cultural stream".

As for the countercultural religions, Yinger (1982, p.227) has stated that „Christianity was, at first, countercultural mainly to Judaism, from which most of its early converts as well as many of its beliefs- and much of its opposition- came. In a few generations, however, it was more drastically at odds with the Roman Empire". Within Christianity, Yinger (1982, pp.229-233) has examined Gnosticism, Church of Satan and Unification Church from the countercultural perspective. Further, some quasi-religious groups like Scientology and *est* as well as cults like Hare Krishna as well as Meher Baba and Ras Tafari movements have also been depicted as countercultural (Yinger, 1982, pp.239-247).

Apart from Yinger, Westhues (1972) has also investigated the sociology of countercultures from a broader perspective. He has described a counterculture as „a set of beliefs and values which radically reject the dominant culture of a society" (1972, pp.9-10). According to him, counterculture is represented by a „group which breaks with the mainstream order more sharply, detaches itself more completely and establishes its own relatively self-contained way of life" (Westhues 1982, p.437).

This thesis will employ Yinger's counterculture theory. Yinger states that the central questions regarding social order and change should be approached in a paradoxical manner, by looking for explanations of disorder, rather than order (1982, pp.3-4). He has formulated his theory by focusing on the disorderly side of three theories of social order. The first theory, in this regard, defines social order as the product of *reciprocity* whereby behaviour occurs in anticipation of rewards from others. The second theory posits social order as a consequence of the *power* of some to command compliance from others and the behaviour in this sense is caused by coercion. The third theory mentioned by Yinger, states that social order is a product of a mutually shared *normative system* (culture) and behaviour here occurs in harmony with values and norms to which one has been socialized (1982, p.4). The three components of „reciprocity-power-normative system" of social order provide the fundamentals for Yinger's theory.

According to Yinger (1982, p.6), individuals and groups attack a frustrating social order by protesting against the above-mentioned three components: Reform movements primarily strike at the reciprocity component and attempt to change social bargains; Rebellions mainly attack the power component and strive to change the rulers; Counterculture movements predominantly bash the normative component and focus on reorganization of culture; Revolutions hit all three components to change the whole social order. Westhues (1972, p.18), who otherwise included the power component as a target of counterculture movements, has simultaneously stated that „discontent with existing power structure…does not lead to attempts at political change…[because] in most cases, counterculture lacks the power to destroy its parent society". Further, Westhues (1972, p.11) has also highlighted the difference between reform and counterculture movements by stating that „a counterculture that would be satisfied with some modification of the wider culture is no counterculture at all".

Although a counterculture is primarily a protest against the normative values of a society, there is also an opposition at secondary level. This secondary protest hits at both the power structure and reciprocity patterns only where they get linked to normative values (Yinger, 1982, p.6). As a result of this protest by a counterculture movement, new normative systems emerge in opposition to the prevailing culture, along with the groups and individuals who are proponents and carriers of the oppositional culture. Apart from proposing this cultural-countercultural dialectic as a tool for resolving problems of analysis and interpretation, Yinger has also described the study of countercultures as a way of explaining normative aspects of social change (1982, pp.4-8). He also emphasized that if one sought to select one theme for the study of the cultural-countercultural dialect, religion would be the wisest choice (Yinger, 1982, p.226). As such, this research shall also be significant with respect to the potential impact of the DMM on the Pakistani society.

1.3.4 Boundaries of the Counterculture

A countercultural movement is a combination of behavioural and symbolic streams, which respectively represent non-conformity and criticism of society"s values. These streams are never entirely separate. Some individuals in a countercultural movement might be both the exemplars and theoreticians of the cultural inversions while others could be identified primarily either with the symbolic or the behavioural stream (Yinger, 1982, pp.23-24).

According to Yinger (1982, pp.22-23), „the term counterculture is appropriately used whenever the normative system of a group contains as a primary element, a theme of conflict with the dominant values of society, where the tendencies, needs, and perceptions of the members of that group are directly involved in the development and maintenance of its values and whenever its norms can be understood only by reference to the relationship of the group to the surrounding dominant society and its culture".

The term „values" in this definition refers to „the states and objects towards which behaviour is preferentially directed" while norms are „the culturally approved procedures and objects believed necessary to optimize the realization of values in particular sets of condition" (Yinger, 1982, p.23). As regards the conflicts, Yinger (1982, p.38) has used the term counterculture to refer to normative and value conflicts *within* a society (intra-societal), not to those *among* societies (inter-societal).

While stating that it is unlikely to „draw the boundaries around the territory of countercultures with sufficient clarity or completeness", Yinger has attempted to define some broad parameters of counterculture (1982, pp.24-39). According to him, countercultural behaviour is a form of group-supported deviation, which is non-conformist but not aberrant as such. This distinction can be understood by the fact that the non-conformist takes pride in his deviant acts and believes they are moral but the aberrant feels guilty and believes his acts are immoral or wrong. For example, illegal behaviour is not countercultural by definition when the violation is aberrant or when the violated law does not represent the prevailing norms. However, illegal behaviour becomes countercultural „if it is non-conformist, if it is accepted by a group as an expression of its normative system, and if it does not have substantial support, overt and covert, from the larger society". For instance, terrorism as a way of life is countercultural. Similarly, the legend of Robin Hood would be countercultural and so would be the participants in the civil rights movement who sought to get a cup of coffee in a „legally" segregated restaurant in the United States (Yinger, 1982, p.35).

These examples also underscore an important point: „to call something countercultural is not to applaud it or lament it" (Yinger, 1982, p.35). As far as religious movements are concerned, Yinger (1982, p.227) has emphasized that „the presence of countercultural religions is not intrinsically good or bad".

Yinger has also pointed out that „the values of a group can be moderately or extensively countercultural: a few, several, or a large number of the institutional patterns can be opposed" (1982, p.26). As such, it is not the quantity of dominant norms and values challenged by a particular group that qualify it as a counterculture. Mostly it is the mixture of countercultural elements and sometimes it is just the intensity of a few such elements that make a group countercultural. Similarly, the flow of a counterculture varies at different points of time; it is „now a torrent, now a trickle, at one time underground, at another fully visible" (Yinger, 1982, p.11). It has also been suggested by Yinger (1982, p. 36) that some countercultures may have reactionary qualities referring to a retreat to earlier values. These are blended, however, with new elements and utopian elements to produce standards sharply at odds with the dominant contemporary system of values.

1.3.5 Types of the Counterculture

Milton Yinger (1982, p.91) has identified following three types of countercultural groups. These are analytic distinctions, of course, not empirical descriptions.

i. Radical prophetic **activist** counterculture „preaches, creates or demands *new* obligations". It attacks the dominant culture and its institutional expressions.

ii. Communitarian **ascetic** counterculture „withdraws into a separated community where the new values can be lived out with minimum hindrance from an evil society". It works for the purification of values.

iii. Bohemian **mystic** counterculture is represented by „those who are searching for the truth and for themselves". It does not so much attack society as disregard it.

According to Yinger (1982, p.91), „every countercultural group tends to be a mixture; the strains and the splits they experience often result from the sharply contrasting views of the best way to realize their oppositional values". In this regard, he has given the example of the „new left" movement of 1970s that combined revolutionary (activist) and hippie (mystic) ideas. The „activist" counterculturalists of the movement later concluded that the tendency of „mystic" participants to „define political problems in terms of personal issues, often in the language of alienation, seems a terrible deflection from the basic goal of achieving a society based on new values" (Clecak, 1973 quoted in Yinger, 1982, p. 91).

Referring to different amalgams of the above-mentioned types in single countercultural movements, Yinger (1982, p.94) has observed that such „mixtures are common but unstable because of the mutually contradictory qualities of both the means seen as effective in attaining the various goals and of the goals themselves". As shall be discussed later, the DMM has also shown the rise of these three types of countercultural trends at various points of the movement's history. This thesis goes one step further by proposing a fourth type (i.e. **extremist** counterculture, which is marked by terrorist attacks on the followers of folk Islam who visit *sufi* shrines) that has emerged in the DMM during the last one decade.

1.4   Research Methodology and Approach

A counterculture is not an independent culture. It develops out of conflict with the dominant tradition or culture (Yinger, 1982, p.187). So what is then cultural about counterculture? In line with Yinger's approach, this research has focussed on culture as a blueprint of a society, a system of normative guidelines. Here, the most relevant definition of culture would be the one by Kluckhohn and Kelly (1962, p.54). According to that definition, culture is „all those historically created designs for living, explicit and implicit, rational, irrational, and non-rational, that exist at any given time as potential guides for the behaviour of men[sic]".

For this research, the culture in question is that of the Muslim society in the colonial India (1866-1947) as well as in Pakistani Muslim society (1947 to date). The counterculture for this research comprises of those norms and beliefs of the DMM, which came into sharp conflict with those of the mainstream Muslim society for the above-mentioned periods. Instead of examining the overall Muslim culture in the Indian subcontinent, this research has simply examined, through an historical approach, DMM's countercultural reversals of prevailing beliefs and practices of the Muslim society at different periods of time.

According to Yinger (1982, p.41), a counterculture is defined primarily by its reversals of the dominant norms and beliefs. He further stated that „every counterculture has unique elements that for some purposes are appropriately the focus of attention"; hence countercultures have been studied from many different perspectives (Yinger, 1982, p.11). This thesis has adopted a research approach whereby countercultural reversals in case of the DMM have been identified in the first instance and then the dominant

behaviour has been explained afterwards. This reverse approach to study such reversals as well as the „disorderly" aspects of the normative system (Yinger, 1982, p.4) is quite in keeping with the concept of the counterculture itself. This selective approach of looking only for the countercultural hues in the DMM while ignoring other aspects is in line with what American literary theorist Kenneth Burke (1897-1993) said, „a way of seeing is also a way of not seeing". In other words, this thesis mostly looks at the DMM through a countercultural lens. However, since the cultural blueprint of a society can be ambiguous and difficult to decipher (Yinger, 1982, p.31), the countercultural deviations of the DMM have partly been defined situationally and politically in this thesis.

This thesis basically addresses the following major research question:

How could Deoband Madrassah Movement be understood from a countercultural perspective?

Based on the hypothesis that there had been seeds of a counterculture in the origin of the DMM, this major question has been answered through following secondary questions.

i.   What has been the pattern of countercultural tendencies in the DMM from its origin to the partition of India (1866-1947) on the one hand, and in Pakistan since 1947, on the other?

ii.   How do the values and attitudes of the Deobandis differ from those of the mainstream Muslim society in Pakistan?

Taking lead from Yinger"s methodology to identify and measure countercultures (1982, p.44), the above-mentioned sub-questions have been researched in two stages. First stage has addressed the first sub-question through a detailed survey of the literature on the DMM from its inception in 1866 to the present day. This thesis has reviewed relevant literature both in English as well as Urdu languages. The latter also included the relevant literature written by Deobandi scholars mostly during the 20th century. This inclusion of Deobandi literature was important in the sense that it was equally valid and reliable in terms of identifying countercultural tendencies and values, because „countercultures tend to be defined, both by themselves and by others, as much by what they are set against as by their own normative system" (Yinger, 1982, p.41). This

first stage of literature review has relied on measured observations to record oppositional values and behaviour of DMM vis-à-vis prevailing practices of Muslim society. Accordingly, countercultural tendencies in the DMM have been identified at different stages in its 150-year long history with a particular emphasis on post-independence period in Pakistan. The DMM in the post-colonial India and Bangladesh has not been included in the scope of this research.

The countercultural ideas are promoted both in the social settings as well as through printed material and in today‟s world through electronic media including the cyber space. Accordingly, the second stage of research in this thesis aimed to look into these instruments of dissemination through fieldwork in Pakistan, which operated at two levels: review of Deobandi journals and interviews of students from madaris and mainstream educational institutions. The Deobandi print media was selected for review due to the fact that DMM has little presence in the electronic media, which is itself a target of DMM‟s countercultural opposition. This review focused on three Deobandi journals to identify countercultural trends in the DMM during the last two decades. The second level of fieldwork comprised of 40 semi-structured qualitative interviews of students of a Deobandi madrassah and a mainstream post-graduate college with the objective of comparing their values and attitudes.

With respect to fieldwork research, it would be relevant to add here that values are generally conflated with attitudes. But values are different in the sense that these are more abstract than attitudes (Rokeach, 1973: Hitlin and Piliavin, 2008). Values are „conceptions of the desirable‟ (Kluckhohn, 1951 cited in Wuthnow, 2008) whereas an attitude is „an organization of several beliefs around a specific object or situation‟ (Rokeach, 1973 cited in Spates, 1983). Further, values are beliefs, which transcend specific actions and situations and serve as standards and criteria to guide attitude and behaviour (Schwartz, 2006).

There is a lack of standardized methods for measuring values and attitudes. As regards measurement of values, the most systematic and influential approaches have been the Rokeach Value Survey (RVS) and Schwartz Value Survey (SVS), which respectively employ ranking and rating techniques. Rokeach (1973) developed a list of 18 instrumental (means) values and 18 terminal (ends) values while Schwartz (1994) identified 10 values, each defined in terms of its motivational goal (Hitlin and Piliavin,

2008). The instrumental values of RVS mainly focus on self-directed competence, restrictive conformity and pro-social personal concerns while terminal values are concerned with individual self-definition, positive affiliation, mature accomplishment, universal pro-social values and a life without inner and outer conflicts (Debats and Bartelds, 1996). The values included in SVS are achievement, benevolence, conformity, hedonism, power, security, self-direction, stimulation, tradition and universalism (Spini, 2003). Later on, Schwartz (2006) put forward a theory of seven cultural value orientations that form three cultural value dimensions: embeddedness versus autonomy (intellectual and affective); egalitarianism versus hierarchy; and harmony versus mastery. Despite a great deal of empirical cross-cultural support for these surveys, their value items may not be valid for a study in Pakistan, because these instruments have primarily focused on the developed countries (Hitlin and Piliavin, 2008) and hence are biased towards western values (Spini, 2003). Most of the values defined in these surveys are either not relevant for this research or they might carry a different connotation in Pakistani society. Schwartz (2006) has stated that „values whose meanings differ across cultures should not be used in cross-cultural comparison".

Therefore, this thesis has not, as such, included the values described in the above-mentioned surveys. Instead, the values of madaris have primarily been identified through the review and analysis of literature about the DMM. As regards attitudes, the fieldwork for this research mainly focused on four themes: popular customs and practices, politics, education and role of women in Pakistani society.

It may not be out of place to reiterate here that this thesis aims to point out countercultural trends in the DMM without disregarding the existing interpretations about this movement. In other words, this thesis intends to explain the history, evolution and behaviour of the DMM specifically from a countercultural standpoint. Therefore, it is not unlikely that anyone employing a different context would be tempted to disagree with the observations and findings of this thesis. However, such disagreement shall not be in conflict with this research"s overall objective to add a new perspective to the study of Islamic movements like the DMM.

2   BACKGROUND OF THE DMM: SEEDS OF A COUNTERCULTURE

'A new cultural pattern does not emerge out of nothing- the seed must already be there'.

Philip Slater in „The Pursuit of Loneliness" (1971, p.111)

This chapter establishes the case that DMM was the continuation of Shah Waliullah"s movement. It also explains that some countercultural currents were present in Waliullah"s movement, but these were overshadowed by the larger intellectual canvas of the movement. Those countercultural trends gradually became more prominent after Waliullah"s death when a „practical" rather than intellectual tradition dominated the movement. This chapter argues that the DMM was the continuation of the latter version of Waliullah"s movement.

Shah Waliullah (1703-1763) was born in Delhi four years before the death of Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb whose death is considered to mark the beginning of the end of Muslim rule in India. During the fifty years after Aurangzeb, Delhi court saw ten emperors and only four of them died natural death (Mian, 1988, p.76). As the palace intrigues weakened the central authority of the Mughal Empire, many regional power centres sprang up in India. Marathas got control of South India and later also got influence in Delhi court after their victory against the Mughals in 1736 (Mian, 1988, p.86). Rohailas set up their government in the North East of Delhi while Sikhs became strong in the North West India (Abbott, 1962). In 1737, Afghan ruler Nadir Shah attacked and looted Delhi while killing thousands of people. After that attack, North West of India and Punjab were completely cut off from the Delhi sultanate. On the eastern front, Bengal, Bihar and Orissa also severed ties with the central government of Delhi. These regions were later occupied by the British East India Company after the Plassi war in 1757 (Mian, 1957, vol.ii, pp.36-7).

The period after Aurangzeb"s death was also marked by the rise of Shia Islam in India. The last Mughal Emperor Bahadar Shah Zafar in fact introduced Shia practices at the imperial court during his rule from 1837 to 1857. Zafar, a poet and a devout follower of *sufi* Islam, presided over a Mughal empire that barely extended beyond Delhi"s Red Fort in the wake of the rise of the British East India Company. Later on, the Lucknow court of Oudh became the centre of Shia culture. The rulers and nobles of Hyderabad, Amroha and Rampur also patronized Shia Islam (Metcalf, 1982, p.41). This official patronage led to notable conversions to Shiaism throughout India. Under the rising

influence of Shia Islam, even the ordinary Sunni Muslims started to observe Shia practices such as mourning assemblies and processions in the Islamic month of Muharram to mark the martyrdom of Imam Hussain, son of Caliph Ali and grandson of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). The orthodox Sunni *ulama* opposed such Shia practices. That opposition marked the beginning of sectarian differences among the Indian Muslims during the 18th century.

Under these circumstances, Waliullah decided to launch a movement for the revival of Islam as well as Muslim rule in India. The centre for his movement was the Madrassah Rahimia in Delhi. That madrassah was founded by his father, Shah Abdur Rahim, who was himself a renowned religious scholar. Unlike the *ulama* of his time, Shah Abdur Rahim was averse to work in royal courts and he actually declined an invitation to join the Delhi court during Emperor Auranzeb's reign (Mian, 1957, vol.ii, p.25). Waliullah received religious education from his father at Madrassah Rahimia. In 1821, Waliullah became the head of that madrassah after his father's death. Later, he also went to the Hijaz for about two years to study Hadith (Mian, 1957, vol.ii, pp.4-5).

In fact, it was during his stay in the Hijaz that Waliullah developed his vision for a revivalist Islamic movement. Waliullah was a contemporary of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab of Nejd (1703-1787). Both studied in Madinah at almost the same period, had at least one teacher in common and were deeply influenced by the revivalist teachings of Ibn Taiymiyah (1263-1328), a 14th century jurist of Damascus (Alan, 2005). However, the major influence on Waliullah during his stay in the Hijaz was his teacher Shaikh Abu Tahir, who was a follower of Ibn Taiymiyah. Shaikh Abu Tahir's father Shaikh Ibrahim Kurdi was also a great scholar who not only respected teachings of Taiymiyah but was also convinced of the greatness of Spanish *sufi* mystic Ibn Arabi (1165-1240), whose ideas were emphatically refuted by Taiymiyah. Waliullah himself later followed Kurdi's approach in accepting the teachings of both Taiymiyah and Arabi (Sindhi, 2008, pp. 67) with focus more on conformity than conflict.

2.1   Shah Waliullah's Movement

After returning to India, Waliullah started his movement by influencing the Muslim political elite of Delhi on the one hand and creating a class of *ulama* on the other (Sindhi, 2008, pp.45-46). Waliullah's movement operated at three levels: intellectual, social and political. At the intellectual level, the movement focused on the renaissance

of Islam in India through the study and teaching of Quran and Hadith. Troubled by the social, political and religious disorder among the Muslims, Waliullah „sought to stem the tide of decline by consolidating and classifying the entire body of Islamic tradition" (Metcalf, 1982, p.36) through *tatbiq-* a term used to define the process of finding a common ground between apparently contradicting statements or ideas. The principle of *tatbiq* is the hallmark of Waliullah's work. For example, he favoured *ijtihad* over strict *taqlid* (following) of a particular school of *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence). *Ijtihad* is the making of a decision in *Shariah* by individual effort independent of Islamic jurisprudence whereas *taqlid* is unquestioned adherence to one of the four schools of jurisprudence or *madhabs* i.e. Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki, Hanbli. Forensically speaking, *ijtihad* is „a process of legal reasoning and hermeneutics through which the jurist-*mujtahid* derives or rationalizes law on the basis of the Quran and the *Sunnah'* (Hallaq, 2005, p.208). Waliullah suggested that the writings of the Imams of the four *madhabs* should be interpreted by the *ulama* in the light of Hadith. He believed that *manqulat* or transmitted sciences were more likely to bring people to the central teachings of Islam as opposed to *ma'qulat* or rational sciences, which he considered as a source of confusion (Metcalf, 1982, p.38).

Through his *tatbiq* approach, Waliullah aimed to end divisions and deviations among the Indian Muslims with respect to their beliefs and practices. He tried to bring some unity and reconciliation between Shia and Sunni Islam. Shias venerate Ali Ibn Abu Talib, the fourth caliph. They believe that Ali was the best among the companions of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and was the natural successor of the latter. Sunnis generally believe that first three caliphs were superior (or equal) to Ali in the order of their succession. Waliullah unsuccessfully tried to find some *tatbiq* between the two sects by stating that not three but first two caliphs were superior to the fourth (Metcalf, 1982, p.42).

Waliullah also claimed to have created a synthesis beyond even that of Al Ghazali, uniting not only reason (*aql*) and tradition (*naql*) but the gnosis (*ma'rifat*) of the *sufi* as well (Metcalf, 1982, p.43). He wanted his followers to take guidance not only from the *fiqh* and Hadith but also from *tasawwuf* or spiritual Islam. In fact, he wanted these three streams to combine in a true Islamic scholar. In one of his writings, he declared that those people are not among his followers who do not adhere to such multi-faceted scholars (Sindhi, 2002, p.200). Waliullah not only preached but even exemplified the

ideal pattern that a religious leader should be both a saint and an *alim* (scholar). He was even able to find *tatbiq* between the two opposing views in Indian *sufism*: *Wahdatul Wajud* (Unity of Being) and *Wahdatush Shahud* (Unity of Witness). *Wahdatul Wajud*, formulated by Ibn Arabi, has been defined as ontological or existential monism. This *wajudi* school of thought emphasizes the singleness of God and suggests that human spirit is a direct emanation from the Divine. This view has been opposed by the *Shahudi School* on the ground that it denies *tawhid* (Islamic monotheism) and encourages the believer to be lax in matters of *Shariah* (Metcalf, 1982, p.39).

On the other hand, *Wahdatush Shahud*, propagated by Shaikh Ahmed Sarhandi (1564-1624), has been defined as phenomenological monism. This view asserted that *Wahdatul Wajud* did not represent ultimate nature of reality, but rather was a mere perception of unity that was superseded by perceptions associated with yet higher stages of spiritual advancement. Waliullah found a common ground between these two views by arguing that *wajudi* position was not only legitimate but it also confirmed the *shahudi* position if properly understood. Although Waliullah, like his father, followed *Wahdatul Wajud*, he was not in favour of discussing such matters in public because of the risk that ordinary Muslims might be misled through such debates (Metcalf, 1982, p.39). That was part of Waliullah''s strategy to make a deliberate distinction of the *khas* (special) and the *aam* (ordinary) between the Indian Muslims. The *khas* was to include a particular class of *ulama* who followed Wailullah''s movement whereas the *aam* were the rest of the *ulama* and the ordinary Muslims.

Although the strategy of differentiating between the *khas* and the *aam* apparently contrasted with the concept of *tatbiq*, Waliullah through this delicate distinction aimed at avoiding any confusion and disunity among the overall Muslim community. Most of the Sunni *ulama* have considered this division of society into *khas* and *aam* as wise and prudent on the grounds that a man of understanding would speak to others in accordance with their capacity for understanding (Metcalf, 1982, p.42). However, by encouraging the *khas ulama* to do *ijtihad,* Waliullah''s intellectual tradition at the same time came in conflict with the prevalent practice of *taqlid* (Metcalf, 1982, p.38-9). Waliullah controlled this conflict by prescribing *taqlid* for the *aam*. Through these strategies, Waliullah managed to maintain the existing harmony and unity among the Indian Muslims despite facing some criticism for his unconventional intellectual approach (Butt, 2002, p.19).

As regards the social and political aspects of Waliullah‟s movement, these are together considered as the „practical‟ tradition, which was less prominent than the intellectual tradition of the movement. This practical tradition was mainly concerned with revival of Muslim rule in India through political and socio-cultural reforms. As regards political reforms, Waliullah wanted to have a strong central Muslim state in India. His vision was based on the hope of revival of a central Muslim state in which the *ulama* had to collaborate with the political leaders as the teachers and advisors of the latter (Metcalf, 1982, p.43). As for socio-cultural reforms, Waliullah sought reinvigoration of faith among Muslims through the true following of the practices of the Prophet and his companions. In this regard, he criticised many local customs of Muslims as *bida'* (wrongful innovation) and *shirk* (polytheism). However, he did not preach intolerance in this regard and this socio-cultural aspect of the movement was less emphasized than intellectual and political aspects.

On the political front, Waliullah also introduced a combination of *zahiri khilafat* (outer caliphate) and *batini khilafat* (inner caliphate). This was derived from the Pious Sultan theory, which in turn had been extracted from pre-Islamic Iranian tradition and proposed that the king or caliph must acknowledge *Shariah* as interpreted by the *ulama* (Hardy, 1971, pp.16-17). More recently, this theory is linked to the articulation of classic Sunni political theory by Ibn Taiymiyah about the Islamic model of legitimacy of power. This articulation, which recognized the legitimacy of first four caliphs, rejected the necessity of having a single caliphate and allowed for the existence of many emirates and sultanates provided that the ruler strictly applied the religious law while his subjects were obliged to obey the established authority except where it required disobedience to God. Despite this legitimacy to „Pious Sultans‟, the ruler could not become absolute because a basic restraint was placed upon him by *Shariah*, which provided him the divine sanction for his authority (Olesen, 1995, p.9). In practice, this legitimacy model did not in principle allow for any popular representation. Rather, it depended upon a „concordant‟ between the ruler and the *ulama* who were the chief intermediaries of the „divine sanction‟ of the former (Olesen, 1995, p.63). In line with this articulation, Waliullah thought that the outer caliphate or the ruler was to be responsible for securing order and stability while the inner caliphate of the *ulama* was supposed to guide the ruler and instruct the Muslim community.

In the troubled period of mid-18th century, which was perhaps considered by him as the end of an age, Waliullah propagated a far more activist role for the *ulama*. This was in sharp contrast to his contemporaries like Farangi Mahall *ulama* who preferred the traditional role of institutional and curricular development and compilation of mere commentaries (Metcalf, 1982, p.36). Waliullah on the other hand was very concerned with the political developments of the time and therefore tried to influence the political elite through his movement. However, he was not particularly in favour of reviving the declining Mughal Empire (Mian, 1957, vol. i, p. 26).

Waliullah was actually looking for some strong central Muslim state where his ideas could be put into practice to uplift the Muslims of India in that era of disorder and decline. He not only patronized Najibud Daulah of Rohilkhand to play some role in this regard but later also invited Ahmed Shah Abdali of Afghanistan to invade India and help strengthen Muslims of the subcontinent (Mian, 1957, vol.ii, pp.26-27). Simultaneously, Waliullah was gradually convinced that Muslim revival in India was to be brought by the Afghan rather than Indian Muslims (Sindhi, 2008, p.53).

2.2   Shah Waliullah's Legacy

Waliullah's work was mainly addressed to the religious and political elite. His ideas could be implemented by those elite only in a situation where Muslim political leadership could be restored in line with Pious Sultan theory. He expected his work to be continued and implemented by his four sons: Abdul Aziz, Rafiuddin, Abdul Qadir and Abdul Ghani. For his successors, their father's manifold legacy was based on four pillars: a sense of their importance as leaders; commitment to the study of Hadith and the Islamic Law; a model in personality and attainments; and a desire for Muslim unity (Metcalf, 1982, p.43).

However, after Waliullah's death in 1762, his successors found themselves in a situation where the decline of Muslim rule was being hastened by the rise of the British power in India. The possibility of finding a „pious sultan" in such a situation was getting even remoter. Therefore, the successors of Waliullah, under the leadership of his eldest son Abdul Aziz, had to improvise their strategy to deal with this not-so-ideal situation for upholding their mentor's legacy. This improvisation gradually changed the character of Waliullah's movement as explained in the following paragraphs.

In the absence of a central Muslim state, successors of Waliullah could not find an outer caliph or a ruler whom they could guide by choosing for themselves the role of inner caliphs. Similarly, there was a limited scope for the second responsibility of the inner caliphs i.e. instruction of the Muslim community. The decline of Muslim rule led to a marked decrease in the direct influence of *ulama* on the community through their role in the royal courts. Their indirect influence on the Muslim community through state-sponsored madaris also declined as the Mughal Empire got too preoccupied with its own survival to support such madaris in a hitherto generous manner.

In such circumstances, the successors of Waliullah adopted a peculiar approach, which allowed them to play the role of inner caliphs without having an outer caliph. Unlike most other *ulama* of late 18th century including the ones belonging to the famous Farangi Mahall tradition, *ulama* of Waliullah's movement were not ready to join the weak regional states or small kingdoms of Muslim rulers in India. Their ideal outer caliph was to be a strong sultan of a central Muslim state, which was absent at that time. So, these inner caliphs decided to utilize the institution of public *fatwa* to fill that legal void. Without any power to ensure compliance to Muslim Law, they offered directions to the faithful on social, political, economic and religious issues (Metcalf, 1982, pp.51-52).

Although Waliullah's legatees continued to look for an outer caliphate, these self-proclaimed inner caliphs decided, perhaps temporarily, to take up for themselves some role of the outer caliph by directly advising the Muslim community on social and political issues in addition to their traditional role of guiding people on personal matters. For this new role, they used the institution of public *fatawa* to directly guide the community in the absence of a central Muslim ruler. Traditionally, such *fatawa* were issued by the courts of Muslim rulers through officially appointed jurists to administer Muslim law (Metcalf, 1982, p.51).

The mass publication of such edicts through the newly available printing presses also strengthened this institution of public *fatawa*. These edicts exemplified the kind of guidance Abdul Aziz „saw as ever more important, guidance that could create a community substantially self-contained not only on matters of faith but in everyday behaviour" (Metcalf, 1982, p.52). Issuing public edicts became a major activity of Waliullah's sons and other *ulama* of post-Mughal period. Although Abdu Aziz was

trying to realize his father's dream, his approach and level of focus was different. He was in fact trying to do through the bigger Muslim community what his father had tried through the Muslim political elite (Sindhi, 2008, p.12).

For the next sixty years after the death of Waliullah, his eldest son Abdul Aziz (1746-1822) was to play the role of top inner caliph with some added burden of outer caliph with respect to directly approaching the Muslim community through thousands of his edicts. Other members of Waliullah family supported him as junior inner caliphs. This additional work of outer caliph actually transformed the original character of Waliullah,s movement. The purely intellectual role of the *ulama* or inner caliphs was gradually expanded to allow for an activist approach. This combination of intellectual and practical tradition was the most vital factor which was to define the future direction of this movement.

At the same time, Waliullah's sons tried their best to uphold the four pillars of their father's legacy i.e. leading the Muslims, promoting study of Hadith and Islamic Law, becoming role models and advancing Muslim unity. They took the religious leadership of Indian Muslims to carry forward the movement. They committed themselves to the study and teaching of Hadith and Islamic Law through their father's madrassah in Delhi. In fact, their contribution in reviving the study of Hadith in India is unprecedented. One non-Indian scholar touring different cities of the subcontinent once wrote that he did not find a single Hadith scholar who was not a student of Waliullah family, directly or indirectly (Rizwi, 2005, vol.i, p.94). In fact, Abdul Aziz, the eldest son was considered the top authority on Hadith in India. He also wrote commentary on Quran apart from issuing religious edicts for direct guidance of Muslim community in the absence of some outer caliph. His most famous *fatwa* was about declaring India as *darul harb* (abode of war) in 1803 in the wake of decline of Mughal Empire, which by that time had been mostly restricted to the Red Fort of Delhi after the rise of the British power. This *fatwa* declared that India was no more under Muslim rule. Later on, it was to be employed by Syed Ahmed and Muhammad Ismail to justify jihad against the British in India (Metcalf, 1982, pp.50-52) as discussed in next section.

As Waliullah's movement broadened its scope by including the middle class of Muslims in its ambit (Sindhi, 2008, p.57), his sons adopted a simple and plain language to convey their father's ideas to the ordinary scholars for whom it was not easy to

understand Waliullah‟s intellectual message. For example, Abdul Aziz wrote an exegesis of Quran titled *Fathul Aziz*, which was actually a source of explaining his father‟s Quranic commentary called *Fathur Rehman* (Sindhi, 2008, p.59). Similarly, his brothers Abdul Qadir and Rafiuddin translated Quran in Urdu language for less educated Muslims. This was in fact an effort to widen the audience of the message of Waliullah who had earlier translated Quran in Persian for highly educated Muslim elite. As regards the third element of Waliullah‟s legacy, his sons also successfully presented themselves as models in personality and attainments. They faithfully followed the spiritual rituals practiced by their father. Similarly, they acted upon the advice of their father to take pride in Arabic language and civilization while trying to avoid practices of Hindu culture (Sindhi, 2008, p.62). They also wrote many books for the Indian Muslims to reform their lives in the light of Waliullah‟s teachings.

On the fourth front of Waliullah‟s legacy, his sons undoubtedly kept a desire for unity among Muslims. However, some disunity was naturally expected as the scope of the movement expanded. Differences did appear on the *fatwa* declaring India as *darul harb*. Many *ulama* did not agree with Abdul Aziz‟s verdict on the ground that Indian Muslims were free to practice Islam and there was still a nominal Muslim ruler present at Delhi. Then there were disagreements on the interpretation of that *fatwa*. Although Abdul Aziz did not give any call for a war, many of his followers later used that *fatwa* to wage jihad against the British. Similarly, Shia-Sunni differences (which never died down even in Waliullah‟s time) re-emerged after Abdul Aziz wrote a book on Shia Islam titled *Tohfa-e-Athna Ashari*. Abdul Aziz declared a Shia person to be an apostate or *murtad*- one who has renounced his religion (Meeruthi, 1908, vol.i, p.166).

As regards the Sunni Islam in India, the unity among Muslims was by and large not threatened by the teachings of Waliullah‟s sons who were quite sensitive to their father‟s instruction especially with respect to maintaining a delicate balance between the *khas* and the *aam*. That was in itself a great achievement by Waliullah‟s sons who had to play the role of inner caliphs without the support of any outer caliph. However, these early successors of Waliullah, being the religious *khas*, compromised on Waliullah‟s idea of *ijtihad* by inclining towards a general *taqlid* of Hanafi *madhab*, which was originally suggested for the *aam*. Perhaps this compromise was deliberate with the intention to promote unity among Muslims through adherence to one school of thought. Another reason for this compromise could be the political uncertainty in the

absence of an outer caliph- a situation which called for preservation of the existing *Shariah* law rather than its re-interpretation through *ijtihad*.

While Waliullah's sons managed to carry forward his vision, the next generation of this family re-interpreted the movement in a manner that clearly showed a drift in his legacy. This new generation was led by Muhammad Ismail (1776-1831), grandson of Waliullah and Abdul Hayee, son-in-law of Abdul Aziz. While the earlier generation under Abdul Aziz had interpreted the revival of Islam mostly at the intellectual level, this new generation emphasized revitalization of Islam in practical form.

This radical shift actually occurred once Syed Ahmed of Rai Bareli joined Waliullah's movement and influenced the younger generation of the family. Both Muhammad Ismail and Abdul Hayee took *bay'ah* (oath of allegiance) to Syed Ahmed as their *shaikh*. That was a deviation from the family tradition in which the younger generation had to take *bay'ah* from the elders of the family. Under the charismatic influence of Syed Ahmed, the younger generation rejected the gradualist and pragmatic approach of their elder Abdul Aziz, who had hoped that scholarly guidance could transform the life of Indian Muslims (Metcalf, 1982, p.52). The new generation, on the other hand, was more focused on reforms through practical rather than intellectual endeavours. It has been observed by Gilani (n.d. vol.i , p.74) that Syed Ahmed focused on practical tradition because he believed that intellectual work had already been accomplished by Waliullah and his sons.

Syed Ahmed (1786-1831) belonged to a family of Syeds (descendants of the Prophet) in Rai Bareli, Oudh. His family was well respected throughout Oudh for piety and spiritual influence (Mian, 1957, vol.ii, p.86). He first arrived in Delhi at the age of eighteen and became a student of Abdul Qadir, Waliullah's son. Being more inclined towards spiritual than scholarly activities, he could not complete his religious education and left for Central India. There, he joined the forces of Amir Khan (1768-1836) who, alongside Maratha leader Jaswant Rao Holkar, was resisting the advance of the British power in India (Metcalf, 1982, p.53). However, when Amir Khan surrendered and was made Nawab of Tonk, Syed Ahmed who was not in favour of surrender, decided to return to Delhi in 1816 (Mian, 1957, vol.ii, p.88).

Upon his return to Delhi, Syed Ahmed quickly assumed a leadership position among some of the most respected *ulama* including those belonging to Waliullah family (Metcalf, 1982, p.54). When the members of the younger generation of that family took *bay'ah* to Syed Ahmed, they not only accepted his leadership but also expected him to later take the role of an outer caliph in-the-making. Under the influence and leadership of Syed Ahmed, both Ismail and Hayee introduced major shifts in Waliullah's movement. Abdul Aziz, an old man approaching his death, was not expected to actively resist this marked shift. However, sensing a major shift in the movement, Aziz bypassed both Ismail and Hayee while appointing his grandson Muhammad Ishaq as his successor. Ishaq was supposed to carry forward the intellectual tradition of the movement as head of the family madrassah at Delhi. Although Ishaq was made the official leader of the movement, it was the trio of Syed Ahmed, Ismail and Hayee, whose practical tradition dominated the movement after Abdul Aziz's death.

It may be noted that while Abdul Aziz introduced his father's movement to the Muslim middle class, Ismail and Hayee took a step further under Syed Ahmed's guidance to take the movement to the ordinary Muslims belonging to the lower socio-economic strata. Their practical tradition was mainly focused on popular reform of customs and practices of Muslims on the one hand and preaching jihad against the British and the Sikhs on the other. The decision of jihad was apparently inferred from Abdul Aziz's 1803 *fatwa* declaring India as *darul harb*. However, Abdul Aziz himself had never called for jihad in his *fatwa* or even otherwise. In fact, some writers have hinted that Aziz might have even opposed jihad (Metcalf, 1982, p.55). But most of the Deobandi writers believe that Abdul Aziz had approved the jihad that was launched under Syed Ahmed after the death of the former. Sindhi (2008, p. 75) thinks that although Aziz had agreed to jihad, the jihadis failed because they diverted from his exact advice to run the Islamic government through an advisory board rather than choosing an *Ameerul Momineen* (leader of the faithful), who was none other than Syed Ahmed.

Coming to the practical tradition, the concept of reforming the popular customs was in any way derived from the teachings of Waliullah who had written in *Wasaya* (plural of *wassiya*:will or bequest) about the superiority of Arabic language and customs vis-à-vis local practices derived from Hindu traditions. Although Abdul Aziz had also issued edicts on many practices like proper conduct on the tombs of saints, he refrained from exactly defining the customs which were to be followed or eradicated. Actually one

major reason why he did not preach such reforms was the fact that any such initiative could easily jeopardize the Muslim unity- one of the major pillars of his father"s legacy. Secondly, Waliullah"s advice regarding Arab and local customs was actually specific to his successors or the *khas*. But the younger generation of his family decided to go ahead with such reforms among all the Muslims of India even without getting much support from within the family.

In fact, the elders of the family sometimes refused to abandon what came to be seen suspect practices by the next generation. For example, Abdul Aziz continued to follow certain practices that were opposed by the younger generation. These practices included: determining auspicious time for doing some work; using particular health care rituals; and distributing food after offering prayer (*fatihah*) at his father"s grave (Mujeeb, 1967, pp. 508-11). Similarly, Abdul Qadir, younger son of Waliullah, allowed women in his family to follow the custom of *bibi ki sahnak* whereby they offered food in the name of Fatimah, daughter of the Prophet. The young reformers like Ismail and Ishaq used to show their disapproval by quietly moving away whenever such events were held in the family (Metcalf, 1982, p.55).

Despite their differences on some customs and practices, the relations between the two generations of Waliullah family remained mutually respectful. In fact, the older generation was generous enough to concede to a few ideas of the young reformers. For example, Abdul Qadir stopped the women of his family from practicing *bibi ki sahnak* at the insistence of Ismail. Similarly, Abdul Aziz did not criticize the idea of Ismail"s *shaikh* Syed Ahmed who had opposed the established spiritual practice of *tasawwar-e-shaikh*- meditation on the image of one"s spiritual leader (Metaclf, 1982, p.55).

Such leeway might have been given by the older generation not only to maintain unity in the family but also on the pretext that such ideas of the new generation could be tolerated as long as they were being preached among the *khas*. Outside the family, neither Abdul Aziz nor Abdul Qadir ever openly preached or even appreciated those new ideas of the younger generation that had been accepted or respected inside their homes. So it appears that for the older generation, the reforms of customs and practices which Waliullah had mentioned in his *Wassaya* were fundamentally addressed to his successors and the *khas*. The elders must have known that preaching such reforms

among the ordinary Muslims or the *aam* could destroy their father‟s fundamental philosophy of *tatbiq* and create differences and disunity among Indian Muslims.

However, the younger generation under Syed Ahmed‟s guidance was ready to compromise on the vital issue of keeping a distinction between the *khas* and the *aam*. Their priorities were different from those of their elders in the sense that they hoped to unite Muslims through revival of Muslim rule or at least creating a Muslim state where the ideas of Waliullah could be implemented in an ideal scenario. They had even found an outer caliph in the shape of Syed Ahmed who now needed a Muslim state to rule. In order to get that state, Syed Ahmed along with Ismail and Hayee campaigned among the Indian Muslims to participate in jihad against the alien British rule. In line with the classical notion of jihad, they decided to launch warfare from an independent and free Muslim area- the tribal region of the North West frontier. Since the *fatwa* declaring whole India as *darul harb* had been disputed by several *ulama*, Syed Ahmed decided to initiate jihad against the Punjab, which could be more easily declared as *darul harb* because its Sikh rulers did not pay even lip service to the weak Muslim emperor at Delhi (Metcalf, 1982, p.61-62).

As Syed Ahmed and younger generation of Waliullah apparently tried to unite Indian Muslims in the name of political revival through jihad, their practical tradition created fissures in the Muslim society through their ideas about religious and socio-cultural reforms as discussed below.

2.3   Rise of Practical Tradition in Waliullah's Movement

Under the energetic influence of Syed Ahmed, the new leadership of Waliullah movement concluded that the major reason for the decline of the Islamic rule in India was the lack of religious commitment among the Muslims. Their solution to stem this descent was to be achieved through purification and revitalization of Islam through popular reform of customs and practices. In a striking parallel to other 19th century movements, „they rejected their local "classical style" of Islam in favour of a scripturalist emphasis on the original practice of the faith‟ (Metcalf, 1982, p.56). Like the contemporary Wahhabis in Arabia, the foremost focus of Syed Ahmed‟s teachings was the centrality of *tawhid*. Muhammad Ismail stressed the paramountcy of the practice of *tawhid* in his two widely published books: *Siratul Mustaqeem* (Straight Path) and *Taqwia tul Iman* (Strengthening of the Faith). The two works stressed above

all the centrality of *tawhid* and denounced all those practices and beliefs that were held in any way to compromise that fundamental tenet of Islam (Metcalf, 1982, p.56).

The followers of Syed Ahmed argued that God alone was entitled to any worship or homage. The old tradition of showing excessive veneration and reverence to the prophets and saints was execrated. In fact, they denounced all those customs, practices and beliefs that were held in any way to compromise *tawhid*. Such practices were declared *shirk* (giving a partner to God or polytheism), which is an unpardonable sin in Islam.

This strict and uncompromising emphasis on *tawhid* was not very dissimilar to what Ibn Abdul Wahhab had preached in Arabia. In 1822, Muhammad Ismail along with Syed Ahmed visited Arabia to perform *hajj*. There, they got the opportunity to learn more about the teachings and strategy of Ibn Abdul Wahhab. It was actually on his return from Arabia that he wrote *Taqwia tul Iman*, which was inspired by Ibn Abdul Wahhab‟s book *Al-Tawhid* (Sindhi, 2008, p.70). According to Hunter (1871, p.47), Syed Ahmed became a fanatical disciple of Ibn Abdul Wahhab after returning from Arabia.

Despite accepting some influence from Ibn Abdul Wahhab, Waliullah‟s movement was otherwise quite different from the Wahhabis of Arabia. The followers of Ibn Abdul Wahhab were far more extremist and aggressive in their approach as compared to Waliullah‟s acolytes. Even on the fundamental issue of *tawhid* and *shirk*, Muhammad Ismail to some extent allowed *tawassul fid-dua*, praying to God to ask for something indirectly through the mediation of some pious person like a prophet or a saint. Wahhabis on the other hand did not allow such practice at all.

Similarly, Ismail divided *shirk* in two categories, major and minor. He proclaimed, unlike Wahhabis, that committing a minor *shirk* did not push a Muslim outside the pale of Islam (Sindhi, 2008, pp.176-77). For example, if a person called upon a saint from a far off distance by only requesting him to pray to God for the former, it would be minor *shirk* because prayer is ultimately directed to God. However, it would be still tainted with *shirk* because a third person had been called upon with the belief that the saint is capable to hear from afar (if invoked) − a quality that is attributed to God alone (Ismail, n.d. p.74). Further, Waliullah‟s movement under Syed Ahmed did not

denounce *sufism*, as did the Wahhabis. However, Syed Ahmed tried to reform *sufism* by introducing initiation in his own spiritual order called *Tariqat-e-Muhammadia* (the way of the Prophet Muhammad, PBUH), which was characterized not by internal devotions but by external obedience to *Shariah* (Metcalf, 1982, p. 57).

In short, Syed Ahmed''s rise was marked by a clear division of Waliullah''s movement into two traditions: intellectual and practical. The intellectual tradition carried by the sons of Waliullah was passed on to Muhammad Ishaq, who was to head the Madrassah Rahimia after the death of his maternal grandfather Abdul Aziz in 1824. This tradition was to focus mainly on the study of Hadith and Islamic Law. The practical tradition, on the other hand, was to be carried forward by Muhammad Ismail and Abdul Hayee under the leadership of Syed Ahmed. This tradition was further divided into political and socio-cultural categories; the former focused on jihad and establishment of an Islamic state while the latter centred on the reform of the prevalent beliefs and practices of the Indian Muslims. The wellspring of the practical tradition was the basic Islamic tenet of *tawhid* that was to be revived in a purified form among the Indian Muslims. Any threat to the purity of *tawhid* was to be opposed. The followers of Syed Ahmed identified three sources of threat to their strict version of *tawhid*: prevalent *sufism*; popular custom; and Shia doctrine and practice (Metcalf, 1982, p.57).

As mentioned earlier, Syed Ahmed, unlike Wahhabis, did not denounce *sufism* as such. Rather he was himself perceived as a *sufi shaikh* among his followers. He tried to reform some established practices of *sufism*, which were considered by him as deviations from the true *sufism*. For example, he believed that a *shaikh* cannot play the role of an intermediary between his disciples and God. He opposed the traditional discipline of repeating the name of a saint or meditating on his image (*tasawwar-e-shaikh*). He also condemned the prevalent practice of calling for help the saints and imams and angels or even naming children after them. He also criticized prostration at shrines and pilgrimages that entailed special dresses, sacrificing animals and burning lights for saints. Although he allowed simple *fatiha* ceremony at shrines or graves, fixing a particular date for such ceremonies (e.g. birth or death anniversary) was condemned (Metcalf, 1982, pp.57-58).

The primary idea behind this execration of the ceremonies connected to the dead was that one should not believe in propitiation of the saints and expectation of any favour in

return. Such propitiating was declared *shirk*. Muhammad Ismail wrote in *Taqwia tul Iman* that only purpose for the performance of any good deed for the deceased could be *isal-e-sawab* (transfer of merit) to the dead. He stated that attributing any favour to the dead was akin to putting the crown of a king on the head of a *chimar* or shoemaker (Ismail, n.d. p.58).

While condemning popular *sufi* practices, Muhammad Ismail described four categories of *shirk* with God: s*hirk* in knowledge; *shirk* in disposing; *shirk* in worship; and *shirk* in daily routine chores. According to him, *shirk* in knowledge involved calling or invoking the name of a saint or prophet for help and meditating on the image or grave of a saint with the belief that the latter gains cognizance of one"s affairs. *Shirk* in disposing meant a belief that some human being or angel has the authority to award health and sickness, poverty and abundance, victory and defeat or prosperity and distress.

Shirk in worship included travelling long distances to visit graves of saints or prophets, offering cloth sheets as a covering for the graves, making a bow or prostration before the graves, standing there with folded hands, lighting lamps on shrines, offering supplications and asking for the fulfilment of wishes on the graves and distributing specific sweet dishes in the name of particular saint e.g. *halwa* for Sheikh Abdul Haq, *maleeda* for Shah Madar and *siwayyan* for Bu Ali Qalandar. As regards *Shirk* in daily chores, it involved, among other things, invoking a vow (*mannat* or *nadhar*) to a saint or prophet with the intention of facilitating a difficult assignment, dedicating animals or farm produce in the name of anyone other than God and giving one"s children such names as Abdul Nabi (slave of the Prophet), Peer Bakhsh (granted by the saint) etc. He even considered standing up for other people with an intention to give them respectful treatment, an act of *shirk* (Ismail, n.d. pp.50-54).

Muhammad Ismail proclaimed that all the prophets and saints were averse to intercession and they never interceded on behalf of someone who adhered to the un-Islamic social customs and defied the injunctions of *Shariah*. He explained that intercession was only possible when God directs some prophet or saint to do so on behalf of only those who seek no one"s support other than God (Ismail, n.d. pp.87-88). He also forbade Muslims from showing excessive praise or veneration for Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) lest it might lead to polytheistic expressions (Ismail, n.d. p.143).

He declared, „he whose name is Muhammad or Ali, has no authority over anything"
(Ismail, n.d.cp.47).

Apart from prevailing *sufi* practices, Syed Ahmed and his followers also reprehended
many other popular customs. For example, they condemned traditional ceremonies
associated with weddings, circumcisions and burials. Syed Ahmed considered these
customs to be harmful to the spiritual as well as worldly well-being (Metcalf, 1982,
p.59). He also attacked the idea of prohibition of widow re-marriages- a practice that
was followed by many Muslim families in imitation of Hindu traditions. Muhammad
Ismail was the first to follow Syed Ahmed in this regard when he convinced his elder
sister (an ageing widow suffering from ill-health) to marry Abdul Hayee (Gilani, n.d.
vol.ii, p.9).

Apart from this prohibition of widow re-marriage, Syed Ahmed"s party rarely
attributed the deviations in Muslim practices to Hindu influence, but rather blamed
Muslims themselves (Metcalf, 1982, p.59). This is in quite contrast to what most of the
Deobandi writers of the subcontinent have narrated with regard to socio-cultural
practices opposed by this movement. Although Ismail did mention in *Taqwia tul Iman*
(n.d. p.110) some Hindu customs that were followed by Muslims (e.g. taking
something as bad omen, believing in propitious hours and influence of moon and
planets etc.), the movement actually never focused on seeking explicit distinction or
conflict between Muslims and Hindus. On the contrary, this movement adopted a
conscious approach not to create any conflict with Hindus. In fact, Syed Ahmed
stopped Ismail from preaching in Hindu fairs in order to avid any conflict.

One may argue here that it was perhaps the huge majority (about 80%) of Hindus in
India that deterred Syed Ahmed from opposing their idolatrous and pantheistic
practices, which could be blamed for adulterating the Islamic way of life. However, it
does not apply to this movement because in the the urban areas of North India, the main
target location of Syed Ahmed"s movement, demography was not that unfavourable.
The Muslims not only made up about 40% of the population in North India but also had
a sizeable share among the influential groups like government servants, small traders as
well as landlords (Robinson, 1974, pp.13-23). As such, Syed Ahmed could have built a
strong support base to oppose those Hindu practices that had influenced the Muslim
way of life. Conversely, his movement chose to ignore the Hindus while criticizing

those socio-religious and spiritual practices of Indian Muslims that had long been established even among the Muslims of different other parts of the world.

It may be argued that through his approach to avoid linking Hinduism with the „*shirk*‟ practices of Muslims, Syed Ahmed might have wanted to avoid the communal disharmony in India. However, the fact of the matter is that his movement was primarily focused on the „intra-societal‟ conflict that challenged the prevalent socio-cultural and religious practices of the majority of Indian Muslims rather than on the „inter-societal‟ differences between Hindus and Muslims. Looking from this perspective, that movement was behaving in a countercultural manner.

Apart from popular custom and *sufism*, the third source of threat to Syed Ahmed‟ purist version of *tawhid* was the influence of Shia doctrine and practices. Shia influence had been increasing in India since the death of Aurangzeb who had restricted Shia practices through the propagation of a puritanical version of Islam. Later on, the decline of Mughal Empire was accompanied by a simultaneous rise of Shia influence in India. Deobandi writer Gilani (n.d. vol.ii, p.60) has interestingly observed that whenever the belief in *tawhid* among Muslims gets weakened or whenever there is a decline of Islamic rule, it is the Shia version of Islam that becomes popular among the concerned Muslim community. Syed Ahmed particularly opposed the Shia practice of keeping *taziyah*- the replica of the tombs of martyrs of Karbala taken in the procession in the first Islamic month of Muharram to observe the death anniversary of Hussain, grandson of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). At that time, this *taziyah* practice was also followed by many Sunni Muslims. Ismail declared this practice to be *shirk*. He preached in *Taqwia tul Iman* that *taziyahs* should be broken down and such an act should be considered as virtuous as destruction of idols. Syed Ahmed reportedly smashed thousands of *imam bargahs*- Shia-owned buildings where *taziyahs* are kept and mourning meetings are held (Hassan, 1950, p.124).

This aggressive approach vis-à-vis Shias was quite different from what Waliullah and his sons had adopted earlier. Although Wailullah had himself criticized Shia Islam, he was very conscious not to create fissures among the overall Muslim community. Similarly, Abdul Aziz also opposed Shia Islam in his writings but his approach was gentle persuasion as compared to what Muhammad Ismail preached and Syed Ahmed practiced against Shias. The practical approach adopted by the latter two was a marked

shift from the original intellectual approach of Waliullah and the first generation of his successors (Gilani, n.d. vol.i, p.74).

Although Abdul Aziz had nominated Muhammad Ishaq to carry over the intellectual tradition of the movement, the aggressive activism of Syed Ahmed and Ismail pushed the old tradition in the background. Muhammad Ishaq, unlike his grandfather, failed to openly disapprove the rise of the practical tradition. Rather, he tacitly approved it. He has been reported to have provided financial support to Syed Ahmed‟s party when they launched jihad against the Sikhs (Sindhi, 2008, p.94).

On their return from Arabia in 1824, Syed Ahmed and his two lieutenants, Ismail and Hayee, planned to launch jihad to set up an independent Muslim state. This strategy was not very different form the followers of Ibn Abdul Wahhab in Arabia who had earlier set up a state in Nejd with the support of Derai‟yeh tribe. Syed Ahmed and his party selected North Western frontier to set up an Islamic state. Their jihad was to be initiated against the Sikh government of the Punjab with the support of the tribal Afghan leaders.

A public campaign for men and money was launched for this jihad. During this campaign, Syed Ahmed travelled more than three thousand miles across India and prepared an army of more than two thousand *mujahideen* (plural of *mujahid*= holy warrior). These *mujahideen* then migrated in 1826 to the North Western frontier (Sindhi, 2008, p. 78) where they soon won allegiance of some local tribes to defeat Sikhs at Akora Khattak. In January, 1827, a provisional Islamic government was established and Syed Ahmed was declared *Ameerul Momineen* (Commander of the Faithful) - a title traditionally assumed by the Muslim caliphs. Abdul Hayee was initially the top advisor of Syed Ahmed and acted like an „inner caliph‟ to the latter who was the ruler or „outer caliph‟ of that Islamic government. Despite all his respect for the outer caliph, Abdul Hayee showed enough courage as inner caliph to guide and direct Syed Ahmed. Once, he even reprimanded Syed Ahmed openly for coming late in the morning prayers (Sindhi, 2008, p.79; Meeruthi, 1908, vol.ii, p.272).

When Abdul Hayee died in 1828, Muhammad Ismail was to play the role of inner caliph and a guide to Syed Ahmed. However, his influence was not as strong as that of Abdul Hayee who had earlier kept that provisional government acceptable to Indian

Muslims by keeping it symbolically attached to the weak Mughal Empire at Delhi. After Hayee, this provisional Islamic government became completely independent and even started opposing the Emperor in Delhi (Sindhi, 2008, p.80).

As the provisional government started behaving like a permanent central Islamic government under the dictatorship of Syed Ahmed, the already weak Mughal Empire in Delhi got even weaker allowing British East India Company to further strengthen its control in the subcontinent (Sindhi, 2008, p.80). At the same time, Syed Ahmed and his *mujahideen* also developed differences with some Afghan leaders who opposed former‟s decision to reform local customs that he considered as un-Islamic. These included ban on re-marriage of widows as well as other strict tribal traditions like dowry, which delayed marriage of Afghan girls. Syed Ahmed criticized such practices and even encouraged Afghans to marry their daughters to Indian *mujahideen*. It was acceptable in Afghan society to inter-marry with Muslims of other nationalities. Actually, Syed Ahmed himself married an Afghan woman. However, things became controversial when some followers of Syed Ahmed forced Afghans to marry their daughters to the *majahideen* (Sindhi, 2008, p.85). This created serious differences between some tribal leaders and *mujahideen*.

Apart from that, some tribal leaders also resented the rise of a non-Afghan like Syed Ahmed as their leader- a fact that was considered against their traditions. Therefore, *mujahideen* had to fight both against the Sikhs and some Afghan groups who opposed the reforms and leadership of Syed Ahmed. In this regard, tribal leaders of Peshawar and Mardan offered the major resistance. In 1830, Syed Ahmed defeated them and established his rule in Peshawar. However, he allowed the tribal heads to act as local leaders as long as they were willing to pay taxes to his government. These local tribal leaders later conspired against the *mujahideen* on the issue of forced marriage of one Afghan girl to some Indian *mujahid*. In order to take revenge for that act, hundreds of tax collectors and other office bearers appointed by Syed Ahmed were killed by Afghans in just one night. That marked the end of the provisional government in Peshawar. Later, Syed Ahmed decided to shift his movement‟s centre to Kashmir (Sindhi, 2008, p.91).

On their way to Kashmir in 1831, Syed Ahmed and about one thousand *mujahideen* were trapped at Balakot in the opening of the narrow Kaghan Valley (Metcalf, 1982,

p.62). About 20,000 Sikh troops under Crown Prince of Punjab, Sher Singh, killed Syed Ahmed, Muhammad Ismail and the *mujahideen* (Sindhi, 2008, p.92). After that, followers of Syed Ahmed re-grouped in Sittana area of the North West frontier and kept the embers of jihad alive for many decades under the leadership of Wilayat Ali and Inayat Ali of Patna. However, that later resistance was gradually delinked from Waliullah's movement, which was to be led by Muhammad Ishaq who was running the Madrassah Rahimia at Delhi.

After Balakot, Muhammad Ishaq tried to revive Waliullah's movement in Delhi. However, his major contribution was the introduction of strict *taqlid* of Hanafi *madhab* among his followers (Sindhi, 2008, p.97). That decision actually proved to be a death blow to the intellectual tradition of Waliullah. The door of *ijtihad* was henceforth closed and there was no room left for applying intellectual synthesis or *tatbiq* to bring about unity among Indian Muslims.

2.4 Link between Waliullah's Movement and the DMM

In 1842, just a decade after Balakot, Muhammad Ishaq along with his brother Muhammad Yaqub, migrated to the Hijaz. Before leaving India, Ishaq set up a Board of scholars under Mamluk Ali to continue Wlaiullah's movement in India. Other members of the Board included Abdul Ghani, Muzaffar Hussain, Qutbuddin, Fazlur Rehamn, Nazir Hussain and later Imdadullah (Sindhi, 2008, p.98; Metcalf, 1982, pp.71-72). Abdul Ghani (1819-1878), a disciple of Abdul Aziz, became head of the Madrasssah Rahimia, which was now to be run for the first time by a person not belonging to Waliullah family.

As regards the members of the Board, they supported the Mughal rulers of Delhi during the Mutiny against the British, with the exception of Nazir Hussain who stayed neutral. After the fall of Mughal Empire in 1857, the members of the Board dispersed as Madrasssah Rahimia had also been demolished by the British. Nazir Hussain launched a *ghair muqallid* (non-follower of any *madhab*) movement. During early 20th century, this movement developed into a new sect called *Ahle Hadith*, which was heavily influenced by the teachings of Ibn Abdul Wahhab and Ibn Taiymiyah. Abdul Ghani and Imadadullah migrated to the Hijaz in 1857. Mamluk Ali had already died before the Mutiny. Following discussion highlights the connection between Waliullah's movement and the founding fathers of the DMM.

Mamluk Ali, the leader of the Board of scholars appointed by Muhammad Ishaq, originally belonged to Nanautah, a small town of North India. He completed his education in Delhi and later joined Delhi College as head Arabic teacher. He was closely associated with Waliullah's family and came to Delhi explicitly to study under them. His teacher Rashid-ud-Din Khan was a student of Abdul Aziz (Metcalf, 1982, p.76). In Delhi, Mamluk Ali kept a close connection with the family of Waliullah and even accompanied Muhammad Ishaq in 1842 when the latter decided to migrate to the Hijaz. However, after performing *hajj*, Mamluk returned next year to join back his duties in Delhi College. His commitment to the Waliullah's movement was very strong (Metcalf, 1982, p.75).

Mamluk Ali was a skilled teacher. He knew Persian, Urdu and Arabic languages. He translated into Urdu classical Arabic works on Hadith, history and mathematics. He, along with his companions Abdul Ghani and Imdadullah kept the spirit of Waliullah's movement alive till his death in 1851. He brought many of his relatives from Nanautah to join him in Delhi to study in Delhi College. These included his son Muhammad Yaqub and his nephews, Ahsan, Mazhar and Qasim as well as two distant relatives Zulfiqar Ali and Fazlur Rehamn. This group of people later played a major role in setting up a madrassah in the town of Deoband near Nanautah in 1866. However, the most conspicuous among them was Muhammad Qasim who along with Rasheed Ahmed, another student of Mamluk Ali, was to be the moving spirit behind the DMM.

During their stay at Delhi, the two future founders of the DMM, Muhammad Qasim and Rasheed Ahmed, were thoroughly influenced by the followers and leaders of Waliullah's movement. Both of them received their formal religious education as private students of Mamluk Ali (Gilani, n.d. vol.i, pp. 222-27). They were not regular students of Delhi College. They studied Hadith from Abdul Ghani, the successor of Muahammad Ishaq at Madrassah Rahimia (Gilani, n.d. vol.i, p.254). Their spiritual leader was Imdadullah, another prominent leader of Waliullah's movement (Metcalf, 1982, p.79). Imdadullah (1815-1899) was a spiritual disciple of Syed Ahmed (Rehman, 1997, p.7; Sherkoti, 1965, p.175). Like Syed Ahmed, he was not trained as an *alim*. However, he held a unique position of being a spiritual guide or *shaikh* to some seven to eight hundred *ulama* of North India (Meeruthi, 1908, vol.i p.47).

It is worth noting that the leadership that was to launch the DMM were influenced by Waliullah‛s movement as it stood in early 19th century. In fact, the movement by that time had gone a long way from its original version introduced about a century earlier. The four pillars of Waliullah‛s legacy (i.e. taking leadership of Indian Muslims, studying Hadith and Islamic Law, acting as model in personality and promoting Muslim unity) had already been shattered by the middle of 19th century. The leadership had already been abdicated by his family after Ishaq and his brother Yaqub migrated to the Hijaz. Their Madrassah Rahimia, even before the Mutiny, was neither very active nor very popular among Indian Muslims especially after the British introduced the modern education system in India. After the Mutiny, the madrassah was razed to earth by the British forces. The desire that religious leaders would become models in personality and attainment was already destroyed after Syed Ahmed and Ismail deviated from Waliullah‛s principle of maintaining the delicate distinction between the *khas* and the *aam*. By fiercely preaching the model for the *khas* to the ordinary Indian Muslims (*aam*), Syed Ahmed and Ismail had hurt the Musim unity by challenging their established beliefs and practices. Even Syed Ahmed‛s jihad on the frontier divided more than it united the Indian Muslims whose majority was ambivalent about the legality and religious sanction of that war.

In short, DMM‛s founding fathers were to follow Waliullah‛s ideas. However, the said ideas had metamorphosed in the intervening generations. The shifts had occurred on a number of levels, which included debates on the intellectual versus practical relevance of religious knowledge, the question of *khas* and *aam*, inner and outer caliph and the place of jihad in Islam as well as the purpose of Islamic revivalism. In other words, the founders of the DMM were more influenced by the metamorphosed version of Waliullah‛s movement than his original ideas. As such, the DMM was to be a partial continuation of Waliullah‛s movement. In other words, the DMM was to mainly inherit the practical tradition of Waliullah‛s movement as elaborated by Syed Ahmed and Ismail. It may be added here that the founders of the DMM were clearly drawing inspiration from Syed Ahmed and Ismail. Their limited armed resistance against the British during the Mutiny (discussed in the next chapter) was part of their desire to revive Syed Ahmed‛s jihad. Further, Muhammad Qasim was deeply influenced by the teachings and preaching style of Ismail. Once his teacher Mamluk Ali likened the two by stating that „people recall Muhammad Ismail but they would also see my Ismail [i.e. Qasim] in future‟ (Gilani, n.d. vol.i, p.267).

To sum it up, this chapter not only establishes links between Waliullah's movement and the founders of the DMM but also suggests that that the latter mostly inherited the practical rather than the intellectual tradition of the former. That practical tradition, which carried the seeds of a counterculture, mainly focused on two fronts: internal and external. On the internal front, it had to purify the Muslim society by fighting against prevailing *sufism*, popular customs and Shia doctrine. On the external front, it was concerned with jihad against the non-Muslims to establish an Islamic state. As shall be discussed in the next chapter, there was to be little room for some activity on the external front after an Indian rebellion was completely crushed by the British in 1857. Therefore, the DMM was to be left with just the internal front at the time of its inception in 1866. At that time, the top most concern of the DMM founders was to be the survival and preservation of their version of Islam in the wake of the British rule in India. The next chapter discusses the countercultural characteristics of the DMM during its initial years.

3   ORIGIN OF THE DMM: ASCETIC COUNTERCULTURAL TRENDS

'Countercultural beliefs lead to their adherents cutting themselves off from mainstream society and severing the ties that bind them to the dominant order'.

Kenneth Westhues in „Society's Shadow: Studies in the Sociology of Countercultures" (1972, p.11)

This chapter explains the origin of the DMM in the backdrop of the War of Independence or the Mutiny of 1857. Apart from discussing the status of Indian Muslims in the post-Mutiny period, the chapter also provides details of DMM's inward-looking approach during its early years when it behaved like an ascetic counterculture. The chapter also points out that the DMM was not much concerned with Waliullah's original concept of *tatbiq* as the major source of DMM's inspiration was the movement of Syed Ahmed and Muhammad Ismail, which focused more on the socio-cultural than intellectual aspects. The chapter suggests that the intellectual decline on the part of the DMM brought forward the countercultural countenance of the movement, which came in conflict with several social and cultural norms and values of the mainstream Muslim society in India.

3.1   Mutiny and the Indian Muslims

The origin of the Mutiny of 1857 can apparently be traced to the political and economic grievances of Indian people against the rule of the British East India Company. However, according to Sir Syed Ahmad Khan of Aligarh, the biggest causes of the Mutiny were social and religious concerns of the Indians. He wrote in his 1859 pamphlet titled „*Asbab-e-Baghawat-e-Hind*" (The Causes of the Indian Revolt) that Indians believed that the Company's government was interfering in the social customs and religious practices of both Hindus and Muslims. The activities of the British clergymen and their missionary schools in India were considered as a threat to the social and religious practices of Indians who regarded these activities as part of the government policy to convert them to Christianity (Khan, 1903, pp.7-23).

Maulana Fazle Haqq Khairabadi, who was sentenced to exile in the Andamans Island for supporting the Mutiny, wrote in his memoirs that the English were planning to destroy the culture and civilization of India (Metcalf, 1982, p.84). The introduction of western education system also hurt the traditional educational institutions like Muslim madaris and Hindu *pathshalas*, both of which were religion-oriented. Thomas Metcalf (1964) has also identified proselytization of Christianity and British attempts to reform

indigenous custom as two of the major grievances behind the Mutiny (quoted in Metcalf, 1982, pp.80-81).

The immediate events that triggered the Mutiny were also related to religious issues. In January 1857, news spread among the local Indian soldiers that the cartridges provided for their rifles carried fat contents derived from swine and cow, the animals whose meat are prohibited in Muslim and Hindu religions respectively. On this pretext, the local soldiers, both Hindu and Muslim, refused to use those cartridges despite assurances by the British officers that no such fat contents were used in the ammunition. For such disobedience, Mangal Panday, a Hindu soldier was hanged by the British military authorities on 6 April, 1857 in Barakpur near Calcutta. As the news of Panday"s death reached North India, local soldiers in Meerut revolted and after killing their British officers on 10 May, they marched towards Delhi where they were welcomed by both the Muslims and Hindus (Mian, 1957, vol. iv, pp. 84-104). In Delhi, these rebels not only killed British soldiers but also murdered civilians of British origin despite the appeals and edicts of religious leaders against such brutalities.

Later on, more local soldiers from other parts of India also reached Delhi and independence from the government of East India Company was announced. Mughal king, Bahadar Shah Zafar, who was just a titular head under Company"s rule, was declared as the Emperor of India (Mian, 1957, vol. iv, pp. 102-103). Afterwards, this mutiny of sepoys, combined with civil rebellion, spread across North India to challenge the hold of the British on the subcontinent. However, the British forces ruthlessly crushed the revolt within a few months.

The cataclysm of the Mutiny was followed by a general political quietude among Indian Muslims who seemed to be finished as a political force in the subcontinent. The British rule in India had been passed from East India Company to the Queen"s government in England. The rebellion had been brutally and completely crushed by the colonial government. Prominent political and religious leaders of Muslims who had participated in the Mutiny had either been sentenced to death or exile. According to Ikram and Spear (1955, p.185), Muslims were now being „looked upon as traitors by the British and an easy target by their erstwhile Hindu subjects to pay off old scores. Sandwiched between the two, Muslim frustration deepened, and the Muslims began to sink lower and lower in the economic, political, and educational spheres".

The post-Mutiny events had „sobered" the Indian Muslims and their *ulama* who were gradually convinced that the British were invincible (Metcalf, 1982, p.87). Apart from political and economic losses, the Muslim community was also suffering from deep psychological scars at that time. That „defeatist mindset" gave rise to two movements among the Indian Muslims (Arshad, 2005, p.29) who felt marginalized after the fall of Mughal Empire in 1857. These two movements were named after the towns where they were launched i.e. Aligarh and Deoband. Although these two movements appeared to be educational in form, they were socio-cultural in spirit. Later on, these two movements played very vital roles in Indian politics.

Aligarh Movement was led by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-1898) who was of the opinion that Muslims, like Hindus, should compromise with the British rulers and try to work for their economic, political and social uplift with the help of modern education. Sir Syed had initiated his reform efforts immediately after the fall of Delhi. In 1859, he established a Persian school at Moradabad during his posting there as a court officer. That school was established in the modern tradition of British educational system but it was independent from the government and was founded with the aid of a committee of local notables, both Hindus and Muslims (Robinson, 1974, pp. 91-92).

Later, Sir Syed set up Muhammadan Literary and Scientific Society of Calcutta in 1863 and Scientific Society of Ghazipur in 1864. The latter society was shifted to Aligarh upon Sir Syed's transfer to that city. Before that, he had also established an independent school in Ghazipur where English language was introduced. In 1866, a building named Aligarh Institute was erected for the Scientific Society, which launched its journal *Aligarh Institute Gazette* in the same year. In 1870, Sir Syed founded a monthly magazine, *Tahzib-ul-Akhlaq* or „Muslim Social Reformer" with a goal „to reconcile Indian Islam to rationalism, and to induce Muslims to acquire education on modern lines" (Faizi, 1970, pp.152-53).

In 1875, the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental (MAO) College was founded in Aligarh by Sir Syed with an emphasis on modern western learning. Later on, that college was upgraded as Aligarh University. Initially, Sir Syed faced strong opposition from the *ulama* and the orthodox of northern India who were not ready to accept his new approach to Islam, which focussed on reason and modernity (Robinson, 1974, p.109). However, he persisted with his approach and gradually influenced „the way of thinking

of Muslim intelligentsia and the attitude of the Muslims in general towards the new order of things" (Faizi, 1970, p.153).

As the Aligarh Movement gathered momentum, it succeeded in attracting to its fold a number of scholars of eminence (Ikram and Spear, 1955, p.186). Sir Syed's influential team included statesmen like Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk (1837-1907) and Nawab Viqra-ul-Mulk (1841-1917), poet Maulana Altaf Hussain Hali (1837-1914), novelist Deputy Nazir Ahmed (1836-1912), historian Maulvi Zakaullah (1832-1910), religious scholar Maulvi Chiragh Ali (1844-1895) and academic Maulan Shibli Naumani (1857-1914). Through his movement, Sir Syed not only filled „the big void created in the life of the Muslim community by the disappearance of Muslim rule", but also „bridged the gulf between the Medieval and Modern Islam in India" (Ikram and Spear, 1955, p.188). In other words, Aligarh Movement's major contribution was to mainstream the Muslim community that had been marginalized after the Mutiny.

The second movement of Indian Muslims in the post-Mutiny period was launched in a small town of North India called Deoband where a small madrassah was established in the old tradition of Muslim religious schools with a particular inclination towards Waliullah's movement. This Deoband Madrassah Movement was led by Muhammad Qasim and Rasheed Ahmed, whose primary objective was to protect religious capital of Indian Muslims (Arshad, 2005, p.31). „While Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was seeking to extricate his co-religionists from the slough of despondency through western education and cooperation with the British" (Ikram and Spear, 1955, p.190), the founders of the DMM „considered that the Muslim community was facing threats from the colonial power as much as from within the community" that was now being influenced by the Aligarh Movement (Riaz, 2008, p.73).

3.2 Defining the DMM

The DMM from the vey beginning opposed the modernist approach of Sir Syed. Unlike the Aligarh Movement which aimed to mainstream the marginalized Muslims, DMM's major objective was to protect and preserve „true" Islam. DMM leaders generally identified the „true" Islam with the one propagated by Waliullah's movement under Syed Ahmed and Muhammad Ismail during early 19th century. The major concern of the DMM was to preserve and revive the values of the latter movement. In line with that movement's philosophy, the DMM considered that the practices of folk

Islam were a bigger threat to „true" Islam than the British or Hindu cultures. For the DMM, the real threats were the same as identified by Muhammad Ismail. These included popular custom, traditional *sufi* doctrine and Shia practices (Metcalf, 1982, p.57). These threats were considered even more menacing in the wake of „growing influence of liberal Muslim leaders under Sir Syed who favoured English education and closer cooperation with the British colonial administration" (Riaz, 2008, p.73).

DMM's opposition to the rise of modernists like Sir Syed in the post-Mutiny scenario makes an interesting collation with the attitude of DMM's founders and other *ulama* of Waliullah tradition during the Mutiny when they failed to support the mainstream religious forces who had issued a *fatwa* to declare the revolt as jihad. One may argue that this attitude of the Deobandis during and after the Mutiny reflected their approach to avoid joining the majority and the mainstream- an approach that is not unlike a counterculture. Following discussion highlights the peculiar positions taken by the DMM during and after the Mutiny.

The *ulama* of Shah Waliullah tradition were divided about joining the Mutiny (Mian, 1957, vol. iv, p.133). The apparent reason for this difference of opinion was the lack of unanimity in interpreting this revolt as jihad. Apart from the religious interpretation of the Mutiny, another important reason behind the reticence of these *ulama* was their disinclination to bear allegiance to Mughal Emperor under whose leadership the Muslims were fighting this war against the British. For such *ulama*, the Emperor was inclined towards Shia Islam as well as those practices of folk Sunni Islam (like shrine visiting), which they considered as un-Islamic (Khan, 1859, p.9). Therefore, the majority of the *ulama* belonging to Waliullah tradition stayed neutral during the Mutiny (Sindhi, 2008, p.106) while some of them like Nazir Hussain, Sheikh Muhammad Thanawi, Khawaja Ziauddin and Mahboob Ali openly opposed the Mutiny (Khan, 1880, p.675).

When an official *fatwa* was issued in Delhi to declare the Mutiny as jihad, very few *ulama* of Waliullah tradition supported it. That *fatwa* was issued under the influence of the rebel commander, Bakht Khan, who was follower of Sarfraz Ali, a disciple of Syed Ahmed (Mian, 1957, vol. iv, p.177). The Delhi *fatwa* helped increase participation of Muslims in the Mutiny. At that time, the future founders of the DMM, the duo of Muhammad Qasim (1833-1880) and Rasheed Ahmed (1829-1905) were staying with

their spiritual leader Haji Imdadullah in Thana Bhawan, district Muzaffar Nagar. Initially, they were reluctant, like many other followers of Waliullah tradition, to join the rebellion. There is some ambiguity about the exact reasons for their much delayed decision to join the Mutiny just a couple of weeks before the fall of Delhi on 19 September 1857. It may be noted that the active rebellion had been going on since early May 1857.

Most of the Deobandi writers believe that the decision to join the rebellion was delayed because there were differing views on declaring the Mutiny as jihad (Madni, 1931, p.274). It has also been reported that the future founders of the DMM also sent one of their associates Rehmatullah to Delhi to gather views of other *ulama* on this issue. As Rehmatullah discussed the issue with the *ulama* of Delhi, he was not only convinced that the rebellion against the British was jihad but he also signed the Delhi *fatwa* for jihad at the end of July, 1857 (Mian, 1957, vol. iv, p.73). However, it is not clear why the future DMM leaders still took about two months to join the rebellion after the Delhi *fatwa*.

One may argue that this group of *ulama* in Thana Bhawan was apparently reluctant to launch jihad under the Mughal emperor whose observance of the practices of folk Islam was perceived as an ineligibility to become their leader in jihad. They might also have in their minds the interpretation according to which jihad becomes obligatory when declared by the *ameer* (leader) of an Islamic state (Okon, 2013). Perhaps that is why they first set up an Islamic government in Thana Bhawan under the leadership of Imdadullah to declare jihad (Gilani, n.d. vol.ii, pp.125-126). Muhammad Qasim was designated as the military chief while Rasheed Ahmed was appointed as the Qadhi or chief justice of that small Islamic state (Mian, 1957, vol. iv, p.276). Thousands of *mujahideen* later joined them to attack and conquer the neighbouring town of Shaamli (Madni, 1931, p.452), an event referred by Deobandi writers as „Jihad of Shaamli‟.

It may be noted that the small Islamic state set up by the future founders of the DMM somewhat resembled the rebel government established by Syed Ahmed in North Western India about three decades ago. Imdadullah, like Syed Ahmed, was not trained as a traditional scholar and was more inclined towards spiritual learning. Similarly, he was supported by Qasim and Rasheed just like Syed Ahmed was assisted by Muhammad Ismail and Abdul Hayee. In fact, Muhammad Qasim tended to idealize

Ismail and revered the teachings and tradition of the latter (Gilani, n.d. vol.i, p.400 & vol.ii, pp.18-19). However, the little Islamic state in Thana Bhawan was too superfluous to leave any impact on the Indian polity. Immediately after the fall of Delhi, the British forces re-captured Shaamli as well as Thana Bhawan and the leaders of this small pocket of resistance went underground.

Despite the fact that most of the Deobandi writers have glorified the events in Shaamli as jihad against the British, the biographers of both Muhammad Qasim and Rasheed Ahmed have described the happenings in Shaamli in the backdrop of a local dispute. Both the biographers have explained the events in a manner that shows loyalty of the two leaders to the British (Gilani, n.d. vol.ii, pp. 89-141; Meeruthi, 1908, vol.i, pp.73-80). In fact, Ashiq Ilahi Meeruthi (1908, vol.i, p.76), the biographer of Rasheed Ahmed, has presented the events in such a way as if these *ulama* were fighting those Indians who had rebelled against the „kind government‟ of the British.

The stance taken by these biographers is in sharp contrast to the nationalist approach of the DMM propagated by the majority of later Deobandi writers. Interestingly, such nationalist accounts of the events of Shaamli and Thana Bhawan appeared only in secondary sources written after 1920 (Metcalf, 1982, p.82) when Deobandis finally joined hands with Indian National Congress to become part of the anti-British nationalist movement in India. These later writings have tried to interpret the stance of the early biographers in terms of DMM‟s efforts to avoid conflict with the British authorities as well as to evade government ban on these publications. The official historian of the DMM, Muhammad Mian, who has been given the title of *Muarrakh-e-Millat* (The Historian of the Nation) has tried to explain away this discrepancy by stating that Rasheed Ahmed‟s biographer was a pro-British writer while that of Muhammad Qasim (i.e. Manazar Ahsan Gilani) did not focus much on political events (Mian, 1957, pp. 270-73).

Irrespective of the reasons behind the revolt in district Muzaffar Nagar, the attack on Shaamli was noted in a British account as Islamic in motivation (Metcalf, 1982, p.83). Even arrest warrants of Muhammad Qasim, and Rasheed Ahmed along with their spiritual leader Imdadullah were also issued by the British authorities after the Mutiny when three of them went into hiding (Meeruthi, 1908, vol.i, p.77). Later, Imdadullah migrated to Makkah and Rasheed Ahmed was arrested but was finally released after six

months because of lack of any evidence of his involvement in the Mutiny (Meeruthi, 1908, vol.i, pp.84-85). Muhammad Qasim remained in hiding till 1861 even after a general amnesty had been announced by the Queen in 1858 (Gilani, n.d. vol.ii, pp.192-3)

The events of Shaamli highlighted how the views on jihad had evolved in this movement within the span of five decades. In 1803, Abdul Aziz issued a *fatwa* to declare India as *darul harb* and the British as *kafir* (infidel), yet he gave no call to military action and apparently wanted Muslims to behave politically as if the situation were *darul Islam* because a Mughal rule was still in place. In 1820s, Syed Ahmed and Muhammad Ismail interpreted that *fatwa* to launch a jihad in India but not against the British. Rather, they targeted the Sikh rule in the Punjab and North Western areas, which could clearly be interpreted as *darul harb* in the absence of any Muslim ruler there. In 1857, the future founders of the DMM declared jihad against the British even when a Muslim emperor was still present in Delhi. Further, their jihad was independent of the main jihad declared by the *ulama* of Delhi who had recognized the weak Mughal emperor as a legitimate Muslim ruler.

The „Shaamli jihad‟ was a marked deviation from the classical legal view, which saw jihad in the context of conflict in a world divided between the *darul Islam* (territory under Islamic control) and the *darul harb* (territory of war, which consisted of all lands not under Muslim rule), with the objectives of defence and expansion of the *darul Islam* (Knapp, 2003). In case of Shaamli, the boundaries of the *darul harb* and the *darul Islam* were ill-defined on the one hand and setting up an Islamic state in Thana Bhawan was itself a rebellion against the Muslim ruler in Delhi on the other. It can be argued that by establishing their own state in Thana Bhawan, the founders of the DMM were taking a lead from Ibn Taiymiyah who had declared that a ruler would forfeit his right to rule if he failed to enforce the *Shariah* rigorously in all aspects (Knapp, 2003). It appears that for the „jihadis‟ of Shaamli, Thana Bhawan was the *darul Islam* and rest of the India was *darul harb*. It may not be out of place to add here that the concept of jihad was to further evolve under the DMM during the 20th century when the Deobandis were to launch a militant campaign against the Shia Muslims in Pakistan. There is a consensus on the view that Islamic law condemns all warfare that does not qualify as jihad, specifically any warfare among Muslims themselves. Thus, use of force against the Muslims is justified only by denying them the status of Muslims (Knapp, 2003).

Accordingly, the Deobandi *ulama* were to issue a *fatwa* in 1987 to declare Shias as non-Muslims (Hassan, 1988) to justify an anti-Shia „jihad".

As regards DMM"s approach in the post-Mutiny scenario, the ruthless and vengeful ways of the colonial government after 1857 deterred the DMM leaders from a public campaign to revive their version of „true" Islam. They knew that it was not possible to openly preach or propagate the teachings of Syed Ahmed and Muhammad Ismail, whose followers had been considered rebels and „Wahhabis" by the British government. At the same time, the Muslim society itself was resisting the criticism of Ahmed and Ismail regarding the popular customs and practices of folk Islam. Maulana Naqi Ali Khan (d.1880), father of Ahmad Raza Khan Barelwi (1856-1921), aggressively refuted, through his writings the ideas of Ismail and Syed Ahmed, who was considered a „Wahhabi" (Sanyal. 2008, p.23). Later, Ahmad Raza carried forward his father"s mission by launching the Barelwi movement, which carried a sizeable support in small towns and rural areas of the United Provinces and the Punjab (Metcalf, 1982, p.297).

In this scenario, the founders of the movement opted for an isloationist approach vis-à-vis the government as well as the mainstream Muslim community, which were considered as a threat to their purified version of Islam. Their primary goal after the events of 1857 was to protect and preserve the Islamic value system they inherited from Syed Ahmed"s movement. Faced with the question of survival, the founders of the DMM set up madaris as separate communities where they could practice and preach their values and norms. In line with Wethues" definition of counterculture (1972, p.20), they added physical isolation to their already existing political and social isolation by establishing closed communities in the form of madaris. The early madaris set up under the DMM were to represent an ascetic counterculture, which „withdraws into a separated community where the new values can be lived out with minimum hindrance from an evil society" (Yinger, 1982, p.91). The first madrassah under the DMM was established at Deoband in May, 1866. Within next six months, another madrassah was set up at Saharanpur (Rizwi, 2005, vol.i, p.164). By the end of 1880, at least 15 madaris had already been operational on the pattern of the mother school at Deoband. In terms of the location of these madaris, the DMM also followed the pattern of some earlier countercultures like monasteries, early Mormons, Amish settlements and Hippie communes who preferred to locate themselves far from cities (Wethues 1972, p.20).

Just like those countercultures, the DMM decided to move away from big cities like Delhi, Calcutta and Bombay to establish the early madaris in small towns of North India like Roorki, Ambahta, Kairanah, Thana Bhawan, Amroha and Naginah.

According to Wethues (1972, p.20), the strategy of isolation among countercultures serves three purposes: maintaining solidarity among members; avoiding interaction with the dominant society that is considered evil; and ensuring survival and longevity of the counterculture. Yinger (1982, p.93) has also observed that an ascetic approach is vital for the survival and continuity of a counterculture as compared to an activist approach, which is highly unstable. He has quoted example of Ranters who shifted to a more ascetic movement like Quakers in 17th century. Similarly, Hippies of 1960s later „turned to ascetic and highly restrained religious groups- the Divine Light Mission, Hare Krishna, or Meher Baba‟ (Yinger, 1982, p.93).

During that ascetic phase, the DMM focused on two activities. The more visible of these activities was to set up madaris for teaching and preaching Deobandi version of Islam inside a closed community. The less visible activity mainly focused on individual *fatawa* to differentiate the Deobandi Islam from the popular folk Islam. These *fatawa* have been discussed in Section 3.4. During that early period, the Deobandis were not able to make a big impression on the mainstream Muslim society even in those areas where they established their madaris. Owing to its closed-door approach, the DMM was neither able to attract many local students nor to change the practices of folk Islam in India. Even, students of madrassah at Deoband were mostly coming from outside that town. Muhammad Qasim once complained about this indifference of the local people. He said in his address to the 1874 convocation of the Darul Ulum that outsiders had benefitted from this madrassah but the residents of Deoband had ignored it (Shahjahanpuri, 2004, p.133). Similarly, in his home town of Gangoh, Rasheed Ahmed was unable to stop pilgrimage at the shrine of his ancestor Shaikh Abdul Quddus and used to leave the place during the annual celebration of latter‟s *urs* (Meeruthi, 1908, vol.ii, p.9).

Although the DMM was not openly attacking the socio-cultural practices of Indian Muslims during that ascetic phase, its religious edicts in this regard were closely monitored by the *ulama* of other schools of thought. As mentioned earlier, the Barelwi movement of Ahmad Raza Barelwi was the most active defender of the traditional folk

Islam vis-à-vis the Deobandi sect. He issued a *fatwa* declaring that Muhammad Qasim and Rasheed Ahmed were no longer Muslims due to showing disrespect to the Prophet. He was even successful in getting support of *ulama* in the Hijaz in favour of his *fatwa* (Metcalf, 1982, p.309). However, the DMM's approach was ascetic to such an extent that it did not even react to that *fatwa* and Rasheed Ahmed advised his followers to ignore the issue. That *fatwa* was publicly refuted by the DMM only when it moved from ascetic to activist approach as shall be discussed in the next chapter.

As the major visible activity of the DMM was to establish madaris, this movement was labelled as an educational movement that was launched in the wake of secular education system introduced by the British in India. In fact, the first principal of madrassah at Deoband, Muhammad Yaqub, while addressing the convocation meeting in 1883, also said that „this madrassah was set up for the revival of Islamic knowledge in the aftermath of the Mutiny when it appeared as if Islamic studies would vanish and there would be no one to learn or teach Islam in the next two or three decades‟ (Rizwi, 2005, vol.i, p.143). However, the DMM appears to have overplayed such fears because thousands of madaris continued to operate even after the introduction of a secular education and also in the post-Mutiny period.

At the time of DMM's inception, many strong madaris traditions at Farangi Mahall (Lucknow), Khairabad (Rampur), Badaun, Delhi and Punjab were still very active in imparting religious education to Indian Muslims (Arshad, 2005, p.26). After 1857, the graduates of these mainstream madaris traditions „indeed took service under the British, filling posts for which they were ideally suited by their literacy and their respectable status. Some of them „kept up a semblance of earlier times by taking employment in the protected Muslim states of Hyderabad and Bhopal‟ (Metcalf, 1982, p.87). So there was hardly any likelihood of extinction of madaris or Islamic education in the Indian subcontinent even after the fall of Muslim rule. In fact, many Muslim states were independent even under the British colonial system. Islamic education system was followed by such states without any hindrance or threat.

Further, the DMM also adopted the same syllabus (*Dars-e-Nizami*) that was already being taught at other madaris of India. Metcalf (1982, p.102) has suggested that the curriculum at Deoband „was not dramatically innovative‟ vis-à-vis other madaris operating in India. However, they followed Waliullah's tradition of preferring

transmitted sciences (*manqulat*) over rational sciences (*ma'qulat*). In fact, Rasheed Ahmed who had been teaching Hadith at his home town of Gangoh before joining the Darul Ulum at Deoband, initially excluded and only later allowed teaching the subject of philosophy (Meeruthi, 1908, vol.i, pp.87-94). Therefore, the argument that the DMM was launched to meet the challenge and threat posed by the secular education, does not hold much ground. The new education system was not of much concern to the DMM‟s founding fathers who actually never opposed the modern education as such. In fact, Muhammad Qasim was in favour of learning modern sciences (Faruqi, 1963, p.33) and once considered introducing English in the madrassah at Deoband. He even intended to learn English himself (Gilani, n.d. vol.ii, p.300). Earlier, Waliullah‟s son Abdul Aziz had also given guarded approval of learning and teaching English (Metcalf, 1982, p.154). Qasim also hinted at the possibility of madrassah students joining modern education after completing their religious studies (Gilani, n.d. vol.ii, p.281). The 1868 decision of the DMM to reduce the duration of madrassah syllabus from ten to six years has also been interpreted in the context of linking the DMM graduates with the modern education system (Gilani, n.d. vol.ii, pp.286-87).

So, in terms of an educational movement, the DMM was neither offering something new or unique in syllabus nor was it presenting itself as an alternative education system. In fact, Mahmood Hassan, the first student and later a Principal of the madrassah at Deoband from 1890 to 1915, himself negated the general belief that the DMM was an educational movement. He stated about the Deoband madrassah (designated as Darul Ulum or university in 1879) that „it was founded in my presence and as far as I know its objective was to compensate for the losses in 1857‟ (Gilani, n.d. vol.ii, p.226). According to the Qasim‟s biographer, Manazar Gilani (n.d. vol.ii, p.212), the DMM was not just an educational movement but was a social and political movement. In short, from DMM‟s perspective, it was neither the religious education nor Islam in general that the British system threatened. For the DMM leaders, it was actually a particular version of Islam and its value system they inherited from Syed Ahmed and Ismail, that was at risk of becoming extinct in the face of opposition from mainstream Muslim society as well as British aggression against „Indian Wahhabis‟ (the followers of Syed Ahmed). So, one may argue that the madaris of the DMM were to basically function as sanctuaries where that particular version of Islam was to be practiced and preserved without any hindrance from the outside society.

3.3   Countercultural Character of the DMM

The founders of the DMM apparently followed the Waliullah tradition by offering a style of composite leadership, which united *Shariah* (Islamic Law) and *tariqat* (Spiritual Path) in the personality of a religious leader. Other schools of thought like Farangi Mahall and Barelwi also made similar claims to espousing a „middle way‟ (Metcalf, 1982, p.140) by combining the elements of *alim* (scholar) and *sufi* (saint) in their leaders. However, there was something unique about the DMM, which kept this movement in conflict with the mainstream *ulama* and *sufis*. In fact, Muhammad Qasim used to lament that „among the *ulama* I have a bad name and *sufis* think I am stained with *maulwiyyat* [derogatory term for *ulama*]‟ (Gilani, n.d. vol.i, p.340).

The source of that uniqueness of the DMM was not Waliullah‟s original movement, which actually worked for *tatbiq* or synthesis of the whole range of Islamic knowledge in order to end divisions and deviations among the Indian Muslims with respect to their beliefs and practices. As mentioned earlier, the DMM had dropped the idea of *tatbiq* as well as *ijtihad* in favour of strict *taqlid* of Hanafi *madhab* after Muhammad Ishaq took control of Madrassah Rahimia in 1824 ((Meeruthi, 1908, vol.i, p.91; Sindhi, 2008, p.97). Rasheed Ahmed while declaring *taqlid* as binding and compulsory for the Muslims (Meeruthi, 1908, vol.i, pp.132-33), stated that Muslims should neither pray behind a *ghair-muqallid* (who does not observe *taqlid*) nor should listen to his *wa'az* – religious speech (Meeruthi, 1908, vol.i, p.179).

It is to be reiterated here that instead of the original movement of Waliullah, the DMM owed this uniqueness to a narrow version of the former movement that emerged under the leadership of Syed Ahmed and Muhammad Ismail. From the Ahmed-Ismail movement, the DMM inherited an idiosyncratic approach marked by an excessive focus on the purification of *tawhid* and aggressive attack on the potential sources of threat to *tawhid* i.e. popular customs and practices of Indian Muslims, traditional *sufism* and Shia Islam. Like Ahmed-Ismail movement, DMM‟s major focus was also to revive „true‟ Islam by protecting *tawhid* from those particular threats.

In line with the strict interpretation of *tawhid* inherited from Ahmed and Ismail, Deobandi *ulama* issued several controversial *fatawa*, which were considered by the Muslim society as disrespectful to the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and even to God. For example, the Deobandis insisted, contrary to common Muslim belief that the

Prophet did not share God's knowledge of the unknown (*ilm-e-ghaib*). Rasheed Ahmed deemed this so important that he forbade his followers to accept as *imam* (prayer leader) anyone who denied it (Metcalf, 1982, p.150).

The Deobandis believed that they had a special understanding of the nature of God and *tawhid*. This belief gave them a certain élan, a sense of uniqueness and pride (Metcalf, 1982, p.150), which is not unlike a counterculture. According to Yinger (1982, p.30), countercultural non-conformists take pride in their acts, which are believed to be moral. Rasheed Ahmed once showed this pride by stating that „truth is what comes out of Rasheed Ahmed's tongue and [I swear] by God that guidance and deliverance in this era is achieved by following me" (Meeruthi, 1908, vol.ii, p.17). This „sense of pride in their cultural tradition" (Metcalf, 1982, p.197) was enhanced by the fact that their position on socio-cultural and spiritual values of Indian Muslims drew attacks from mainstream *ulama* and ordinary Muslims. Such attacks included the above-mentioned *fatwa* by Ahmad Raza Barelwi against Muhammad Qasim and Rasheed Ahmed.

Such attacks against the Deobandi version of Islam on the one hand and close monitoring of the DMM by the British government on the other, convinced the DMM leaders to pursue an ascetic approach during the early years. At that time, DMM leaders mostly restricted themselves to their madaris and the small communities surrounding those institutions. At that time, they preferred to live in the society „with detachment and dignity" (Metcalf, 1982, p.197) presenting themselves as a model of religious leadership, which combined the qualities of *ulama* as well as *sufis*.

Despite DMM's claim to follow Waliullah in consolidating Islamic sciences and *sufi* orders, the main emphasis of the movement was on „popular reform of custom, not intellectual synthesis" (Metcalf, 1982, p.140). The major intellectual activity of Deobandi *ulama* was restricted to writing of *fatawa*, which were mainly derived from the teachings of Waliullah's son Abdul Aziz and grandson, Muhammad Ismail. Apart from those *fatawa*, publications of Deobandi *ulama* during the early years included „letters written to disciples and followers, biographies and biographical dictionaries, and collection of exemplary anecdotes or *hikayat*… All these works reflected to varying degrees the atmosphere of controversy among the schools of thought of the *ulama*…No writing served what one might call an objective or intellectual concern" (Metcalf, 1982, p.210).

Although DMM leaders were against the religions of Hindus and the colonial rulers, they considered that the biggest threat to „true" Islam did not come from those non-Muslims but from the socio-cultural and spiritual practices of folk Islam followed by the mainstream Muslim society in India. In fact, the DMM showed far less opposition towards Hindus and the British as compared to the religious or political groups of Muslims in India. As for the colonial rulers, DMM"s „concern was not with the British culture in general but with British law as it affected them and British decorum as they observed it" (Metcalf, 1982, pp.153). As regards Hindus, Rasheed Ahmed issued a *fatwa* in favour of Hindu-dominated Indian National Congress while opposing the Indian Patriotic Association- a political organization founded by Sir Syed (Madni, 1930, pp.481-82).

The DMM coupled its „moral disapproval of the British with realism in their relations with them and their culture" (Metcalf, 1982, p.154). Rasheed Ahmed once declined a large donation of five thousand rupees from Afghanistan"s ruler Habibullah Khan with the view of not offending the British (Meeruthi, 1908, vol.ii, p.172). In fact, the DMM initially showed symbolic loyalty to the British and even when it later decided to oppose the colonial government that was accomplished with the support of Hindu-dominated Congress.

As mentioned above, the uniqueness of the DMM came from its condemnation of: socio-cultural and religious practices of Muslims; popular *sufism*; and Shia Islam. Following the Ahmed-Ismail tradition, the DMM declared many popular customs of Indian Muslims as *shirk* (polytheism) or *bida'* (wrongful innovation). Rasheed Ahmed was so concerned and obsessed with elimination of the popular custom that he ensured to make it part of his will (Meeruthi, 1908, vol.ii, p.342). Muhammad Qasim declared that *shirk* is committed „by following false custom" (Metcalf, 1982, p.145). Similarly, Rasheed Ahmed once lamented that the harm the *sufis* have caused to Islam is greater than that of any other sect (Hasan, 1950, p.279).

Owing to its ascetic approach during the early years, the DMM did not aggressively attack the mainstream folk Islam. However, they kept on issuing *fatawa* from time to time against many prevalent customs and practices of Indian Muslims. Those *fatawa* clearly linked the DMM with the tradition of Ahmed-Ismail movement (Metcalf, 1982,

p.149) as shown in the following discussion. It may be added here that the only difference between the ideas of these two movements is that of scale. The concept and boundaries of *tawhid* and *shirk* had already been defined by Ahmed-Ismail movement with respect to some popular beliefs and customs of Indian Muslims. The DMM only took it forward by identifying and criticising more customs and practices, which were considered to be violative of *tawhid*. What its predecessors could not elaborate perhaps due to their priority for and engagement in jihad was thus accomplished by the DMM, which had ample time to ponder and produce relevant *fatawa* in the post-Mutiny scenario when it was mostly confined to its madaris. It is the detail and extent of Deobandi ideas in this regard that sometimes make the DMM look more inflexible than its predecessor.

The socio-cultural practices that were opposed by the DMM included ceremonies associated with elaborate marriages, funerals and even *eid* (twice-a-year Muslim religious festival). Deobandi ulama also „forbade funeral prayers to be read in either mosque or graveyard, and prohibited ceremonies on fixed days after death" such as *teejah*, *daswan* and *chaleeswan*- events on third, tenth and fortieth day after death respectively where supplications are offered and food is distributed for the soul of the deceased (Metcalf, 1982, p.149). Rasheed Ahmed issued a *fatwa* forbidding participation in such events (Meeruthi, 1908, vol.i, p.141), which were part and parcel of the life of the mainstream Muslim society. Similarly, he also declared as *bida'* the common practice of embracing and hand-shaking among Muslim men after the *eid* prayers (Meeruthi, 1908, vol.i, p.181).

The Deobandis even denounced the widely popular practice of *Milad-un Nabi* „on the grounds that it encouraged the belief that a dead person was actually present [and] that it elevated the importance of a fixed day…Under Rasheed Ahmad"s aegis, a group jointly signed a *fatwa* opposing [its] observance" (Metcalf, p.150). Rasheed Ahmed once wrote that not a single participant of *Milad* ever followed the path of the Prophet (Meeruthi, 1908, vol.i, pp.128-29). The Deobandis also anathematized as *bida'* several other popular custom and practices such as fasting on 24th day of the Islamic month of Rajab, reciting certain verses in supererogatory prayers and the distribution of sweets upon completion of the reading of the Quran (Metcalf, 1982, p.151).

Following the footsteps of Ahmed and Ismail, Deobandis also declared it *haram* (forbidden) to show excessive respect to parents and elders through the use of words such as *qibla* and *ka'bah* (names used for Holy *Ka'bah* in Makkah), a cultural practice that was common among the Muslims of North India (Meeruthi, 1908, vol.i, p.137). Similarly, they also asked Muslims to avoid excessive veneration of the saints and prophets (Meeruthi, 1908, vol.i, p.146). Further, the DMM also condemned the prohibition of widow re-marriage, a practice prevalent among many Muslim families in India. Muhammad Qasim set an example, like Muhammad Ismail did a few decades ago, by arranging marriage of his elder sister who was a widow (Gilani, n.d. vol.ii, p.9). Popular *sufi* practices were the special target of DMM"s criticism. About one third of Rasheed Ahmed"s *fatawa* dealt with issues related to *sufism*. Here again, their stance was similar to that of Ahmed-Ismail movement. For example, DMM leaders „consistently sought to strip away local customs that unduly elevated the status of saints and prophets…theoretical justification for this orientation was again an emphasis on *tawhid*, the singularity of God" (Metcalf, 1982, p.149). However, the Deobandis, unlike Arabian Wahhabis, never sought to eliminate *sufism* altogether. Rather, they hoped, like Ahmed and Ismail, to integrate *sufism* into an obedient and responsible religious life whereby a *sufi shaikh* had to offer no intercession or miraculous intervention on behalf of his followers (Metcalf, 182, p.140). That was a marked deviation from the established practices of traditional *sufism*.

DMM leaders „offered an alternate spiritual leadership, geared to individual instruction rather than to mediation, stripped of what they deemed to be a deviant custom" (Metcalf, 1982, p.157). They also strictly objected to customs such as *sama'* or *qawwali* (mystic musical sessions to induce ecstasy), distributing food after offering prayer (*fatihah*) for the dead and pilgrimage to the tombs of saints. They also prohibited eating any food on which *fatiha* had been recited for the dead. Their approach here looks even stricter than that of Abdul Aziz and Syed Ahmed who did not object to eating such food (Gilani, n.d. vol.ii, pp.43-44). The Deobandis also declared as *bida'* the practice of offering utensils and clay pots to the *pirs* for placing at the shrines. Rasheed Ahmed used to break all the clay pots offered by people to his uncle who was associated with the shrine of his ancestor Abdul Quddus Gangohi (Meeruthi, 1908, vol.i, p.58). Later on, he even stopped going to that shrine because of such activities (Meeruthi, 1908, vol.ii, p.16).

The Deobandis also opposed many customary observances at the famous tombs of Khawaja Moin-ud-din Chishti and Nizam-ud-din Auliya, which were visited by large number of Muslims. One of those observances was the *urs*, an annual event at the shrines, during which the pilgrims recited the Quran, listened to *qawwali* or *sama'*, offered money and distributed food. The Deobandis also condemned observances held by many Indian Muslims on behalf of the greatest Muslim saint, Abdul Qadir Jilani „whose followers observed not only the yearly anniversary of his death but a monthly one (the *giyarhwin*) as well" on the eleventh day of each Islamic month (Metcalf, 1982, p.181). They also declared as *haram* the meat of an animal that was slaughtered after being declared as *nadhar* (gift) to some saint- another common practice among Indian Muslims (Meeruthi, 1908, vol.i, p.157).

As regards intercession by *sufi* saints, the Deobandis tried to minimize the role of not only the living *shaikh* but also that of the dead saints. Rasheed Ahmad explained in one of his *fatawa* that praying to a saint to grant one"s wish was wholly illegitimate, nothing less than *shirk*. Following the tradition of Syed Ahmed, he decried the idea of *tasawwar-e-shaikh* because of the possibility of *shirk* (Meeruthi, 1908, vol.ii, p.233 & 312). Similarly, he doubted that the dead saints could even hear one"s prayers (Metcalf, 1982, pp.181-82). Muhammad Qasim, despite believing that the dead could hear, forbade his followers to call on the dead. He allowed his followers to just read a section of the Quran and offer it as *isal-i-sawab* (transfer of merit) for the dead (Gilani, n.d. vol.ii, pp.32-33).

Apart from popular custom and traditional *sufism*, the DMM also refuted the practices of Shia Islam. Not unlike Ahmed and Ismail, the Deobandis believed that Shias „deny the singularity of God, the humanity of the Prophet, and the finality of revelation" (Metcalf, 1982, p.152). Rasheed Ahmed issued a *fatwa* asking Sunni Muslims to stay away from religious activities of Shias and to avoid offering congregation prayers with them. He was of the view that Shia *ulama* were *kafir* whereas ordinary Shias were *fasiqeen*- sinners who openly disobey God (Meeruthi, 1908, vol.ii, p.286).

On the question of marriage between Shia and Sunni Muslims, Rasheed Ahmed issued a *fatwa* declaring Shias at par with *ahl-e-kitab* (People of the Book- a term used for the Christians and the Jews) and accordingly allowed marriage between a Sunni man and Shia woman but not between a Shia man and Sunni woman (Meeruthi, 1908, vol.i,

p.166). Following the tradition of Walullah family, Rasheed also wrote a book *Hidaya-tush-Shia* (Guidance of the Shia) to denounce Shia Islam (Meeruthi, 1908, vol.i, p.200). Rasheed forbade his followers to read or listen to true events of the martyrdom Imam Hussain in the month of Muharram on the ground that it resembled a Shia act (Meeruthi, 1908, vol.ii, p.78).

Muhammad Qasim also condemned Shia Islam in his book *Hadya-tush-Shia*- Gift of the Shia (Husaini, 2003, p.51). He believed that the source of many wrongful customs and practices among Sunni Muslims was actually the Shia Islam (Gilani, n.d. vol.ii, p.70). Following the tradition of Syed Ahmed, he successfully managed to stop among the Sunnis of Deoband the practice of *taziyah* (Gilani, n.d. vol.ii, p.77). He also tried to reinforce the common misconception among the Sunni Muslims about the general inability of Shias to learn Quran by heart. He wrote that the reason for that inability was the opposition of Shias to the third Caliph Usman who played an extraordinary role to compile and publish the Quran (Gilani, n.d. vol.ii, p.67). He also declared that Shias were holding a *barzaghi* religion that was to be placed in-between *kufr* (non-belief) and Islam (Gilani, n.d. vol.ii, pp.63-64). *Barzakh* is a term used in Islamic eschatology to define the barrier between the physical and spiritual worlds at which the soul awaits after death till the Judgement Day (*Qiyamah*).

As regards the role of the DMM in politics, the two founding fathers Qasim and Rasheed kept the movement completely detached from political issues for almost four decades after its inception. During that early period, the movement was never involved in any criticism or opposition of the colonial government. On the other hand, the DMM seemed to be showing loyalty and support to the British rulers till the second decade of the 20th century. For example, Darul Ulum Deoband „celebrated ceremonial occasions with appropriate pomp, and observed times of crises, like Queen Victoria"s last illness, with fitting prayers and messages" (Metcalf, 1982, p.182). The DMM remained totally nonchalant to the founding of Indian National Congress in 1885 and All India Muslim League (AIML) in 1906. It remained completely unconcerned with major issues of Indian Muslims like Urdu-Hindi dispute and separate electorates. During that period, the political concerns of Indian Muslims were mainly raised by Aligarh movement and later by AIML.

The isolation of the DMM from the mainstream social and political issues was so thorough that it even refused to support many religious causes on which there was a consensus among all the Indian Muslims. As shall be discussed in the next chapter, the DMM refused to join *Anjuman-e-Khuddam-e-Ka'bah*, an organization set up to protect Muslim holy places in the wake of the decline of the Ottoman Empire after the Balkan War. Similarly, the Deobandis refused to support the pan-Islamic movement in India that was launched to bolster the weakened Ottoman Empire. The DMM was also initially reluctant to join the Khilafat Movement launched to protect the Muslim Caliphate in the wake of the Young Turk Revolution (1908) as well as the First World War (1914). The details are given in the next chapter.

Keeping in view that isolation of the DMM from the political arena, this movement can hardly be considered a political movement for that initial period. During that phase, the DMM tried to present itself as a movement that was primarily working for the protection and preservation of religious capital of Islam. That period can be explained in the context of „interiorization" thesis, which sees the DMM as religious reform movement more concerned with perfection of faith and moral development of ordinary Muslims, and less with assertion of political agenda (Pemberton, 2009). However, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the DMM did not behave like a typical social reform movement and concerned itself with protection of its own version of „true" Islam and Muslim culture. Therefore, one may argue that the DMM, for the first four decades after its inception, can neither be called a prototypal social reform movement nor a political movement. For that initial period, DMM"s behaviour can at best be likened to an ascetic counterculture that decided to withdraw into a separated community where their values could be „lived out with minimum hindrance from an evil society", which was considered a threat to those values (Yinger, 1982, p.91). That „evil society" included the mainstream Muslim society as well as the colonial government in India, which apparently threatened the Deobandi version of Islam and its values inherited from the movement of Syed Ahmed and Muhammad Ismail.

The DMM continued its ascetic mode till the death of the second founding father Rasheed Ahmed in 1905. The other founding father Muhammad Qasim had already died in 1886. This ascetic approach adopted by the two founding fathers, focused on keeping the movement aloof mainly from mainstream Muslim society in order to avoid influence of the latter on DMM"s value system. The movement deliberately kept a

distance from other Muslim movements operating at that time. In 1874, when Sir Syed of Aligarh movement invited DMM‟s Muhammad Qasim and Muhammad Yaqub to be a part of a committee to design religious curriculum for Aligarh College, the latter two declined participation on the ground that some Shia Muslims were also members of that committee (Metcalf, 1982, pp.328-29). Similarly, Rasheed Ahmed stopped Deobandis from joining Nadwa-tul-Ulama, an association of *ulama* founded in 1891 to consolidate a single leadership for all Indian Muslims (Meeruthi, 1908, vol.i, p.205). Nadwa offered a new model of education that combined modern and religious education and was overwhelmingly welcomed by all sections of the Muslim society in India (Nadwi, 1970, p.149).

After the death of the two founding fathers, the next generation of the DMM felt less insecure about their value system. They decided to gradually open itself to the outside world in terms of condemning the socio-cultural practices of Indian Muslims as well as participating in the mainstream political activities to oppose the colonial rulers. That started happening under Mahmood Hassan (1851-1920) who took up the leadership of the movement after the death of Rasheed Ahmed in 1905 and decided to introduce a somewhat activist approach in the DMM. Even before that, Mahmood Hassan, after becoming the *Sadr Mudarris* or Principal of Darul Ulum Deoband in 1890, has started working to expand the network of Deobandi madaris. Hence, about 60 madaris having links with the parent school at Deoband had been established at the dawn of the 20th century (Metcalf, 1982, p.134). Unlike DMM‟s earlier preference for small towns, some of the new madaris were established in big cities like Delhi, Lucknow, Calcutta, Lahore, Peshawar and Karachi. The next chapter discusses how the DMM moved from an ascetic to activist mode through its involvement in politics.

4   DMM IN UNITED INDIA: ACTIVIST COUNTERCULTURAL APPROACH

'Countercultural deviation…is partly defined situationally and politically. The cultural blueprint of a society -smudged by much handling- is sometimes ambiguous and difficult to decipher'.

Milton Yinger in „Countercultures: The Promise and Peril of a World Turned Upside Down" (1982, p.31)

This chapter discusses the circumstances under which the DMM dropped its ascetic approach in favour of an activist one. Under this new approach, the Deobandis established networks of Darul Ulum alumni in India as well as the North West Frontier region and Afghanistan to revive the old dream of its predecessors to set up an Islamic state. This change of approach occurred at a time when second generation of leadership took control of the movement during the first decade of the 20th century. This chapter points out that DMM"s activism was largely displayed in politics where it adopted a nationalist approach and hence countered the Pakistan movement, which demanded a separate state for Indian Muslims. In line with the view that a counterculture is partly defined situationally and politically (Yinger, 1982, p.31), this chapter focuses on the countercultural behaviour of the Deobandi movement in the political arena. The chapter also suggests that in its opposition to the idea and creation of Pakistan, the DMM was motivated inter alia by its countercultural mindset.

DMM"s transformation from ascetic to activist mode occurred during a period that was marked by remarkable regional and global developments. That was a time when the British revived their „forward policy" to strengthen their grip on the Indian subcontinent. At the international level, Great Britain had allied with France and Russia at the start of the 20th century to form the Triple Entente. The Ottoman Empire was falling apart. Egypt had gone under British influence while the French had taken control of Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. In 1910, Italy attacked Tripoli and in 1912 Balkan states of Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro as well as Greece launched a military offensive against the Ottoman Empire where the rebellion of the „Young Turks" in 1908 had led to constitutional reforms. At around the same time, Albania announced independence from Turkey. After the Balkan war, all areas of European Turkey were gone to the Balkan states in 1913 (Madni, 1954, pp.519-541). These political upheavals were followed by the World War I in which Turkey allied with Germany and Austria-

Hungary to face the Triple Entente. As a reaction to these developments, anti-colonial and pan-Islamic movements were started in the Muslim world.

Going through an ascetic phase, the DMM‟s attitude towards the above-mentioned developments was mostly nonchalant as shall be discussed later in this chapter. However, the movement could not keep itself unconcerned for long with the situation in the North West frontier and Afghanistan, the region where many graduates of Darul Ulum Deoband had established themselves as religious leaders. In this region, both anti-colonial and pan-Islamic sentiments were flourishing during Amir Habibullah‟s reign (1901-1919). Anti-colonialism in this region was originally a reaction to the aggressive British „forward policy‟ of pushing outposts into tribal areas, recruiting local levies, paying high subsidies to some tribes while fighting others and building railway lines to Dargai, Thal and Jamrud at the Khyber. The local response was equally aggressive resulting in tribal raids on these outward symbols of the Empire. In 1897, there was a Frontier uprising, which took no less than thirty five thousand troops to put down. As a result, North Western Frontier Province was established with a Chief Commissioner directly under the Viceroy. However, tribal raids continued in the coming years (Olesen, 1995, pp.102-103).

The warring tribes in the North West were supported on the one hand by the „traditionalist‟ religious and tribal leaders of Afghanistan who were represented by Sardar Nasrullah, younger brother of Amir Habibullah and *Qadhi-ul-Qudhat* (Chief Shariah Judge) Haji Abdur Razzaq, a graduate of Darul Ulum Deoband and on the other hand by the „modernists‟ led by Mahmud Tarzi and Sardar Amnullah, who later became king of Afgahnistan in 1919. Pan-Islamism in Afghanistan was mainly spread by Islamic modernist Mahmud Tarzi through his Persian language bi-weekly *Sirajul Akhbar*. Tarzi had become familiar with pan-Islamic ideas and Ottoman nationalist movement during his forced exile to Damascus during Amir Abdur Rehman‟s reign (1880-1901). After returning to Afghanistan in 1904, Tarzi not only influenced the Afghan court and people but also the Muslim intellectuals of India who were already watching with concern the political developments in the Ottoman Empire (Olesen, 1995, pp. 99-102).

Apart from focusing on the North West, this chapter shall also highlight how the DMM responded to the political changes inside the mainland India where a nationalist

movement under the banner of Indian National Congress (INC) was launched in 1885 to get more Indian participation in the legislative process. It may be added here that INC largely remained a Hindu-dominated party despite explicit efforts to draw Indian Muslim into its fold. The prominent Muslim leaders like Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and Syed Amir Ali (1849-1928), the eminent lawyer and religious thinker of Calcutta, argued that Congress could not be the spokesman for the interests of the two distinct „communities‟ that comprised India. The pervasive opinion among the Muslims was that identity rested in one‟s religious community. The Congress vision, by contrast, insisted that the interests of self, caste and community be subordinated to the „public good‟ and the Indian nation (Metcalf, 2002, pp.136-137). In this backdrop, All India Muslim League (AIML) was formed in 1906 with the objective of advancing the interests of Muslims (Metcalf, 2002, p.159). The Aligarh movement of modernist Sir Syed Ahmad was closely associated with the events that led to the establishment of AIML (Taylor, 1983, p.185). These changes gradually drew the Deobandis into active politics under the banner of Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind (JUH), a platform of Indian *ulama* established in 1919.

4.1   End of DMM's Ascetic Approach

As discussed in the last chapter, Mahmood Hassan, the first student of Deoband madrassah, was a favourite of the DMM founders. Being a close associate and confidant of Muhammad Qasim - the founder and the ideologue of the DMM, Hassan was considered to be well aware of the objectives of the movement (Mian, 1957, vol.v, pp.171-73). He joined the Darul Ulum as a teacher in 1874 after his graduation (Rizwi, 2005, vol.i, p.174). In 1880, he set up an alumni association of the Darul Ulum named *Samrat-ul-Tarbiyyat* (Fruit of the Training). The main objective of that association was to convince the graduates of the Darul Ulum to support their alma mater by making an annual financial contribution equalling 25% of their monthly income (Rizwi, 2005, vol.i, p.187).

In 1890, Mahmood Hassan was selected as the Principal in a unanimous decision by the members of the Darul Ulum (Madni, 1954, pp.547-48) who considered him to be the true successor of the DMM founders. Deobandi historian Muhammad Mian (1957, vol.v, pp.171-173) has declared Hassan to be the *roohani farzand* (spiritual son), *talmiz-e-khas* (special student) and *hamraaz* (sharer of secrets) of Muhammad Qasim. Another Deobandi writer, Manazar Ahsan Gilani who was a contemporary of Hassan at

the Darul Ulum, declared the latter to be Muhammad Qasim"s bona fide successor and heir (Gilani, n.d. vol.ii, p.226). Owing to this exceptional association with the DMM founders as well as his constant links with the Darul Ulum alumni, Hassan carried an extraordinary influence and clout in the movement. The authority and respect inspired by Hassan gave an unprecedented leverage to the academic post of Principal vis-à-vis the powerful management posts of *Mohtamim* (Chancellor) and *Sarprast* (Patron or Rector) at the Darul Ulum.

After 1895, when Muhammad Qasim"s son, Muhammad Ahmad was appointed as *Mohtamim* of Darul Ulum, the management focused on institutional strengthening. Muhammad Ahmad gave particular attention to raising more funds and donations, expanding the physical infrastructure, establishing new departments as well as a big library at the Darul Ulum (Rizwi, 1974, vol.ii, p. 228). His primary focus seemed to be the development of the madrassah at Deoband and not the Deobandi movement as a whole. His target was to make the Darul Ulum a centre of excellence for religious education with a peculiar emphasis on Deobandi Islam and its values. He was also very careful, like the DMM founders, not to offend the colonial government with respect to the activities of the Darul Ulum.

On the other hand, Principal Mahmood Hasan"s vision for the DMM was far broader than that of the *Mohtamim*. He wanted to follow the practical tradition of Syed Ahmed and Muhammad Ismail in letter and spirit. As a true successor of Muhammad Qasim, he believed that the primary purpose of the DMM was not to impart religious education. According to Hassan, the DMM was launched in the backdrop of the fall of Muslim rule in India in 1857 and that Muhammad Qasim"s vision was not just to set up madaris for educational purposes. He told Manazar Ahsan Gilani that Darul Ulum was set up as a centre to prepare people who could avenge the defeat of 1857 (Gilani, n.d. vol.ii, P.226). Hassan wanted to pursue that vision through an activist approach

It is interesting that both the biological and spiritual successors of Muhammad Qasim (Muhammad Ahmad and Mahmood Hassan respectively) belonged to the same Deobandi tradition. However, their approaches were quite different with regard to the spread of their movement. Muhammad Ahmad preferred to continue with the ascetic approach adopted by the movement in the wake of the post-Mutiny situation. He wanted to preserve and propagate Deobandi Islam through madaris and religious

education. On the other hand, Mahmood Hassan felt confident enough to come out of the ascetic phase. By the end of the 19th century, he was ready to adopt an activist approach and explore the possibilities of an Islamic state where Deobandi Islam could be implemented. It can be argued that the ascetic approach of the DMM continued till the time Rasheed Ahmed was *Sarprast* of the Darul Ulum. After his death in 1905, Hassan became more influential in the affairs of Deobandi movement as a whole whereas Muhammad Ahmad"s role was mostly restricted to the management of the Darul Ulum.

In 1908, the Pricipal (Mahmood Hassan) and the *Mohtamim* (Muhammad Ahmad) decided, in view of the expansion of academic disciplines and rise in number of students, to strengthen the faculty of the Darul Ulum by recalling some old graduates to teach at their alma mater. Consequently, many well-known *ulama* who were running Deobandi madaris in different parts of India joined the Daru-Ulum. These included Anwar Shah from Kashmir, Ubaidullah from Sindh, Murtaza Hassan from Darbhanga, Abdus Samad from Rehrrki and Sahool Bhagalpuri from Calcutta. In addition, Hussain Ahmed Madni, former student of Mahmood Hassan was also called back from Madinah to join the faculty at the Darul Ulum Deoband (Madni, 1954, p.142). Madni later became the principal of the Darul Ulum from 1927 till his death in 1957. During the last nine years of his life, he was also the President of the Deobandi political party, Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind (JUH).

The expansion of faculty at the Darul Ulum marked the rise of an activist approach in the DMM. Most of the new teachers came under the influence of Mahmood Hassan owing to latter"s image as the harbinger of Muhammad Qasim"s ideology (Gilani, n.d. vol.ii, P.226). In 1909, Hassan set up *Jamiat-ul-Ansar*, an alumni association of Darul Ulum, under the leadership of one of his most trusted lieutenants, Ubaidullah Sindhi (1872-1944). Through *Jamiat*, Hassan was able to organize Deobandi *ulama* in India as well as in Afghanistan (Sindhi, 2008, p.111). The *Jamiat* was housed in the Darul Ulum Deoband. Its apparent role was to propagate the teachings of the Darul Ulum and expand the network of Deobandi madaris (Mian, 1957, vol.v. pp. 215-16). However, the exact aims and objectives of this organization were never defined. That is why the role of *Jamiat* has been interpreted differently by different writers. According to Faruqi (1963, p.57), the idea behind *Jamiat* was to lay the foundation of an organization of Deobandi *ulama* who could be mobilized in time of need. Deobandi historian,

Muhammad Mian (1957, vol.v. pp. 196-97) has referred to *Jamiat* as an „outline" of a broader „system", which was to be presented before the ordinary Muslims through Deobandi madaris and its *ulama*. Without giving any concrete idea about that „system", Mian (1957, vol. iv. p. 195) has hinted that Hassan"s major objective was to revive the movement of Syed Ahmed and Muhammad Ismail by bringing together North Western Frontier region of India and Afghanistan.

In order to popularize the idea of *Jamiat-ul-Ansar*, Hassan first used the platform of the Darul Ulum where a big *Jalsa-e-Dastarbandi* (convocation) was held in 1910. That much-advertised event was attended by more than thirty thousand Muslims from all over India (Faruqi, 1963, p.58). Next year, a big public gathering was held under the banner of *Jamiat-ul-Ansar* in Moradabad where more than ten thousand people came to participate. Maulana Ahmad Hassan Amrohawi, who presided over that meeting, said in his speech that *Jamiat* is neither an old boys" association of the Darul Ulum nor an embodiment of anyone"s personal and worldly ambitions; rather its purpose includes all the necessary objectives whose achievement is urgently needed (Mian, 1957, vol.v. pp.198-99).

Although these „necessary objectives" were never explicitly stated by the *Jamiat* leaders (perhaps to avoid any reaction from the colonial government), later activities of Hassan and his followers would indicate that they were perhaps trying to achieve their predecessors" old dream of finding an „external caliph" in an Islamic state where their *ulama* could play the role of „internal caliphs" to propagate and implement Deobandi Islam.

During the Turkey-Italy war (1911-12) and the Balkan Wars (1912-13), *Jamiat* became active to collect funds for the war victims of Turkey. Hassan used his influence on the management of Darul Ulum Deoband to temporarily close the madrassah and engage the students in fund raising for Turkey (Madni, 1921, p.31). According to a British report, Hassan at that time believed that the Darul Ulum should focus more on jihad than religious education. He had, in fact, also started mobilizing his followers and taking *bay'ah* (oath) from them for participation in jihad (Madni, 1954, vol.ii. p.632).

The differences between the Principal Mahmood Hassan and the management of the Darul Ulum became explicit after 1912 when the British Governor of United Provinces

was invited by the management to visit the madrassah where he bestowed the title of *Shamsul Ulama* on Muhammad Ahmad, the *Mohtamim*. Hassan boycotted the whole event and preferred to stay in his office (Mian, n.d. p.265). In 1913, the management reacted by expelling many of his followers from the Darul Ulum without taking him on board. First, Ubaidullah Sindhi, head of the *Jamiat*, was reprimanded by the management for taking part in political activities. Later on, Sindhi along with some of his companions was thrown out of the Darul Ulum in 1913 (Mian, n.d, pp.262-65). The management also issued a *fatwa* declaring Sindhi a *kafir* (non-believer) with respect to some of his religious thoughts, which were considered to be in conflict with Deobandi Islam (Robinson, 1974, p.270). Further, Hassan was also asked to keep away from politics but he ignored these suggestions (Faruqi, 1963, p.59). This rift between the management and Hassan marked a split of the DMM into two parallel streams; one preserving and practicing the Dobandi Islam through madaris and the other politically pursuing the goal of an Islamic state for implementing Deobandi Islam. This implicit division of labour in the DMM has continued since then in one form or another whereby madaris have tried to separate themselves from the manifestations of Deobandi politics in the public space. Despite having different approaches, these two streams have managed to avoid a direct conflict with each other to prevent any damage to the movement. Conversely, these parallel streams have helped sustain and strengthen the movement through their mutual links between the Deobandi madaris and Deobandi politicians, who in turn are mostly the graduates of the same madaris. This has been further explained in the next chapter.

This sharp division in the Deobandi movement in 1913 was clearly identified in the Rowlett Report of the British government that investigated the activities of Hassan and his followers. The report declared the *Mohtamim*, Muhammad Ahmad and his management team as loyal to the British government as opposed to the camp represented by Hassan and Sindhi (Mian, n.d. p.425, 439-40, 449). While acknowledging this division in the movement, most of the Deobandi writers have tried to downplay and rationalize it. However, Deobandi historian Muhammad Mian has tried to give the impression that there were no actual differences between the Principal and the management. He has defended the acts of the management to invite the British Governor and to expel Hassan"s supporters as part of their policy of *maslehat* (short-term compromise or expediency) to avoid any British intervention in the Darul Ulum (Mian, n.d. pp.160-163 & 261-265).

Another Deobandi leader Madni (1954, p.561, 661) while understating such divisions has, however, acknowledged presence of such differences in the movement owing to the soft approach of the management about the British government. According to Madni (1954, p.561), the real fear of the management of the Darul Ulum was that the activist approach of Hassan and *Jamiat* would offend the British to such an extent that the government might decide to permanently close the madrassah. When Madni shared such concerns of the management with Hassan, the latter replied, „the founder of the Darul Ulum, Muhammad Qasim had prayed to God that the madrassah may survive for fifty years; so that period of fifty years has passed by the grace of God and the madrassah has served the purpose for which it was established" (Madni, 1954, vol.ii. p.623). These words of Hassan as well as another of his previously mentioned statement refuting the educational objectives of the madrassah at Deoband while linking it to the revenge for 1857 defeat (Gilani, n.d. vol.ii, p.226), highlight a conflict between the demeanour and intent of the DMM with respect to its goals. Deobandi writers have further mystified things by owning both the demeanour and intent perhaps in order to avoid criticism of any of their leaders. It may be argued here that if Hassan, a close confidant of the DMM founders who is well-acclaimed among all the Deobandis, was right then it becomes hard to declare the DMM an educational movement. In that case, one can argue that Deobandi madaris were to mainly serve as sanctuaries where the value system of a particular version of Islam was to be preserved in the face of British policy of repression against the followers of Syed Ahmed and Muhammad Ismail especially in the post-Mutiny scenario.

For Hassan, the time had already come to mobilize the followers of Ahmed and Ismail to revive their movement, a goal that was pursued by the founders of the DMM when they tried to set up an Islamic state in district Muzaffar Nagar during the Mutiny. Hassan, like Ahmed and Ismail, selected the region of Yaghistan to launch his movement. The reason for selecting that area was not only the historical connection of Ahmed-Ismail movement but also the presence of many graduates of the Darul Ulum in that particular region. The term Yaghistan (literally the lands of freedom and unrestraint) was referred to those tribal areas of North Western region that were independent both from the British and Afghanistan governments (Madni, 1954, p.558). Today, this region mostly forms what is called Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan.

After the events of 1913 at the Darul Ulum, Hassan asked Sindhi to temporarily move to Delhi to work for the *Nizarat-ul-Ma'rif-ul-Quran* (Academy of Quranic Learning). That Academy was established by Hassan, in association with Hakim Ajmal Khan and Wiqar-ul-Mulk, two graduates of Aligarh University. The major objective of the Academy was to instruct the western-educated Muslim youth in the Quranic teachings in a way that would enable them to shake off their ill-founded scepticism about Islamic belief (Madni, 1954, vol.ii. pp. 554-55). The objectives and activities of the Academy hint towards the new approach of the DMM, which tried to influence the mainstream Muslim society through their own interpretation of Islam. Despite the insistence of the Darul Ulum management to continue with the ascetic approach, the influence of Hassan had convinced many Deobandis to be more self-assured and open about their version of Islam. In fact, it was at the start of this activist phase that the DMM aggressively worked to refute the *fatawa* of Ahmad Raza Barelwi, who had declared the DMM founders and many other Deobandi *ulama* as *kafir*. During that period, followers of the DMM collected hundreds of signatures from the Indian *ulama* and testified that the Deobandis were Sunni Hanafi Muslims (Metcalf, 1982, p.310).

In 1915, Hassan commanded Sindhi to proceed to Afghanistan. Within few months of Sindhi"s departure, Hassan himself left for the Hijaz in 1915 to avoid arrest as the British government became alert about his activities. The departure of Hassan was considered by many Indian Muslims as *hijrat* (migration) in line with Abdul Aziz"s 19th century *fatwa* declaring India as *dar-ul-harb* (Mian, n.d. p.276). Therefore, thousands of Muslims came to see him off on different railway stations during his train journey from Deoband to Bombay, where he boarded a ship for the Hijaz (Madni, 1921, pp.38-39). There are two different opinions among the Deobandi writers about the departure of Hassan. Some have interpreted it as part of his plan to get support from the Ottoman Empire against the British. Others on the other hand think that the immediate reason for his departure was to avoid arrest (Madni, 1921, p.37)

In another part of the world, when Sindhi arrived in Kabul, he found a number of people who enthusiastically welcomed him as a representative of Hassan. According to Sindhi (2008, p.112), this influence of Hassan in Afghanistan „was the outcome of fifty years of efforts by DMM"s graduates" in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. Interestingly, Hassan had also mentioned the same number of years for which the madrassah at Deoband was supposed to play its role as per the vision of Muhammad

Qasim. It may be argued that the timing of Hassan's activism suggested that he was perhaps more inspired by Muhammad Qasim's vision than by some specific political plan or strategy.

The true and exact objectives of Hassan's movement are as obscure as those of *Jamiat-ul-Ansar* or even the DMM itself. Sindhi has stated that when Hassan directed him to go to Afghanistan, the latter did not give him any programme or plan (Faruqi, 1963, p.59). Deobandi writers have tried to portray Hassans's movement as a nationalist movement for the freedom of India. However, there is hardly any evidence to prove that the goal of Hassan or Sindhi was to win independence for India from the British. Although it is true that this movement did oppose the British in early 20th century, there is no convincing proof to show that it was a typical freedom movement in the true sense of the word. On the other hand, circumstantial evidence suggests that it was just an attempt by the Deobandis to somehow replicate the earlier movement of Ahmed and Ismail who had temporarily set up an Islamic state in North Western Frontier region. In that sense, the ultimate goal of the DMM could perhaps be the revival of Muslim rule in India at some distant point in future. In such a scenario, India was not to win the kind of freedom it got in 1947 for which the Deobandis have already tried to take credit for by linking it with Hassan's movement.

The objective of Hassan's movement was not much different from that of Ahmed and Ismail. He even adopted a similar approach by propagating jihad and taking *bay'ah* for jihad, which was to be launched in the same region which was selected by the earlier movement. Like Ahmed and Ismail, he also planned to use the famous *fatwa* of Abdul Aziz declaring India as *dar-ul-harb* (Mian, n.d. p.301). However, the strategy of Hassan was a bit different in the sense that he tried to involve the Afghanistan government on the one hand and the Ottoman Empire on the other, as shown in the following discussion.

When Sindhi started organizing people in Kabul for jihad, Hassan advised many Deobandi *ulama* from North Western part of India to move to tribal areas and motivate people for jihad (Mian, n.d. p.373). As a result of that a group named *Junoodullah* (Armies of God) was established in tribal areas under the leadership of Haji Tarangzai of Charsadda, a close friend of Hassan (Madni, 1954, vol.ii. pp.578-79). *Junoodullah*

started fighting against the depleted British forces in Frontier region as the major portion of British armies got engaged on various fronts during World War I.

While Sindhi coordinated with Afghan government to support *Junoodullah*, Hassan met in Makkah the Turk Governor of the Hijaz, Ghalib Pasha, to get the support of the Ottoman Empire for his movement in India. The response of Pasha was positive. That was actually in line with the Ottoman Empire"s tactical approach to revive the pan-Islamic ideas to strengthen its position in the war. Otherwise, the theme of pan-Islam was on the decline in Turkey itself since 1908 when the Young Turks seized power (Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996, p.139). Ghalib Pasha gave three letters to Hassan. First letter was addressed to Indian Muslims and declared support for their struggle against the colonial government. Second one was for Basri Pasha, Governor of Madinah, asking him to help Hassan in meeting Anwar Pasha, Turkish Minister for War. Third letter was for Anwar Pasha stating that Hassan was a reliable person who should be provided help in the form of men and money (Madni, 1954, vol.ii. p.634). Later, Hassan met Anwar Pasha in Madinah to receive another letter of support (Madni, 1954, vol.ii. p.642).

After getting these letters, Hassan"s plan was to go to the tribal areas of Yaghistan and actively launch a jihadi movement with the aim of setting up an Islamic state. He requested Anwar Pasha and Turkish Commander Jamal Pasha to send him to Yaghistan via Kabul using the Iranian route. But he was told that the Russians had blocked the Iranian route while the British had cut the Iraqi route to Kabul making communication impossible between the Ottoman Empire and Afghanistan (Madni, 1954, vol.ii. p.607). Accordingly, Anwar Pasha advised him to go to Yaghistan through India. However, Hassan avoided that due to fear of arrest in India and decided to wait in the Hijaz for the time being.

In the meanwhile, letters provided by Turkish authorities were secretly despatched to India and then onward to Yaghistan for distribution among the followers of the movement. These letters proved to be helpful in lifting the morale of Hassan"s followers in both India and Yaghistan (Mian, n.d. p.359). Sindhi was also trying hard to lure Afghanistan into a war against the British to revive Muslim rule in India. In the tradition of Shah Waliullah who in 18th century had invited Afghan ruler Ahmad Shah Abdali to invade and rule India, Sindhi offered Habibullah that if Kabul attacked India

to defeat the British, the crown prince of Afghanistan would be declared the permanent emperor of India (Mian, 1957, vol.v, p.276). There was also a suggestion to appoint a prince from the Afghan royal family as the head of the rebel provisional government of India in Kabul (Mian, n.d. p.329). However, his efforts failed to convince the Afghan ruler.

Realizing the impending failure of the movement, Sndhi wrote a secret letter to Hassan in 1916 warning the latter not to come to Kabul (Mian, n.d. p.185). That letter by Sindhi was written on yellow silk cloth and was to be delivered to Hassan in the Hijaz through some reliable member of the movement (Mian, n.d. p.185). However, the British government in India got hold of that letter along with another letter addressed to Abdur Rahim Sindhi who was to ensure safe delivery of the first letter to Hassan. In August 1916, a series of investigations was launched by the government to probe and expose Hassan‟s movement, which was named as „Silken Letters Conspiracy‟. In the meantime, Sharif of Makkah had rebelled against the Turks with the help of the British. Soon after that, Hassan and his companions in the Hijaz were arrested by the authorities under Sharif and handed over to the British forces, who exiled him to Malta for the next three years.

During all those years of activism, Darul Ulum Deoband kept itself completely aloof from the followers of Hassan despite the fact that the movement was operating underground until the silken letters were intercepted by the British government in 1916. Although Deobandi writers have tried to downplay the differences between the Darul Ulum and Hassan‟s followers, the division was so clear and sharp that the former was strongly criticized by the latter for serving the interests of the British and even ignoring Hassan‟s family members who were left behind in India (Mian, n.d. p.358).

The management of the Darul Ulum was afraid that if the colonial government found any links between the madrassah and Hassan, the British might close the Deobandi madaris. Therefore, the Darul Ulum preferred to stick to the old ascetic approach for preserving Deobandi Islam by using the madaris as the sanctuaries. It was in line with this ascetic approach that the Darul Ulum Deoband passed a resolution of loyalty to the British at the outbreak of war in 1914 (Robinson, 1974, p.282). Similarly, management of the Darul Ulum did not show any reaction on the arrest and exile of Hassan despite

latter‟s rising popularity and support among the Muslims and non-Muslim nationalists of India.

Apart from the fear of reprisal from the British government, another reason for DMM‟s ascetic approach under Darul Ulum‟s management was its countercultural mindset vis-à-vis the mainstream Muslim society in India. That is why the DMM had not only kept itself away from political issues of Indian Muslims but had also declined to join the Muslim community even on many purely religious matters. For example, they declared against joining *Anjuman-e-Khuddam-Ka'bah*, an organization that was launched to protect the Muslim holy places in the Hijaz and represented all shades of Muslim society in India (Robinson, 1974, p.208). The reason for DMM‟s declaration against the *Anjuman* was clearly not the objectives of the latter, with which no Muslim could disagree. Neither was there any risk of British reprisal as such if the DMM had joined the *Anjuman*. As a matter of fact, the DMM had „no intention of having much to do with a society in which the Firangi Mahalis [sic] were in command‟ (Robinson, 1974, p.209). The Farangi Mahall school of thought followed that version of Islam, which was not acceptable to the Deobandis. Similarly, the DMM was perhaps also not comfortable with other Muslim groups in the Anjuman who represented the folk Islam generally practiced by the mainstream Muslim society.

The DMM also opposed the Lucknow Pact of 1916 between the two biggest political parties of India whereby the major political party of Indian Muslims, All India Muslim League (AIML) succeeded in getting support of Hindu-dominated Indian National Congress to give representation to Muslims in central and provincial legislative councils according to their population. That Pact also provided guarantees to Muslim population with regard to legislation affecting their religious code and practices. That was a remarkable achievement of AIML in the wake of the „home rule‟ and self-government schemes announced by the colonial government.

While AIML tried to interpret the Lucknow Pact in terms of protecting and preserving the Islamic way of life in India, the DMM chose to oppose the agreement despite itself making similar claims about Islam in India. DMM not only objected to the authority of AIML‟s President, Mr. Jinnah to sign that pact but also raised doubts about the likely gains of Indian Muslims through this agreement. Instead, Deobandi leader, Mufti Kifayatullah proposed that the British government should set up Muslim *Shariah* courts

to be headed by the *ualama* (Mian, 1957, vol.v, pp.309-320). Here again, the opposition of the DMM appeared to be inspired by its tendency to dissociate from the popular folk Islam of the ordinary Muslims, which AIML claimed to uphold.

It is interesting to note that the DMM, which later claimed that Hassan's movement was for the freedom of India, was taking in 1916 a contradictory stance by disapproving the Lucknow pact, which was an important milestone on the road to Independence of India. The chief target of DMM's criticism of Lucknow Pact was the AIML, which was the major party claiming to represent the Muslims of India. Although Deobandi historians like Hussain Madni and Muhammad Mian have tried to portray the DMM as a pioneer of freedom struggle in India, the DMM was actually proving the otherwise by passing resolutions of loyalty to the colonial government during World War I, disowning Hassan and his followers and opposing a truly nationalist agreement like the Lucknow Pact.

4.2   DMM's Entry into Active Politics

It is interesting to note that DMM's reaction to the nationalistic spirit of Lucknow Pact was quite opposite to what the movement was to preach in the next few years. Commenting on the Pact in 1917, DMM's Mufti Kifayatullah stated that „it is the duty of Muslim public to give top priority to protect religious independence…We are first Muslims and then Hindi, Arabic, Iranian or Chinese‟ (Mian, 1957, vol.v, p.315). In other words, the DMM, which was to later present itself as the champion of nationalism, was putting the concept of Indian nationalism on the back burner till the second decade of the 20th century. As for their concerns about the protection of religious independence, the Lucknow Pact in no way endangered that independence for Muslims; rather it provided enough space and guarantees to block any laws, which they would find to be against their religious values. If one tries to understand DMM's criticism from countercultural perspective, one may reckon that the Deobandis were mainly concerned about protecting the values of their own version of Islam, which was not likely to get any representation in the proposed legislative councils owing to the fact that the DMM at that time had no political platform of its own and neither was it willing to join other groups and parties that represented the Indian Muslims.

It is remarkable that during 1916 when the DMM was censuring the AIML after the Lucknow Pact, Sindhi wrote in a letter to Hassan that the Darul Ulum was not only

busy serving the colonial government but also feeling proud to be loyal to the royal court (Mian, n.d. p.358). Even if one believes the viewpoint of Deobandi writers that the DMM was actually nationalist at core but was showing loyalty to the British as a policy of *maslehat*, the question still arises as to why the DMM chose at the same time to condemn a party like AIML by declaring it loyal to the colonial government (something the DMM was also doing in one way or the other). In fact, the Deobandis, without giving any benefit of doubt to the AIML, did not hesitate to call Mr. Jinnah an agent of the British (Mian, 1957, vol.vi, p. 169 & 173).

Despite issuing occasional statements on political issues, the DMM, in line with their previous ascetic approach, kept a distance from the Indian politics till 1920. The Deobandis did not show any interest to join the pan-Islamic Khilafat (Caliphate) Movement that was launched by Indian Muslims when they felt that peace proposals after the end of the World War I had falsified the British assurances given to them about Turkey and the Ottoman Caliphate. They were also concerned about the Muslim holy places in the Hijaz which, it seemed to them, could go under the control of non-Muslims (Faruqi, 1963 p.63). The moving spirit behind the Khilafat Movement, like *Anjuman-e-Khuddam-Ka'bah*, was Maulana Abdul Bari of Farangi Mahall school of thought, which upheld the values of folk Islam. The DMM had earlier shown its contempt for the Farangi Mahall school by snubbing Abdul Bari as „a busy body who could not read his Koran[sic] rightly‟ (Robinson, 1974, p.282). This time, when Abdul Bari tried to bring *ulama* together to resist the British policy on the Khilafat issue, the Deobandis opposed it. In fact, *Mohtamim* of Darul Ulum, Muhammad Ahmad took a pro-British position by declaring that „the Indian Muslims were not obliged to help their co-religionists against the British government with which they entered into a contract‟ (Robinson, 1974, p.293). Interestingly, this position of the DMM was to be reversed soon as shall be discussed in the following paragraphs. Here, one may argue that not unlike the the case of *Anjuman*, DMM‟s refusal to join Khilafat Movement was perhaps inspired by its unwillingness to work under the leadership of Abdul Bari (Robinson, 1974, p.209). Otherwise, the Khilafat Movement was launched to protect the Ottoman Caliphate and as such there was no reason for the DMM to refuse participation in it.

In this way, the DMM continued its policy of *maslehat* as well as its countercultural approach of avoiding any close association with *ulama* and Muslim political leaders not

belonging to their own school of thought. This same *maslehat* approach allowed them to reverse their stance during World War II when the Deobandis not only urged the Muslims to oppose the British government but also commended the Hindus for their resistance against the British. On 28 September 1939, pro-Deobandi Urdu daily *Madinah* wrote a satirical editorial whereby it stated, „It is ironical that a nation [Muslims] that had always felt pride in its martial nature and had opposed non-violence of Hindus was standing at the door of the British in a posture of slavish respect with folded hands and stooped neck while the other nation [Hindus], which believed in avoiding war and fighting was standing in front of the British in a bold manner with its head held high and chest straight" (Mian, 1957, vol.vi, p.62).

In the summer of 1920, estranged Deobandi Mahmood Hassan reached Bombay when the British finally ended his exile. The colonial government advised him not to take part in politics hoping he would avoid contact with Khilafatists as was done by the DMM. But he ignored that advice and decided to attend the reception arranged in his honour by the Khilafat Committee of Bombay where he was bestowed with the title of *Shaikh-ul-Hind* (The Elder of India). Abdul Bari specially travelled from his home town of Lucknow to welcome Hassan and brief him about the objectives of the Khailafat Movement and its alliance with Indian National Congress. Gandhi also travelled from Allahabad to Bombay to meet Hassan and update him on the political situation of the country.

Contrary to DMM‟s policy, Hassan not only announced his support for the Khilafat Movement but also issued a *fatwa* giving religious sanction to the non-violent, non-cooperation movement being launched jointly by the Khilafatists and Indian National Congress to resist the British policies vis-à-vis India and the Ottoman Caliphate. The stature and popularity of Hassan among the Indians soon convinced his Deobandi supporters to gather behind him. This situation left the DMM with little choice but to own Hassan as well as Khilafat Movement, which they had earlier opposed. Hassan‟s return actually marked the beginning of active participation of the Deobandis in Indian politics.

The return of Hassan to India brought together the followers of ascetic and activist approaches in Deobandi movement, which finally seemed to be settling under the undisputed leadership of Hassan who, owing to his alliance with Khilafists and

Congress, was now considered more as a nationalist than Deobandi religious leader. When Hassan later visited Deoband, he asked *Mohtamim* of Darul Ulum Muhammad Ahmad to return the title of *Shams-ul-Ulama* granted to the latter by the British government. That was part of the non-cooperation strategy of the Khialfat Movement and Congress. Muhammad Ahmad found it impossible to resist Hassan and made the announcement to return the title. However, he continued to receive the periodic financial support given to such title-holders (Mian, 1957, vol.v, p.388).

Hassan soon adjusted to his new role of a Muslim nationalist leader by lifting himself above the identity of a Deobandi activist. Therefore, he did not hesitate to join those students of Aligarh University, old nemesis of Darul-Ulum Deoband, who decided to boycott classes in line with non-cooperation movement, which required people to sever ties with every institution that received funds from the colonial government. Despite his illness, Hassan presided over a ceremony in Aligarh in October 1920 to lay the foundation of Muslim University (which was later shifted to Delhi in 1925 and was named Jamia Millia). His speech there showed as if he had made up his mind to take Deobandi movement to the mainstream Muslim society instead of restricting it to madaris. While criticizing the government"s influence on the original Aligarh University, he suggested a model for the mainstream education on the pattern of the DMM whereby educational institutions should be independent from the funds and influence of the government (Mian, 1957, vol.v, p.377).

In November 1920, Hassan agreed to preside over the second annual conference of *Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Hind* (JUH), a platform of Indian *ulama* established a year ago through the efforts of Abdul Bari Farangi Mahall, who was the president of the first JUH Conference in 1919. Hassan, in his presidential address, reminded the Indian *ulama* that „God has somehow made the biggest nation of India [Hindus] your ally in achieving your noble objective [*pak maqsad*]". He emphasized that both Hindu and Muslim nations should work together for the independence of India; otherwise, he thought, the grip of the British government would get even stronger and „the already-dim imprint of Islamic rule [in India] would be erased forever" (Mian, 1957, vol.v, pp.363-64). Although Hassan did not explain the said „noble objective", it can be inferred from the contents of his speech that what he visualized was perhaps more than just the independence of India. It may be added that he had already nodded to the idea of appointing an *Ameer-e-Hind* (religious leader of whole India) to implement the

mandates of *Shariah* (Gilmartin, 1988, p.63). Another important point to be noted in what turned out to be his last speech was that he referred to Hindus and Muslims (at least five times in his short address) as two different nations, a fact that was to be completely ignored by his Deobandi successors in the coming years. Just one week after that speech, Hassan died on 30 November 1920.

A closer look at the last two speeches of Hassan suggests that after the failure of his movement to revive Muslim rule in India or to set up some Islamic state in North Western Frontier region, he seemed to be convinced that the DMM alone could not succeed in establishing an Islamic state where its *ulama* could serve as „internal caliphs" to implement their version of Islam. As mentioned earlier, this idea of finding an „outer caliph" or „pious sultan" in an Islamic state had not worked during Waliullah"s time when he invited Ahmad Shah Abdali of Afghanistan to invade India. Later, Syed Ahmed and Ismail temporarily established such a state in Pushtun tribal areas but their government soon fell owing to resistance from the Sikh forces as well as from some tribal leaders who found that peculiar Islamic state to be in conflict with their socio-cultural practices. Hassan"s movement was a third such failed attempt to set up an Islamic state involving Afghanistan and North Western tribal areas.

After his return from exile, Hassan appeared to have changed his strategy as is evident from his above-mentioned last two speeches. His new strategy required the DMM on the one hand to get cooperation from the mainstream Muslim society while ignoring its countercultural conflict with the latter. On the other hand, he preferred an alliance with nationalist Hindus to fight for freedom of India from the colonial rule. For example, he said at Aligarh, „O youth of my country, when I realized that sympathisers to my distress [at the British supremacy] are less in madaris and *khanqahs* and more in schools and colleges, I along with some sincere friends took a step towards Aligarh...It is not unlikely that many well-intentioned elders would criticize my trip [to Aligarh] and declare that I deviated from the path of my predecessors" (Mian, 1957, vol.v, p.375).

Further, he adopted a softer approach towards mainstream education while defending DMM founders" opposition to the western education. He stated, „My great predecessors never issued a *fatwa* of *kufr* against learning foreign language or sciences and skills belonging to other nations. But yes, it was certainly said that if the final impact of

western education is that people get immersed in Christianity or they ridicule their religion and co-religionists through atheistic contempt or they start worshipping the government of the day, then it is better for a Muslim to stay illiterate than getting such education". Referring to Gandhi's statement declaring modern education as a pure and clean milk with a pinch of poison in it, Hassan said, "Thanks to God who enabled the youth of my nation to differentiate between what is beneficial and what is harmful for them and then separate that poison from the milk through a chelating agent...Muslim University is that chelating agent" (Mian, 1957, vol.v, p.376).

During his other speech at the JUH meeting, Hassan stressed the need for an alliance between Hindus and Muslims. He said, "I consider the unity and agreement between the two to be very useful and decisive". He also preached for broadening the scope of the JUH by asking the *ulama*, "Through wisdom and good advice, absorb in your party those people who are presently separate from you" (Mian, 1957, vol.v, p.380).

One may argue here that Hassan's post-exile strategy was based on cooperation with the mainstream Muslim society on the one hand and with the Hindu-dominated Congress on the other. However, there is no evidence to suggest that Hassan's new strategy was in any way meant to drop the goal of Islamic state. In fact, that goal seemed to be delayed until after independence of India, which actually meant the simultaneous liberation of a vast Muslim area (Faruqi, 1963, p.71) thus increasing the possibility of creating a state where Deobandi version of Islam could be implemented. Such a strategy would have required the DMM to temporarily ignore its countercultural approach towards the socio-cultural practices of ordinary Muslims. Hassan, through his visit to dissident Aligarh students showed that he was willing to hold back that approach at least for the time being. But after his death, the Deobandi leadership both at the Darul Ulum and JUH was not able to take that strategy forward either due to their lack of understanding of Hassan's initiative or their inability to follow it under the changed circumstances. However, as far as cooperation with Hindus was concerned, the Deobandis completely followed Hassan's advice as shall be discussed in section 4.4.

Hassan had already found an appropriate forum for his new strategy in the form of JUH, which he was to head. However, his death immediately after he was appointed president of JUH and the later developments in Turkey leading to the end of Caliphate

changed the scenario on the political horizon of India leading to a sudden decline in the role of *ulama* in politics (Robinson, 1974, p.338)

To recap the preceding discussion, there were two factors that inspired the DMM to come out of its ascetic phase and adopt an activist stance: tempting times indicating towards the rise of religion and *ulama* in the political field; and indomitable influence of Hassan‟s new strategy to join nationalist freedom struggle after the failure of latter‟s decade-long secret movement. Hassan‟s movement had created serious differences between his followers and the Darul Ulum Deoband, which preferred to continue with the old ascetic approach. However, once Hassan returned to India after three years of exile, the DMM finally adopted his activist approach by developing close links between the two streams of madaris and politics.

As its activist approach became officially recognized when the DMM joined JUH, it was not unlikely for some Deobandis to resist this change after having followed an ascetic approach for more than half a century. As a result of this resistance, a group of Deobandi *ulama* decided to set up *Tablighi Jamaat* (proselytizing group) under the leadership of a prominent Deobandi scholar, Maulana Muhammad Ilyas (1885-1944). The major objective of this off-shoot of the DMM was to inform the ordinary Muslims of distant regions of the subcontinent about the basic tenets of Islam while strictly keeping away from the public arena of elections and parties. According to Metcalf (1993), the focus of the *Tablighi Jamaat* (TJ) was the spiritual formation of individuals. Although TJ apparently opposed the activist approach of Mahmood Hassan in politics, Maulana Ilyas at least seemed to have shared former‟s vision about approaching the mainstream Muslim society while de-emphasizing the role of madaris in line with what he considered the vision of DMM founder (Madni, 1954, vol.ii. p.623). Therefore, he decided to adopt an activist approach by trying unsuccessfully to revive Muslim rule in India or at least set up an Islamic state in tribal areas on the North Western Frontier. However, TJ adopted an approach different from both the ascetic and activist approaches of the DMM. Instead of establishing new madaris to continue with the previous ascetic approach or aggressively opposing the mainstream Muslim society, TJ apparently adopted a „mystic‟ countercultural approach. According to Yinger (1982, pp.91-95) a mystic counterculture is represented by „those who are searching for the truth and for themselves‟. This type of counterculture prefers to disregard the mainstream society rather than attacking it.

Behaving like a mystic counterculture, TJ preferred to focus on the spiritual formation of individuals (Metcalf, 1993). It stayed away from politics on the one hand and avoided criticism of practices of folk Islam on the other. The favourite refrain of TJ missions visiting the ordinary Muslims was that „we concern ourselves only with what is in the heavens above and the grave below" (Sikand, 2006). Calling his movement a „*khanqah* on the move" (Troll, 1994), Maulana Ilyas stated that „the aims of modern political authority and Islam do not coincide and that if Islam were to make any progress, it must be divorced from politics" (Haq, 1972, p.170 quoted in Sikand, 2006). At the same time, the Tablighi texts avoided criticism of those customary practices of Indian Muslims, which were considered wrong by the DMM (Metcalf, 1993). TJ actually believed that „by doing away with material pursuit of happiness and worldliness, the Tablighi Jamaat principles help members make in-roads to a new unity between Muslims and Allah" (Ali, 2003).

As the popularity and following of TJ increased outside the Indian subcontinent, it gradually acquired an identity different from the DMM. Owing to its policy to avoid any link with a sect or sub-sect, TJ attracted members and followers from different sects and *madhabs*. This diversification coupled with a soft approach towards folk Islam further separated TJ from the DMM. However, TJ continued to get support from Deobandi mosques in the subcontinent where *Tablighi* missions stayed during their proselytizing tours. In this regard, TJ could be considered a pro-Deobandi organization. Otherwise, it gradually developed as a movement independent from the DMM. As such, a detailed study of TJ is beyond the scope of this thesis.

4.3   Countercultural Politics of Deobandi JUH

Jamait-e-Ulama-e-Hind (JUH) represented an era marked by the rise and hegemony of *ulama* in Indian politics. It was a unique platform in the sense that it brought together the *ulama* of all shades of opinion. Abdul Bari had finally succeeded in bringing some Deobandi *ulama* on board by offering a leading role to Mufti Kifayatulah, a graduate of Darul Ulum Deoband. Kifayatullah became President of JUH after Mahmood Hassan‟s death in December 1920 and continued in that position till 1938 when he was replaced by the then-Principal of the Darul Ulum, Hussain Ahmad Madni, who led JUH till his death in 1957. Although JUH initially included *ulama* of different schools of thought, it was soon dominated by the Deobandis as the *ulama* belonging to other religious groups

left it after the decline of non-cooperation movement as well as Khilafat agitation in early 1920s.

JUH had an ambitious programme, which included: providing guidance to the Indian Muslims according to *Shariah*; defending Islam, the Caliphate and other centres of Islam; protecting Islamic rituals and customs; organizing *ulama* on a common platform; fighting for the freedom of the country and religion according to *Shariah*; and propagate Islam in India and foreign lands (Faruqi, 1963, p.68). The ultimate goal of JUH, it seemed, revolved around a single pivot i.e. *Shariah*, which could be correctly understood and interpreted only by the *ulama* who considered themselves its custodian; therefore the correct lead for the Muslims could come only from them (Faruqi, 1963, pp.69-70).

The DMM saw an opportunity in JUH to grab the leadership of Indian Muslims and to find some space to impose Deobandi version of Islam on the latter. It is worth noting that during the inception meeting of JUH, Syed Jalib, Editor of newspaper *Humdam*, suggested that instead of setting up a separate political party, the *ulama* should better work alongside AIML, which was already representing the Muslims of India. Deobandi leader Kifayatullah opposed that proposal and stated that the the political field could not be left at the mercy of those who had no knowledge of Islam (Mian, 1957, vol.v, pp.237-38). The Deobandis thought that cooperation with AIML was not possible because western-educated Muslim intelligentsia of AIML (mostly drawn from Aligarh University) was representatives of a different culture. The cultural concerns of the Deobandis about AIML can be illustrated by the following excerpt quoted by Faruqi (1963, p.76) from an official publication of JUH written by Muhammad Mian under the title of *Jamiat-ul-Ulam Kia Hai?* (What is JUH?):

„The situation is this that in matters of daily behaviour and culture the western-educated class, both Hindu and Muslim, has accepted a new culture and discarded their old cultural norms. This new culture is so uniform that hardly any distinction can be made between the Hindus and the Muslims. As for the masses, their culture varies from place to place in accordance with the general culture of the majority of the area. In the Punjab and other Muslim provinces a Hindu looks like a Musalman[sic] while in provinces of Hindu majority the situation is the reverse".

The above-mentioned excerpt shows that the Deobandis were not ready to accept any culture except that of their own. That is why Habib-ur-Rehman of Deoband declared that JUH was superior to all other Muslim organizations and conferences in India (Robinson, 1974, p.337). Not unlike the countercultural movements, this pride of the DMM in its own values and derision for those of other Muslims, kept the Deobandis in conflict on the one hand with the urban middle class Muslims (represented by AIML) and on the other with the lower socio-economic class living in small towns and rural areas, where folk Islam was popular owing to the influence of the Barelwis (Metcalf, 1982, p.297).

DMM‟s cooperation with the Muslim leadership was restricted to its short-lived association with *ulama* of different schools of thought on the JUH platform during the period of 1920-24. However, it is interesting to note that even during that period the DMM was able to avoid the Barelwi *ulama* who not only stayed away from JUH but also showed little enthusiasm for the Khilafat Movement. After the failure of non-cooperation and Khilafat movements when *ulama* of different shades lost prominence on the political scene during mid-1920s, the DMM became the sole spokesman of JUH. In line with Hassan‟s advice, JUH extended full cooperation to Hindus and Congress party. However, at the same time Deobandi *ulama*, owing to their countercultural inclinations, found it hard to go along smoothly with parties and leaders representing mainstream Muslim society. Apart from expressing their original aversion for *pirs* as well as customs and practices of folk Islam, Deonadis also showed a „deep-rooted distrust‟ towards political leaders in the Indian legislative councils, which were composed of members of various communities under the British control (Faruqi, 1963, p77).

During mid-1920s, when several bills regarding changes in the existing laws on civil marriage, child marriage and *hajj* (pilgrimage to Makkah) were introduced in the legislature, JUH protested by organising campaigns not only against the government but also against Muslim legislators whose requests for guidance were ignored by Deobandi *ulama* (Faruqi, 1963, p.77). In fact, when a Central *Hajj* Committee in 1924 recommended that intending *hajj* pilgrims should purchase a return ticket to avoid being stranded in the Hijaz for want of money, a bill was drafted by the government. One Muslim member Muhammad Yaqub translated the draft and sent it to the Darul Ulum Deoband and JUH for comments. Both these organizations did not offer any

comment for one year and when Central Legislative Assembly gave leave to introduce the bill in February, 1925, Deobandi *ulama* suddenly sprang into action by blaming the Muslim legislators and declaring their leader Mr. Jinnah as the arch-conspirator (Nagarkar, 1975, p.157).

Similar aggressive reaction was shown by Deobandi *ulama* on the occasion of introduction in September 1927 of Child Marriage Bill, which was termed by JUH as interference in Muslim Personal law. Many Muslim legislators were ready to support the Bill when it was disclosed in the Assembly that according to 1921 census there were 1,575 married Muslim children below the age of one year, 2,000 in the age group of 1-2 year, 6,000 in the age group 2-3 year and so on. This disclosure was followed by a scholarly debate between Muslim legislators, whose majority was in the favour of prohibiting child marriages in the country. Mr. T.A.K. Sherwani of AIML stated that „Islam never contemplated child marriages, that the scriptures left the question entirely to the person who wanted to marry, that the only verse in the Koran [sic] pertaining to marriages of women contained Arabic word *nissa* which meant a grown-up woman and not a child, that the early Muslim jurists had only allowed the pre-Islamic custom of child marriages to continue but the laws could be changed and were not immutable" (Nagarkar, 1975, p.168). He also quoted an extract from Hadith, which when translated meant, „Do not marry a virgin unless she gives her consent by inclination". Mr Sherwani added, „In the face of this *hadis* [sic] I ask my Mussalman [sic] friends whether they can oppose this bill. On receipt of a telegram by Jamiat-ul-Ulema, I sent a long reply followed by reminders. I also quoted my authorities but I have yet to receive a reply. There is not a single verse in the Koran, there is not a single *hadis* [sic] which recommends pre-puberty marriage" (Nagarkar, 1975, p.168). The Bill was eventually passed. It was supported by thirteen and opposed by six Muslim members.

The above discussion shows that the DMM was not a reform movement as has generally been assumed in the literature produced by the writers like Smith (1943), Metcalf (1982), Berkey (2007) and Riaz (2008). In fact, the DMM was not even a purely revitalization movement in the sense that it was more concerned with opposing the prevalent customs and values than reviving the ones prevalent during the early period of Islam. Deobandis have used the revivalist argument mostly to condemn the customs and practices of the mainstream Muslim society. Otherwise, they were ready to improvise and rationalize when it applied to their own group. For example, JUH

supported and justified the Gandhian ideas of non-violent non-cooperation for the resistance movement against the British when those ideas were challenged as being alien to Islam. Mahmood Hassan gave religious sanction to the idea of non-cooperation by issuing a *fatwa*, which was later ratified by about 500 *ulama* of JUH. He declared that „religious standing of this issue [non-cooperation] is undeniable. In these circumstances, it is obligatory upon the honour of a true Muslim that he should: i) return official titles and honours; ii) refuse participation in modern councils of the country; iii) use only local things and products; iv) not send his children to government schools and colleges‟ (Madni, 1954, pp.675). Hassan justified his position by stating that if modern weapons could be allowed for violent resistance against the enemy, then the same line of argument can be extended to resist an infidel British government through non-violent non-cooperation (Madni, 1954, pp.679-80). However, that argument was self-contradictory vis-à-vis DMM‟s policy of earlier cooperation with the British for more than half a century.

In order to justify the resistance to the British in his *fatwa*, Hassan employed those Quranic verses, which forbade for Muslims any cooperation and friendship with *kuffar* (infidels). However, he simultaneously chose to ignore the fact that while declining cooperation and friendship with the British infidels, he was allowing the Muslims to join hands with Hindus who were also *kuffar*. Looking from a Deobandi perspective, the afore-mentioned *fatwa* was perhaps part of their *maslehat* policy. However, if their support to the idea of non-cooperation is viewed from the countercultural perspective, it can be assumed that the DMM accepted this idea because it was presented by Hindus who were placed outside the scope of Deobandi counterculture, which was by definition restricted to Muslim society. If the above line of argument is further extended, it can be visualized that the Deobandis might have opposed or condemned the very same idea of non-cooperation if it had been presented or practiced by the mainstream Muslim society because a counterculture is fundamentally concerned with an intra-societal (within Muslims in case of the DMM) rather than an inter-societal (Hindu versus Muslim) conflict. Another example of DMM‟s flexibility and improvisation to justify its own stance was the decision of JUH in 1931 to support, on Congress‟ insistence, the ideas of adult franchise and elections, which had earlier been declared un-Islamic by the Deobandis in 1923 (Nagarkar, 1975, p.131 and 227).

There are several examples where the DMM appeared (unlike a revitalization movement) to be supporting or following those customs and practices, which never existed during the early period of Islam. For instance, from dress to dining and from travelling to technology, the Deobandis adopted the new trends and innovations while simultaneously continuing to condemn the customs and practices of other Muslims on the ground that those were *bida'* (wrongful innovations), which did not exist during the time of the Prophet and his companions. A detailed discussion on such customs and practices is given in Chapter 6.

4.4   Deobandi Opposition to Pakistan Movement

This section shall discuss how the countercultural disposition of the DMM influenced its political behaviour that was more concerned with „intra-societal‟ conflict within the Muslim community than the „inter-societal‟ disagreements between Muslims and other religions. The following discussion on DMM‟s opposition to Pakistan movement shall also try to analyze the political position of the Deobandis whereby they extended unconditional cooperation to Hindu-dominated Congress while never missing an opportunity to criticize AIML, which claimed to champion the cause of the rights of Indian Muslims (Faruqi, 1963, p.79).

Deobandi historian Syed Muhammad Mian has repeatedly termed AIML and its leader Mr. Jinnah as the agents of the British government (Mian, 1957, vol.vi, p.76, 85, 87, 107, 115, 165, 173-75, 257). He declares that „Muslim League and its Quaid-e-Azam, by dancing to the tune of British imperialism, have left no stone unturned to abase the Indian Muslims in the history of independence‟ (Mian, 1957, vol.vi, p.68). Similarly, Hussain Madni, Darul Ulum‟s principal, wrote a pamphlet titled „Eight Muslim-cidal [*Muslim-kush*] Mistakes of The Muslim League‟ whereby he stated that Muslim League leaders had „conceived a conspiracy in alliance with Tory leadership, which included Lord Lloyd, Lord Hertford, Lord Sydenham and others. Whenever signs of weakness or defeat [of the British in India] appeared, Tory Lords whole-heartedly backed the communal leaders [of AIML to get latter‟s support for the British]‟ (Mian, 1957, vol.vi, p.257). In 1939, when AIML disagreed with the Congress on the issue of war and India‟s future and asked the British government not to make any future plan without the approval of AIML, Chief Organizer of Deobandi JUH, Maulana Ahmed Saeed issued a statement to condemn Jinnah and his party. He declared, „it is a well known reality that the Viceroy needed at this critical juncture a party of Muslims that

he could use to beat the Congress...[British] government faced no difficulty in this [regard] as Mr. Jinnah took the *bay'ah* [of the British]" (Mian, 1957, vol.vi, pp.82-83). These allegations of the DMM against the AIML lead to an interesting debate. If AIML was pro-British, the Deobandis should have perhaps fared better by initially supporting the former on Lucknow Pact of 1916 as well as Jinnah's policy of „loyal" nationalism because that was perfectly in line with DMM's policy of *maslehat* whereby it maintained a pro-British stance till 1920. In that case, the colonial rulers would also have appreciated the DMM for supporting a party and a leader who were „British agents". However, the DMM, on the contrary, set aside its policy of *maslehat* in this case by aggressively criticising the „loyal" AIML while simultaneously keeping itself also loyal to the British. Here, one can assume that either DMM's own argument for adopting a *maslehat* policy vis-à-vis British government was not valid or their allegations against the AIML and Jinnah were untrue.

However, if one takes both these viewpoints of the DMM to be true, then one can infer that DMM's opposition of the AIML was so intense that the Deobandis took the risk of offending the colonial rulers by confronting their agents i.e. AIML. It is quite remarkable that the Deobandis did not take that risk for more than fifty years since its inception. It was the same inability to undertake that venture that had compelled the DMM to disown the Principal of their Darul Ulum for many years. In this scenario, the Deobandi opposition to AIML (which claimed to represent the majority of the Indian Muslims) can perhaps be better understood only in terms of the countercultural leaning of the DMM as discussed below. The following discussion about the politics of JUH also hints that it was perhaps not unlikely that Deobandi opposition to the idea of Pakistan was not only about politics but also about counterculture.

Without discounting JUH's political stance of blaming AIML as an agent of the British, one may argue that Deobandi *ulama*'s hostile attitude towards AIML reflected their condemnation of mainstream Muslim society and its folk Islam, which came in direct conflict with Deobandi sect. Faruqi (1963, p.80) has highlighted the different perspectives of AIML and Deobandi *ulama* of JUH regarding Islam. He has stated that Deobandi *ulama* were neither intellectually well-equipped to give new interpretation to Islam nor were they committed to Shah Waliullah's tradition of *tatbiq*. Therefore, they were not likely to win the support of the western-educated urban Muslims who were trained in an entirely new set of traditions. Similarly, rural Muslims who followed folk

Islam were also opposed to Deobandi sect owing to latter's countercultural stance on popular customs and traditional *sufism*.

JUH's opposition to AIML was also linked to earlier Deobandi criticism of Islamic modernist, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan whose Aligarh University was the alma mater of many leaders of the AIML. In 1891, the founder of the DMM, Rasheed Ahmed had issued a *fatwa* declaring that Muslims „should not keep any connection with Syed Ahmad Sahib irrespective of the fact if he talks about national welfare in name only or if he is a well-wisher in actuality. His involvement in the affairs of the Muslims is a killer poison for both Islam and Muslims. He makes one drink a sweet poison that ultimately kills. Therefore, avoid joining him. [However], you may work together with Hindus" (Mian, 1957, vol.v, p.163). Taking lead from that *fatwa*, the DMM also opposed AIML. According to Deobandi writer Mian (1957, vol.v, pp.166-67), „Muslim League and its leaders are far ahead than Sir Syed and his associates with respect to such dangers [modernism]. Not to mention the practices of praying and fasting, they are not even properly aware of these acts of worship. For them, the commandments of the Quran are, God forbid, backward and cumbersome vis-a-vis the modern developments...[They] are typically European in demeanour; have a resolute intent to end the power of the *ulama*; and are an amalgamation of the Muslims, Shias and Qadyanis".

During the early years of AIML, the Deobandis believed that „League's politics is only about getting the share of Muslims in those rights and positions [already] achieved by the Hindus. This is not true politics. Asking the government to meet people's demands is true politics and this passion derives an equal force from the religion. Owing to the absence of this [religious] force, a member of the Muslim League is unable to bear any loss and hence lacks the will-power and courage" (Mian, 1957, vol.v, p.291). After 1930, when AIML motivated the Muslims for a separate Muslim state, the Doebandi criticism was to take a different turn whereby the intentions of the AIML were questioned. Mian (1957, vol.v, p.166) justified that Deobandi criticism in the light of the above-mentioned *fatwa* by stating that „it is extremely dangerous to join and relate with such Muslims who achieve their personal objectives and ideas in the name of Islam". Such Deobandi opposition mostly kept JUH in a camp opposite to AIML.

The countercultural character of the Deobandis was more explicitly reflected in their politics in 1920s when poet-philosopher and leader of AIML, Dr. Muhammad Iqbal provided the intellectual content as well as emotional vigour to the general separatist feeling among the Muslim community vis-à-vis the Hindus. Although Iqbal had been referring to the „unconscious trends of the two communities" regarding their identities as separate nations since his return from Europe in 1908, his belief in two-nation theory actually got strengthened after the rise of Hindu revivalist movements like *Shuddhi* (proselytization) and *Sanghatan* (organization) in reaction to Muslim religious parties like JUH. In fact, Iqbal interpreted the Indian nationalism of Congress as part of neo-Hinduism (Faruqi, 1963, p.85).

During his landmark presidential address to the annual session of AIML at Allahabad in 1930, Iqbal declared Hindus and Muslims as two separate nations in the light of religious, social, cultural and historical contexts. While recognizing the right of each community to free development according to its own cultural traditions, Iqbal put forward a proposal, which contained the seeds of the demand for a separate homeland for the Indian Muslims. He said, „I would like to see the Punjab, North West Frontier Province, Sindh and Baluchistan, amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India" (Ikram, 1970, p.169).

A strongly negative reaction of Deobandi leaders of JUH to this official declaration of two-nation theory by Iqbal exposed DMM"s approach towards AIML, which was the mainstream party of the Muslims. If principles and history were to be any guide, the Deobandis should not have opposed the two-nation theory because their leader Mahmood Hassan had himself repeatedly described Muslims and Hindus as two separate nations in his last address (Mian, 1957, vol.v, pp.380-81). Similarly, the idea of a Muslim state had also been pursued by Hassan as well as his predecessors like Shah Waliullah, Syed Ahmed and Muhammad Ismail. However, Deobandi leaders of JUH chose to ignore their history and principles. Instead, they allowed their countercultural biases to dominate their policy, which required them to oppose the mainstream Muslim society that was to be looked down upon when compared with the Deobandi Islam.

For a counterculture, the rest of the society to which it belongs is to be considered as wrong and evil (Yinger, 1982, p.91). Therefore, an idea from such a society also needs to be condemned as wrong and evil. Accordingly, JUH not only opposed the two-nation theory put forward by Iqbal of AIML but also decided to redefine the concept of nation for Indian Muslims. Hussain Madni, principal of Darul Ulum Deoband and a top leader of JUH, stated that in modern times nations were formed by lands and that the Indian Muslims should accept this view (Faruqi, 1963, p.88). In support of his definition of nationalism for Indian Muslims, Madni argued that if the British, in order to promote Arab independence, could declare Turks and Arabs as different nations, then all Indians (both Muslims and Hindus) should also be considered as a separate nation from the British and thus deserved independence (Mian, 1957, vol.v, p.574).

That argument in favour of a United Indian Nationalism did not appear to be convincing vis-à-vis two-nation theory adopted by AIML because Madni was apparently trying to explain his idea of United Nationalism in the context of freedom movement while ignoring the sharp communal divisions between the Hindus and the Muslims of India. Therefore, Madni‟s idea of composite Indian nationalism did not cut much ice with Muslim intellectuals and masses who considered it to be something unusual in Islamic ideology (Nagarkar, 1975, p.304).

By taking that modern and innovative stance, Madni chose to ignore the history of Islam as well as his own Deobandi movement, which had always looked for a peculiar and purified identity of Muslims. If one has to look at this „re-interpretation‟ of Muslim nation through the countercultural lens of DMM, one might end up considering it akin to a *bida'*. Madni was perhaps himself aware of the novelty and uniqueness of his interpretation of Indian Muslims‟ status in the context of modern concept of nation state. That is why he tried to liken his United Indian Nationalism with the Prophet‟s alliance with the Jews of Madinah (Mian, 1957, vol.v, p.582). However, that was not a strong argument in the sense that the Prophet had made an agreement with the Jews, called *Misaq-e-Madinah* (Charter of Madinah), which was more like a defence treaty against any outside aggression. On the other hand, JUH and Congress had never hinted at the possibility of such a formal agreement between two communities of India. Further, there was nothing in that Charter to consider Muslims and Jews of Madinah as one nation. The example of that Charter was also not very appropriate in the sense that

it had fallen apart within four years when the Muslims of Madinah forced the Jewish tribe of Banu Nadheer to go into exile for violating the agreement.

The Deobandis also tried to defend their idea of United Indian Nationalism in the backdrop of Prophet"s love for his homeland Makkah, which was dominated by non-Muslims just like India. This was again not a very relevant argument because Prophet"s love for Makkah was not just because he was born there but that love was more to do with that city"s sacred and holy status for the Muslims as a whole. India did not carry any such sacredness for Muslims. Further, the Prophet had to migrate from Makkah and he did not choose to make it his abode even after it was conquered by the Muslims.

Madni, while asserting that the United Indian Nationalism was not contrary to the spirit of Islam, stated that such a type of nationality was necessary in India because people of different religions shared the same problems, the same happiness and the same miseries despite their religious differences (Nagarkar, 1975, p.305). It sounds quite perplexing that the Deobandis, who had always highlighted their differences with the overall Muslim society, were ready to find similarities with people of other religions. In fact, that vision of the Deobandis also reflected their peculiar mindset, which was more concerned about counterculture within Muslims than cultures of other religions.

Dr. Muhammad Iqbal was quite surprised by the unique approach of Hussain Madni and other Deobandis to define and defend United Indian Nationalism. In his presidential address delivered at the annual session of All India Muslim Conference at Lahore on 21 March, 1932, Iqbal said, „I am opposed to nationalism as it is understood in Europe, not because, if it is allowed to develop in India, it is likely to bring less material gain to Muslims. I am opposed to it because I see in it the germs of atheistic materialism which I look upon as the greatest danger to modern humanity. Patriotism is a perfectly natural virtue and has a place in the moral life of man. Yet that which really matters is a man"s faith, his culture, his historical tradition. These are the things, which in my eyes, are worth living for and dying for, and not the piece of earth with which the spirit of man happens to be temporarily associated" (Faruqi, 1963, pp.88-89).

As Iqbal"s ideas about two-nation theory caught the imagination of Muslims of India, Mr. Jinnah decided to re-organize AIML by weaning away the Muslim masses from Congress and Muslim nationalist organizations like JUH. By the end of 1930s, Hindu-

Muslim division had reached to such a point where no compromise on the subject of United Indian Nationalism was possible. The mass contact of Congress and JUH in favour of that United Nationalism had already failed (Faruqi, 1963, pp.89-90). Mr. Jinnah had also made up his mind by then about the future strategy for a final fight with the Congress. That strategy was announced in the landmark Lahore session of AIML in March 1940 whereby a resolution was passed demanding separate homelands for the Muslims of India comprising the Muslim majority areas. That resolution was termed by the nationalist media as a demand for an independent Pakistan.

When historic Lahore Resolution was passed on 23 March 1940, the Deobandis got another opportunity to display its countercultural approach by attacking AIML and its idea of a separate Muslim country, Pakistan. Within one month of Lahore Resolution, the Deobandis organized an Azad Muslim Conference under JUH to denounce it. On the other hand, Lahore Resolution immediately increased the popularity of AIML in the mainstream Muslim society that chose to call Mr. Jinnah as Quaid-e-Azam (The Greatest Leader). The demand for a separate homeland had remarkably broadened the appeal of AIML, which had earlier been labelled as an organization representing the interests of the Muslim bourgeoisie. Later, when AIML tactfully presented the demand for Pakistan in terms of religious and cultural freedom along with the cry of ‚Islam in danger‟, the Muslim masses gathered behind AIML and Pakistan became a common goal of the majority of Indian Muslims. As the Pakistan movement gathered momentum, the old rivalry between the DMM and Aligarh was revived as Deoband became the citadel of opposition to Pakistan while Aligarh turned out to be the training centre of ‚*mujahidin-i-Pakistan'*- holy warriors of Pakistan (Faruqi, 1963, p.104).

The demand for an independent Muslim state was not supposed to be an alien idea for the Deobandis in view of the earlier efforts of Shah Wailullah, Syed Ahmed and Muhammd Ismail as well as Mahmood Hassan and Ubaidullah Sindhi. The history should have ideally convinced Deobandi leaders of JUH to at least not oppose the idea of a Muslim state even if they were not ready to support it. However, the immediate response of the Deobandis was that of shock and comprehensive opposition of the demand for a separate state for Indian Muslims. The potential source of their condemnation of a not-so-unfamiliar idea was the reality that it was being presented by those Muslims whose customs and values came into conflict with Deobandi Islam.

The Deobandis, prima facie, criticized the idea of Pakistan as being the conspiracy of the colonial government to prevent the emergence of a strong United India. They blamed, without the support of any evidence, AIML and Mr. Jinnah as the agents of the British. They were not ready to give any benefit of doubt to AIML despite the fact that they themselves had shown open loyalty to the British. JUH leaders also tried to oppose the creation of Pakistan in the context of economic development of the Muslims that was to be hurt in case of partition of India. They labelled it as a British design to keep the Muslims backward, a design the former had pursued for more than a century after ending the Muslim rule in India (Faruqi, 1963, pp.106-08). This line of argument was again based more on conspiracy theory than evidence.

Another Deobandi argument against partition was presented by Hussain Madni who believed that Pakistan movement would prove to be „death-knell for the Muslims of the areas where they were in minority" and which were to be part of Hindu-dominated India (Mian, 1957, vol.vi, p.136). This argument in fact implicitly supported the two-nation theory by apprehending some retaliation from Hindus, JUH"s partners in United Indian Nationalism. In reply to such apprehensions, Mr. Jinnah argued that presence of Hindu minority in Muslim-dominated Pakistan would prove to be the surest guarantee for fair treatment of the minorities on both sides. He explained this balance by stating that if there would be 25 million Muslims in India after partition then exactly same number of Hindus would be there in Pakistan (Mian, 1957, vol.vi, p.314). Mr. Jinnah"s reference to this „balance theory" was condemned as „dubious, foolish and mad" by the Deobandis who did not believe it could provide sufficient safeguards to the minorities (Faruqi, 1963, p.113).

The Deobandis further criticized the „balance theory" argument by stating that according to *Shariah*, future Muslim government of Pakistan could not treat unfairly its Hindu minority for something wrong done to Muslims in India by the Hindu majority. Madni further asked, „What would happen in case of breach of any of the mandatory safeguards? Would Pakistan intervene, by show of force, to save the Muslims from the tyranny and oppression of the Hindus?"(Faruqi,1963, p.113). Although this argument by Madni did carry some weight, its validity gets diluted if one takes this line of argument further and asks how would the Muslim majority regions (future Pakistan) be able to help the Muslims of Hindu-majority areas if India was to stay united (a situation supported by JUH). In other words, the Deobandis expected the rulers of Muslim

majority provinces in United India to be more effective than the rulers of independent Pakistan in helping the Muslim minorities living in Hindu majority areas. Similarly, Deobandi argument of population strength of Muslims in united India was also not very sound because Muslims were to be just one fifth of the total population even if India were to stay undivided. In fact, the DMM was depending on the promises of Gandhi and Congress that the post-colonial united India would observe a form of secularism that would allow the Muslims to preserve their Islamic culture identity (Mian, 1957, vol.vi, p.93). Madni stressed this point in his presidential address to JUH"s meeting in June 1940 by showing complete trust in Congress" pledge to safeguard every religion, civilization, language and culture after independence (Mian, 1957, vol.vi, p.117).

In their campaign against the idea of Pakistan, the Deobandis were ready to put forward any rationale that could be employed to serve their cause. They argued that Pakistan movement was creating antagonism between Hindus and Muslims, a situation that would hurt the peaceful missionary work of conversion of Hindus to Islam (Mian, 1957, vol.vi, p.271). The ideologue of JUH"s anti-Pakistan campaign, Madni, stated that it is the non-Muslims who are the field of action for the *tabligh* (proselytizing) of Islam. The history and background of the DMM also betrayed this argument because *tabligh* had never been a forte of this movement, which had always been more concerned with values and customs of Muslims than non-Muslims. Even *Tablighi Jamat* (TJ) that was established by some Deobandi *ulama* itself had to face criticism of DMM leaders like Ashraf Ali Thanvi who did not approve of TJ"s approach, which preferred a simplistic version of Islam as compared to a purified Deobandi Islam. It would also be pertinent to add here that even TJ"s *tabligh* focused on Muslims rather than Hindus and as such that *tabligh* could be continued even after partition.

In yet another argument against partition, Madni tried to refer to the Truce of Hudaibiyah between Muslims and Qureysh of Makkah, which despite being apparently unfavourable to Muslims, promoted mutual interaction between the two communities thus allowing more opportunities to Muslims for preaching their religion to Qureysh through peaceful *tabligh*. According to Madni, that truce was the precursor to the conquest of Makkah and later the whole of Arabia (Faruqi, 1963, pp.114-15). Although it looks hard to disregard Madni"s argument, one counterargument might state that before the Truce of Hudaibiyah, there was migration of Muslims to Madinah and establishment of an Islamic state there. Then there were three big wars between the

Muslims and the Qureysh and even the conquest of Makkah was made possible more through a Muslim invasion than mere peaceful *tabligh*. Further, it is interesting to note that on the one hand, the Deobandis condemned the Islam practiced by the majority of Indian Muslims while on the other hand, they were quite hopeful to convert Hindus to Islam and set up a United Muslim India on the pattern of conversion of Qureysh of Makkah.

It may be noted that while referring to the treaties of Madinah and Hudaibiyah with regard to the relationship between Hindus and Muslims of India, the Deobandis preferred to focus more on the opposition of the demand of the majority of Indian Muslims for a separate state than promoting their own future vision for United India. Instead of spending their energies to win over Indian Muslims to their side or at least convince their Hindu allies in Congress to support, if not sign, some treaty with Indian Muslims on the pattern of above-mentioned treaties, the Deobandis were mostly busy in condemning the idea of Pakistan as well as the leadership that represented the mainstream Muslim society in India. As such, the Deobanadi movement chose to define itself mainly by negation, by what it stood against than by what it supported.

The smorgasbord of Deobandi arguments against the demand for Pakistan on the one hand and their decision to disown an idea (of a Muslim state) upheld by their predecessors on the other, makes a curious case. In this regard, the most common explanation for DMM"s opposition to Pakistan movement is that the Deobandis believed that AIML and its leaders like Mr. Jinnah were not capable of building up an Islamic state in Pakistan. The Deobandis conceived that neither the educational training nor the mental make-up of League leadership was suited to strive for such a high ideal (Faruqi, 1963, p.118). The Deobandis tried to undermine the Islamic credentials of AIML leadership by pointing out that Mr. Jinnah and Raja of Mahmoodabad were Shias and Sir Zafrullah was a Qadyani (Mian, 1957, vol.vi, p.108). Further, Mr. Jinnah, a popular leader who was given the title of Quaid-e-Azam by the Indian Muslims was ridiculed by Deobandis who called him Kafir-e-Azam- the greatest infidel (Pirzada, 2000, p.38).

This capability issue was also showcased by JUH president, Madni who equated the AIML leaders with Turkey"s Mustafa Kamal, whose secular and modernist approach was considered un-Islamic by the Indian *ulama*. He wrote to one of his disciples about

the „un-Islamic" behaviour of the League leadership and stated „Are the Leaguers not like Mustafa Kamal, Muslims only in name?"(Faruqi, 1963, p.118). Similarly, Madni was perhaps also indirectly referring to this „incapability" of League leadership when he declared in his presidential address to the 12th session of JUH at Jaunpur in 1940 that the idea of an Islamic government in future Pakistan „cannot actualize under the present circumstances" (Mian, 1957, vol.vi, p.115).

However, it could be argued that if the capability of League leadership was the major issue, then it was more appropriate for the Deobandis to join hands with AIML in the Pakistan movement and help the latter in building an Islamic state. Interestingly, many League leaders like Nawab Ismail Khan were openly declaring that Pakistan would be an Islamic state based on the principles of the Quran and *Sunnah*. Even Mr. Jinnah was also occasionally referring to Islam, the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet while explaining the future state of Pakistan (Faruqi, 1963, pp.119-20). Simultaneously, AIML through its office secretary, Maulana Zafar Ahmad Ansari, also tried hard to convince religious leadership of Indian Muslims to join the Pakistan movement. The spiritual leaders, *pirs* and *mashaikh*, of the Punjab and Sindh provinces had already joined the Pakistan movement soon after the 1940 resolution. Later, the Khaksar Movement of Inayatullah Mashriqi as well as one faction of Farangi Mahall *ulama* in North India also announced its support for the idea of Pakistan. Most of the followers of Barelwi movement either supported Pakistan or stayed neutral (Smith, 1943, pp.322-40). Even pro-Congress Ahrar party abandoned its once caustic denunciation of AIML in the wake of Pakistan movement and also dissociated itself form JUH-dominated Azad Muslim Conference (Nagarkar, 1975, p.340).

Despite above-mentioned successes, the AIML was not able to win over Deobandi JUH. Another Muslim party which opposed League"s idea of a separate homeland was Maulana Maududi"s *Jamaat-e-Islami*. Abul A'la Mududi (1903-1979) was initially associated with JUH but „he eventually parted ways with the pro-Congress ulama party and embarked upon a crusade to revive Islam as the sole apodictic answer to the Muslim communal predicament in India"(Nasr, 1994, p.3). Maududi opposed both AIML and JUH and set up his own party *Jamaat-e-Islami* (JI) in 1941. He believed that Muslims „should reject Hindu ascendancy and continue to lay claim to the whole of India" (Nasr, 1994, p.5). After 1947, Maududi accepted the partition and migrated to

the new state of Pakistan, which he considered to be as the would-be laboratory for practical experiments in the religio-political philosophy of Islam (Faruqi, 1963, p.119). Coming back to AIML"s efforts to win the support of religious leaders for its cause, it got an important success in 1945 when a prominent Deobandi scholar Shabbir Ahmad Usmani set up a separate Deobandi party named All India *Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Islam* (AIJUI), which declared support for Pakistan movement. Usmani (1887-1949) was a close aide of Mahmood Hassan. He wrote and even delivered speeches of Mahmood Hassan during latter"s illness. He served as the Principal of Darul Ulum from 1935 to 1944. Usmani supported the idea of Pakistan because in it he saw the seed of an Islamic state, which his predecessors had dreamed of. He hoped to strengthen through his party the capability of AIML to make Pakistan an Islamic state. He expressed this objective by arguing that those who feared that Pakistan would be ruled by un-godly Leaguers should themselves join the AIML to ensure that Pakistan was run by true Muslims (Hardy, 1971, pp.42-3).

Apart from Usmani"s small group, the Deobandis continued to oppose Pakistan movement with their heterogeneous arguments vis-à-vis AIML as mentioned earlier. In view of the divergence and contradiction in the Deobandi arguments against Pakistan, one may assume as if the Deobandis did not oppose Pakistan because of these arguments; rather, they seemed to have developed those arguments because they opposed Pakistan. If this line of assumption is taken further, then some reason other than those arguments might also be working behind the Deobandi opposition to Pakistan. That particular reason may be traced to the presence of countercultural currents in the DMM throughout its history and origin going back to Shah Waliullah"s movement.

Keeping in view the above discussion and looking from the countercultural perspective, one may argue that the Deobandis were not supposed to cooperate with AIML, which represented the mainstream Muslim society whose values and customs had been condemned by the DMM for long. The Deobandis criticized the appearance, habits, dress and overall customs and practices of the Muslim supporters of AIML and declared that the latter had no idea about Islamic culture (Mian, 1957, vol.vi. p.196). They even ridiculed the majority of Muslim supporters of AIML as „totally illiterate, ignorant, uneducated and unwise people dominated by centuries-old superstitious customs" (Mian, 1957, vol.vi, p.81). The support of *pirs* and *mashaikhs*, the epitomes

of folk Islam, for AIML further reduced the possibility of any such cooperation. Mian (1957, vol.vi, p.267) criticized this alliance in the following words;

„There is class of *maulvis* and *pirs* in India, who have always been opposed to Deobandi *ulama*. They neither have an interest in politics nor a political sense. They are not even organized but [Muslim] League needed them at this point to confront Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind‟.

At the same time, it may also be argued that DMM‟s refusal to join hands with AIML might be due to the unacceptability of a scenario where it had to concede a leading role to the latter. In this regard, Robinson (1974, p.209) has suggested that the Deobandis refused to join Anjuman-e-Khuddam-Ka‟bah in 1913 because they did not want to work under the leadership of Abdul Bari of Farangi Mahall who represented folk Islam. Such behaviour of the DMM fits more into countercultural pride than usual political opposition.

It may be recalled here that condemnation of Shia Islam was one of the three major targets of Deobandi counterculture, the other two being the opposition of *sufism* and popular customs of the Muslim society. So, an additional reason for DMM‟s countercultural condemnation of Pakistan movement might be the presence of Shia Muslims among the top leadership of AIML. In fact, the head of AIML, Mr. Jinnah as well as other important leaders like Raja of Mahmoodabad and Prince of Pirpur were Shia Muslims (Smith, 1943, p.330). Deobandis referred to this issue when four million rupees of relief fund for the victims of communal riots in Bihar were channelled through Habib Bank. It was alleged that Mr. Jinnah, through that transaction had tried to favour the owner of the bank who was a Shia friend of the League leader (Mian, 1957, vol.vi, pp.407-08). Similarly, Deobandi JUH, despite being a close ally of Congress, strongly criticized the provincial government of Congress in 1939 for imposing unnecessary restrictions on Sunni Muslims during the Shia-Sunni disputes in Lucknow (Nagarkar, 1975, p.292)

As the elections were announced in 1946, JUH allied with a few small regional Muslim parties to challenge the idea of Pakistan, but failed to impress the Indian Muslims who overwhelmingly voted for AIML candidates who campaigned in the name of Pakistan. During the election campaign, JUH President faced stiff resistance from ordinary

Muslims who labelled the former as traitor for going against what was the demand of the vast majority of Indian Muslims. During his tour to Bengal, Madni was abused and physically assaulted several times by the Muslims who on several occasions stopped him from addressing election meetings. Although such attacks have usually been attributed to the aggressive politics of AIML against its opponents, a closer look at the origin and history of the DMM shows that similar attacks by the ordinary Muslims had also been carried out against Shah Waliullah, his son Abdul Aziz and grandson Muhammad Ismail for opposing the values and practices of mainstream Muslim society. Madni was perhaps also the victim of countercultural approach of the DMM in an apparently political scenario. Further, if attacks on Madni during 1946 campaign were to be simply an outcome of AIML"s aggressive political approach, then more such events would have occurred against other Muslim rivals of the League like pro-Congress Abdul Ghaffar Khan in the North Western Frontier Province and Unionist Party leaders in the Punjab. However, no such aggressive resistance was reported in these regions.

The results of 1946 elections in India under the British government allowed AIML to boost its claim to be the representative of the Indian Muslims. AIML won the majority of the Muslim seats while Congress candidates swept the general seats. JUH failed to make any mark in those elections. The colonial government, which had already been working on several schemes for the independence of India after the World War II, was finally convinced about the partition of India on the basis of the election results. A Partition Plan was announced on 3 June 1947 according to which the new state of Pakistan was to consist of Muslim majority areas of the Western Punjab, Eastern Bengal, Sindh, Balochistan and the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP).

When the Partition Plan was being finalized, communal tensions in India increased remarkably. Hindu-Muslim riots of 1946 had already left the two communities in a state of unrest (Mian, 1957, vol.vi, p. 421). When the Partition Plan was announced by the British government, the Deobandis expected their long-time ally, Congress, to oppose the Plan tooth and nail. When Congress accepted the partition without much ado, JUH not only failed to condemn the former but also ignored their arguments about having treaties like Hudaibiyah and Madinah, which they had earlier hoped to sign with the Hindu community. It seems to be quite strange that earlier the Deobandis were passionately referring to such treaties in order to oppose the idea of Pakistan but when

the need for such treaties became more evident to protect the Muslim minority in post-partition India, JUH chose not to make any effort to explore the possibility of any such treaty perhaps knowing that their argument was more for public consumption than practice.

As the two independent states of Pakistan and India came into being at midnight between 14 and 15 August 1947, the minorities in both countries felt extremely insecure in the wake of the rising communal riots. The consequent mass migration of the minorities further aggravated the situation. While the two governments of the newly independent states took measures to rehabilitate the refugees and to control the law and order situation soon after the independence, the Deobandis of India became introspective to evaluate their activist approach adopted after the World War I. Since 1920s, their apparent strategy was to first win freedom for the united India through cooperation with Hindu majority and then pursue their original goal of a Muslim state for Deobandi Islam. That strategy proved to be unsuccessful in the sense that they not only failed in keeping India united but also lost cooperation of Congress when the latter decided to accept the Partition Plan. Confronted with an unenviable scenario whereby they had to face a huge majority of Hindu community, the Deobandis of India decided to revert to their earlier ascetic approach and withdraw into their madaris to protect and preserve their version of Islam.

In the newly independent state of India, the DMM found itself facing a situation where the values and norms of Deobandi Islam were threatened by the aggressive Hindu majority on the one hand and folk Islam of the mainstream Muslim society on the other. Faced with an environment, which threatened their values and norms, the Deobandis decided on 1 February 1948 in the Working Committee meeting of JUH to withdraw from the political field while restricting the role of JUH to religious, educational and cultural matters. In April 1948, Hussain Madni announced in his Presidential address to the general meeting of JUH the new Debandi approach in India. By emphasizing the need for protection and survival of Islam in India (Mian, 1957, vol.vi, p.584), Madni ensured that the DMM adopted its original ascetic approach. To support that approach, he came up with new arguments, some of which actually contradicted his earlier arguments employed during the activist phase of the DMM. For example, he stated in 1948 that future of a community did not depend on its population but on its character and conduct; whereas he had earlier opposed the partition on the

pretext of making Muslims a sizable minority, which the majority could not ignore. Mr. Madni contradicted his latest argument about population in the same breath by reminding his party that during the past Muslim rule, total population of united India was even less than the number of Muslims in the post-partition India (Mian, 1957, vol.vi, p.586).

While comparing the old and new arguments of Madni one may infer that if his 1948 arguments were to be valid a year ago, the Deobandis might have supported the Pakistan movement wholeheartedly. In fact, in 1948 Madni himself advocated strong and friendly relations with Pakistan, a state which he opposed tooth and nail on the basis of an altogether different set of arguments that became irrelevant within six months of partition. This change in arguments and attitude of Indian Deobandis seems to reflect the change in their countercultural approach from activist to ascetic. Further, the change of attitude of Indian Deobandis vis-à-vis Pakistani Muslims was also due to the fact that from a countercultural perspective, Indian DMM after independence was mainly concerned with the mainstream Muslim society of only India. As regards the countercultural scenario in Pakistan, the mainstream Muslim society of that new state was now to be the concern of the Pakistani Deobandis under the leadership of Shabbir Ahmed Usmani and Muhammad Shafi who had migrated to the newly independent Muslim state.

The study of Deobandi movement in post-partition India as well as Bangladesh is beyond the scope of this thesis, which primarily focuses on growth and evolution of DMM in Pakistan, which is the subject of the next chapter.

5 DMM IN PAKISTAN: COUNTERCULTURAL POLITICS AND EXTREMISM

'A counterculture is in one sense a far more radical rejection of a given society than any political movement, even one bent on revolutionary change'.

Kenneth Westhues in „Society‟s Shadow: Studies in the Sociology of Countercultures‟ (1972, p.34)

This chapter discusses the history and evolution of the DMM in Pakistan while identifying different phases of the movement marked by ascetic, activist and extremist trends. The chapter has been divided into four sections. The first section describes how a small group of Deobandis led by Allama Shabbir Ahmad Usmani actively campaigned to make Pakistan an Islamic state before being intercepted by the liberal and modernist leadership of the ruling Muslim League. After this initial failure, the DMM adopted an ascetic approach for some years before re-emerging in politics under new leadership. This section also highlights the role of the Deobandis in Afghan „jihad‟ on the one hand and DMM‟s growing links with the powerful military establishment of Pakistan on the other. The changing stances and strategies of the Deobandis in Pakistani politics have been discussed in the second section. The third section elaborates the rise of extremism in the Deobandi movement after its involvement in Afghanistan. This section spotlights the links between the DMM and the Afghan Taliban as well as the countercultural nature of Deobandi militancy that targeted the *sufi* shrines as well as Shia Muslims in Pakistan. The final section sums up the countercultural tendencies in the Deobandi movement in Pakistan since 1947.

5.1 Brief History of DMM in Pakistan

After the creation of Pakistan, a small Deobandi faction that called itself All India *Jamiat Ulma-e-Islam* (AIJUI) before partition organized itself in Karachi under the leadership of Allama Shabbir Ahmad Usmani in December 1947. This new party was named *Markazi Jamiat Ulma-e-Islam* (MJUI). Allama Usmani was supported by some other Deobandi scholars like Mufti Muhammad Shafi, Zafar Ahmed Usmani and Ehtishamul Haq Thanvi. This small group of Deobandis was very enthusiastic about turning Pakistan into a model Islamic state. That was their main reason to support the idea of Pakistan in the first place. Shabbir Usmani, through the support of the Muslim League, also became the member of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (CAP) hoping to persuade the government that the new constitution should be based on Islamic principles.

During the Pakistan movement, slogans like Islamic government, Islamic state and Islamic constitution were raised by both Muslim League and Deobandis of AIJUI. However, neither League politicians nor Deobandi *ulama* had any definite plan in this regard when independence came upon them (Binder, 1961, pp.4-5). The modernist leadership of Muslim League had in mind some mutation of European nationalist theory for the new state but the Deobandis apparently had no clear plan about how to make Pakistan an Islamic state. The first response from the latter was a resolution passed by MJUI on 13 January 1948 demanding that the government appoint a leading *alim* to the office of *Shaikh ul Islam* with appropriate ministerial and executive power over the judiciary (Binder, 1961, p.98). Second Deobandi response came in the summer of 1948 when a meeting was held at the residence of Usmani to discuss a plan for a semi-independent Ministry of religious affairs. The proposed ministry was supposed not only to control and supervise the religious institutions, mosques, endowments and *qadhi* courts but also to act as general censor of all government activities and exercise general supervision over the behaviour of all government servants (Binder, 1961, p.33). Owing to their lack of clarity about the exact nature of an Islamic state in the modern era, the Deobandis were soon influenced by the ideas of Maulana Maududi of Jammat-e-Islami who became active in Pakistani politics in early 1948. He declared that the supreme sovereignty belonged to God and the state must administer the country as His agent. He demanded that *Shariah* should be the basic law of the land and all existing laws coming in conflict with the *Shariah* should be repealed (Binder, 1961, p.103).

Usmani followed suit by demanding that the CAP should set up a committee of eminent *ulama* and thinkers to prepare a draft Islamic constitution (Binder, 1961, pp. 140-41). In March 1949, Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan moved in the CAP the adoption of the Objectives Resolution, which embodied fundamental Islamic principles for future constitution of Pakistan.

The Objectives Resolution was merely an indication of good faith from the League leadership, which seemed to have made up its mind to adopt a modern democratic nationalism in Pakistan. Although the Resolution stated that sovereignty belonged to „God Almighty alone, and the authority which He has delegated to the state of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is sacred trust‟, the League government ensured that the word *Shariah* no where appeared in the resolution. However, the government simultaneously established a board of experts

called *Board of Taleemat-e-Islamiyah* (BTI) consisting of reputed scholars to advise on matters arising out of the Objectives Resolution on such matters as may be referred to them.

Deobandis carried great influence in BTI through the membership of *ulama* like Mufti Shafi and Zafar Ansari as well as the support of Usmani as member of the CAP. However, the recommendations of the Board for an Islamic constitution showed that these *ulama* had no clear vision about an Islamic state in the modern era. They equated the Islamic state with the persona of the caliph. They considered that the qualifications of the Head of the State require that he knows and understands the laws of the *Shariah* from the Quran and *Sunnah,* and that he observes the rules of the *Shariah*. Their ideas indicated towards the creation of a theocratic state. The founder of the nation, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, on the other hand, had castigated the notion of a „theocratic state to be ruled by the priests with a divine mission". Similarly, Prime Minister Liaqat also opposed *mullaism*- a theocracy (Pirzada, 2000, p.15). Further, the *ulama* in the Board also intended to preserve their role (and reduce the power of the parliament) by proposing a Committee of Experts on the *Shariah* to decide finally whether or not a particular law militates against the requirements of the *Shariah* (Binder, 1961, p.169). The recommendations of BTI were turned down not only by the Sub-Committee on Constitution and Powers but also by the Basic Principles Committee of the Constituent Assembly. This negative response of the Assembly to BTI"s recommendations and the death of Usmani on 13 December 1949 marked the parting of ways between the League government and the Deobandi MJUI.

The role of the Deobandis during the early years of Pakistan showed as if their aim was „to preserve, not to change; their method was through political recognition of their institution" as religious scholars" (Binder, 1961, pp.32-33). Lacking a clear vision about the modern Islamic state, MJUI leadership soon allowed the religious issues to fall within the framework of the normal political process (Binder, 1961, p.237). After the death of its dynamic leader Usmani, MJUI became less active on the political front. Other reasons for MJUI"s downturn included the withdrawal of government patronage as well as the lack of smooth adjustment in the new state by Deobandi leaders, almost all of whom had migrated to Pakistan from different parts of India after independence (Binder, 1961, p.194). However, MJUI still played an important role in 1952 to set up

Tehreek-e-Tahaffuz-e-Khatam-e-Nabuwwat (Movement for the Protection of the Finality of the Prophethood) to launch an anti-Qadyani movement.

In the wake of MJUI's decline, a group of Deobandi *ulama* comprising Mufti Mahmood, Ahmad Ali Lahori, Abdullah Darkhawasti and Ghulam Ghaus Hazarwi established in 1956 a new party named *Markazi Jamiat Ulma-e-Islam West Pakistan* (MJUIWP). This party was dominated by the Deobandis from the North West Frontier and Punjab provinces as opposed to MJUI whose leadership mostly belonged to Karachi. The major aims and objectives of the new party included an Islamic system of government, implementation of Islamic teachings in all walks of life, minority status for the Qadyanis and separate electorates for the non-Muslims (Pirzada, 2000, p.23). In 1958, Pakistan faced the first coup d'état that was to establish the dominance of the military in Pakistani politics. When military government of Ayub Khan banned party politics in 1959, MJUIWP organized itself as *Nizamul Ulama Pakistan* (System of Religious Scholars). This was a non-political organization and its objectives were mostly directed towards re-organizing Deobandi madaris. In 1962, when the official ban on political activities was lifted, the Deobandi leadership of MJUIWP emerged in the political arena under the name of *Jamiat Ulma-e-Islam Pakistan* (JUIP), generally known as JUI.

The military regime of Ayub Khan tried to modernize the traditional Islamic activities. First, *auqaf* (trusts) system, which provided support to madaris and shrines, was nationalized and later a move was launched to attach madaris to the formal system of education (Malik, 1996, p.123). Apart from that, Ayub's polemics against the religious leaders were already well-known. He thought that the *ulama* were not equipped to provide Islam with a modern-day orientation. He exhorted the *ulama* to acquaint themselves with the advancement of science, philosophy, economics and contemporary history (Pirzada, 2000, p.24). Ayub criticized *ulama*'s role and authority by stating that they thought a ‚constitution could be regarded as Islamic only if it were drafted by the *ulama* and conceded them the authority to judge and govern the people" (Khan, 1967, pp.203-04). It was in that hostile scenario that Deobandi madaris established their umbrella organization in 1959, called *Wifaqul Madaris Al-Arabiyya* (WMA).

In order to counter the government's move to interfere with madaris system, Deobandi WMA ensured to include in its objectives the reform of curriculum through inclusion of

modern subjects in it. However, no practical initiative was ever taken by WMA. Malik (1996, p.125) has stated that *ulama*'s failure to reform the madaris seems to have provided their critics with sufficient ground for considering them backward. However, it appears that it was less about *ulama*'s inability to reform than their ability to delay any state intervention until the madaris could prepare themselves through integration under their umbrella organizations. It may be recalled that the Deobandi model of madaris, from its vey origin in 1866, was based on the policy of avoiding intervention by the state while getting financial support through community donations (Rizwi, 2005, vol.i, pp.154-7).

As the overwhelming victory of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's Peoples Party in 1970 elections gave rise to the idea that the clergy in Pakistan had vanished once and for all, the Bhutto regime at first did not try to engage *ulama* or madaris (Malik, 1996, pp.128-9). On the other hand, the madaris, which had acquired some confidence after thwarting Ayub Khan's reform attempts, were busy consolidating their power. In fact, they successfully resisted Bhutto government's initiative to include madaris in its nationalization drive of education sector (Riaz, 2008, p.197). During this period, the Deobandis convinced the government to recognize their board's higher degree equivalent to Master's degree. However, the National Assembly added a condition of passing a Bachelor level English test for the proposed recognition. The Deobandis rejected the conditional support and the proposal petered out (Malik, 1996, p.129).

The growing confidence of the madaris and the relevant *ulama* during 1972-77, pressured Prime Minister Bhutto to announce in 1970s some Islamization measures, which included declaring Qadyanis as non-Muslims and banning alcohol and gambling in the country. Ultimately, an anti-Bhutto alliance under the leadership of a Deobandi scholar, Mufti Mahmood, launched an agitation for complete Islamization of Pakistan. Foot soldiers for this movement were provided mainly by Deobandi madaris (Riaz, 2008, pp.197-8). The drop scene of this movement was the military coup by General Ziaul Haq against the Bhutto government on 5th July, 1977.

The Zia era (1977-88) marked a watershed in the history of madaris in Pakistan especially Deobandi ones. Being a military dictator, General Zia lacked constitutional legitimacy. Therefore, immediately after usurping power, he launched an Islamization campaign to achieve credibility for his government among the *ulama* who had led the

movement against Mr. Bhutto on the slogan of *Nizam-e-Mustafa* (the system of the Prophet) for Pakistan. Apart from political expediency, Zia‟s Islamization project was also motivated by his ideological conviction (Riaz, 2008, p.198).

Zia came from a humble lower-middle class background. From a young age, he was actively involved with the *Tablighi Jamaat* (TJ). After coming into power, he aspired to turn Pakistan into an ideological state ruled by *Shariah*. He introduced a rigid interpretation of *Shariah* thus empowering the religious groups like *Jamaat-e-Islami* and the DMM whose members were given jobs in the judiciary, the civil service and educational institutions. *Shariah* courts were established to try cases under Islamic laws. School textbooks were overhauled to ensure ideological purity. Books deemed un-Islamic were removed from syllabi and university libraries (Hussain, 2007, pp.15-19).

Zia also tried to give a new Islamic orientation to the army, which had long been a secular organization in line with the British traditions. He expanded the role of the army to be the defender of the ideological frontiers of the country in addition to the geographical borders. Islamic teachings were introduced into the Pakistan Military Academy. Islamic training and philosophy were made part of the curriculum at the military Command and Staff College. A Directorate of Religious Instruction was established to educate the officer corps on Islam. The officers were taught to be not just professional soldiers but also soldiers of Islam. The army allowed free flow of religious political literature in its training institutions. Graduates of Deobandi madaris were appointed to work among the troops as prayer leaders. They were supposed to be the bridge for officers between the westernized profession and the faith (Hussain, 2007, pp.18-21). The Islamization project of Zia led to critical implications as shall be discussed later in this section.

In mid-1978, a delegation of *ulama* met General Zia and demanded greater autonomy for madaris. The government later set up a Committee for Dini Madaris in January, 1979 under the chairmanship of A.W.J. Halepota, the man who was largely responsible for the failed madaris reforms of 1962 during Ayub Khan‟s era. In the meantime, Zia floated the idea of unification of madaris of all denominations under one umbrella organization. However, the proposal was opposed by Deobandi WMA. The 1979 reform proposals were not much different from the ones of 1962, especially with

respect to introduction of secular subjects and revision of curriculum in madaris (Zaman, 2007, p.79). The proposals of the 1979 Committee were immediately opposed by WMA, which interpreted these reforms as an attempt by the government to control madaris.

The Deobandis had, in fact, raised objections from the very beginning and had called for the boycott of the Committee. Yusuf Ludhianvi of Jamia-tul-ulum-ul-Islamiah in Binouri Town, Karachi even questioned the mandate of the Committee by saying that it was continuing the policies of the British government. While considering the mainstream system of education not worth striving for, Ludhianvi accused the Committee of trying to subordinate the traditional content of religious education to the modern sciences (Malik, 1996, pp.136-7). Madaris of other denominations (except for Jamaat-e-Islami) also opposed the proposed reforms and general Zia was forced to postpone implementation.

The resistance of madaris to reform efforts gradually subsided as the military government recognized their degrees, made available for them *zakat* (Islamic tax for the poor) funds and offered job opportunities for their graduates in government organizations, both civil and military. By early 1980s, Barelwi and Ahle Hadith madaris had agreed to introduce „secular" subjects on the pattern of *Jammat-e-Islami* (JI) madaris. The Barelwis offered as optional subjects English and Mathematics only at the *Sanviya Aama* (equivalent to Matric) level. Ahle Hadith madaris introduced Pakistan Studies, Science and Social Studies in addition to English and Maths. For the *Sanviya Khasa* and *Aliya* (equivalent to Intermediate and Bachelor levels respectively) students, Ahle Hadith and JI madaris have since added more subjects like Economics, Political Science, Education, Computer Science (Khalid, 2002, pp.388-405). On the other hand, Deobandi WMA resisted such moves. However, WMA did allow many Deobandi madaris the option to prepare their selected students to appear as private candidates in mainstream examinations at Matric, Intermediate and Bachelor levels in addition to their traditional *Dars-e-Nizami* studies. Although there was „no essential alteration of the classic DM [Dini Madaris] course of instruction", Zia regime secured, through this compromise, the „acceptance of his leadership by the *ulama*" and „an Islamic legitimation of his rule" whereas the madaris achieved „social recognition" (Malik, 1996, p.172). The real rapprochement between the Zia regime and madaris was

to come in the wake changing political scenario in the region after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in December, 1979.

As Pakistan became an ally of the United States and a frontline state in the war in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, an elaborate infrastructure under the guise of madaris was built to provide training to *mujahideen* (holy warriors) from Afghanistan, Pakistan and various other Muslim countries (Riaz, 2008, 200). Madaris from Deobandi, *Jamaat-e-Islami* and Ahle Hadith denominations participated in this infrastructure, which was to receive money, training and weapons from the U.S. through Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) - Pakistan‟s premier spy agency (Riaz, 2008, p.105). Apart from Pakistan, radicals from other Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt were also invited to participate in the „jihad‟ against the Soviets. Between 1982 and 1992, some 35,000 Muslim radicals from 43 Islamic countries in the Middle East, North and East Africa, Central Asia and the Far East joined the *mujahideen* in Afghanistan. In the Middle East, the Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen*), the Saudi-based World Muslim League and Palestinian Islamic radicals organized the recruitment for this „jihad‟. The centre for the Arab-Afghans was the offices of the World Muslim League and the Muslim Brotherhood in Peshawar, headed by Abdullah Azzam, a Jordan-based Palestinian whom Usama Bin Laden had first met at the Jeddah University and revered as his leader (Rashid, 2008, pp.130-31).

Pakistan‟s Afghan Policy in 1980s was conducted by the ISI mainly with the help of the *Jamaat-e-Islami* of Pakistan and *Hizb-e-Islami* of Afghan leader Gulbadin Hikmatyar. Deobandi JUI and its allied *mujahideen* were not given a prominent role at that time, a policy that was to be reversed in 1990s after the rise of the Taliban (Rashid, 2008, p.89.) Olivier Roy described this war as „a joint venture between the Saudis, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-e-Islami, put together by the ISI‟ (Rashid, 2008, p.130).

Although *Jamaat-e-Islami* of Pakistan played a leading role in the war against the Soviets, the Deobandis were the most enthusiastic participants of this war owing to their special historical connection with Afghanistan dating back to the movements of Shah Waliullah and Syed Ahmed as well as Mahmood Hassan‟s Silken Letters campaign. Further, most of the madaris, which were involved in the Afghan „jihad‟ belonged to Deobandi sect. From 1982 to 1988, around one thousand new Deobandi

madaris were opened in Pakistan, mostly along the borders with Afghanistan in the North West Frontier and Balochistan provinces. Their location in these provinces, „which had close cultural, linguistic and sectarian affinities with Afghan Pashtuns, made it easier to motivate the pupils to fight for their brethren in distress" (Hussain, 2007, p.80).

The students in these madaris were taught specific books to encourage them to join the „holy war". Special textbooks were published in Dari and Pushto languages by the University of Nebraska through an USAID-funded project to promote jihadist values and militant training. Million of such books were distributed at Afghan refugee camps and Pakistani madaris where students were taught basic maths by counting dead Russians and Kalashnikov rifles. These madaris provided for the Afghan resistance the recruits who were given training by Pakistani military, particularly the ISI, in the camps inside Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal regions (Hussain, 2007, p.80).

As the Afghan „jihad" progressed, such „jihadi" madaris did not remain restricted to the remote border regions. Soon, several militant Deobandi seminaries started operating in Karachi, Pakistan's largest city and its financial centre. The largest among them was *Jamia-tul-ulum-ul-Islamiyah* in Binouri Town also known as *Jamia Binouria*) under Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai (1930-2004). This Jamia along with its eight affiliated madaris enrolled more than ten thousand students from Pakistan as well as 30 other countries including Afghanistan, China, Central Asian Republics, Chechnya, Malaysia, the Philippines and Britain. Many of the Afghan Taliban leaders also graduated from this seminary and took guidance from their former teachers (Hussain, 2007, p.83). Another such madrassah is Darul Ulum Haqqania in Akora Khattak near Peshawar run by Maulana Samiul Haq, who heads his own faction of *Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam* (JUI). Known as the cradle of Afghan Taliban militia, this seminary has served since 1980s as a recruiting centre for dozens of Pakistani militant groups fighting in Afghanistan and Kashmir (Hussain, 2007, p.77). It mainly attracted students from Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Similarly, *Jamia Naumania* of Dera Ismail Khan produced militants like Fazlur Rehman Khalil, leader of *Harkat ul Ansar* (HuA) and *Harkat ul Mujahideen* (HuM). These militant organizations hold a long history of involvement in Afghanistan. Khalil ran the Camp Badar near Khost on Pak-Afghan border for training and recruitment of jihadists to fight in Kashmir, Chechnya and Yugoslavia (Rashid, 1998, p.76). It was through this participation in Afghan „jihad" as

well as the presence of international students in its madaris that the DMM developed links with Muslim radicals in other Islamic countries (Rashid, 2002, p.44).

It may be noted that the official support and patronage provided by the Zia regime to madaris for their participation in active warfare was unprecedented. Never in the history of madaris had any Muslim state used these institutions as military academies to prepare soldiers for the battlefield. This extraordinary initiative by the Zia regime then led to equally extraordinary consequences which have since been faced by the Pakistani state in the form of rising sectarianism, militancy and „Talibanization‟ as shall be discussed later in this section.

When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the U.S. government took no time to adopt a hands-off policy in the region, leaving Pakistan to deal with the aftermath of that decade-long „jihad‟. After the death of General Zia in 1988, the weak civilian governments of Benazir Bhutto (1988-90 and 1993-96) and Nawaz Sharif (1990-93 and 1997-99) ignored the issue of madaris. During the 1990s, Pakistan‟s military establishment continued to support the student militia, the Taliban, in Afghanistan as part of its strategic goal. Later on, militant madaris were also established in southern part of Punjab province under the influence of Deobandis like Masood Azhar, a graduate of *Jamia Binouria* who later set up a jihadist outfit named *Jaish-e-Muhammad* (JeM) in 2000 reportedly at the behest of Pakistan‟s military establishment. In addition to guerrilla activities in Kashmir, JeM kept close ties with Taliban as well as al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. JeM also promoted jihadi journalism through its Urdu weekly newspaper *Zarb-e-Momin* that sold about quarter of a million copies across Pakistan. The group also publishes an Urdu daily *Islam* with a nationwide circulation of more than 100,000 Kashmir (Hussain, 2007, pp.65-66). After 9/11 attacks, the military government of General Pervez Musharraf banned several militant groups. When JeM was banned in 2002, Azhar set up a new group Khudam-ul-Islam, which was also proscribed in 2003 (Mir, 2004, p.32). However, Azhar stayed a free man even after that and patronized several madaris in South Punjab.

Musharraf‟s government also tried to reform madaris through the promulgation of Pakistan Madrassah Education (Establishment and Affiliation of Model Deeni Madaris) Board Ordinance, 2001 and Madrassah Registration Ordinance (MRO), 2002. Like previous such efforts, this reform initiative also failed to make any headway owing to

the sharp resistance mostly from the DMM and the two provincial governments of NWFP and Balochistan run by the Deobandi-led alliance of religious parties called *Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal* (MMA, Joint Action Group). The political role of the Deobandis and the MMA government is discussed in the next section.

5.2 DMM's Shifting Stances in Politics

After their vain attempts for an Islamic constitution after 1947, the Deobandis seemed to have lost hope of making Pakistan the Islamic state. Soon, the Deobandi party, JUI decided to join the electoral politics. Initially, it contested elections independently but its performance quite disappointing. In 1962 elections, JUI won just one National Assembly seat. In 1965 elections, it failed to win even a single seat. However, the party kept on making its presence felt in politics through its stance on different social and political issues.

During Ayub Khan's era (1958-69), JUI opposed Muslim Family Law Ordinance promulgated by President Ayub Khan in 1961 on the ground that the restriction of seeking permission for a second marriage in the presence of an existing marriage was not Islamic. The Ordinance introduced registration of all marriages and maintenance of their records at the union council level. Further, the effect of the Ordinance was to set up local Arbitration Councils whose business was to bring about, if possible, resolution of disputes between couples or to process and document the divorce cases. According to the Ordinance, no man was permitted to contract a further marriage so long as a previous marriage subsisted, except with the permission of the Arbitrary Council to which an application had to be submitted stating whether the consent of the existing wife or wives had been obtained. That section of the Ordinance was in no way against the polygamy, a practice allowed in Islam. Rather its purpose was to stop the misuse of that practice by the weak, the vicious and the grasping. President Ayub Khan tried to explain the spirit of the law to the Deobandi Mufti Muhammad Shafi, in a letter dated 11 June 1961 whereby he wrote that „...untold miseries and cruelties... are commonly perpetrated in our country under the cover of indiscriminate polygamy. This does not only result in embittering and ruining the lives of innumerable tongue-tied women and innocent children, but it also brings in its wake the social, moral, and economic collapse of thousands of families" (Feldman, 1967, pp.144-48). However, the Deobandis and their party JUI continued to oppose the Ordinance.

During late 1960s, the DMM was divided on the issue of socialism. Initially, there was a consensus among the Deobandis that socialism was an apostasy and *kufr* (non-belief).

In fact, one of the objectives of JUI declared in 1956 was to „shield the citizens of Pakistan against the attacks of inhuman capitalism, atheistic communism, and socialism" (Pirzada, 2000, p.223). Later, when Deobandi politicians joined the movement against Ayub Khan, they came close to Pakistan People's Party (PPP) of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and started adopting a softer approach towards socialism because the PPP was a pro-socialism party. At that time, the *Nazim*-e-*Aala* (Chief Organizer) of JUI, Ghulam Ghaus Hazarwi was alleged to have lent support to the kind of socialism which he thought was not against Islamic principles. Similarly, a series of articles were written by Zahidur Rashidi under the title „Islamic Socialism of Bhutto" were published in the Deobandi monthly „*Tabsira'* (commentary). It was asserted in these articles that the term „Islamic Socialism" was not contrary to the *Shariah*. Mufti Mahmood also endorsed this view (Pirzada, 2000, p.30). This soft approach of JUI was opposed by the non-political *ulama* of the DMM.

By 1970, Deobandi movement in Pakistan was broadly divided, despite some overlapping, into Deobandi politicians and Deobandi *ulama*. The former focussed on the electoral politics while the latter restricted themselves to the madaris and mosques. The former preferred a pragmatic approach over an ideological one to ally themselves with other political parties whereas the latter centred their attention on the protection and preservation of their particular version of Islam through the network of madaris, mosques, print material (books, journals, magazines) and indirectly through the *tabligh* (proselytizing) missions who sojourned at the Deobandi mosques.

It is interesting that most of the *ulama* of Deobandi madaris did not support this new interpretation presented by Deobandi politicians. A group of leading DMM *ulama* launched a strong criticism against JUI leadership when the party entered into an alliance with pro-socialism Pakistan Labour Party (PLP). This campaign was led by the renowned *ulama* like Mufti Shafi and Ihtashamul Haq Thanvi, who had initially joined politics under the leadership of Shabbir Usmani but later withdrew themselves to focus on their madaris. This „socialism controversy" gradually died down as the politicians and ulama of the DMM settled in their respective roles whereby the latter seemed to have an edge owing to their authority to issue *fatawa* and rulings to provide support and legitimacy for the Deobandi politics. This broad division provided a sense of superiority to the *ulama* on the one hand and allowed Deobandi politicians more space to practice pragmatism and realpolitik on the other.

Since 1970, JUI has opted for political alliances in order to make an impression on the mainstream politics. For example, for the 1970 elections, JUI joined *Muttahida Dini Mahaz* (Joint Religious Front) - an alliance of 19 religious parties and minor organizations like PLP. Seven candidates of JUI returned to the National Assembly in the 1970 elections. Inside the Assembly, JUI became component of United Democratic Front (UDF) – an alliance which included old and hard rivals of JUI like Barelwi *Jamiat Ulama-e-Pakistan* (JUP) and Maududi"s *Jamaat-e-Islami* on the one hand and secular, socialist and pro-Russia National Awami Party (NAP) on the other. At the provincial levels, JUI joined hands with NAP to form coalition governments in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan. These governments lasted for less than 10 months and JUI failed to make any impression on the people with regard to their declared commitment to the *Shariah*.

For 1977 elections, JUI joined even a broader alliance of nine parties named Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). From 1988 to 1999, JUI under the leadership of Maulana Fazlur Rehman (after whose name it is called JUI-F to distinguish it from two smaller factions of JUI) adopted the strategy of joining or supporting the ruling coalitions. In 2002 elections, JUI-F allied with five religious parties under the name of *Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal* (MMA). Other component parties included *Jamaat-e-Islami*, Shia *Tahreek-e-Jafria Pakistan* (TJP, later renamed *Islami Tehreek* Pakistan), Barelwi JUP, JUI (Sami-ul-Haq group) and *Jamiat Ahle Hadith*. The leaders of these parties were in the forefront of the anti-U.S. demonstrations in Pakistan after 9/11. MMA contested the elections on the anti-U.S. and anti-Musharraf slogans in the heated post-9/11 scenario. The public opinion in Pakistan about the U.S. was highly unfavourable after the NATO forces invaded Afghanistan. According to a PEW survey report (2002, p.53), Pakistan was the second country after Egypt where the U.S. received lowest favourable opinion rating of just 10%. This rating was more than 23% in the PEW survey conducted a couple of years ago (PEW Report, 2012, p.9). JUI successfully exploited these public sentiments against the U.S. in its favour particularly in the two provinces contiguous to Afghanistan i.e. NWFP and Balochistan.

Elections of 2002 were the peak of JUI"s electoral politics. In National Assembly, JUI-led MMA won 63 seats in the house of 342. These seats were won mostly from the above-mentioned two provinces where MMA was able to form governments. In

NWFP, the MMA had got simple majority to form a government but in Balochistan it had to enter into a coalition with the pro-Musharraf Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam group) which came to power in the centre and two provinces (Punjab and Balochistan).

Although the MMA had promised during its election campaign to implement *Shariah*, it failed to make any serious effort in this regard either at the federal level where it headed a sizeable opposition group or in the two provinces where it was in power. This failure in the two provinces has generally been attributed to JUI‟s pragmatic approach, which prevented it from making any serious endeavour to implement *Shariah* in the face of a powerful liberal military dictator, General Pervez Musharraf. It was also alleged that the MMA had developed some understanding with General Musharraf who was said to have tolerated the two provincial governments in return for MMA‟s soft approach towards his military rule. In fact, the MMA supported 17th amendment in the constitution which provided indemnity to the extra-constitutional measures taken by the military government of Musharraf. Earlier in 2002, military regime of Musharraf had mobilized JUI and other religious parties to hold anti-U.S. and anti-U.N. rallies, while his government continued to secretly support the Taliban (Rashid, 2010, p218). It was amid these allegations that the MMA was satirically called Mullah Military Alliance (Mir, 185, 2004)

The provincial government of MMA in the NWFP did not seriously demonstrate the means or the will to implement *Shariah*. However, some cosmetic measures were taken by it to establish their Islamic credentials. These symbolic actions included: opening the sessions of the provincial assembly with the *adhaan* (call to *salah* or prayer); banning alcohol, even for the non-Muslim foreigners; prohibiting the playing of music and movies in public transport buses; announcing a crackdown on „pubs and gambling dens‟ despite the fact that there were no pubs in the province (White, 2008, p.52). Alongside these official moves, came a rise in vigilante-style campaigns against „obscenity‟ in the province. Other symbolic measures taken by the MMA government included closing of video shops, prohibitions on traditional music and dance, obscuring women‟s faces on billboards etc. Besides that, the MMA also discussed proposals to close down dance halls, music stores, cinemas as well as cable television in the province (Daily Times, 2003).

Apart from the above-mentioned symbolic measures, JUI-led MMA government set up *Nifaz-e-Shariat Council*, a quasi-governmental recommendatory body of *ulama*, which debated the establishment of a „vice-and-virtue ministry‟ within the provincial government, and issued suggestions on such matters as the proper colour of the *dupatta* (head covering) to be worn by schoolgirls (Ali and Khattak, 2003). Almost without exception, the Council‟s recommendations were announced with fanfare, featured prominently in the local press and then promptly ignored (White, 2008, p.52). Under the guidance of the Council, the MMA government prepared a blue print for establishing an Islamic judicial system for the NWFP through the Hasba (Accountability) Bill which was approved by the provincial assembly in 2005. This bill intended to equip the MMA with a means to oversee the implementation of *Shariah* through the appointment of hundreds of local ombudsmen. JUI hoped through these appointments to empower the Deobandi *ulama* who were to be the main beneficiaries of this Bill because of the traditional influence of the DMM in the province.

The ultimate objective behind the Hasba Bill was to establish a parallel judicial system under the *ulama*. That system was to work under a Provincial *Mohtasib* (Ombusdman) with the powers of a High Court judge whose office was to be supported by District and tehsil *Mohtasibs* who were to enjoy the powers of the session and civil judges respectively. The *Mohtasib* was given the authority to: „(a) Enquiries into the allegations of maladministration against any agency or its employees; (b) Protect/watch the Islamic values and etiquettes; (c) Watch the media established by Government or working under the administrative control of Government to ensure that its publications are useful to the purpose of upholding Islamic values; (d) Forbid persons, agencies and authorities working under the administrative control of government to act against *Shariah* and to guide them to good governance (Hasba Bill, Section 10). Apart from that, the *Mohtasib* was equipped with extensive special powers under Section 23. Some of these powers were either inspired by the countercultural tendencies of the DMM or provided the platform for implementing Deobandi values through this Bill. For example, the *Mohtasib* was given the authority to: monitor adherence of moral values of Islam at public places; discourage exhibition of extravagance, particularly at the time of marriages and other family functions; discourage entertainment shows; observe decorum of Islam at the time of *Adhan* and prayers; discourage un-Islamic and inhuman customs; eradicate the practice of *taweez* (amulet), palmistry, magic, etc. In order to

exercise his powers, the *Mohtasib* was to be supported by a religious police (Section 26) that was not much different from that of the Taliban government in Afghanistan.

Section 25 (1) of the Bill provided a supra-judicial status to the *Mohtasib* by stating that „no court or authority shall be competent to question the legal status of the proceedings before a *Mohtasib'*. Section 14 granted the *Mohtasib* the powers equivalent to the High Court regarding contempt of court to block hindrance in implementation of his orders. It was mainly because of these two sections that on 4 August 2005, the Supreme Court of Pakistan declared the Hasba Bill as unconstitutional within one month of its approval by the provincial assembly of NWFP (Daily Times, 2005). The apex court observed that the provincial government could file an appeal after revising such controversial sections of the Bill (Kamran, 2007). The provincial assembly passed a fresh bill in November 2006. The federal government challenged it in the Supreme Court, which declared the bill partially unconstitutional by ruling that the *Mohtasib* could not be given judicial powers to prosecute a person who disobeyed his orders and that a - madrassah graduate could not be eligible for the post of the *Mohtasib* (Kamran, 2007). Chief Justice of Pakistan obliquely hinted towards the Deobandis when he remarked that one sect could not be allowed to impose itself on others through this Bill. He observed that in the next stage such sect might dictate the size of the beard, length of the *shalwar* (loose pants worn under a long shirt in Pakistan) and the procedure of offering prayers (Daily Express, 2007). After that, JUI did not show much resolve to further pursue the Bill.

Before the 2008 elections, MMA was practically dissolved when *Jamaat-e-Islami* decided to boycott the 2008 elections under the Presidency of General Musharraf. So, JUI had to contest the elections without the support of its major allies. The performance of the party was quite dismal and it managed to get just seven out of 342 seats of National Assembly. Later, JUI joined the coalition government led by the PPP, which was being run by President Asif Ali Zardari after the assassination of his wife, Benazir Bhutto in December, 2007.

In 2013, JUI again contested the elections independently and slightly improved its overall tally of National Assembly seats by winning 10 general seats. However, the share of JUI in the provincial assemblies of the NWFP and Balochistan provinces decreased as compared to 2008 elections. It would be pertinent to point out here that

during 2013 elections, JUI was unable to win a single national or provincial level seat in the provinces of Punjab and Sindh, which together make up more than 80 percent of Pakistan‟s total population of 180 million. As for the smaller Deobandi groups like JUI (Samiul Haq), JUI (Nazriyati) and *Ahle Sunnat wal Jamaat* (ASWJ), they failed to win a single seat in any part of Pakistan in the 2013 elections when they joined one faction of *Jamiat Ahle-Hadith* and a splinter group of Barelwi JUP to form an electoral alliance called, *Muttahida Deeni Mahaz* (Joint Religious Front).

The above-mentioned three Deobandi groups share the same sectarian and ideological outlook with the main party JUI (F) and the DMM as a whole. However, it is the difference of approach and the leadership struggle that has separated them from JUI (F). Samiul Haq formed his own faction of JUI (S) during 1980s in the backdrop of his differences with his party head Fazlur Rehman. JUI (S) has always maintained a very close relationship with the military establishment of Pakistan and played an important role in recruiting „jihadis‟ for Afghanistan and Kashmir through its madrassah, Darul Ulum Haqqania. JUI (Nazriyati) was formed before the 2008 elections as a result of leadership struggle in JUI (F)‟s Balochistan chapter. As Fazlur Rehman tried to distance his party from the military establishment as well as the Afghan Taliban, the hard-liners of his party in Balochistan rebelled under Maulana Asmatullah and challenged the leadership of the provincial head of JUI (F), Maulana Muhammad Khan Sherani. With the tacit support of military establishment, Asmatullah set up JUI (Nazriyati) and defeated Sherani in the National Assembly election. JUI (*Nazriyati*) is a pro-jihadi, pro-establishment party, which is restricted just to the province of Balochistan. As regards, ASWJ, it is generally considered a new name for the SSP, a banned militant Deobandi outfit. Its leader Muhammad Ahmed Ludhianvi contested election from the traditional Deobandi stronghold of Jhang district and was defeated with a narrow margin. Like SSP, the main objective of ASWJ is that Pakistan should become a Sunni Hanafi state and Shias be declared non-Muslims. These three minor groups of the DMM are part of the ISI-backed Defence of Pakistan Council, an umbrella organization of about 40 small political and religious parties that advocate anti-U.S. and anti-India policies. The main Deobandi political party, JUI (F) is not part of that alliance.

It is interesting to note that since 1970, Deobandi politicians, through JUI‟s various alliances, have shared political aspirations with a variety of political groups, which included liberal, secular and regional parties. Pirzada (2000, pp.234-35) has concluded

that JUI‟s approach of alliances with parties of every hue is a veiled confession about the impossibility of establishing an Islamic state in Pakistan. Owing to such indiscriminate and conflicting alliances, Pirzada has termed JUI as a „munificent‟ Islamist party whose supporters gradually got disappointed as the ideological basis of the party corroded. This disappointment was reflected in JUI‟s electoral decline during the period between 1970 and 1997 (Pirzada, 2000, pp.231-33). This trend was again shown in 2008 and 2013 elections. The only exception was the 2002 elections when JUI‟s alliance with other religious parties was able to significantly improve its electoral performance. In fact, it was not actually the alliance which worked for JUI. Rather it was the anti-US sentiment in Pakistan which MMA successfully exploited in its favour in the two provinces located on the Afghan border. Similarly, the alleged tacit support of the military also boosted the performance of the MMA. Above all, it was the exile of the leaders of the two biggest parties, Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan Muslim League (N) and Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan Peoples Party, which created a great leadership vacuum helping JUI to improve its electoral fortunes.

It may be pertinent to add here that the little success JUI was able to manage in 2013 elections was mostly restricted to the NWFP. The major factor that helped JUI to win a few seats there was the fact that two mainstream political parties, Pakistan People‟s Party and Awami National Party were not able to campaign because of the threats and attacks by the extremist Deobandi groups operating in that province. The next section examines the extremist streaks in the Deobandi movement.

5.3   Rise of Extremism in DMM

This section argues that extremism in the Deobandi movement was manifested at three levels in Pakistan. The first level was marked by assaults on Shias. The rise of local Taliban groups represented the second level. At the third level, Deobandi extremists started attacking the symbols of folk Islam like *sufi* shrines. The details of these three streaks of Deobandi extremism are given below.

After the Soviet withdrawal, many jihadists belonging to Deobandi madaris returned to Pakistan to support their brethren who were already involved in a sectarian conflict with Shias. Actually, Zia‟s move to establish a Sunni-Hanafi state to reflect the majority of Pakistani Muslims had created a sense of insecurity among the minority Shia community. Before Zia era, the relationship between the Shias and the majority Sunnis was generally peaceful (Murphy, 2013, p.27). As Zia promoted the Deobandi

ulama by giving them high level positions in the government and judiciary (Riaz, 2008, p.109), Shias became more anxious knowing well the DMM‟s views about them. Until 1979, Pakistani Shias were a politically moderate community, which supported secular political parties. But Zia‟s policy to enforce Hanafi laws on the one hand and the Iranian revolution on the other spurred the Shias into political activism. In 1980, tens of thousands of Shias protested in Islamabad against their marginalization by the Sunni majority. At around the same time, a Shia political party, *Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria* (TNFJ, Movement for the implementation of Shia Jurisprudence) was also set up under the leadership of Arif al-Hussaini, a student of Ayatollah Khomeini.

As post-revolution Iran became the centre of spiritual and political support for Pakistani Shias, Zia regime and its Sunni allies perceived TNFJ as an Iranian conspiracy to export its revolution to Pakistan (Hussain, 2007, pp.91-92). The spill-over effect of Shia revolution also worried many Arab rulers. The consequent Sunni reaction to Shia activism in Pakistan was launched with the funding from Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries as well as tacit support from the military government of Zia. The first such reaction came from the Deobandis. Emboldened by their role in Afghan „jihad‟ and facilitated by the weapons and funds, the Deobandis took a domestic initiative to wage „jihad‟ inside Pakistan. In 1985, they founded the *Sawad-e-Azam Ahle Sunnat* (Greater Unity of the Sunnis), a movement, which later institutionalized as *Anjuman Sipah-e-Sahaba* (ASS, Society of the Prophet‟s Companions) with one point anti-Shia agenda under the leadership of fiery Deobandi cleric Haq Nawaz Jhangwi. A prayer leader at a mosque in Jhang district of central Punjab, Jhangwi was reported to have close links with Pakistani intelligence agencies (Hussain, 2007, p.92). The only demand of ASS was to declare Pakistan a Sunni state and Shias as non-Muslims. In this backdrop, Manzoor Naumani, a renowned Deobandi scholar of India issued a *fatwa* in December 1987 declaring Shias as *kafir* (non-believer). That *fatwa* was endorsed by hundreds of prominent Deobandi *ulama* in both India and Pakistan. Maulana Wali Hassan, Deobandi Grand Mufti of Pakistan, issued a separate *fatwa* in this regard whereby he wrote, „Shias are *kafir*. Their marriage with Muslims is *haram*. Muslims should not participate in funeral prayers of Shias. An animal slaughtered by a Shia is not *halal* for the Muslims. It is not permissible to bury Shias in the graveyard of Muslims. In short, Shias must be treated as non-Muslims‟ (Hassan, 1988).

As Iran and Saudi Arabia supported their respected allies, Pakistan became a battlefield in an intra-Islam proxy war. In the meantime, Haq Nawaz Jhangwi had reorganized ASS as *Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan* (SSP, Armies of Prophet‟s Companions). In February 1990, when he was killed by Shia militants, sectarian violence spiralled. The newly-organized SSP unleashed a reign of terror with some 5000-6000 well-trained militants who were backed by almost one million cardholding members. While blaming Iran for the murder of Jhangwi, SSP militants in December 1990 gunned down Sadiq Ganji, Iranian Consul General in Lahore as revenge. The situation continued to get worse when Shia militants killed in 1991 the new leader of SSP, Isarul Qasmi in retribution. After that, SSP was headed by Ziaur Rehman Farooqi till his death in 1997 in a sectarian attack. He was replaced by Azam Tariq, a fiery cleric who had served 2-year jail sentence for his involvement in several Shia murder cases. Tariq later turned towards electoral politics and was elected to the National Assembly four times from district Jhang before he was killed by Shia militants in a revenge attack in 2003 (Hussain, 2007, pp.92-100).

After Haq Nawaz Jhangwi‟s death in 1990, several of his die-hard followers left the SSP and formed their own groups with the aim of completing Jhangwi‟s mission. In this process, at least six groups were formed namely Jhangwi Tigers, Al Haq Tigers, Allah Akbar, Tanzeemul Haq, Al-Farooq and Al-Badr Foundation. In 1996, first three of these groups joined hands to launch *Lashkar-e-Jhangwi* (LeJ) with the consent of the SSP leadership (Mir, 2004, p.177). This new sectarian outfit made its mark as the most feared violent outfit soon after its inception. LeJ believed in using terror tactics to force the government to accept its demands of declaring Shias as non-Muslims. It also prepared female suicide bombers to attack Shia places of worship in Karachi (Mir, 2004, p.183). Head of the LeJ, Riaz Basra was a veteran of Afghan „jihad‟ and was considered a dangerous terrorist owing to his involvement in the murders of several high profile Shia leaders. He was arrested in 1994 for the murder of Iranian Consul General but made an escape from the court and fled to Afghanistan to join the Taliban militia. After 1996, the Taliban government ignored several requests from the Pakistani authorities to extradite Basra saying that he was a great „mujahid‟. However, Basra regularly visited Pakistan secretly to motivate and organize attacks on Shia targets. During one such visit, he was killed in a shoot out with the police near Multan in 2003 (Hussain, 2007, pp. 94-97). LeJ, despite being outlawed in 2001, continued to carry out attacks on Shia community.

As regards the second level of Deobandi extremism, it was unveiled in the form of a phenomenon generally referred to as „Talibanization". The roots of that phenomenon are also traced to DMM's involvement in Afghanistan as discussed below.

After Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988, various Afghan factions who had participated in „jihad" came to power. However, these factions soon started fighting amongst themselves. As this infighting got intense and merciless, the regional leadership of the warring factions in some provinces was virtually eliminated. One such province was Kandahar. The leadership gap in this province left the field free for the rise of a new wave of Islamist group in 1994 - the Taliban, under the leadership of a local named Mullah Omar (Rashid, 2008, p.19).

This group chose for themselves the name Taliban (plural of *Talib* or Islamic student) because most of them were part-time or full time students at madaris. Many of them had been born in Pakistani refugee camps, educated in Pakistan's Deobandi madaris and had learned their fighting skills from the *mujahideen* based in Pakistan (Rashid, 2008, pp.22-23). Soon after 1994, thousands of young Afghan Pushtuns studying in Deobandi madaris of Balochistan and the NWFP rushed to Kandahar to join the Taliban. They were then followed by Pakistani volunteers from Deobandi madaris, who were inspired by the new Islamic movement in Afghanistan (Rashid, 2008, p.29). This movement had in fact revived one of the the dreams of Shah Wailullah's movement to set up an Islamic state under the Pushtuns.

Broadly speaking, the Taliban forces comprised of three categories. First category consisted of the loyal members of the movement who were the students and graduates of the madaris operating in the rural areas of Afghanistan where they had been taught a concise official curriculum that mainly focused only on Quranic studies, general principles of the Islamic law and Arabic language. The second category included the students of Deobandi madaris as well as JUI activists from Pakistan who catered to the administration and military ranks of the movement. The third category consisted of young Afghans studying in the refugee camps in Pakistan. This last category is further divided into two groups. The first group attended the madaris run by Afghan *mujahideen* who taught their national curriculum for religious schools. The second group in this category comprised of those Afghan students who attended Deobandi

madaris in Pakistan and were taught a far more thorough curriculum as compared to Afghan madaris. This purely Deobandi group of Afghans later made the core of the high ranking leadership who ran the Taliban administration inside Afghanistan as well as managed their international affairs (Najomi, 2002, pp.125-26). The influence of this group turned the Taliban into a predominantly Deobandi movement. Members of this influential group were trained at Pakistani madaris like Darul Ulum Haqqania, Jamia Binouria and Darul Ulum Karachi and occupied vital positions like governor of Jalal Abad, Taliban‟s representative to the UN and their ambassador in Islamabad. In fact, three of six members of the council of the Taliban leadership came from Jamia Binouria of Karachi (Najomi, 2002, pp.120-21).

It may be pertinent to add here that owing to the Deobandi ideology they followed, Taliban‟s behaviour became hard to interpret in academic terms. Some authors labelled the Taliban as fundamentalists, others called them traditionalists, still others considered them totalitarians and terrorists. Former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Robert Oakley suggested that the Taliban represented the arrival of „village‟ values and attitudes in the cities (Maley, 1998, pp.16-22). This difference of opinion regarding the interpretation of the Taliban is not unlike the inconclusive debate about the interpretations about the DMM as discussed in Chapter 1.

As the Deobandi creed became the primary religious and ideological influence on the Taliban (Rashid, 2008, p.89), they developed closest links with the leadership of Deobandi madaris as well as JUI of Pakistan whose leader, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, had become a political ally of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. He had access to the government, the army and the ISI to whom he described this newly emerging force of Taliban (Rashid, 2008, pp.26). As Head of Parliament‟s Foreign Relations Committee on Kashmir, Fazlur Rehman visited Washington and European capitals to lobby for the Taliban as well as Gulf and other Muslim states to enlist their support (Rashid, 2008, p.90). Pakistan‟s military establishment was also deeply involved in helping and guiding the Taliban in their battles against the Northern Alliance forces, which were being supported by Iran and Russia. Saudis later provided funds, fuel and vehicles for the successful Taliban attack on Kabul (Rashid, 2008, p. 201). As a result of this moral, physical and financial support, the Taliban were able to control most of Afghanistan by 1996.

Pakistan played a pivotal role in bringing the Taliban into power. The prime objective of Pakistan's Afghanistan policy was to attain strategic depth against its old rival, India. This concept of „strategic depth" was actually propagated by Pakistan's powerful military establishment. However, Eqbal Ahmad (1998) declared that in military terms this was a non-concept unless one is referring to a hard-to-reach place where a defeated army might safely cocoon. Criticising this concept, he wrote that a Taliban victory was likely to augment Pakistan's political and strategic predicament. His analysis later proved to be prophetic as discussed below.

Pakistan's military had assumed that the Taliban would recognize the Durand Line- the disputed boundary line between the two countries created by the British but never recognized by any Afghan regime owing to their claims on some parts of the NWFP (renamed as Khyber Pukhtun Khwah in 2010). The military also assumed that the Taliban would curb Pushtun nationalism in the NWFP and provide an outlet for Pakistan's Islamic radicals, thus forestalling an Islamic movement at home. In fact, just the opposite happened. The Taliban did not recognize the Durand Line and fostered Pushtun nationalism of an Islamic character, which was to lead to the rise of Pakistani Taliban in the NWFP and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Further, the Taliban were to give sanctuary to the most violent Deobandi extremist groups involved in killing Pakistani Shias and advocating the overthrow of the ruling elite through an Islamic revolution. In short, the Taliban were not to provide strategic depth to Pakistan but it was going to be the other way round (Rashid, 2008, p.187).

After the fall of the Taliban rule in the wake of intervention of NATO forces in Afghanistan, the links between the DMM and Taliban continued. In 2002, many Taliban members returned to their families who still lived in refugee camps in Pakistan, others returned to the Deobandi madaris in Pakistan from which they had been recruited. The JUI-led provincial governments in the NWFP and Balochistan, installed after the 2002 elections held under General Musharraf, provided considerable backing to the Taliban in raising funds and launching campaign against the NATO forces in Afghanistan (Rashid, 2010, p.223). That was the time when the Taliban started receiving help from Al Qaeda, which trained the former about the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), suicide attacks as well as sophisticated media outlets for producing DVDs and inspirational tapes against the NATO forces. After 2004, the number of suicide attacks by the Taliban markedly increased. They also used web sites,

FM radio stations and emails in sharp contrast to the Taliban of 1990s who abhorred the media. This newfound acumen actually came from Al Qaeda media outlet *al-Sahab* (Rashid, 2010, pp.229-31). As the Taliban became more radicalized after their association with Al Qaeda, so did the Pakistani Deobandis fighting alongside the Taliban.

It was quite ironic that even after the fall of Taliban government, Musharraf"s military regime continued some clandestine support for the Taliban owing to the Pakistani army"s fear that by backing the US invasion of Afghanistan, it had helped bring to power the Northern Alliance (NA) whom the military loathed because NA received support from Pakistan"s regional rivals India, Iran and Russia (Rashid, 2010, p.224). However, it is also true that official patronage to the „jihad" in Kashmir and Afghanistan gradually started decreasing during that period and it had been reduced to a large extent by the time Musharraf resigned in 2008.

The outcome of this decrease in „external jihad" in Afghanistan and Kashmir was a sharp increase in „domestic jihad" marked by bomb explosions and suicidal attacks on security forces and non-combatant civilians in Pakistan. The real impact of the Taliban ideology was felt by the Pakistani state and society after 2001 when many Afghan Taliban fighters and commanders along with some al-Qaeda activists escaped into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. With high mountains, rugged terrain, few roads and sparse population, FATA made the ideal safe haven for the Taliban.

FATA comprise of seven agencies (Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai, Mohmand, Bajaur and North and South Waziristan) with a population of about 4.5 million. FATA was established by the British in 1901 as a no-man"s-land between Afghanistan and British India. Britian exercised indirect control over the agencies through its Governor and political agents while allowing the tribal leaders to hold power over the local population. Pakistan has still maintained that system, which is now totally outdated. Efforts to introduce reforms in FATA were blocked on the one hand by the power-wielding tribal chiefs and on the other by the army, which used the region as a training ground for the militants to be sent to Kasmir and Afghanistan (Rashid, 2010, pp.236-38).

After 2001, at least two agencies, North and South Waziristan were to become the training and recruiting grounds for the Afghan Taliban and their al-Qaeda allies for launching a guerrilla war against the U.S. forces in Afghanistan. In the process, many activists from the outlawed Deobandi outfits of Pakistan like SSP, LeJ and JeM also gathered in FATA. Many locals also organized themselves into small groups or Lashkars with the aim of protecting their guests as well as implementing Deobandi version of Islam in the tribal areas.

Between 2001 and 2003, military government of Musharraf made no effort to stop this activity in FATA and denied even the presence of Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda in Pakistan. However, after the two assassination attempts on Musharraf in December 2003, which were planned in South Waziristan, the army half-heartedly woke up to the threat. In March 2004, para-military troops of Frontier Corps (FC) were sent to South Waziristan without any air cover, artillery and good intelligence. These troops were badly mauled by the Wazir militants under Nek Mohammad. More than 200 soldiers were killed and many more were captured and later executed.

On 24 April 2004, the army signed the first of several humiliating „peace" deals with the Wazir militants in Shakai, pardoning Nek Mohammad and other Pakistani Taliban, offering compensation for their losses, freeing their prisoners on the condition that foreign militants would register with the authorities. However, in May 2004, Nek Mohammad objected to the process of registration and the fighting resumed. In June 2004, Nek Mohammad was killed in a drone attack by the U.S. forces (Pirzada, 2013). Army signed more such „peace" deals in FATA while suffering setbacks and casualties after which militants were left in control of the territory they had already occupied. On 22 February 2005, a deal was signed with the militant group of Baitullah Mehsud in Sararogha, South Waziristan. Another deal was signed with the militants of North Waziristan on 5 September 2006. In 2007, yet another peace accord was signed with South Waziristan‟s militants and on 21 June 2008, the army agreed to have a deal with the Afridi tribes and *Lashkar-e-Islam* of Mangal Bagh in the Khyber agency (Safi, 2013). At the same time, these militant groups started setting up their own courts and administration in FATA while killing more than 300 tribal elders and chiefs who did not support them. Inspired by their Deobandi ideology, these militants banned TV, music and internet. They destroyed schools for the girls while Debandi madaris in the area multiplied (Rashid, 2010, pp.238-39).

The impact of the FATA developments was soon felt in the settled areas of the NWFP. Swat valley became the major centre for the local Taliban. Strategically located just 120 miles north of Islamabad, this valley with a well-developed infrastructure gave access to the broad flat lands that extended into Punjab, the largest province of Pakistan. In Swat, Mullah Fazlullah established an FM radio station in 2004 after setting up a madrassah. He began broadcasting inflammatory speeches against the Americans and asked the locals to: stop sending their girls to schools; avoid evils of TV and music; and refuse polio vaccination for their children to avoid inreftility. He claimed to have burned TV sets, video equipment, computers and digital cameras worth 20 million rupees because „these are the main sources of sin" (Khattak, 2013). With the tacit support of JUI-led provincial government, Fazlullah had set up a well-armed militia called Shaheen Force (Hussain, 2013) and multiple FM radio stations by 2007 when the army finally decided to intervene. The militants forced the army to withdraw leaving Fazlullah in virtual control of Swat valley.

On the other hand, the militant groups that had successfully resisted the army offensives for many years, felt confident enough to launch their own movement in 2007 under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud of South Waziristan agency. This movement was formed by two dozen tribal militias and other groups from Punjab and Kashmir and was named *Tehreek-Taliban Pakistan* (TTP) or Movement of Pakistani Taliban. The aim of this loose umbrella organization of mostly Deobandi groups was to take over Pakistan and turn it into a *Shariah* state ruled by the Taliban. The TTP leadership declared Mullah Omar as *Ameerul Momineen*. Mehsud, a close ally of Afghan Taliban and Jalauddin Haqqani, had fought for the Taliban in 1990s. He was later charged with assassinating Benazir Bhutto in 2007 and was held responsible for dozens of suicide attacks in Pakistan (Rashid, 2010, pp.236-240). He was killed in a drone attack in 2009 and was replaced by another fellow tribesman from South Waziristan, Hakimullah Mehsud.

At around the same time, the rising extremism in the DMM was demonstrated at the Red Mosque (*Lal Masjid*) of Islamabad. In March 2007, radical Deobandis running a chain of madaris in Islamabad announced their intention of imposing *Shariah* in the capital. They closed a Chinese massage centre by force on the pretext of being un-Islamic. They also beat up a woman on the alleged charges of running a brothel. Later,

they occupied a government building for children's library and announced to set up a female *madrasssah* there. The Musharraf government was initially not willing to use force against these extremists in the hope of finding a peaceful solution. By the time, the army was forced to attack the mosque in July 2007, hundreds of militants had already gathered there. The latter tried to use the resident madrassah children as human shields. Many of these boarding students belonged to FATA and NWFP. A three-day battle ensued in which about one hundred people including some children were killed. The militants who survived fled to FATA and were joined by the male relatives of the children killed in the mosque. They vowed revenge and became the core of a new group of suicide bombers for Baitullah Mehsud's TTP (Rashid, 2010, pp.239-40). Many Deobandi activists from Punjab also joined the TTP soon after its inception.

Meanwhile, Fazlullah merged his group in the TTP and was made head of its Swat chapter. The army again invaded Swat in 2008 but was defeated by the Taliban. The fighting forced a mass exodus and there were many civilian casualties. As the army withdrew, the Taliban swiftly started imposing their interpretation of *Shariah*, which included executions, floggings, destruction of schools and homes, preventing women from leaving their homes and executing all those who had resisted their rule. In February 2009, the provincial government of the NWFP and the army signed a peace accord with the Taliban in Swat allowing *Shariah* courts to be set up in the province in return for army's withdrawal and Taliban's disarming. Without showing any willingness to disarm, the Taliban embarrassed the government by taking control of the local administration, police and education in the Swat valley. They also began expanding into other districts with clear intention of trying to overthrow the Islamabad government. More than 2.5 million refugees fled from Swart and adjoining districts of Buner and Dir. The army, impelled by international pressure and public opinion, finally attacked Swat with much larger force than it had sent in before and drove the Taliban out of the valley in June 2009. However, the entire leadership of Swati Taliban including some 20 commanders and Fazlullah managed to escape and later resumed sporadic attacks against the security forces in Swat (Rashid, 2010, pp. 240-41). In 2013, Fazlullah became the chief of TTP after the death of Hakimullah Mehsud in a drone attack. By that time, the number of militants groups under TTP had reportedly risen to 57, out of which 35 were under its direct control (Jawwad, 2013).

Various groups attached to the TTP have been involved in hundreds of bomb explosions and suicide attacks inside Pakistan since 2003. According to South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), more than 25,000 civilians and security personnel had died in Pakistan between 2003 and 2012 during such attacks. According to a statement by the attorney of intelligence agencies before the Supreme Court of Pakistan in March 2013, the death toll in the terrorist attacks since 2001 had reached 49,000 (Raja, 2013). The newest trend in these attacks has focussed on targeting the popular *sufi* shrines, which are daily visited by thousands of devotees as majority of the ordinary people in Pakistan express their religious sentiments through *sufism* (Jafferlot, 2002, pp.232-34). The most revered shrines of *sufi* saints throughout Pakistan have been attacked by suicidal bombers during the recent years killing hundreds of devotees. These and other suicidal attacks have been categorically condemned by all the sections of Pakistani society. However, the Deobandi response in this regard has generally been that of equivocation and tergiversation. The top Deobandi leadership in Pakistan has failed to condemn or stop such suicide attacks. Influential Deobandi *ulama* are reluctant to openly condemn or declare *fatwa* against suicide attacks. In 2005, Musharraf government tried unsuccessfully to convince the Grand Mufti of Deobandis, Rafi Usmani and the general secretary of Deobandi *Wifaqul Madaris*, Hanif Jallandhri to issue *fatwa* against suicide bombing (Jamal, 2004). Another well-respected Deobandi scholar, Taqi Usmani also refused cooperation with the government in this regard. According to a report in daily Times, the Interior Ministry believed that „Taqi Usmani is a problem and a key man who can save a lot of lives by giving out one single statement [against suicide bombing]" (Chishti, 2010). On the other hand, all the groups and religious leaders representing majority Barelwi sect issued clear *fatawa* against such attacks from time to time. Even Ahle Hadith leader Hafiz Saeed also opposed such attacks.

As regards the DMM, the only prominent Deobandi scholar who openly opposed the suicide attacks was Hassan Jan of Peshawar. To punish him for his opposition to what most Deobandi militant groups justify as a legitimate tactic, he was shot dead on 15 September 2007 (Gul, 2009, p.145). Some observers have also linked the murder of another influential Deobandi scholar, Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai of Jamia Binouria with his *fatwa* against suicide bombings (Nishapuri, 2012). On 14 October 2008, the government managed to get signatures of a couple of less important Deobandi *ulama* on a joint statement by all sects against suicide bombing inside Pakistan (Daily Times,

2008). However, the Deobandi signatories at the same time ensured that their demand for stopping the army operation against local Taliban should be included in the joint statement, which was the outcome of the hectic efforts of a well-respected Barelwi scholar, Sarfraz Naeemi. On 12 June 2009, Naeemi was killed in a suicide attack reportedly carried out by the Deobandi militants.

Further, the Deobandi scholars have particularly found it very hard to sympathize with the victims among shrine visitors. A Deobandi cleric who is a prayer leader at the *Masjid Ahsanul Ulum* in Gulshan-e-Iqbal, Karachi bluntly refused to condemn the suicide attacks on *sufi* shrines (Chishti, 2010). For the DMM, such practices are un-Islamic and eliminating these activities is part of the „practical tradition" they inherited from Waliullah"s movement. Ahle Hadith school of thought, whose origin can also be traced to Waliullah"s movement, also rejects such popular practices of folk Islam. However, the latter sect holds little influence and following inside Pakistan as they represent less than 5% of population. It is the Deobandis, with their share of madaris exceeding 60% and support of many political and militant groups, which seem to play a major role in challenging and influencing the values and customs of the mainstream Muslim society of Pakistan. More details of this third level of Deobandi extremism are given in the next section.

5.4 Countercultural Tendencies in DMM Since 1947

The DMM in Pakistan mostly behaved like an Ascetic or Mystic counterculture during the early years after partition. After failing to get a constitutional role for them, the founding fathers of *Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam* withdrew from the political arena and restricted themselves to the madaris. However, the second tier of Deobandi *ulama* continued the political activities without getting much success in terms of electoral representation.

As these two Deobandi streams of politics and madaris gradually became disillusioned about the possibility of making Pakistan an Islamic state, the focus of the DMM got even narrower. The old Deobandi goal of an Islamic state was reduced to a distant dream. In this scenario, Deobandi politicians became more and more pragmatic in their approach through their motley alliances with secular, sectarian and liberal parties. Therefore, JUI, which was originally a party of Deobandi politicians, gradually became a party of politicians who happened to be Deobandis. Although JUI politicians took

guidance from the *ulama* of Deobandi madris, their politics was not much different from other political parties, which were either doing power politics or acting as pressure groups.

In the wake of JUI"s pragmatic politics, the actual leadership of the DMM in Pakistan was retained by the *ulama* of Deobandi madaris. From the anti-Qadyani movement of 1950s to the socialism controversy of 1960s, it was left to the Deobandi *ulama* to play the decisive role. These *ulama* also played the leading role by making JUI to follow and defend their strategy of resistance against various madrassah reform initiatives taken by the state. After the 9/11 attacks, it were the Deobandi *ulama* like Mufti Shamzai of *Jamia Binouria* rather than the politicians of JUI who were requested by the government to use their influence on Afghan Taliban for the ejection of Usama Bin Laden from Afghanistan. Similarly, these *ulama* were asked to play their role in resolving the Lal Masjid crisis in Islamabad in 2007. Further, different Pakistani governments have been trying hard to stop suicide attacks by getting an explicit *fatwa* from the Deobandi *ulama* in this regard. In 2013, it was again the *ulama*, not the politicians of the DMM, who were requested by the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif"s government to convince the TTP leadership to start negotiations with the government. Despite all their influence and clout in the movement, Deobandi *ulama*, not unlike their political counterparts, did not appear to be very optimistic about turning Pakistan into an Islamic state of their choice. Although these *ulama* frequently referred to Islamization of Pakistan, they were not able to provide a roadmap or action plan for setting up an Islamic state. Still, they continued to provide guidance to Deobandi politicians of JUI through their interpretations of different political, religious, social and cultural issues through their writings and speeches.

For nearly three decades after the creation of Pakistan, the DMM was not able to establish itself in the arena of political Islam, which was mainly dominated by *Jamaat-e-Islami*. During those years, the DMM nurtured itself mainly as a movement, which condemned and contradicted the popular customs and socio-cultural as well as spiritual practices of the mainstream Muslim society. Instead of producing religious scholars who could interpret the Quran and Hadith in the modern era, the output of the DMM in Pakistan was mostly restricted to sectarian scholars who specialized in condemning other Muslim sects and their practices. The target of such scholars was not just the folk Islam, which Barelwis claimed to represent. These Deobandi *ulama* also strongly

condemned the followers of Shia Islam on the one hand and the *ghair-muqallids* belonging to Ahle Hadith as well as *Jamaat-e-Islami* on the other (***Appendix I***). In other words, the DMM, like a typical counterculture, placed itself against the whole non-Deobandi Muslim society in Pakistan.

After having lost the hope of setting up an Islamic state, DMM's objectives were reduced to preservation and protection of their version of Islam and condemnation of beliefs and practices of folk Sunni Islam as well as censure of popular custom and castigation of Shia Islam. In this regard, the Deobandis in Pakistan, like their predecessors, employed two terms, *bida'* (innovation) and *shirk* (polytheism) to denounce the beliefs and values of the mainstream Muslim society. Although this was quite in line with the earlier tradition of Abdul Aziz and Rasheed Ahmed, DMM leaders in Pakistan presented a more superficial and simplistic interpretation of the term *bida'* in order to make their message loud and clear to the ordinary Muslims who did not hold a deeper knowledge of Islam. This approach of Pakistani Deobandis was much in the traditions of *Salafis* (Wahhabis) of Arabia who condemned and forcefully stopped all practices they considered as *bida'* during 18th century after they got into power. Muhammad Ismail and Syed Ahmed also adopted a similar approach in the 19th century but they simultaneously announced jihad against non-Muslims to gather support of Indian Muslims in their favour. However, the situation of Pakistani Deobandis was quite different because they neither got into power nor were they able to raise the slogan of jihad in a country like Pakistan where more than 95% of people were Muslims. In this scenario, DMM leaders in Pakistan adopted a countercultural approach that was more „ascetic" and „mystic" than „activist". Through the platform of *Tablighi Jamaat*, the Deobandis indirectly adopted a „mystic" approach whereby they got opportunity to contact mainstream Muslims who were asked to join *Tabligh* missions during which they were not only taught about the basic tenets of Islam but also about the „wrongful" and „sinful" practices prevalent in the mainstream Muslim society. The other platform the Deobandis employed was their mosques where graduates of their madaris got weekly opportunities to address the ordinary Muslims during Friday prayers.

However, the DMM did not openly clash with the mainstream society during the early years after independence. It was only after the involvement of the DMM in Afghan „jihad" that it truly became active on the political front. However, by that time the decades of training in the narrow sectarian and countercultural tradition had rendered

the movement bereft of any broad vision about political Islam. Before that, the Deobandis did get opportunity to head the provincial government in the NWFP after 1970 elections. However, they failed to come up with concrete ideas for the implementation of the *Shariah*.

When Mufti Mahmood of JUI became the Chief Minister of the NWFP in 1972, Pakistan"s Deobandis got a great opportunity to establish a model for the realization of their original objective of turning Pakistan into an Islamic state. However, their vision about Islam had become so parochial by then that JUI could not present a viable road map for Islamization. They ended up with the announcement of some symbolic initiatives, which included: prohibiting alcohol and gambling; mandating observance of Ramadan (fasting); establishing an *ulama* advisory board; making reading of the Quran and study of Arabic compulsory for university admission; requiring women to be veiled in public; banning dowry; and making *shalwar-kamiz* (local dress comprising a baggy cotton pants and a long shirt that extends to below the knees) tunic to be mandatory for government servants (White, 2008, p.34). It is ironic that such surface measures were to set the tone for JUI"s future vision about Islamization of Pakistan.

At the same time, the DMM through mosques, madaris and *Tabligh* missions had managed by 1970s to make some impact on the urban middle class, who reckoned Deobandism as a middle ground between the Barelwis (who were painted by the DMM as too lenient) and the Ahle Hadith (who were generally viewed as hardliners). This urban middle class supported the Deobandis through regular donations. Till that time, their activism was restricted to the defence of their madaris against any possible control or intervention by the government. This Deobandi paranoia about the state (which still haunts the DMM), was a legacy of the colonial era. This situation continued till 1977 when JUI got an opportunity to adopt an activist approach. It was a time when JUI joined an alliance of nine political and religious parties (including Barelwi JUP and *Jamaat-e-Islami*) who launched a successful mass movement against populist Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. During that movement, the slogan of *Nizam-e-Mustafa* was raised by some religious parties. That movement led to a military coup by General Zia on 5 July 1977.

While carrying its two dimensional vision of political Islam, the DMM continued to beef up its sectarian and countercultural credentials. Therefore, when the DMM started

getting funds and patronage from domestic and foreign sources and got opportunities to increase its influence in Pakistan after 1980s, the movement was not able to rise above its countercultural and sectarian mindset. Resultantly, the DMM started behaving like an „activist" counterculture after 1980s. The major targets of this activist approach were the practices and beliefs of the Barelwis and Shias, who together represented around 75% of Pakistani Muslims.

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, when intelligence agencies of the U.S. and Pakistan decided to use Pakistani madaris and their students to launch „jihad" against the Soviets, the Deobandis readily joined in. They saw in it the possibility to revive their old dreams of jihad and an Islamic state. They could link this opportunity to Waliullah"s vision about an Islamic state under the leadership of Pushtun Afghans. However, 1980s were a different time. The leadership of the DMM, unlike their predecessors, was not trained to uphold or revive the traditions of jihad and an Islamic state envisioned by Waliullah or Abdul Aziz, or even Syed Ahmed. The Deobandi *ulama* of 1980s fell far short of the genius of Waliullah and his 18th century successors whose traditions of intellectual synthesis and religious reform had long been disregarded by the DMM. Pakistan"s Deobandis had limited themselves for about three decades to mere propagation of basic tenets of Islam to the ordinary Muslims, and criticism of popular customs and socio-cultural practices of the Muslim majority. The first generation of Deobandi leadership in Pakistan, who had some exposure to the tradition of political Islam, was already dead and the next generation merely represented a sect that was actually behaving like a counterculture vis-à-vis the mainstream Muslim society.

When this countercultural leadership of the DMM got involved in the Afghan war against the Soviets, they were not only exposed to a lot of funds and facilities provided by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia through ISI but also to the Wahhabi Islam through their interaction with Arab *mujahideen*. This interaction with foreign radicals greatly contributed to the radicalization of the Deobandis (Rashid, 2010, p.238). Gradually this activist counterculture of the DMM became more illiberal and rigid owing to this influence of Wahhabi Arabs. This increasing inflexibility and intolerance in the DMM led to the rise of a new kind of countercultural trend, which not only condemned and anathematized the Barelwi and Shia values and practices but also believed in physically eliminating the followers of these sects. This militant faction of the Deobandis has not

only been involved in killing thousands of Shia Muslims in Pakistan since 1980s but has also been alleged to support the bomb explosions on the shrines of *sufi* saints revered by majority of Sunni Muslims.

The most esteemed shrines of *sufi* saints like Data Ganj Bakhsh in Lahore, Baba Farid in Pakpattan, Abdullah Ghazi in Karachi, Bari Imam in Islamabad, Rehman Baba in Peshawar and Sakhi Sarwar in Dera Ghazi Khan, have been attacked by suicidal bombers in recent years killing hundreds of devotees. This extremist approach of a faction of Deobandis does not fit any of the three types of counterculture defined by Yinger (1982): ascetic, mystic and activist. Neither can it be explained simply as terrorism, which is typically meant to hurt, directly or indirectly, some political authority against which the terrorists have some grievances. As such, terrorism is the use of violence as a political weapon, which is generally targeted at a government or established order. On the other hand, the afore-mentioned violence of the Deobandis is specifically directed against the ordinary powerless people who visit the shrines for their spiritual satisfaction. Therefore, one has to coin a separate term for this type of counterculture, which allows killing of ordinary Muslims just because they visited shrines. This thesis suggests calling it as „extremist counterculture‟. It may be pointed out here that the recent attacks of the TTP against the security forces of Pakistan are more like typical terrorism because the TTP is trying to implement their vision of political Islam in Pakistan just on the lines of Taliban‟s rule in Afghanistan.

As regards DMM‟s anti-Shia approach, the Deobandis have been involved in the killing of Shias since the inception of *Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan* (SSP). Later on, Deobandis founded *Lashkar-e-Jhangwi* (LeJ), a ferocious sectarian outfit that was even more ruthless and cold-blooded in its anti-Shia approach. Shias, in the meantime, also set up their own extremist organizations like *Sipah-e-Muhammad* to take revenge. Since 1980s, thousands of Pakistanis have been killed during Shia-Sunni clashes. In fact, Shia-Sunni clashes in Pakistan are actually Shia-Deobandi clashes because the majority (more than 60%) of Sunnis in Pakistan belong to Barelwi sect, which is not against the Shia Islam. In these Shia-Deobandi clashes, two different approaches have been adopted by the two sects. While Shia groups have targeted the most influential Deobandi leaders who are campaigning against them, the Deobandis have indiscriminately killed Shias of every hue and class. That is one reason the number of Shias killed during such clashes is far more than the Deobandis.

Many Deobandi extremists took refuge in FATA and Afghanistan after 1998 when Pakistani government launched an operation against the sectarian organizations after banning such outfits. In FATA, the SSP developed close links with the Taliban and other militants. After the fall of the Taliban government, many of these Deobandis returned to the NWFP and Balochistan provinces in 2002. Since then, SSP and LeJ have been banned by the government. However, LeJ is still active in Karachi (Sindh), Quetta (Balochistan), Gilgit-Baltistan (Northern Areas). In Balochistan, they have targeted Shia Hazaras (Herald, 2012, p.55). The Inspector General of that province categorically stated that LeJ and TTP are involved in the killing of Hazara community in Quetta (Jamal, 2012). Since 2001, more than 600 Hazara Shias have been killed in about 50 attacks (Dawn, 11 January, 2013). Disgruntled by such attacks, Hazaras are migrating from Pakistan. Around 100,000 of them have already migrated to Australia and other countries (Shahid, 2012, pp.46-48).

After the SSP was banned, it re-emerged with a new name, *Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat* (ASWJ) under the leadership of Muhammad Ahmed Ludhianvi. Although ASWJ has apparently adopted a less aggressive stance, Ludhianvi has come up with a complicated formula for sectarian peace. He has declared that he would do ‚anything and everything" for sectarian harmony as long as it does not compromise his party"s ‚avowed goals of turning Pakistan into a Sunni Islamic state and declaring Shias a religious minority" like the Qadyanis in 1974 (Jamal, 2002).

One may argue that Deobandi politics in Pakistan apparently did not behave like a typical counterculture. However, the *ulama* of Deobandi madaris apparently continued to follow the countercultural traditions of the DMM. These *ulama* carried a great influence on the Deobandi politicians and guided the latter on different issues in the light of Deobandi Islam. The influence of these *ulama* ensured that the Deobandi politics remained countercultural in spirit, if not in form. That is why, whenever, Deobandi JUI got a chance to come into power (in the NWFP in 1970 and 2002) its Islamization agenda was kept restricted mostly to announcement of countercultural measures, which the Deobandis tried to explain in the light of the *Shariah*. Same was the case with Fazlullah"s ‚Islamic" rule in Swat from 2007 to 2009. As discussed in the previous section, Fazlullah"s rule was known more for its anti-state and anti-society narratives than for its Islamic credentials.

While hailing the symbolic measures of JUI governments as part of their Islamization agenda, the Deobandis have attributed their failure to impose *Shariah* during their stints in power to some external factors. For example, in 1970, their government survived for less than 10 months and their alliance with a secular party, NAP also hampered them. Similarly, they argue that after 2002, a secular President Pervez Musharraf as well as the Supreme Court stopped them from imposing *Shariah* through their Hasba Bill. These arguments of the DMM do carry some weight and the Deobandis can be given some benefit of doubt in this regard. However, at the same time, the DMM can be criticized for not coming up with a clear detailed roadmap for converting Pakistan into an Islamic state for the last 65 years. On the other hand, the DMM has simultaneously shown much clarity and commitment in condemning the social, cultural and spiritual values and practices of the mainstream Muslim society in Pakistan as shall be discussed in the next chapter.

Although the DMM was not given a free hand to rule in Pakistan, one may get some idea about its vision of *Shariah* by reviewing the reign of Deobandi Taliban in Afghanistan where they enjoyed full power in all the provinces they occupied. As mentioned in sub-section 5.1.3, Taliban‟s was primarily a Deobandi movement. That is why several measures taken by the Taliban to impose *Shariah* in Afghanistan highlighted the countercultural complexion of Deobandi movement. For example, after coming into power, they immediately closed down girls‟ schools and restricted women to their homes, smashed TV sets, forbade a whole array of entertainment and cultural activities including music, TV, internet, videos, painting, playing cards, chess, kite flying, pigeon keeping and most sports and games (Rashid, 2008, p.2, 29,219). The Taliban did not recognize the very idea of culture. They banned Nawroz, the traditional Afghan New Years‟s celebrations as well as *Ashura* processions by Shia Muslims. After coming into power, the Taliban also strongly condemned the instruments of mainstream politics and rejected the general elections because these were incompatible with the *Shariah*. The Taliban as rulers of Afghanistan implemented an extreme and narrow interpretation of the *Shariah* that placed them in direct conflict with the mainstream society. Rashid (2008, p.107) explained this situation by stating that „the Taliban were right, their interpretation of Islam was right and everything else was wrong and an expression of human weakness and a lack of piety‟. He further argued that the Taliban interpretation divested Islam of all its legacies except theology whereas

Islamic philosophy, science, arts, aesthetics and mysticism were ignored (Rashid, 2008, pp.211-12). This viewpoint can also be applied to the DMM as a whole.

Keeping in view the above discussion, the DMM hardly qualifies to be labelled as a true religious or political movement. It may be added here that Deobandi approach even about the theology of Islam was quite limited, narrow, and superficial. Owing to its strict *taqlid* of Hanafi *madhab*, DMM's contribution towards the theology of Islam had also become quite restricted. As mentioned earlier, the major focus of the DMM since its very inception has been the denunciation of the popular beliefs, social customs and practices of the Muslims of the subcontinent. Looking from another angle, the general approach and priority of the present-day DMM might have been to employ the theology of Islam to condemn these beliefs and practices. Instead of interpreting the religion at a broad canvas, the Deobandis have preferred to construe and excoriate the prevalent beliefs and practices of the Muslim society in the light of their own understanding of the theology of Islam. For example, when the Deobandis declared most of the popular customs and practices of the Muslim society as *bida'* (innovation), they employed a very narrow definition of that religious term as shall be explained in the next chapter, which highlights the conflict between Deobandi movement and the folk Islam with respect to socio-cultural and religious beliefs and practices.

6   DEOBANDI ISLAM: COUNTERING THE FOLK ISLAM AND POPULAR CUSTOMS

'On the ideological level, a counterculture is a set of beliefs and values which radically reject the dominant culture of a society and prescribe a sectarian alternative. On the behavioural level, a counterculture is a group of people who, because they accept such beliefs and values, behave in…radically nonconformist ways'.

Kenneth Westhues in „Society‟s Shadow: Studies in the Sociology of Countercultures‟ (1972, pp.9-10)

The objective of this chapter is to highlight the conflict between the DMM and the majority of Muslims in Pakistan. Unlike the previous chapters that identified the presence of countercultural tendencies in the history of the DMM, this chapter presents a direct comparison of the values and practices of folk Islam with those of the Deobandi Islam. The chapter elaborates how the DMM has employed the theology of Islam to condemn and castigate the established religious and socio-cultural beliefs and practices of the mainstream Muslim society in Pakistan.

As mentioned in the Introduction of this thesis, a large majority of Pakistani Muslims follow the folk Islam- a charitable version of Islam broadly linked to spiritual and *sufi* traditions. For this thesis, the folk Islam represents the mainstream Muslim society whereas the Deobandi sect, followed by about 20% Pakistani Muslims, epitomizes a counterculture. The current chapter identifies the most prominent beliefs and practices of folk Islam as well as popular customs that have been condemned by the Deobandis. The chapter not only presents the arguments of Deobandi scholars in this regard but also compares their views with the perspectives of the non-Deobandi *ulama*, mostly from the Barelwi sect that generally represents the folk Islam in Pakistan. The latter viewpoint has been included to highlight the justification and continuation of these beliefs and practices by the majority of Pakistani Muslims.

For this discourse on DMM‟s countercultural approach, the views and *fatawa* of three prominent Deobandi scholars i.e. Ashraf Ali Thanvi (1863-1943), Abdul Haq (1912-1988) and Yousaf Ludhianvi (1932-2000), have been selected to represent the Deobandi persuasion. Thanvi is considered as one of the most influential *ulama* of the DMM. He was the student and spiritual disciple of DMM‟s founder Rasheed Ahmed. He authored many books on varied subjects ranging from translation of Quran to *tasawwuf* and from role of women to reform of popular custom. Thanvi has a large

following among the Deobandis of both India and Pakistan. Two of his books are part of the *Dars-e-Nizami* syllabus in the Deobandi madaris. These are *Jamal-ul-Quran* (Beauty of the Quran) for the male and *Bahishti Zewar* (Heavenly Ornaments) for the female students (Khalid, 2002, p. 388 & 415).

The second Deobandi scholar, Abdul Haq, graduated from and taught at Darul Ulum Deoband before returning to his native town of Akora Khattak near Peshawar after the partition of India. Here he established his madrassah, Darul Ulum Haqqania, which played an active role in organizing the DMM in the newly established state of Pakistan. Apart from being a leading religious scholar, Haq participated in active politics through the platform of JUI and won three elections to become member of the National Assembly. He played a pivotal role in recruiting madrassah students for the Afghan resistance against the Soviets. He issued several *fatawa* to declare the Muslim resistance in Afghanistan, Kashmir, Burma and Bosnia as jihad (Haq, 2009, vol.v, pp.288-94). His madrassah is presently run by his son, Samiul Haq, who heads his own faction of JUI and known as „the father of the Taliban‟ (Dawn, 22 January, 2014). This chapter mainly takes excerpts from the compilation of Abdul Haq‟s religious edicts titled *Fatawa-e-Haq*.

The third Deobandi scholar, Yousaf Ludhianvi of Jamia Binouria played an important role in organizing and strengthening the DMM in Pakistan. He was on the forefront of the Deobandi resistance to various madrassah reform initiatives taken by different governments in Pakistan. He actively participated in the anti-Qadiyani movement and also became involved in the anti-Shia drive of the DMM before he was murdered allegedly by Shia militants in 2000. He was a prolific writer and authored more than 30 books. He was editor of two monthly Deobandi journals and his weekly column on religious issues was published in Pakistan‟s largest selling Urdu newspaper *Jang* for more than 30 years.

Before providing details of Deobandi criticism against the dominant beliefs and practices, it would be pertinent to add here a brief discussion on *bida'*- a term repeatedly employed by the DMM to condemn folk Islam.

6.1 Different Interpretations of *Bida'*

The Deobandis in Pakistan, not unlike the Ahle Hadith or *Salafis*, have adopted an over-simplified definition of *bida'*. According to them, *bida'* is just the opposite of *Sunnah*- the practice of the Prophet (Ludhianvi, n.d. p.90). The Deobandis have preferred to interpret *bida'* only as a negative term as opposed to the majority of Islamic scholars who declare that *bida'* can be good as well. The Deobandis perhaps thought that if the positive aspect of *bida'* was accepted by the people, the DMM would be deprived of its best weapon against the practices of the majority of the Muslims. It is amazing that the Deobandis were so obsessed with the concept of *bida'* that they preached abandonment of all the practices followed by *Ahl-e-bida'* (those who practice *bida'*) - a term employed by the DMM to refer to the Barelwis and Shias who together represent around 75% of Pakistani Muslims. The Deobandis have also declared that one should even avoid resemblance with the *Ahl-e-bida'* (Ludhianvi, n.d. p.120).

Ludhianvi (n.d., pp.92-94) has defined *bida'* as anything that was not in practice till the time of the Prophet, his *sahabah* (companions), *tabi'un* (lit. followers, the generation of the Muslims who lived with the *sahabah*) and *tabi' ut tabi'een* (lit. followers of the followers, those who lived with *tabi'un*).

Ludhianvi has identified two types of *bida'*; one is *bida't-e-aitqadi* (innovation in faith) and the other is *bida't-e-'amali* (innovation in acts). *Bida't-e-aitqadi* is said to occur when a person or a group of persons follows such ideas and faith that oppose the teachings of the Prophet and three generations of Muslims after him. This type of *bida'* can be divided into further categories, some of which can lead to outright *kufr* or non-belief (e.g. Qadyani faith questioning the finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad) while others are simply misguidance (*dhalala*). As for *bida't-e-'amali*, it does not involve any change in basic faith but is caused by pursuing those acts and practices that were not followed by *salaf-as-saliheen* (pious predecessors) - a term generally used to refer to the first three generations after the Prophet.

The Deobandis have further expanded the scope of *bida'* by declaring that any practice, which becomes a custom for the people needs to be condemned even if it is otherwise a good act in itself. Apart from the practices, which have been linked by the DMM to *shirk* or *kufr*, the Deobandis have deplored most of the religious and socio-cultural practices mainly on the ground that these have become popular customs and cultural

activities. This approach makes the DMM in Pakistan more of a countercultural movement than a religious reform movement.

Contrary to the simplistic approach of the Deobandis to divide *bida'* simply into two categories i.e. *aitqadi* and *‚amali* (both of which are condemned), most of the Islamic scholars have come up with a broader division of *bida'* into *bida't-e-hasanah* (good innovation) and *bida't-e-saiyyah* or *bida't-e-dhalala* (bad innovation) as detailed below.

The Deobandis have based their interpretation of *bida'* on that Hadith of Imam Muslim (2004, vol.ii, p.335) in which the Prophet said that every innovation is a misguidance and every misguidance leads to Hell fire. Ludhianvi (n.d. p.97) has supported this viewpoint by quoting another Hadith in which the Prophet disapproved of those who changed his *Sunnah* by turning back from the *deen*- the way of Islam ((Mishkaat, vol.i, n.d. p.59).

While the Deobandis took these Ahadith (plural of Hadith) for their literal meanings, several Imams and *muhaddatheen* (experts of Hadith) have interpreted the above-mentioned Ahadith in a wider context. About the first Hadith, there is a widespread consensus among Islamic scholars that it is concerned only about bad innovation. In support of their argument they have quoted the second caliph Umar who started the practice of *tarawih* (prayers in congregation during Ramadhan nights) and called it *ni'mal bida'* (good innovation). Further, Imam Shafi‘i, Imam al Qartabi and Imam Mubarak al-Jazri have quoted the following Hadith of Imam Muslim to support the division of *bida'* into good and bad (Qadri, 2005, p.14).

„Whoever institutes a good practice in Islam has its reward and the reward of all those who practice it until the Day of Judgment without lessening the rewards of the latter. And whoever institutes a bad practice in Islam bears its onus and the onus of all those who practice it until the Day of Judgment without lessening the onus of the latter‟ (Muslim, 2004, vol.vi, p.265).

As regards the second Hadith quoted by Ludhianvi, different scholars have put forward different interpretations about the people who turned away from *Sunnah* and *deen*. Abdullah Ibn Abbas, a companion of the Prophet, described them as those *murtadeen*

(plural of *murtad*- an apostate) who renounced Islam immediately after Prophet"s death. The first caliph Abu Bakr fought against these *murtadeen* until they were killed or reverted back to Islam. Imam Tabari also interpreted those people mentioned in the Hadith to be the *murtadeen* while Imam Haakim, and Hafiz Ibn Abdul Barr have referred to those people as the ones who were first involved in the murder of third caliph Usman and then later fought against the fourth caliph Ali before being labeled as *khawarij* (Qadri, 2010, pp.30-32). Imam Ibn-e-Hajr Asqalani is also of the same view (Raz, 2004, vol.vi, p.176).

Imam Shafi" has stated that those acts, which are against the Quran, the practice of the Prophet and his *sahaba* as well as against the *ijma'* (consensus) of the *ummah* (the Muslim community) are called *bida't-e-dhalala* or bad innovation. On the other hand, those acts, which are performed for the general good and don"t contradict the *Shariah* are *bida't-e-hasanah* or good innovation (Qadri, 2005, pp17-18). Some scholars like Imam Ibn-e-Kathir and Imam Ibn Taiymiyah have divided *bida'* into *bida't-e-shariah* and *bid't-e-lughwia*; the former is considered wrong while the latter is generally considered as good depending on its objective (Qadri, 2005, pp.45-47).

Apart from the above two interpretations, scholars like Imam Azzuddin Abdul Aziz Ibn Abd-us-Salam, Imam Shahabuddin al-Maliki, Imam An-Nawawi, Imam al-Qastalani (quoted in Qadri, 2005, pp.29-67) have further divided *bida'* into following five categories in line with the five principles of *Fiqh* i.e. *haram* (forbidden), *makruh* (detestable), *halal* (permissible), *mustahab* (recommended), and *mubah* (indeterminate and undefined). The first two of the following categories fall under bad innovation while the last three come under good innovation (Qadri, 2010, pp.49-51).

   i.   *Bida't-e-Muharramah*
This is an innovation, which leads to conflict and clash within Islam e.g. establishing new religions like Qadriyah, Jabriyah and Qadyani religions. The opposition of such religions is compulsory for Muslims and that defiance shall be called *Bida't-e-Wajibah* as mentioned below.

   ii.   *Bida't-e-Makruhah*
This innovation causes abandonment of Prophet"s *Sunnah* e.g. unnecessary adornment and embellishment of mosques as well as the Quran (although later *ulama* adopted a softer stance on these practices).

iii.   *Bida't-e-Mubahah*

This term is used for those practices, which are not forbidden by the *Shariah* and the Muslims follow them without hoping to get a reward (*sawab*) from God for such practices. Examples include handshaking after morning (*Fajr*) and evening (*Asr*) prayers as well as having lavish food and drinks.

iv.   *Bida't-e-Mustahabah*

This is a new act or practice, which is neither declared forbidden nor compulsory but Muslims do it with the hope of *sawab* e.g. construction of madaris and free inns for the travelers, *tarawih* prayers in Ramadhan, social welfare and reform work, explanation of issues regarding *tasawwuf* or spiritual Islam.

v.   *Bida't-e-Wajibah*

This is an innovation, which becomes compulsory for the survival and growth of Islam e.g. teaching and learning of the principles of Arabic *nahw* (grammar) and *sarf* (morphology) for understanding the Quran and Hadith as well as developing doctrines and dogmas for *fiqh* and *Shariah*.

Taking lead from these interpretations of *bida'*, Qadri (2010, pp.36-38) has stated that the term *bida't-e-dhalala* would not include minor differences among the Muslims but would rather be those crises of *fitnah* (evil trial), which would lead to; i) *irtadad* (apostasy), ii) contradiction of fundamentals of Islam and Prophet"s *Sunnah*, or iii) *ikhtalaf-e-kaseer* (major difference) causing divisions and infighting among the Muslims. Accordingly, Qadri has concluded that small and minor differences like *Milad-un-Nabi*, *urs*, and methods of *isal-e-sawab* etc. cannot be termed as *bida't-e-dhalala* or misguidance because these neither lead to apostasy nor contradict the teachings of Islam or *Sunnah*. He has simultaneously claimed that all such practices are linked to the *Shariah* and have been derived from the practices of the *salaf-as-saliheen*. Another Hadith of Imam Muslim (2004, vol.iv, p.341) that is frequently quoted by the Deobandis to condemn the popular practices of the Muslims narrates, „Whosoever invents a new thing in our religion is rejected". The Deobandis employ the literal and apparent meaning of this Hadith to generally conclude that any new practice, for which there is no *nass* (a known or clear legal injunction) available from the Quran and Hadith, is to be rejected as wrong innovation. However, non-Deobandi *ulama* interpret this Hadith to apply to those who invent a new belief or those who invent a practice or action which is in contradiction with the Quran and *Sunnah*. According to Qadri (2007, pp.20-25), the simplistic Deobandi interpretation is wrong because if it is believed that

any act, which has not been mentioned in the Quran and Hadith is rejected or declared *haram*, then *Shariah*'s established concept of *mubah* would become irrelevant and innumerable *mubah* acts in Islam would become *haram*. (*Mubah* is a term denoting an action as neither forbidden nor recommended while giving it a degree of approval.)

At another level, Qadri (2007, p.160) has tried to reduce the *bida'* debate of the Deobandis to irrelevance by referring to another well-recognized principle of the *Shariah*, which has been approbated by Allama Shaami, Imam Asqalani, Imam Siyuti and Imam Sarkhasi. According to this principle, the reality of a thing is its legitimacy. Imam Asqalani has explained this principle by stating that anything, which was not done by the Prophet, is not illegitimate until that is proved *haram* by the established arguments of the *Shariah*. Therefore, it has been concluded that everything is *mubah* until Allah and His Prophet declare it to be *haram* (Qadri, 2007, pp.160).

6.2 DMM and Dominant Beliefs and Practices in Pakistan

As mentioned above, the Deobandis have generally used the term *bida'* with a negative connotation considering every *bida'* as a wrong innovation that would either be *makruh* (detestable) or *haram* (forbidden). Various popular custom as well as dominant socio-cultural and religious practices in Pakistan that have been consistently condemned by the DMM, can be divided into three broad categories. The first two categories are directly related to folk Islam while the third one is about the non-religious popular custom and cultural activities.

The first category includes those practices, which can be termed *bida't-e-makruha* (detestable innovation) from Deobandi perspective. The second category covers those practices, which are considered *bida't-e-muharramah* (forbidden innovation) by the DMM on the pretext that they lead to *shirk* and *kufr*. The third category includes those norms and practices, which cannot be considered *bida'* in the sense that Pakistani Muslims do not link them to the religion. However, the Deobandis have condemned such practices and traditions using the same line of argument they employed against *bida'*.

A brief discussion of these three categories is given below.

6.2.1 Popular Practices Considered Makruh by the DMM

The most important practice in this category is the celebration of the the birth anniversary of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) on the twelfth day of Rabi-ul-Awwal

(third month of Islamic calendar). This day is popularly called *Eid-Milad-un-Nabi*. The word *eid* is otherwise used for two annual festive occasions for Muslims, one after the fasting month of Ramadhan and the other in the month of *hajj* (pilgrimage). The name *eid* has been given to the Prophet"s birthday in order to highlight the happiness attached to this day, which is marked by large public processions as well as religious gatherings called *milad* in homes and mosques. At these meetings, speeches about the Prophet are made, *na'at* (poems in Prophet"s honour) is recited and *durood-o-salam* (blessings and peace) for him is offered. Many Muslims distribute food among the poor as well as the friends and neighbours. Streets and market places are decorated with banners and buntings. At night, public buildings, market places and houses are decorated with colourful lighting. The Deobandis have condemned all these activities on different pretexts as shall be discussed in Section 6.3 of this chapter.

Isal-e-sawab is another religious practice made controversial by the Deobandis. *Isal-e-sawab* is an Islamic practice of doing a good act and conveying its reward to some other Muslim. The Deobandis, like the majority of Pakistani Muslims, believe that the practice of *isal-e-sawab* is legitimate. However, they have simultaneously condemned this practice when it is carried out on some particular day or occasion (Ludhianvi, n.d. pp.185-87). Their logic for this viewpoint is that Islam does not allow fixing a particular day for an act of goodness or elective (*nafl* or *nafila*) worship. On the basis of that interpretation, the DMM has deplored a lot of religious activities, which are popular among the Pakistani Muslims. These include the practices of *qul* or *teeja* (prayers and distribution of food for the deceased on the third day of the death) *chehlum* or *chaleeswan* (prayers and food distribution on the 40th day of death), *barsi* (death anniversary), *Giarhhwein* (distribution of food and milk on the 11th day of every Islamic month for the *isal-e-sawab* of great saint Abdul Qadir Jilani) and *urs* (death anniversary of saints) etc.

The Deobandis believe that if elective (*nafl*) practices are performed on fixed and particular days, these gradually become obligatory (*fardh*), which is against the spirit of Islam. Apart from that argument, the Deobandis also condemn such practices for being extravagant and wasteful as well as resembling Hindu and Shia rituals. Abdul Haq (2009, vol.ii, pp.73-4) pronounced a *fatwa* that *isal-e-sawab* on death anniversaries is

against the *Shariah* and directed the Muslims to avoid such non-sense and tawdry custom derived from the Jews and Hindus.

Further, the Deobandis believe that *isal-e-sawab* for the saints like Abdul Qadir Jilani is not done to convey rewards for them; rather people do it in the hope of winning the favours or avoiding the wrath of the saints (Ludhianvi, n.d. pp.188-91). This Deobandi interpretation comes in the wake of the belief of Muslims that saints even after their death are able to help their followers through their spiritual power, which is called *tasarruf* (a concept denied by the Deobanids, who consider it to be *shirk*).

Haq (2009, vol.ii, p.46) has declared in his *Fatawa* that although *isal-e-sawab* for the dead is permissible at any time but the practice of the common Muslims to fix a particular day in this regard e.g. *qul* or *teeja* and *chehlum* or *chaleeswan* is forbidden. Thanvi (2002, pp.138-45) has castigated the *isal-e-sawab* practices after death on the ground that these have gradually become routine social customs, which people feel binding to follow even when they do not afford resources to finance these practices. In order to give authenticity to this countercultural approach, Thanvi (2011, pp.15-18) even declared, „whoever opposes the popular customs and practices is a saint and God‟s favourite person‟.

Based on the above-mentioned line of argument, the DMM has opposed the practices of distribution of sweets after completion of the Quran‟s recitation in *tarawih* prayers in Ramadhan, eating and distributing sweet vermicelli on *eid* and *halwa* (a dense sweet confection made of flour) on 15th night of Islamic month of Sha‟ban (called *shab-e-barat*) and distribution of *haleem* and *khichrra* (saltish dishes made from meat, rice and pulses) as well as sweet drinks on *Ashura* (10th day of Muharram).

However, these popular custom and practices have continued to be followed by the majority of Pakistani Muslims who consider these to be acts of generosity or part of their culture and tradition. They hardly consider these practices to be obligatory part of the religion, as has been portrayed by the DMM in its strong criticism against the popular customs.

Some other religious practices, which have been condemned by the DMM as wrongful innovations include kissing one"s thumbs when Prophet"s name is mentioned in *adhaan* (call for prayers), handshaking after the congregation prayers and doing loud *dhikr* after the prayers. These practices have been deplored by the DMM on the basis that these were not followed by the Prophet and the *salf-as-saliheen*. Although these last two practices are not strictly followed by Pakistani Muslims as part of their religion, the Barelwi *ulama* consider these to be *mustahab*. These *ulama* have also traced the history of such acts in different Islamic traditions, which are disregarded by the Deobandis as weak or wrong. For example, Ibn Abbas stated in a Hadith that loud *dhikr* after prayers was a commonplace practice during Prophet"s time (Naeemi, n.d. p.183). This has also been reported in a Hadith by Imam Muslim (2004, vol.ii, p.150). Further, the practice of kissing thumbs has been linked to a tradition mentioned in *Fatawa-e-Shami*, *Kitab-ul-Firdous*, *Fatawa-e-Sufia* and *Kanz-ul-Ibad*. Allama Ismail Haqqi has acknowledged in *Tafseer Rooh-ul-Bayan* that the said tradition is weak. However, he has simultaneously mentioned the agreement among the *muhaditheen* on the fact that it is legitimate to accept and act upon a weak Hadith for the sake of creating love of Islam and fear of God (Al-Mustafa, 2010, pp.285-89).

As for the the practice of handshaking after the congregation prayers, Deobandi Ashraf Ali Thanvi has forbidden handshake after congregation prayers whereas Abdul Haq (2009, vol.ii, p.46) has declared that it is impermissible only when this practice is considered obligatory. However, the latter has simultaneously promulgated that this practice should be avoided. In another *fatwa*, Haq (2009, vol.ii, p.95) has declared this practice to be a *bida'* and against the *Shariah*. The Barelwi *ulama* have traced the origin of this practice to the writings of Imam Izzuddin Abdus Salam, Imam al-Jazri, Imam al-Haitimi, Sheikh al-Khateeb and Mulla Ali Qari, who have declared this practice to be *Bida't-e-Mubahah*- neither forbidden nor recommended (Qadri, 2005, pp. 13, 32, 71).

According to Mulla Ali Qari, handshaking after morning (*Fajr*) and evening (*Asr*) prayers is considered to be *Bida't-e-Mubahah* in Shafi"i *madhab* while it is considered *Bida't-e-Makruha* (detestable innovation) by the Hanafi school (Qadri, 2005, pp.73-74). This practice is generally followed in Barelwi mosques in Pakistan. However, they don"t consider it to be compulsory part of the religion. Further, this is also practised by the Muslims of many other countries like Malaysia, Indonesia and Turkey. Although

opposition of this practice can be explained in the light of difference of *fiqh*, the DMM has criticised this practice mainly in the light of their countercultural approach because otherwise huge majority of the Muslims in Pakistan, including Barelwis and Deobandis, belong to Hanafi *madhab*. Same is true about DMM''s approach towards widespread religious practices like loud *dhikr* and joint *dua* (supplication) after the congregation prayers as well as *dua* after the funeral prayers.

6.2.2 Beliefs and Practices Declared Haram by the DMM

This category includes those beliefs and practices, which have been castigated by the DMM far more aggressively as compared to the ones included in the first category. The reason for this greater intensity is that, according to the Deobandis, the beliefs and practices included in this category lead to *shirk* and *kufr*.

The beliefs and practices covered in this category can be further divided into four sub-categories. The first sub-category includes popular practices that are performed while visiting the graves (*ziyarat-e-quboor*). For example, kissing the graves, standing in respectful manner in front of the graves, bowing or prostrating before the graves, lighting lamps on shrines, laying flower wreaths or cloth sheets on graves and offering *nadhr* or *mannat* on a shrine (like distribution of food, or sacrificing an animal on the fulfilment of some particular wish).

The second sub-category is about the prevalent beliefs regarding the status and power of the Prophet. According to such beliefs, the Prophet was a *noor* or light of God (not a human being like us); he is *haazir* and *naazir* (i.e. he has the spiritual power to be present wherever he wants to as well as the power to listen and see); he is knower of hidden knowledge (*ilm-ul-ghaib*); and he holds the power of *tassaruf* (ability to make things happen). The Deobandis have condemned these beliefs to be *shirk*.

The third sub-category includes the practices of: calling for help (*istamdad*) anyone other than God; praying to God to give something through the mediation (*wasilah*) of some saint or prophet. These practices have also been declared *shirk* by the DMM.

The fourth sub-category included practices of Shia Muslims with respect to *Ashura* in the Islamic month of Muharram, when they commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Hussain, through *taziyah* processions and mourning meetings. These activities of Shia

Muslims have been declared as *shirk* and *kufr* by the DMM. In fact, Shia Muslims have been declared as *kaafir* (non-believer) by many Deobandi scholars through different *fatawa*. The latest *fatwa* in this regard was issued in 1987 by the Deobandi *ulama* of India and Pakistan (Naumani, 1988). Despite considering Shias as non-Muslims, the Deobandis continue to condemn the practices of *Ashura* in order to influence the majority of Sunni Muslims who not only consider Shias as Muslims but also tacitly approve the tradition of *Ashura* to mourn the martyrdom of Imam Hussain. Details are given in Section 6.3.

6.2.3 Socio-Cultural Practices Condemned by the DMM

This third category includes those customs and practices, which are otherwise not considered part of the religion. As mentioned in the last chapter, the Deobandis applied the term *bida'* on such practices, which did not exist during the times of *salf-as-saliheen* and which are considered as religious or pious acts by the followers of such practices. Therefore, the Deobandi definition of *bida'* cannot as such be applied to the customs and practices included in this category. However, it is interesting to note that the approach and the intensity of the Deobandi condemnation with respect to these practices are not much different from what they employed vis-à-vis the beliefs and practices declared *bida'*, *shirk* and *kufr*.

The most popular customs and practices that have been condemned by the DMM in this regard are the different ceremonies held on the occasion of marriages. Thanvi (2002, pp.54-89) has described a total of one hundred customs and ceremonies, which were observed by the Muslims during a typical marriage in the North India of 20th century. Although most of these customs are not followed in Pakistan (and perhaps not even in the modern day North India), several of these marriage-related activities are still being performed in many parts of Pakistan. These include: *mayoon* (seclusion of the bride from the guests a few days before the marriage for her beautification through the use of special facial and body masks); *mehndi* (use of henna by the female guests to colour hands and feet and singing of songs); lighting and firework; *sehra bandi* (wearing by the bridegroom a shining golden coloured headdress with garland hanging over the face); display of *jahez* (dowry) from bride"s family as well as *barri* (gifts from the groom"s family); *joota chhupai* (hiding of groom"s shoes by the sisters and friends of the bride); offering milk and sweets to the groom by female relatives of the bride; and distribution of dry dates among the guests after the *nikah* (registration of marriage) etc.

Further, the Deobandis have also opposed popular sports and festivals as well as the practice of observing national and international days. They have also declared *haram* the sports like chess, kite flying, pigeon keeping and the use of fireworks to mark a happy occasion. Details of the Deobandi viewpoint in this connection are given in Section 6.4.

6.3   DMM against the Folk Islam

This section focuses on those values and practices of folk Islam, which have generally been criticized by the DMM as *makruh* or *haram*. A detailed discussion about these widespread practices is given below.

6.3.1 Eid Milad-un-Nabi (Celebration of Prophet's Birth)

Haq (2009, vol.ii, p.92) declared in his *Fatawa* that the practice of celebrating the birth anniversary of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) on the twelfth day of Rabi-ul-Awwal was the worst kind of *bida'*. Ludhianvi (n.d. pp.76-90) also condemned this practice on the following grounds.

i.   This practice was never followed by the early generations of Muslims for about six hundred years after the Prophet. It was actually started in the year 602 A.H. by Sultan Abu Saeed Muzaffar in Iraq.

ii. The Prophet allowed only two *eids* (occasions of happiness) for the Muslims i.e. *Eid-ul-Fitr* (after the fasting month of Ramadhan) and *Eid-ul-Adhha* (during the month of *hajj* or pilgrimage). Further, the Prophet himself advised his companions not to make his grave an *eid.* So this event cannot be called *eid* because *eid* is an Islamic term and applying it to the birth anniversary of the Prophet is *tahreef fid deen* (alteration in the religion).

iii. A lot of money is spent on lighting and decoration on this occasion. This leads to prodigality, which is condemned by Islam.

iv. *Eid Milad-un-Nabi* shows resemblance with the Christians who also celebrate the birth anniversary of the Jesus Christ (PBUH) as Christmas on 25th December. Therefore, it is wrong because of *tashabbuh bil kuffar* (resemblance with the non-believers). The resemblance with Shias as well as Christians has been condemned in the light of a Hadith in which the Prophet said, „He who imitates a people is from them‟ (Hanbal, n.d. vol.iii, p.165).

v. In *Milad* gatherings, unauthentic stories and miracles of the Prophet are mentioned and young men without beards recite such poems (*na'at*) in Prophet's praise, which elevate his level to an extent that violates the principles of *tawhid*.

Ashraf Thanvi (2002, pp.107-120) of the DMM has declared that *Milad* should not be celebrated in a particular manner and on a particular date. Thanvi derived this approach to condemn peculiar methods for some acts, from the following two Ahadith narrated by Abdullah Ibn Abbas.

In the first Hadith, Abdullah advised the Muslims that „it is binding on each of you not to leave any share for the Satan in your prayers. That share is there when you consider it obligatory to turn towards your right side after finishing the prayers. I saw the Prophet on many occasions turning towards his left side after completing his prayers" (Muslim, 2004, vol.ii, p.235). In the second Hadith, he narrated that the Prophet had advised not to make it a particular practice to worship on Friday nights and to fast on the Fridays (Thanvi, 2002, pp.112-113).

Thanvi repeatedly employed these two Ahadith to condemn many popular customs and practices of the Muslim society in the subcontinent. He argued that Islam does not allow fixing of date and time for doing a pious or good act that is otherwise not declared obligatory in the *Shariah*. However, non-Deobandi scholars have disagreed with this approach by stating that it is impossible to survive in this world without time tables and schedules in life. They have quoted many Ahadith supporting the idea of affixing particular time for a particular act. For example, according to a Hadith narrated by Abi Sa'ad, the Prophet fixed a particular day of the week for teaching Islam to women (Bukhari, 2004, vol.i, p.250). Similarly, Abdullah Ibn Masood, a companion of the Prophet, used to hold a meeting on every Thursday to give religious advice and guidance to the Muslims (Niazi, 2012, p.47).

Coming to other counterarguments against above-mentioned Deobandi objections, the proponents of *Eid Milad-un-Nabi* have declared that this event has been celebrated by the ordinary Muslims a long time before 602 A.H. and Sultan Abu Saeed Muzaffar just started it at the official level, which made this practice more popular among the Muslims. Imam Asqalani stated that the Muslims had been holding *Milad* meetings

even before that (Attari, 2009, pp.229-31). Refuting DMM‟s claim that *Milad* is a *bida'*, followers of this practice have quoted following Quranic verses and Ahadith to support their celebrations to mark the birth of the Prophet (Attari, 2009, pp.226-229).

Quranic Verses:

   i.   *And remember Allah's favour upon you.* (3:103)

Here the favour has been interpreted as the Prophet.

   ii.   *Say you, only Allah's grace and only His mercy, on it therefore let them rejoice. That is better than all their wealth.* (10:58)

Here the Prophet has been considered as Allah‟s grace and mercy for which Muslims should rejoice and spend their wealth on this rejoicing. Al-Mustafa (2010, pp.28-29) has stated that such spending on *Milad* is superior to any other spending. In this way, the DMM‟s objection regarding prodigality has been refuted.

   iii.   *Undoubtedly, Allah did a great favour to the Muslims that in them from among themselves sent a Messenger.* (3:164)

It has been inferred from this verse that the Muslims should feel jubilant for this favour from Allah.

Ahadith:

   i.   After the death of Abu Lahab (Prophet‟s uncle and an avowed enemy of Islam), some of his family members saw him in the dream in a very bad condition and asked him about his situation. He replied that he got no reward except for receiving water from his finger with which he indicated to free Sobia (his slave girl) to celebrate the birth of his nephew i.e. the Prophet (Bukhari, 2004, vol.vi, p.593).

Abdul Haq Muhaddis Dehlwi has employed this Hadith to support *Milad* celebrations and expenditure in this regard. He has argued that if a *kafir* and enemy of Islam like Abu Lahab can be rewarded in this regard, then Muslims would be recompensed by God in a far more generous manner.

   ii.   According to a Hadith by Imam Muslim (2004, vol.iii, p.167), when the Prophet was asked about his practice of fasting on Mondays, he replied that he was born on that day and the Quran was also revealed to him on the same day.

This Hadith has been referred to show that the Prophet himself was celebrating his birth by thanking God through fasting.

Many a great Imams and religious scholars have supported the practice of celebrating *Milad*. These include Imam Jazri, Imam Qastalani, Ismail Haqqi, Ibn-e-Hajr Haitimi, Imam Sakhawi, Imam Siyuti, Abdul Haqq Muhaddis Dehlwi and Mujaddid Alf Saani (Attari, 2009, pp. 231-38). It is interesting to note that Shah Waliullah, whose movement is linked to the DMM, also supported *Milad* and many other practices which were to be later condemned by the DMM (Jaaisi, 2007, pp. 5-6).

The Deobandi objection of *tahreef fid deen* about declaring 12th Rabi-ul-Awwal as *eid* has been contradicted by Barelwi *ulama* through following Ahadith, which indicate that there are more than two *eids* for the Muslims.

     a. The Prophet said, „verily Friday is the king of all days and its esteem is even superior to *Eid-ul-Adhha* and *Eid-ul-Fitr* in the eyes of Allah. Adam was created, descended to the earth and then given death by God on Friday" (Amin, 2010, p.83).

     b. When Ibn Abbas recited Quranic verse, „This day I have perfected your religion for you and completed my favour upon you and have chosen Islam as religion for you" (5:3), in front of a Jew, the latter said that if this verse was revealed to us, we would have celebrated *eid*. Ibn Abbas replied that this verse was revealed on a day when there were two *eids* for Muslims because that was Friday as well as the Day of *Arafa*-9th day of the last month of Islamic calendar and most important day during *hajj* (Bukhari, 2004, vol.i, p.223).

     c. Once during Prophet"s time, there was *eid* on Friday. The Prophet told the Muslims that two *eids* have come together for you (Bukhari, 2004, vol.vii, pp.224-25).

Further, non-Deobandi scholars have also refuted DMM"s criticism regarding resemblance of *Milad* celebrations with Christmas and *Milad* processions with Shia practices. They consider that Deobandi interpretation and application of the Hadith, „He who imitates a people is from them" can hardly be considered accurate for two reasons. One, Shias are considered part of the Muslim community by the all the four *madhabs* and any resemblance with Shias, is not condemnable as such. Two, the said Hadith regarding resemblance with non-Muslims has been interpreted by almost all modern

day *ulama* to be applicable only when Muslims adopt a practice which is hallmark of a particular non-Muslim community. If Muslims gradually adopt that practice to such an extent that it is no more considered as symbolic of some other community, then the above-mentioned Hadith shall not apply in that scenario. For example, the practice of wearing western-style trousers or jeans was once identified with the Christians in the subcontinent and was execrated by the *ulama* as un-Islamic. However, when modern Muslims gradually adopted such dresses, religious scholars (except for the Deobandis) showed flexibility in their opinions. According to a *ghair-muqallid* scholar, Waheed-uz-Zaman, there is no harm even in *tashabbuh* (resemblance) until one actually intends to embrace resemblance with the non-Muslims (Qadri, 2005, p.91). Therefore, in case of *Milad*, the concept of *tashabbuh bil kuffar* hardly applies vis-à-vis the Christmas. Even if it is agreed for the sake of argument that Muslims took the idea of *Milad* celebration from Christians, the concept of *tashabbuh* became irrelevant once the practice of *Milad* got established and popular among the Muslims.

Qadri (2008, pp15-18) has further explained the *Milad* celebrations in the subcontinent from a cultural point of view. He is of the view that processions on *Eid Milad-un-Nabi* are part of the culture of the subcontinent. People here go for processions on occasions of joy, grief and protest. They even celebrate victories in sports by holding processions. Similarly, lighting and decoration of buildings and mosques for celebrations have also been derived from the local culture. Qadri has also maintained that standing up during *durood*-o-*salam* for the Prophet in *Milad* meetings is also related to the culture as being the the sign of respect. On the other hand, DMM‟s founder Muhammad Qasim and other Deobandis have condemned this last practice by linking it to acknowledging the spiritual presence of the Prophet in the *Milad* meetings (Amin, 2008, pp.17-18). That is why, Deobandi scholar Abdul Haq (2009, vol.ii, p.72) issued a *fatwa* that standing up to recite *durood* is against the *Shariah*.

As regards the Deobandi approach of considering it un-Islamic to fix date and time for a particular event, non-Deobandi scholar have refuted it through the following Hadith. „When the Prophet came to Madinah from Makkah, he observed that the Jews of Madinah fasted on the day of *Ashura*. When asked about this practice, the Jews replied that we fast on this day to thank God who delivered Prophet Moses (PBUH) and drowned Pharaoh on this particular day‟. Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) then fasted and

allowed his companions to follow this practice of fasting on that particular day to celebrate victory of Prophet Moses (Bukhari, 2004, vol.iv, p.679).

6.3.2 Prophet as Noor (Light) or Bashar (Human Being)

Many great Islamic scholars and saints have supported the belief that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) was *noor*. These included Abdullah Ibn Abbas, Imam Razi, Imam Asqalani, Imam Nafsi, Imam Zarqani, Qadhi Aʻyadh Maliki, Imam Qastalani, Allama Alusi, Imam Abul Ahsan Ashʻari, Allama Khazin, Imam Siyuti, Imam Baithawi, Imam Ibn-Hajr Makki, Ismail Haqqi, Mullah Ali Qari, Abdul Haqq Muhaddis Dehlwi, Maulana Jalaluddin Rumi, Imam Buseeri etc. (Attari, 2009, pp.190-201). Interestingly, most of the early Deobandi *ulama* like Muhammad Ismail, Imdadullah, Rasheedd Ahmed, Ashraf Thanvi, Hussain Madni and Shabbir Usmani also endorsed this popular belief (Attari, 2009, pp.201-204). Rasheed Ahmed (n.d. p.86) even stated that there was no shadow of the Prophet because he was a light.

However, later Deobandi *ulama* declared that the Prophet was a human being like all of us. The Deobandis adopted this belief under the influence of *Salafi* (Wahhabi) Islam. According to this belief, the Prophet was *noor* in the symbolic manner as he served as a beacon of light for the humanity (Ludhianivi, n.d. p.33). Therfore, Abdul Haq (2009, vol.i, pp.161-62) stated in his *Fatawa* that the Prophet could only metaphorically be described as *noor*. Otherwise he was created as a human being. Interestingly, this symbolic interpretation is incompatible with DMMʻs approach of explicating the concept of *bida'* by taking the literal and apparent meaning of the Ahadith.

This viewpoint of the Deobandis was against the belief of the overwhelming majority of the Muslims of the subcontinent who considered it contemptuous to call the Prophet a human being like others. They generally believed that the Prophet was a light derived from the light of God and appeared in this world in the form of a human being. The Deobandis, however, condemned this belief due to resemblance with the Christians who considered Jesus Christ (PBUH) to be God. Therefore, this belief was declared *shirk* and *kufr* (Ludhianvi, n.d. p.34). Barelwi *ulama* have replied to such declarations of the DMM by stating that the Prophet was created from Godʻs light because God made him so. It did not mean at all that he was part of Godʻs light as such or that God became part of him through His light. The Barelwis have not only deplored DMMʻs

claims in this regard but have also paid in the same coin by declaring that such Deobandi beliefs could also lead to *shirk* and *kufr* (Attari, 2009, p. 184).

The Deobandi arguments in this regard have referred to those Quranic verses where the past prophets have been declared as brothers of their respective nations (e.g. *And to Madyan We sent Shuaib from their brethren.* 7:85) and where the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) called himself a human being like others (e.g. *Say you, 'apparently I am a human like you, I receive revelation that your God is one God'*. 18:110). The Deobandis also quote a Hadith of Bukhari (2004, vol.iv, p.717) in which the Prophet advised his followers not to praise him to the extent of Christians who decaled Jesus as God and son of God. He said that he was a slave and a Prophet of God and he should be called just that (Ludhianvi, n.d. pp.34-35).

In reply to such Deobandi arguments, the Barelwis have referred to the following verses from the Quran.

   a. „Then the chiefs of the unbelievers of his people spoke, "We see you a man like us, and we see not that anyone who has followed you but the meanest of us inadvertently, and we do not find in you any superiority over us; but rather we think you a liar" (11:27).

   b. „And the chiefs of those people who disbelieved and belied the presence of the Hereafter and whom We gave comfort in the life of the world, said, "He is not but a man like you, he eats of that what you eat and drinks of that what you drink. And if you obey a man like you, then necessarily you are in loss" (23:33-34).

   c. „Then We sent Musa and his brother Haroon with Our signs and a clear authority. To Firawn [Pharaoh] and his courtiers, but they boasted and they were a people already possessed with dominance. Then they said, "Shall we believe in two men like ourselves while their people are serving to us?" (23:45-47).

Barelwi *ulama* have inferred from these verses that only God or the prophets themselves or the *kuffar* (non-believers) have referred to the prophets as human beings. Other than that, no one has called the Prophet a human being. Therefore, they believe that calling the Prophet a human being like ourselves is *kufr* and misguidance. Apart from quoting many miracles of the Prophet to prove that he was not a human like us,

the Barelwis have interpreted that the word „light‟ (*noor*) mentioned in the following verses is in fact refers to the Prophet (Attari, 2009, pp. 209-224).

i. „O people of the Book! Undoubtedly, Our Messenger has come to you who makes clear to you much of that which you had hidden in the Book and pardons much. Undoubtedly, there has come to you from Allah a *light* and a Book, luminous‟ (5:15).

ii. „They wish to put off the *light* of Allah with their mouths and Allah will not agree but to perfect His *light*, though the infidels may dislike it‟ (9:32).

iii. „They desire to extinguish the *light* of Allah with their mouths and Allah is to accomplish His *light*, even though the infidels may take it bad‟ (61:8).

It is interesting to note that the difference between the Deobandi and Barelwi *ulama* on this issue is more of a philosophical nature. This difference was not very sharp till the time of early leaders of the DMM who themselves believed that the Prophet was a *noor* in actuality. However, as the scope of the Deobandi movement gradually narrowed down and it adopted a typical countercultural character, this undisputed belief of the Muslims was contradicted by the DMM.

6.3.3 Prophet as Alim-ul-Ghaib (Knower of the Hidden Knowledge)

This widespread belief that the Prophet had the knowledge of the unknown (*ghaib*) has been supported by many a great scholars like Imam Baithawi, Imam Qastalani, Imam Ibn-e-Hajr Makki, Imam Asqalani, Imam Ghazali, Qadhi A‟yadh, Allama Zarqani, Abdul Haqq Muhaddis Dehlwi, Mulla Ali Qari etc. (Attari, 2009, pp.171-76). Apart from that, forefathers of Deobandi movement like Abdul Aziz, Imdadulllah and Muhammad Qasim also agreed with this belief (Attari, 2009, pp.177-78). However, as the countercultural character of the DMM came to the fore and it was influenced more by the views of Ibn Abdul Wahhab through Muhammad Ismail, this widely accepted belief was challenged by the later Deobandi *ulama*.

Rasheed Ahmed of Gangoh was the first Deobandi scholar to openly support the views of Ibn Abdul Wahhab. In one of his *fatawa*, he praised Ibn Abdul Wahhab as a good pious person who practiced the *Sunnah* of the Prophet and stopped *bida'* and *shirk*. He defined a Wahhabi in his *fatwa* to be a very religious person who follows the *Sunnah*

(Nizami, n.d. pp.72-73). He also issued following *fatawa* regarding Prophet"s knowledge of the unknown.

a. Knowledge of the unknown is reserved for God alone and applying this to someone else through arguments is akin to *shirk* (Gangohi, n.d. vol.iii, p.37).

b. Having a belief that the Prophet had the knowledge of *ghaib* is a clear and open *shirk* (Gangohi, n.d. vol.ii, p.10).

Later on, Ashraf Thanvi (n.d. p.7), a disciple of Rasheed Ahmed, stated in his book, *Hifz-ul-Iman* (Protection of Faith) that the Prophet was not given whole knowledge of *ghaib* and if he was given some of that knowledge then it is not particular with him only because such knowledge is given to every Tom, Dick and Harry or even to a child or deranged person. This statement of Thanvi created uproar among the Indian Muslims and the DMM had to face a barrage of criticism from the *ulama* of all schools of thought who declared it to be contempt of the Prophet. A heated debate ensued and a campaign was launched against the Deobandi *ulama* who employed different conflicting stances in order to to defend their position against the belief system of the mainstream Muslim society (Nizami, n.d. pp.131-51). In recent years, Abdul Haq (2009, vol.i, p.159) declared that Satan"s knowledge was even more than that of the Prophet.

Presently, the Deobandis have adopted on this issue the same approach they employed on the belief regarding Prophet"s status as *noor* or light. According to Ludhianvi (n.d. pp.35-37), the Prophet was given more knowledge than all the prophets and angels together. But his knowledge cannot be called the knowledge of the unknown (*ghaib*) because it was revealed to him and something that is already revealed cannot literally be called *ghaib*. The Deobandis have presented the following verse of the Quran to support their view that the Prophet did not possess the knowledge of *ghaib*.
„Say you, "whosoever are in the Heavens and earth do not know themselves the unseen but Allah". And they do not know when they will be raised up" (27:65).

They have also quoted the Hadith of Prophet"s wife, Ayeshah who stated that „the one who says that the Prophet had the knowledge of *ghaib* attributes falsehood towards God" (Mishkaat, n.d. p.501).
While conceding that no one can have an idea about the vastness of Prophet"s knowledge, the Deobandis simultaneously declare that neither his knowledge is

equivalent to that of God nor it is permissible to call anyone *alim-ul-ghaib* (knower of the hidden knowledge) except God. The Deobandis have defined the knowledge of unknown (*ilm-ul-ghaib*) as something that cannot be proven through an evidence or argument (*daleel*) and no creation is aware of it (Ludhianvi, n.d. p.37). So, they conclude that what is already known to the Prophet is technically not *ilm-ul-ghaib*.

On the other hand, Barelwi *ulama* have defined *ilm-ul-ghaib* as a hidden thing, which cannot be known through the use of five senses and the intellect. They have described two types of *ilm-ul-ghaib*: i) which can be known through some evidence or *daleel* e.g. Heaven, Hell, angels, *jinn* etc. that have been mentioned in the Quran; ii) which cannot be deduced through some *daleel* e.g. knowledge about the Day of Judgement, time of death, good or bad fortune etc. (Attari, 2009, p.155).

According the Barelwi definition, Prophet"s knowledge was actually *ilm-ul-ghaib* even when it was revealed to him by God. It was no more *ilm-ul-ghaib* only when he revealed it to the people. They believe that all prophets were given *ilm-ul-ghaib* but Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) was granted more than all of them. Barelwi *ulama* have quoted many Quranic verses and Ahadith to support their belief about prophets" *ilm-ul-ghaib*. A few of these are given below (Attari, 2009, pp.157-71).

Quranic Verses:
  i.   „And Allah has sent down to you the Book and Wisdom and has taught to you what you did not know and great is the grace of Allah upon you" (4:113).
  ii.   „The Knower of Unseen reveals not His secret to anyone. Except to His chosen Messengers" (72:26-27).
  iii. „And he is not niggardly as to the disclosing of unseen" (81:24).
  iv.   „These are the tidings of unseen that We reveal to you in secret" (3:44).

Ahadith Excerpts:
Non-Deobandi *ulama* have quoted dozens of Ahadith narrating events which were perfectly foretold by the Prophet. Only four of these are being mentioned here to give an idea about his *ilm-ul-ghaib*.
  i.   Once the Prophet stood up at a place and told about events about the birth of the whole creation and continued to explain until the ones who deserved the

Heaven reached there while those who were to go to the hell reached their destination (Bukhari, 2004, vol.i, p.453 & Muslim, 2004, vol.v, p.63).

ii. The Prophet said that God rolled the whole earth for him to see it all from the East to the West (Muslim, 2004, vol.ii, p.390).

iii. Umar said that the Prophet showed us one day before the Battle of Badr the places where exactly the *mushrikeen* (disbelievers) were to be killed…no *mushrik* died away from the location of his death as identified by the Prophet (Muslim, 2004, vol.ii, p.102).

In the light of the above discussion, one can conclude that the difference between the Deobandi and other Muslims is that of intellectual and philosophical nature and it should have been treated as such. However, owing to its countercultural inclinations, the DMM interpreted this difference to condemn and contradict an established belief of the mainstream Muslim society to the extent of declaring it *shirk*.

6.3.4 Prophet as Haazir-o-Naazir (Who is Present and Watching)

The DMM has defined the concept of *haazir-o-naazir* in a manner that distinguishes them from the followers of the folk Islam in Pakistan. The Deobandis think that the term *haazir-o-naazir* refers to someone whose presence is not restricted to one place, rather his presence covers the whole universe and he is able to see the beginning and the end of everything (Ludhianvi, n.d. pp.37-38). In the light of this definition, Ludhianvi has explained the Deobandi belief that the concept of *haazir-o-naazir* applies to God alone while the Prophet‟s presence is restricted to his grave.

On the other hand, Barelwi *ulama* have stated that the concept of *haazir-o-naazir* is neither related to the physical body of the Prophet nor to his human existence, which is restricted to his grave. Rather, it is concerned with his *noor* and spirituality, which allow him to be present anywhere or everywhere To support their views, the Barelwis have quoted the example of the Sun, which is present in the sky but its light reaches all over the earth (Abdul Hakeem Sharf Qadri quoted in Attari, 2009, pp.59-60).

It may be added here that the forefathers and early leaders of the DMM agreed to the spiritual presence of the Prophet in this world even after his death. Waliullah stated in his book, *Fuyuz-ul-Haramain* (n.d. p.28) that whole atmosphere is filled with the shining spirit of the Prophet. Abdul Aziz also agreed with this concept. Rasheed

Ahmed (n.d. p.10) was even more generous about the notion of *haazir-o-naazir* and conceded that spirits of the saints are not restricted to one place and could reach their disciples when called upon by the latter.

As DMM‟s approach gradually became more countercultural, the concept of the spiritual presence of the Prophet was contradicted. Ludhianvi (n.d. pp. 38-39) has not only refused to accept this explanation of *haazir-o-naazir* but has also propagated the later Deobandi belief according to which a person would become *kafir* (non-believer) if he believes that spirits of the saints could make themselves present (*haazir-o-naazir*). This Deobandi belief contradicts the long established belief of great Muslim scholars and spiritual leaders (Attari, 2009, pp.67-70). A few examples in this regard are quoted below.

i. Imam Ghazali said, „whenever you enter a mosque, offer *salam* (peace greetings) to the Prophet. Undoubtedly, he is present in the mosque‟. Ghazali also believed that the Prophet still has the authority to visit different parts of the world and many saints have seen him in actuality.

ii. Prophet‟s companion, Alqama stated that whenever he entered a mosque he would say, „O Prophet, peace and blessings on you‟.

iii. According to Imam Qastalani, there is no difference between the life and death of the Prophet. He watches his *ummah* (nation) and is aware of their state, their ambitions and intentions. Imam Siyuti has stated that it is still part of Prophet‟s spiritual engagements to keep an eye on the actions of the *ummah*, praying for the Muslims, visiting different places and to join the funeral prayer of the most pious Muslims.

Taking lead from great Islamic scholars, Barelwi *ulama* have quoted dozens of Ahadith to defend the popular belief of *haazir-o-naazir* (Attari, 2009, pp.62-67). Excerpts from a few of those Ahadith are given below.

a. The Prophet said, „I am your predecessor and your witness to the promised place of *Haudh-e-Kauthar* (Pond of Plenty) in the Heavens. I am watching that place from here and I have been given keys of the treasures of the earth‟ (Muslim, 2004, vol.ii, p.250).

b. When a Muslim is buried in his grave, two angels come and after indicating towards the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), ask the dead what he thinks about the

Prophet. The believer replies that he is slave and Prophet of God (Muslim, 2004, vol.i, p.178). This Hadith has been interpreted to show that the Prophet visits the graves of the believers.

c. According to a Hadith of Bukhari (2004, vol.iv, p.446), the Prophet, while sitting in Madinah, informed his companions about the martyrdom of Zaid, Jaafar and Ibn Rawaha in the battle, which was being fought at Mauta, about a thousand kilometres away from Madinah. He also informed beforehand about Khalid Ibn Waleed taking the flag and winning the battle.

6.3.5 Calling Ya Rasool Allah

Another established belief of Pakistani Muslims that has been criticized by the DMM is that the Prophet listens to the call of Muslims when they directly address him by saying *Ya Rasool Allah* (O Prophet of God). This belief has been derived from the above-mentioned belief of *haazir-o-naazir*. The Deobandis have condemned this belief and practice mostly on the ground that the prophet is not *haazir-o-naazir* and hence cannot listen to the call of Muslims. Apart from that, the Deobandis have also opposed this practice because of its resemblance with a Shia practice of calling *Ya Ali* to address the fourth caliph. (It is to be noted that resemblance of any practice to Shia traditions is considered by the DMM as sinful as resemblance to some non-Muslim practice.)

However, Ludhianvi (n.d. pp.43-45) has mentioned following four exceptions to allow the practice of directly addressing the Prophet with the condition that the caller does not believe that Prophet‟s spirit can actually be present everywhere.

i. When someone calls the Prophet in the manner poets imaginatively address mountains, trees and birds, knowing well that they cannot give an answer.

ii. When someone says *Ya Rasool Allah* out of sheer pain and intensity of love.

iii. When someone offers *durood-o-salam* to the Prophet with the hope that angels would take that to the grave of the Prophet. However, this should be avoided because this can lead to *fisaad* (transgression), wrongful beliefs and *shirk*.

iv. When someone is actually present at the grave of the Prophet, he can directly address the Prophet and offer *durood-o-salam* because the prophet can listen to him. The Deobandis believe that all prophets are alive in their graves but are restricted to their tombs. Apart from the prophets, no one including the greatest of saints can listen in his grave. This concept called *nafi-e-sama'-e-mauta*

(negation of listening by the dead) is contrary to the popular belief among Muslims who offer *salam* (peace greetings) to the dead in graveyards and even call the spirits of the saints for *istamdad* (help)- a concept that would be discussed later in this section.

Deobandi scholar Abdul Haq allowed this practice of directly addressing the Prophet only for reciting *durood-o-salam* with the hope that angels would take that to the grave of the Prophet. However, he simultaneously declared that such practice is illegitimate in a gathering because that can be detrimental to the faith of ordinary Muslims. He also promulgated that addressing the Prophet directly in *durood* while having a belief that the Prophet can hear the caller is *haram* and a cause of *shirk* and *kufr*. If not for *durood*, calling *Ya Rasool Allah* has been altogether forbidden (Haq, 2009, vol.i, pp. 162-73).

On the other hand, he belief and practice of directly addressing the Prophet has long been accepted by most of the Muslims. Following excerpts from Ahadith and writings of prominent Islamic scholars show the widespread acceptance and practice of this belief (Attari, 2009, pp. 117-126).

   a. One of the companions of the Prophet addressed him at his grave by saying, „*Ya Rasool Allah*! You are the abode of our hope, you were very kind to us and you were not harsh on us (Zarqani alal Mawahib, vol.8, p.274).
   b. The Prophet said that when the Jesus would return to this world... he would visit my grave and say „*Ya Muhammad'* and I would answer him. (Tirmidhi)
   c. Imam Jazri stated that it was the practice of early Muslims to loudly raise the slogan „*Ya Muhammad'* before launching an attack on the enemy in the war.
   d. Zainab, grand-daughter of the Prophet called in Karbala after the death of Imam Hussain, „*Ya Muhammad! Ya Muhammad!* This is Hussain who is lying in blood among the enemies".

It may be noted Shah Waliullah and and his son Abdul Aziz also agreed with the practice of directly addressing the Prophet. Similarly, Haji Imdadullah, the spiritual leader of the DMM founders, also recommended directly addressing the Prophet during spiritual exercises (Attari, 2009, pp. 117-126). However, as the countercultural approach gradually dominated the movement, the Deobandis declared that it was not legitimate to call „*Ya Muhammad*" even as a mystic ritual (Ludhianvi, n.d. pp.46-47).

6.3.6 Tassaruf and Ikhtiyar of the Prophet and Saints

After condemning the established beliefs regarding *haazir-o-naazir* and *Ya Rasool Allah*, it was quite logical for the Deobandis to challenge the prevalent concept of *ikhtiyar* (authority) and *tasarruf* (power to make things happen through miracle or thaumaturgy) with regard to the Prophet and the saints. Abdul Haq (2009, vol.i, pp.188-89) promulgated a *fatwa* stating that the belief in the *ikhtiyar* of saints and prophets is explicit *shirk* that would lead to an eternal abode in the Hell. He also declared the belief in *tasarruf* to be an overt *shirk*.

Ludhianvi (n.d. pp.39-42) has declared that the sovereignty and authority over the whole universe belongs to God alone and He has not shared this authority with the Prophet as generally believed by the Muslims who consider the Prophet to be *mukhtar-e-kul* (all powerful). On the same pattern, saints have also not been given any power or authority. Ludhianvi has stated that any miracle on the part of the Prophet and *karamat* (thaumaturgy) on the part of the saints is actually the act of God and that no prophet or saint has ever claimed for himself any such power or authority. Ludhianvi has quoted the following Hadith to support this Deobandi belief.

The Prophet said to Ibn Abbas, „O‟ boy! Take care of God‟s rights and He will take care of you. If you take care of His rights, you would find Him in front of you. If you need anything, ask from Him. If you need help, ask it from God. And have faith that if the whole nation gathers to benefit you, it cannot provide you any profit except for the one destined by God for you. And if the whole nation unites to hurt you, it cannot give you any harm except for the one preordained for you by God‟ (Mishkaat, n.d. p.453).
On the other hand, Barelwi *ulama* have supported *ikhtiyar* and *tasarruf* for the prophets and saints. They believe that God has delegated a lot of power and authority to Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) who could declare the same thing *halal* for one person and *haram* for another. Attari (2009, pp. 78-94) has quoted many Quranic verses, Ahadith and viewpoints of famous Islamic scholars and jurists to support this belief. Some excerpts are given below.

QuranicVerses:
i. „And it is not befitting to a Muslim man or Muslim woman, when Allah and His Messenger have decreed something that they would have any choice in their

matters, and whoever disobeys Allah and His Messenger, he undoubtedly, has strayed away manifestly" (33:36).

ii. „Then O beloved! By your Lord, they shall not be Muslims until they make you [Muhammad] judge in all disputes among themselves, then they find not any impediment in their hearts concerning whatever you decide, and accept from the eve of their hearts" (4:65).

Ahadith Excerpts:

i. According to a Hadith of Bukhari (2004, vol.iv, p.690), the Prophet said that when the angel of death came to Prophet Moses (PBUH) to make him die, Moses (PBUH) slapped the angel who then returned to God. This Hadith shows the *ikhtiyar* of prophets.

ii. According to a Hadith of Bukhari, the Prophet said that God gave him the option of either choosing to take what was in the world (life) or what was with God (death).

iii. When a delegation of Saqeef tribe put up three conditions for accepting Islam (i.e. no *zakat*, no *salat* and no jihad), the Prophet allowed relaxation of *zakat* and jihad despite the fact that these were compulsory in Islam. (Abu Dawood, n.d. vol.ii, p.72)

iv. The Prophet said, „Let it be known to you that the earth belongs to God and His Prophet". (Muslim, 2004, vol.ii, p.94)

v. The Prophet once asked his servant Rabee"a Ibn Ka"ab about his wish. The latter said that he wanted to be a companion of the Prophet in the Heavens. Then the Prophet ensured him about that by saying that he should offer *nafl* (supernumerary prayers) more frequently. (Muslim, 2004, vol.i, p.193)

Views of Scholars and Saints:

i. Imam Nawawi has declared that it is legitimate for the Prophet to amend the commands of the *Shariah*. Similarly, Mulla Ali Qari has stated that our Imams have declared that it is the discretion of the Prophet to interpret and apply commands of the *Shariah* in whatever manner he deems right.

ii. Allama Shatnufi stated that he saw four *mashaikh* (saints or spiritual leaders) who employed *tassaruf* from their graves just as they did when they were alive. These are Abdul Qaqir Jilani, Maroof Karkhi, Aqeel Manji and Hayad Ibn Qais Hirani.

iii. Shaikh Abdul Qadir Jilani also known as *Ghaus-e-Azam* (the greatest of the helping saints) wrote that when saints reach their highest status, they are given the power of *takween* (derived from God‟s saying of *kun*, which means be, to make things happen). At this stage, whatever they want, happens itself with God‟s permission.

iv. Shah Waliullah declared that saints belonging to Naqshbandi order have strange powers of *tasarruf*, which include healing illness, making people offer repentance, influencing the feelings and thoughts of the people and knowing what is in the hearts and minds of others.

6.3.7 Istamdad (Asking for Help and Intervention)

Istamdad (asking for help and intervention from anyone other than God) is a concept, which is associated with the notions of *tasarruf* and *ikhtiyar*. The Deobandis have condemned this practice as *shirk* on the ground that all power and authority belong to God and no one else can help except Him. Abdul Haq (2009, vol.i, p.188) in one of his *fatawa* declared the practice of *istamdad* as *shirk*. In another *fatwa*, he declared the belief in *istmadad* to be *haram* and *kufr* (Haq, 2009, vol.i, p.190).

The practice of *istamdad* has been followed by the Muslims for centuries whereby help from prophets and saints is sought during their life as well as after their death. While the Deobandis have decried this practice after interpreting the call for help in its literal meaning, non-Deobandi scholars have explained such calls for help in a more philosophical and ideational manner. Allama Waqaruddin has stated that in every language an act is either referred towards the real actor or to the apparent actor (Attari, 2009, p.96). For example, it is said in Arabic, *ambat-ar-rabiyul baql* (the spring weather has grown the vegetable). Here, the weather is apparent actor, which has grown the vegetable while the real actor is God. Similarly, it is said in Urdu language, *dawa ne bimari door kar di* (the medicine healed the disease) or *doctor ne mareez ko achha kar diya* (doctor cured the patient). Here the medicine and the doctor are apparent actors. It is interesting that the words of such examples don‟t make anyone consider these sentences to be equivalent to *shirk* or *kufr* because these references are indicating just towards the apparent actors. Otherwise, every Muslim believes that the actual and the ultimate Healer is God, rest are just reasons and resources.

Attari (2009, pp.96-97) has explained that such apparent references have been mentioned even in the Quran. For example, the angel Gabriel tells Mary, „I am only a messenger of your Lord. That I may give you a pure son' (19:19), whereas, the Muslims believe that it is only God who gives children. Similarly, it is stated in Surah Muhammad of Quran, „How then shall it be, when the angels will cause them to die, beating their faces and their backs? (47:27). On the other hand, it is the firm faith of the Muslims that God alone can give death to anyone.

It is in line with the above discussion that the Barelwi *ulama* have interpreted the concept of *istamdad* whereby help is sought from anyone other-than-God (*ghairullah*) through a source or mediation (*wasilah*) whereas the original belief is still there that the ultimate help comes from God alone (Attari, 2009, pp.96-97). In the light of this Barelwi interpretation, the Deobandis could have found a synthesis or common ground with the former. However, the countercultural spirit of the DMM put the movement in direct conflict with the majority of the Muslims who were just following an established practice.

Following are some of the references from the Quran, Hadith and writings of many great Islamic scholars quoted by Barelwi *ulama* to support the concept of *istamdad* (Attari, 2009, pp.98-107).

Quranic Verses:
   i.   „O Believers! Seek help with patience and prayer; no doubt, Allah is with the patients" (2:153).
   ii. „Then undoubtedly, Allah is his helper, and Gabriel, and the righteous believers and after that the angels are his helpers" (66:4).
   iii. „Then again when Isa [Jesus] found infidelity in them, said, "who become my helpers towards Allah". The disciples said, „We are the helpers of the religion of God" (3:52).
   iv. „And help each other in righteousness and piety, and help not one another in sin and transgression and remain fearing Allah" (5:2).

Ahadith Excerpts:
   i.   The Prophet told his companions that if their riding animal runs away from them in an unknown place, then they should loudly say, „O slaves of God! Stop

it (animal). There are certain (invisible) people on earth who would stop that"
(Tafseer-e-Kabeer). Imam Shokani has categorized the narrators of this Hadith
to be *siqah* (reliable).

ii. Ibn Abbas stated that there are angels who write the number of leaves which fall
from trees in the forest. Therefore, he told his companions that if they find
themselves in some trouble during the travel, they should say, „O slaves of God!
Help me, May god bless you". (Imam Ibn Abi Sheebah)

iii. The Prophet said that if anyone of you loses something in an unknown place,
he should say, „O slaves of God! Help me. There are some creations of God we
cannot see". The Prophet added that it was his tested technique. (Tabarani)

Views of Islamic Scholars:

i. Imam Ghazali has stated that the one who is called for *istamdad* in life can also
be called for help after his death.

ii. Imam Shafiʻī has recommended the grave of Imam Moosa Kazim for the
acceptance of supplication.

iii. Imam Nawawi mentioned that once during a travel the riding animal of one of
his fellow travelers ran away. Then he repeated the words of the Hadith, „O
slaves of God, stop it" and the animal stopped. Mulla Ali Qari has explained
that those words of the Hadith refer to angels as well as saints whom we cannot
see.

iv. Abdul Haqq Muhaddis Dehlwi mentioned that one of the *mashaikh* declared
that *iistamdad* by the dead saints is stronger and more effective than that of the
living ones because the dead are stationed closer to God.

It may be noted that forefathers and early leaders of the DMM also accepted and
practiced *istamdad*. For example, Shah Waliullah wrote in his book, *Fuyuz-ul-*
Haramain (n.d. p.28) that during his visit to Prophet"s grave, he requested the Prophet
for help. The Prophet listened to his request and granted him a lot of spiritual powers.
Further, Waliullah also recommended calling Ali for help to get rid of grief and misery
by saying *Ya Ali, Ya Ali, Ya Ali*. SImilarly, Shah Abdul Aziz declared that if someone
asks help from another person while considering that such help would be ultimately
coming from God through that person, then it is permissible in the *Shariah*. This type
of *istamdad* is considered help from the prophets and saint. But, it is actually a help

from God. Further, Muhammad Qasim, founder of the DMM, also addressed the Prophet in his poem by calling „*Ýa Nabi'* while asking for latter"s help.

However, later Deobandi leaders like Rasheed Ahmed and Ashraf Ali Thanvi attached some conditions to the concept of *istamdad* to rule out any possibility of *shirk*. For example, Rasheed Ahmed declared that it is permissible to recite poems (*na'at*) in which the Prophet is addressed directly and requested to help. However, he simultaneously stated that such poems should be recited out of love and also in seclusion while hoping that God may place such requests before the Prophet. Later on, Mahmood Hassan adopted a more inflexible approach about *istamdad* and declared that it was forbidden to ask for help from anyone other than God. Ultimately, the belief and practice of *istamdad* was condemned by the DMM as *shirk, kufr* and *haram* (Haq, 2009, pp.188-90).

6.3.8 Tawassul (Mediation) and Wasilah (Source of Mediation)

Tawassul refers to a practice whereby one prays to God to accept one"s supplication through the intervention of some prophet or saint. This concept has been accepted and practiced by the Muslims since the very early days of Islam. The forefathers of the DMM also shared this belief with all other Muslims of the subcontinent. However, as the movement exhibited its countercultural colour, it was natural for the Deobandis to distance themselves from the mainstream Muslim society. Hence, the DMM started disputing this concept and many shades of opinion gradually developed in the movement about *tawassul*. According to a *fatwa* by Abdul Haq (2009, vol.i, p.217), the belief that a supplication through the *tawassul* of saints shall definitely be accepted by God goes beyond the *Shariah*.

According to Ludhianvi (n.d. pp.47-48), some Deobandi *ulama* thought that *tawassul* of one"s good acts was permissible but considering some personality as a *wasilah* was *shirk*. Others declared that *tawassul* of a living person was allowed but that of a dead person was *shirk*. One group of Deobandi scholars allowed *tawassul* of not only some good deeds but also that of pious persons, both alive and dead. They justify this practice in the name of humility, submissiveness and fear of God because the one who refers to a *wasila* in fact admits indirectly that he himself is not pious enough to directly pray for his own self.

While accepting the practice of *tawassul* in a direct prayer to God, the Deobandis identified two other types of *tawassul* practiced by the Muslims of the subcontinent. These two types of *tawassul* have been declared as wrongful *bida'*, which lead to misguidance and *shirk* as discussed below.

As regards the first type, Ludhianvi (n.d. pp.49-59) explained that many Muslims, who consider themselves not pious enough to directly ask from God, employ *tawassul* of the saints (both dead and alive) in their supplications. They believe that saints can mediate on their behalf for the acceptance of their prayers. The Deobandis, instead of giving a benefit of doubt to such Muslims on the above-mentioned grounds of humility and fear of God, have declared their *tawassul* to be *shirk* because of two reasons. First, such Muslims think that the Kingdom of God is like worldly kingdoms where people cannot directly access the king without any source of mediation. Therefore, one has to find mediation for God as well. Applying the principle of such mediation to God has been declared totally wrong because it creates a similarity between a worldly king and God, who is not similar to anything or anyone. Second, these people believe that like worldly kings, who delegate power to their subordinates, God has delegated some authority to prophets and saints. According to the Deobandis, the above-mentioned Muslims are making two grave mistakes here. One, they are creating similarity between God and the worldly kings. Two, through this similarity, they indirectly acknowledge that God has limitations like worldly rulers who delegate powers because they are not able to know or perform all the activities of their countries. On the other hand, God not only knows each and everything but also holds power to make everything happen without sharing his authority with anyone.

The second type of *tawassul* condemned by the DMM involves those Muslims who simply request saints (both dead and alive) to pray to God on their behalf. The Deobandis have declared that making such requests to saints who are alive, is permissible. As regards views about the requests made to the saints who have passed away, there are two groups in the DMM. One group believes that deceased people cannot hear the voices of those who are alive. However, the only exception is the *tawassul* of prophets. The second group completely condemns this type of *tawassul* without any exception at all.

This debate about addressing the dead at their graves has long been going on among Islamic scholars under the title of *sama'-e-mauta* (listening by the dead). There was a small group among the early Deobandi *ulama* who believed that dead people do listen in their graves when someone addressed them. Ignoring this belief of early Deobandis, the DMM gradually adopted an inflexible stance about this category of *tawassul*. The later Deobandis also issued *fatawa* against *sama'-e-mauta*, which were compiled into a book titled, *Nafi-e-Sama'-e-Mauta-* Negation of the Listening by the Dead (Ibrahim, 2011, pp.238-243).

On the contrary, Barelwi *ulama* have defended the practice of *tawassul* by declaring that *wasilah* of prophets as well as saints (both alive and dead) is permissible. Attari (2009, pp.132-47) has described several references from the Quran, Hadith and *salaf-as-saliheen* to prove that *tawassul* has always been practiced by the Muslims. Some of these references are given below.

Quranic Verses:
  i.   „O believers! Fear Allah and seek *wasilah* (the means of approach) to Him and strive in His way haply you may get prosperity‟ (5:35).
  ii.   „And if when they do injustice unto their souls, then O beloved! They should come to you and then beg forgiveness of Allah and the messenger should *intercede* for them then surely, they would find Allah Most Relenting, Merciful‟ (4:64).
  iii. „And before that they were asking for victory over the infidels *by means* of the same prophet‟ (2:89).

Ahadith Excerpts:
  i.   Caliph Umar used to pray for rain through the *wasilah* of the Prophet. After Prophet‟s death, he prayed to God through the *wasilah* of Prophet‟s uncle, Abbas and it rained (Bukhari, 2004, vol.i, p.137).
  ii.   Ibn Abbas narrated that once the Jews faced the tribe of Ghatfan in a battle, they prayed through the *wasilah* of the Prophet by saying, „O God! We ask your help through the *wasilah* of your promised Prophet who would come near the end of times‟ (Tafseer Qartabi, vol.ii, pp.27-28).
  iii. A blind person asked the Prophet to pray for him so that he should get his eyesight back. The Prophet asked him to offer *nafl salat* (optional prayers) and

then say like this: „O God! I ask of you and I turn to you through the *wasilah* of Muhammad. O Muhammad! I present to God my need through your *wasilah*. So please fulfill my need‟. After that supplication, the eyes of that blind person became perfect (Tirmidhi, vol.ii, p.197).

Views of Salaf-as-Saliheen:

i. Shaikh Abdul Qadir Jilani advised his followers that when they pray to God, they should ask Him through my *wasilah* (Bahjatul Asrar, n.d. p.23).

ii. When Caliph Abu Jaffar Mansoor visited Prophet‟s grave in Madinah, he asked Imam Malik whether he should turn towards Ka‛bah or towards the Prophet to make a supplication. Imam Malik replied, „how could you turn your face away from the Prophet when he has been declared a *wasilah* for you and even for the prophet Adam. So you should turn your face towards the Prophet while making your supplication (Shifa, n.d. vol.ii, p.33).

iii. During his sojourns to Baghdad, Imam Shafi‛i always visited the grave of Imam Abu Hanifa where he used to offer *salam* (greetings) and then make supplication to God through the *wasilah* of Abu Hanifa (Tareekh Khateeb-e-Baghdadi, vol.i, p.123).

iv. Imam Hanbal who used to supplicate through the *wasilah* of Imam Shafi‛i said that the personality of the latter was like sunlight for the people and like health for the body (Shawahid-ul-Haq, p.166).

Interestingly, the ideologues and forefathers of the DMM themselves preached and practiced *tawassul*. For example, Ibn Taimiyah declared in one of his *fatawa* that it is correct to make a supplication to God through the *wasilah* of prophets, angels as well as pious people. Shah Abdul Aziz also declared that *tawassul* of pious persons (both dead and alive) is permissible there is not an iota of *shirk* in such *tawassul*. Similarly, Rasheed Ahmed declared that *tawassul* is permissible through the dead and alive persons as well as through the pious acts of one‟s own or of the others (Attari, 2009, pp.142-47).

However, as the movement became more countercultural with the passage of time, its followers adopted a narrow definition of *tawassul* by declaring that one should not believe that any supplication without *tawassul* won‟t be accepted by God or that a supplication with *tawassul* shall surely be accepted. Such restrictions also allowed the

DMM enough room to castigate all other Muslim groups and sects who practiced *tawassul*. At present, most Deobandis believe in the concept of *tawassul* in theory alone. In practice, they mostly try not to preach or employ *tawassul* in their supplications. Although a small group of Deobandis do practice *tawassul*, it is restricted to the Prophet alone. *Tawassul* of saints is particularly avoided by the Deobandis to keep themselves apart from the majority of Pakistani Muslims.

6.3.9 Ziyarat-e-Quboor (Visitng the Graves)

The Deobandis have allowed the practice of *ziyarat-e-quboor* with the objectives of: remembering one‟s own death as well as the hereafter; praying for the souls of the dead; and conveying the reward of some good acts to the dead (*isal-e-sawab*). However, they have simultaneously condemned as *shirk* the following popular practices and rituals, which are performed by many Muslims with regard to the graves (Ludhianvi, n.d. pp.59-76).

a. *Constructing stone graves and erecting buildings over the graves*
Abdul Haq (2009, vol.i, p.185) declared in his *Fatawa* that this practice is illegitimate and leads to *shirk*. In this regard, the Deobandis quote the Hadith of Jabir who narrated that the Prophet had forbidden from constructing graves with stones, building domes or tombs as well as sitting on the graves (Mishkaat, n.d. p.148). Deobandi *ulama* have also referred to the *fatwa* of Imam Muhammad (disciple of Imam Abu Hanifa) who declared it *haram* to construct graves and tombs with stones and bricks (Ludhianvi, n.d. p.63).

The Barlewis, on the other hand, have declared it permissible with regard to the graves of the saints and Islamic scholars. Niazi (2012, pp.132-45) has argued that if such construction was forbidden then the building in which the Prophet was buried, should have been demolished. On the contrary, Caliph Umar built a brick wall around the Prophet‟s tomb. Later on, that wall was constructed with carved stones during the reign of Caliph Waleed. It has also been reported that once a wall of Prophet‟s tomb fell down and the *sahaba* constructed it. Abdul Haqq Muhaddis Dehlwi has written in his book *Jazb-ul-Quloob* that in 550 A.H (1155 CE), Jamaluddin Isphahani got erected a netting of sandalwood around that wall in the presence of *ulama* of that time. Then in 678 A.H. (1279 CE) Sultan Salihi built a green dome over the Prophet‟s grave. It may be noted that this construction is not exception for the Prophet alone because in the same building are the graves of two caliphs, Abu Bakr and Umar.

One of the arguments of non-Deobandi *ulama* to support such construction on the graves of saints is that such buildings are meant to display the grandeur of Islam (*shaukat-e-Islam*). Allama Ismail Haqqi (d. 1725 CE) supported this practice in his *Tafseer Bayan-ul-Quran* while interpreting verse 18 of chapter 9. He asserted that it was legitimate to establish buildings over the graves of scholars and saints with the object of enhancing their reverence among the people. Similarly, Abdul Haqq Muhaddis Dehlwi believed that the grandeur of such tombs helped in creating awe and obedience among the non-Muslims (quoted in Niazi, 2012 p.134). This *shaukat-e-Islam* argument was also employed by Deobandi Ashraf Thanvi (2002, p.22) to defend the practice of firing a cannon during *hajj* to announce some rituals as shall be discussed in Section 6.4.2. However, the Deobandis are not willing to accept the same argument for building shrines.

The practice of constructing tombs has also been allowed by many other scholars like Imam Shami, Allama Haskafi, Imam Shi'rani and Abu Hanifa. Imam Shami declared that it is not *makruh* to erect a building over the grave of saints and *ulama* whereas Allama Haskafi wrote in *Durr-e-Mukhtar* that there is no harm in constructing a building over a grave. (Niazi, 2012, pp.134-35).

As regards the above Hadith of Jabir, many non-Deobandi *ulama* have interpreted such prohibition of using stone to be applicable to only those graves that are: stoned from inside; meant for ordinary Muslims; and constructed with the intentions of decoration and pride. It has been mentioned in the Hadith book, Mishkaat, that the Prophet affixed a stone on the head-side of the grave of Usman Ibn Madh'un and said that it would mark the grave of our brother and we shall bury our family members around that grave. Further, it is mentioned in the Quran about the people who died in the cave: „then they said "build over their cave any building or mosque" (18:21). This verse has also been quoted by non-Deobandi scholars to justify the practice of building shrines and tombs (Niazi, 2012, pp.137-38).

Mufti Ahmad Yar Naeemi has mentioned in his book *Jaa'al-Haqq* (n.d. pp.148-50) that the practice of building tombs was followed during the times of the *sahaba*. For example, Caliph Umar constructed a dome over the grave of Zainab bint-e-Jahash, wife of the Prophet. Similarly, Muhammad Ibn Hanfia constructed a building over the grave of Abdullah Ibn Abbas and Prophet's wife Ayeshah got a dome built over the grave of

his brother Abdur Rehman Ibn Abu Bakr. The wife of Imam Zain-ul-Abideen also got a building constructed over his husband‟s grave. That covered area was meant for those who visited the grave to pray for the Imam and recite the Quran for *isal-e-sawab*.

b. *Putting sheets of cloth on the graves*

The DMM has also declared this practice to be *haram* on the basis that it was not followed by the *salaf-as-saliheen*. They refer to Imam Shami‟s *fatwa* in *Radd-ul-Mukhtar* which declared this practice as *makruh* (Ludhianvi, n.d. p.64). On the other hand, non-Deobandi writer Niazi (2012, pp.83-88) has stated that this practice is unnecessary vis-à-vis the graves of the ordinary Muslims. However, it is permissible in case of saints because such practice increases the respect of the saint in the eyes of the visitors. Many Barelwi *ulama* have also referred to Imam Shaami‟s another *fatwa* in which he allowed this practice with the intention of creating respect and awe of the saint in the hearts of ordinary people who visited shrines. Some *ulama* have linked this practice to the tradition of placing a cloth cover over *Ka'bah* as a mark of respect (Niazi, 2012, pp.83-88).

c. *Lighting on and prostration before the graves*

While declaring the practice of lighting on the graves as wicked and illegitimate in his *Fatawa*, Deobandi scholar Abdul Haq (2009, vol.i, pp.183-85) pronounced that prostration before the graves is *haram* and *shirk*. The Deobandis have quoted following Ahadith to support their viewpoint (Ludhianvi, n.d. pp.65-67).

  i. Abdullah Ibn Abbas narrated that the Prophet condemned those women who visited graves as well as those people who prostrate before the graves and burn lamps there (Mishkaat, n.d. p.71).

  ii. Ayeshah narrated that the Prophet condemned the Jews and the Christians because they had made their prophets‟ graves as places of prostration (Mishkaat, n.d. p.69).

  iii. The Prophet prayed to God, „don‟t make my grave like an idol, which is worshipped‟ (Mishkaat, n.d. p.172).

Furthermore, the Deobandi *ulama* have referred to the writings of Shah Waliullah in his book *Al-Fauz-ul-Kabeer* (The Great Success) where he mentioned that the acts of ignorant and ordinary people on the graves actually reflect the beliefs and acts of *mushrikeen* (Ludhianvi, n.d. p.68). Apart from that, the Deobandis have also

condemned touching and kissing of saints" graves to receive blessings, as wrongful bida". Haq (2009, vol.ii, p.78) promulgated a *fatwa* stating that the act of kissing the graves is impermissible and *haram*. According to a *fatwa* by Abdul Haq (2009, vol.i, p.186), the act of kissing the graves out of respect is *kufr* and misguidance while doing the same without any intention of respect is a great sin and *haram*.

On the other hand, the Barelwi *ulama* have declared that burning lamps on the graves of ordinary Muslims without any need, is forbidden. However, this is allowed for the graves and shrines of the saints (Naeemi, n.d. p.160). It has also been argued by the Barelwi *ulama* that bowing before a saint"s grave out of respect cannot be termed as prostration because the objective of prostration is worship whereas Muslims never intend to worship the graves when they bow there. Similarly, kissing the grave is also out of respect and not as a mark of worship. This difference between respect and worship also becomes manifest by the established practices of kissing the black stone (*Hajr-e-Aswad*) at *Ka'bah* as well as kissing the Quran and books of Hadith. Imam Hanbal allowed kissing of Prophet"s *minbar* (pulpit) as well as his grave. In fact, caliph Umar used to touch Prophet"s *minbar* with his hand and then kiss that hand. Imam Siyuti stated that the practice of kissing the graves has been derived from the kissing of the black stone (Niazi, 2012, pp.88-95). Interestingly, the DMM has condemned the kissing of graves even as a mark of respect.

Imam Hanbal has also narrated that Abu Ayub Ansari, a companion of the Propheta once placed his face on the grave of the Prophet. When the governor of Madinah, Marwan tried to stop him, Ansari replied that he knew what he was doing. He said, „I have not come to the clay and stone. I am present in the court of the Prophet"(Niazi, 2012, pp.96-97).

d. *Placing flowers on the graves*

The Deobandis have also forbidden the popular practice of placing flower petals and wreaths on the graves because it was never followed by the *salaf-as-saliheen*. Contrariwise, many Sunni *ulama* have allowed this practice in the light of an authentic Hadith, which states that the Prophet once placed green twigs of palm tree on two graves and said that until those twigs dried up, the punishment of the dead in those graves would hopefully be lessened (Bukhari, 2004, vol.vii, p.458).

The Deobandis, however, have interpreted this Hadith from a different angle to oppose this practice. Abdul Haq is one notable exception who agreed that placing flowers and green leaves and twigs on graves with the intention that it would benefit the dead is allowed in the *Shariah*. However, he simultaneously pronounced that in the modern era of corruption, evil and trials, people's intentions are mostly vitiated; therefore, *ulama* have declared it against the *Shairah* to place flower wreaths on the graves (Haq, 2009, vol.ii, p.77).

The DMM has generally opposed the practice of placing green plants or flowers on the graves on the following grounds (Ludhianvi, n.d. pp.198-211).

i. It was not a usual practice of the Prophet and he did it only 2-3 times. Non-Deobandi scholars have argued that the Prophet might not do it regularly because in that case it would have become a binding *Sunnah* or obligation for the Muslims. According to a Hadith (Muslim, 2004, vol.ii, pp.239-40), the Prophet avoided many practices he liked just because those might not become obligatory for his followers.

ii. The reduction in the punishment was due to the blessing and miracle of Prophet's hand, which placed the green twigs on the graves. Non-Deobandis have stated that green plants are living things and every living thing praises God as mentioned in Quran (17:44). So due to that praise, the punishment is reduced. Fresh flowers and leaves are also living things.

iii. If it is accepted that reduction in punishment was due to green twigs, then it would be better to place green twigs rather than flowers. The exact *Sunnah* should be to use the palm twigs. According to non-Deobandi scholars, the spirit of the practice was to use any fresh parts of the plants or flowers and sheaths of flowers also include green twigs and leaves. As flowers also reflect beauty, this practice gradually became more popular. Further, the Prophet used the palm tree because that is more common in Arabia (Niazi, 2012, p.83).

iv. Nowadays, this practice is no more followed in the light of the said Hadith. Rather, the objective of this practice is to show respect to the graves or receive favours and blessings from the dead saints, both of which are *bida'* and *shirk*. According to non-Deobandi viewpoint, if Muslims are doing it to show respect to their dead relatives and saints as well as national leaders, then this practice cannot be termed as wrongful *bida'* because most people

do not consider it to be a part of religion. As regards receiving favours from the saints, that comes under the concept of *istamdad* as discussed in Section 3.3.7.

    v. If the explanation of reduction in punishment through green living plants is accepted, then this practice should not be followed on the graves of the saints because they are not supposed to receive any punishment being pious persons and friends of God (*Aulia Allah*). Looking from that perspective, this practice actually shows contempt for the saints. From the non-Deobandi perspective, this is even a weaker argument than the earlier ones because if this line of argument is accepted, then the practice of the Prophet to do *istaghfar* (act of seeking forgiveness from God for one‟s sins) could be interpreted in a far more contemptuous manner. Similarly, the practice of rendering *durood-o-salam* to the Prophet (a highly revered practice followed by all the Muslims) would also lead to scornful interpretations. Similarly, if the same line of argument is taken a bit farther, the concept of *isal-e-sawab* for prophets and saints would also become redundant whereas the DMM has approved it with the condition of not fixing a date for it. The truth of the matter is that the reward of good acts conveyed through *isal-e-sawab* helps the sinful persons in reducing their punishment whereas it leads to the elevation of the status of the pious and innocent people (Niazi, 2012, pp.81-82). Further, if a Muslim performs a good act to be transferred to the saints, then that act would not only benefit the latter but can also be helpful for the former through the blessings returned by the saints.

6.3.10 Nadhr or Mannat vis-à-vis Shrines

A *nadhr* or *mannat* is one‟s vow to do a good act for the sake of God if a particular supplication or wish comes true. The scope of such good acts in return for the fulfilment of a wish is quite broad. For example, these include offering of *nafl* (supernumerary) prayers, fasting and distributing money or food among the poor etc. In the subcontinent, most popular good acts for *nadhr* included distribution of food and sweets on the shrine of a particular saint or placing of cloth sheet or flowers on the grave of some specific saint.

Mannat or *nadhr* is a widespread practice among the Muslims all over the world. God has permitted this practice by stating in the Quran, „And whatsoever you spend or vow

Allah knows it and the unjust have no helpers" (2:270). As such, the Deobandis have interpreted this practice to be an act of worship allowed by God. However, they have simultaneously declared that an act of worship cannot be performed for the sake of a saint. Through this interpretation of *nadhr*, the Deobandis have declared this popular and religiously legitimate practice to be *haram*.

The Deobandis have agreed in principle that if someone practices *nadhr* purely for God and his act of distributing food among the poor on the shrine of some saint is just for the sake of *isal-e-sawab* or for helping the poor, then such *nadhr* or *mannat* cannot be called *haram* or *shirk*. However, in practice, they don"t allow even such a pure and legitimate *nadhr* on the ground that common Muslims are not able to keep this delicate balance between worship and *shirk*. Ludhianvi (n.d. p.74) has observed that although people who practice *nadhr* involving shrines and saints declare that they are doing it for the sake of God and *isal-e-sawab* of the saints, they are just deceiving themselves because their ulterior motive is to get blessings from the saints through *istamdad* and *tasarruf*, which lead to *shirk* and *kufr*. Therefore, Abdul Haq (2009, vol.i, p.230) issued a *fatwa* declaring *nadhr* at the shrines as *haram* and *shirk*.

It is interesting that on the one hand the Deobandis opposed the above-mentioned practices because these involved showing respect to the graves, whereas on the other hand they themselves displayed an extraordinary veneration for the graves of their elders. For example, Deobandi *ulama* fervidly protested in 2006 when militant Hindus damaged the grave of Ashraf Ali Thanvi in a cemetery called *Ashraf-ul-Maqabir* (Best of the Graves) in India. That graveyard is highly revered by the Deobandis because many DMM leaders are buried there. Zafar Usmani, a renowned Deobandi leader, wrote about that graveyard, "This place is like heaven because of God"s blessings, and who got buried here became purified. Whoever wants to spend a night in the Garden of Heaven must come here because this is a perfumed garden" (Tirmazi, 2007, pp.34-39).

6.4   DMM's Opposition to Non-Religious Socio-Cultural Practices

The discussion in this section mostly includes those customs, which have been condemned by Ashraf Ali Thanvi in his book, *Islah-ur-Rusoom* (Reform of the Customs). This is a short book, which Thanvi wrote for the common Muslims with the intention of condemning their beliefs and customs. In this book, he employed the instruments of Quran and Hadith to strengthen his arguments against the socio-cultural

practices prevalent among the North Indian Muslims at the start of the 20th century. He used plain language and avoided complex religious terms to attract wide readership among ordinary Muslims. Even references were not given to distinguish s*ahih* (authentic) Ahadith from the *dhaeef* (weak) ones. Apart from that book, a few *fatawa* of Abdul Haq have also been included in the relevant sections.

Some popular socio-cultural practices condemned by the DMM are discussed below.

6.4.1 Celebration of Matrimonial Events

Although marriage-related customs and practices vary in different parts of Pakistan in line with geography, history and culture, the DMM has condemned all these customs on one pretext or the other. For example, Abdul Haq (2009, vol.ii, pp.73-4) issued a *fatwa* that wearing of *sehra* by the bride-groom is a Hindu custom that must compulsorily be avoided and insistence to follow this custom is sinful. Thanvi (2002, pp.54-89) has given several reasons to castigate different ceremonies practiced during matrimonial events. These reasons include; prodigality, pride and exhibition of wealth; non-observance of *purdah* (physical segregation and proper covering of bodies by women)during these ceremonies; *tashabbuh bil kuffar*; taking loans for these events even on interest (*riba*); supporting sinful activities like interaction between men and women; singing and dancing that is *haram*; backbiting and jealousy among women who compete with one another in dresses and make-up; ignoring or delaying obligatory prayers during the ceremonies etc. Above all, Thanvi has also included in this list the committing of *shirk*, the favourite condemnation weapon of the DMM.

It may not be out of place to add here that the exaggerated emphasis of Deobandis to declare the customs and practices of the majority of Muslims as *shirk* is in conflict with the authentic Hadith in which the the Prophet swore on God that he was not afraid that Muslims would commit *shirk* after him and that his only fear in this regard was that they would dispute among themselves for worldly gains (Bukhari, 2004, vol.viii, p.55). Coming back to marriage rites, Thanvi has also pilloried some marriage-related customs that are considered as good omen for the new couple e.g. distribution of money after waving it around the head of the bride or groom in order to ward off evil. Similarly, special foods are prepared for particular ceremonies as good omen and absence of such foods is considered a bad omen. It is worth noting that while declaring the concept of good or bad omen as *haram*, Thanvi ignored an authentic Hadith

whereby the Prophet had said that there is nothing wrong with taking good omen (Bukhari, 2004, vol.vii, pp-317-18).

According to Thanvi (1992, pp.7-15), „many customs of marriage are *bida'* [while] several of these are *shirk*‟. In fact, he has declared, directly or indirectly, almost all the matrimonial customs and practices as *bida'*, *haram* or *shirk*. In this regard, he has quoted following Quranic verses and Ahadith (without references).

Quranic Verses:

i. O children of Adam! Take your adornment whenever you go to mosque and eat and drink and do not cross the limit. Undoubtedly, the persons crossing the limit are not liked by Him. (7:31)

ii. And give kinsmen their right and to the needy and the traveler and spend not extravagantly. No doubt, the extravagant are the brothers of the devil (Satan). And the devil is very ungrateful to his Lord. (17:26-27)

Ahadith:

i. The Prophet said that the one who follows affectation and pretension shall be humiliated by God.

ii. The Prophet condemned *riba* (interest) and discouraged the practice of taking loans.

iii. The Prophet said that God detests those who follow the practices of *jahiliyyah* (the state of ignorance of the Divine guidance) even after embracing Islam.

iv. The marriage banquet (*walima*) by the groom, if done with pomp and pride was called an evil food by the Prophet. (Otherwise, *walima* is a *Sunnah*.)

v. The Prophet condemned the woman who goes outside her home after wearing a fast perfume that reaches other people.

vi. The Prophet declared that there is a Satan with every musical instrument.

Despite all the condemnation of the DMM, the above-mentioned customs and practices are still very popular among the majority of the Pakistani Muslims who consider these as part of the culture and norms of the society. It is pertinent to mention here that holding of different ceremonies on the occasion of marriage was a common practice during Prophet‟s time. According to an authentic Hadith, Prophet‟s wife Ayeshah once

accompanied a bride to lead her to the bridegroom in a group. When she reported the ceremony to the Prophet, he suggested that someone with a tambourine (*duff* or *riq*) should have also accompanied the women to support their songs (Bukhari, 2004, vol.vi, p.631).

6.4.2 Sports and Recreation Activities

The Deobandis have generally deplored the popular cultural events like festivals and fairs as well as sporting events. Thanvi (2002, p.106) has strongly condemned the practice of the people to go to such events like horse racing, wrestling matches, exhibitions, fairs and theatre for entertainment. He has denounced such events on the ground that many un-Islamic things happen in such gatherings e.g. music, interaction between men and women, gambling, wrong sportswear of wrestlers (whose thighs are uncovered) etc. Deobandi Taliban also banned in Afghanistan the wearing of shorts by men in sports.

Thanvi declared that going to such events was akin to accepting and promoting all these sinful acts and hence helping increase the congregations of *fisq* (open disobedience of God) and *kufr*. To strengthen this last argument, he has quoted a Hadith whereby the Prophet stated that he, who helped increase the gathering of a group or nation, belonged to that group. Further, Thanvi has also tried to link another Hadith with such events. According to that Hadith, the Prophet forbade his companions from sitting on the roadside. However, Thanvi failed to mention the whole Hadith, which states that when his companions explained their custom of sitting on the roadside, the Prophet allowed them to do so while avoiding immoral behaviour (Bukhari, 2004, vol.iii, p.585).

The Deobandis have also condemned sporting and recreation activites like pigeon keeping, kite flying, fireworks and chess as discussed below.

Thanvi (2002, pp.17-18) has declared pigeon keeping as *haram* on two presumptions: One, it can lead to gambling; Two, sometimes the person involved in this sport ignores his obligatory prayers as well as his duties towards his family and escaping an obligatory act is considered *haram*. Since pigeon keeping can lead to something that is *haram*, this sport is also *haram* because anything that leads to *haram* is itself *haram*. Apart from these convoluted arguments, Thanvi has also quoted an unauthentic Hadith

in which Abu Hurairah narrated that when the Prophet saw a person running after a flying pigeon, he said, „one Satan is chasing another Satan". On the same pattern, Thanvi has also forbidden other hobbies like raising cocks and quails for bird-fighting. Although such sports are not very popular these days, majority of Pakistanis do not consider them to be *haram* or sinful. The Deobandis on the other hand continue to condemn these hobbies and sports. It is interesting that when Deobandi Taliban established their rule in Kabul in 1996, one of the decrees announced by their religious police stated: „To prevent keeping pigeons and playing with birds: Within ten days this habit/hobby should stop. After ten days, this should be monitored and the pigeons and any other playing birds should be killed" (Rashid, 2008, p.219).

As for the kite flying, Thanvi (2002, pp.18-20) has deplored it on almost the same grounds he employed with respect to pigeon keeping. However, his presumptions here are even more far-fetched as shown below.

  i.   Running after a kite is like running after a pigeon and the latter has been condemned by the Prophet.

  ii.   Catching a free kite is *haram* because it belongs to someone else. Since looting another person's belonging is *haram* and the Prophet has apparently declared that a looter shall lose his *iman* (faith). Same principle also applies to looting of strings after a kite is cut by another kite.

  iii. Everyone participating in this sport intends to cut the kites of others. This is akin to harming other Muslims, which is *haram*. So because of this intention of *haram*, all kite flyers become sinners.

  iv.   This sport can led to forgetting and missing obligatory prayers. Since God has forbidden gambling and alcohol as *haram* on the ground that these evils lead to ignoring of prayers, kite flying also falls in the same category of sins.

  v.   A kite is made of paper, which is an instrument for spreading knowledge. Therefore, kite flying shows disrespect to knowledge. Similarly, a paste of wheat flour is generally used to make kites, a practice that is disrespect of a food item. Thanvi has linked it to a Hadith in which the Prophet advised his wife, Ayeshah to respect the bread (food).

  vi.   A lot of money is wasted on such sports and extravagance is *haram*.

It was perhaps in line with the above arguments that the Deobandi Taliban in Kabul issued a decree against kite flying and closed all kite shops (Rashid, 2008, p.219).

Abdul Haq (2009, vol.ii, pp.111-12), also issued a *fatwa* declaring that *basant* (annual kite-flying festival) was a Hindu custom and therefore impermissible because of *tashabbuh-bil-kuffar*. Despite all these arguments, the DMM has not been very successful to convince the Pakistani Muslims in this regard despite using religious arguments. The majority of Pakistanis still believe that kite flying is just a hobby or entertainment activity. *Basant* in Lahore was a big national event till very recently when the courts banned it after several persons were injured by extra sharp strings. The event is set to return in near future with restrictions on the use of dangerous strings.

As regards the fireworks, this practice is very popular in Pakistan and is generally associated with occasions of happiness. People use the fireworks not only to mark marriage events, festivals and Independence Day but also to celebrate victory in sports or elections. In small towns and villages, people also use fireworks and crackers to announce the return of a friend or relative from *hajj*. Fireworks are also displayed on other religious occasions like *Eid Milad-un-Nabi* and *shab-e-barat* on 15th night of Islamic month of Sha''ban.

Thanvi (2002, pp.21-22) has declared this practice as *haram*. Here again, he has made an extra effort to add weight to his declaration through indirect references to the Quran and some Ahadith. Some of his old arguments like wastage of money, use of paper in making fire crackers have also been repeated here. Besides that, he has used following arguments to castigate this popular practice.

i.   The Prophet directed in one Hadith that one should avoid the use of fire without any need and that one should put out any fire or lamp before going to bed. Therefore, fireworks should also be avoided because these are not needed. Rather these can be harmful to life.

ii. Islam has ordered that children should focus on religious knowledge and teachings. When children are encouraged to watch fireworks, it means their initial learning becomes sinful. This is a contradiction and opposition of the above Islamic order.

iii. The fireworks, which go straight upwards are *haram* because it resembles the act of Yog and Magog (two evil nations which shall rise near the Resurrection or *qiyamah*) who shall, according to a Hadith, throw their arrows straight upwards into the sky. Since Yog and Magog shall be non-Muslims and resemblance with the non-Muslims is *haram*, so the fireworks are also *haram*.

Interestingly, Thanvi has defended the practice of using cannon fire (which is also directed upwards) during the *hajj* to announce the beginning or end of some ritual e.g. the end of stay at the plain of Arafa and beginning of the travel towards Muzdalifah. Thanvi has allowed this cannon fire in the name of necessity of a religious announcement and showing grandeur of Islam (*shaukat-e-Islam*) as well as respect for its religious places. It is remarkable that the last two arguments have been disregarded by the Deobandis when the Barelwi *ulama* employed the same to defend the practice of building shrines and tombs of saints as discussed in Section 6.3.9.

Playing Chess has also been prohibited by the Deobandis. Abdul Haq (2009, vol.ii, p.434) pronounced a *fatwa* that one should avoid playing chess because it involves waste of time and compulsive craving. Thanvi (2002, pp.15-17) has quoted following Ahadith to declare chess playing as *haram*. These Ahadith were not authentic enough to get included in the most reliable Hadith books by Imam Bukhari and Imam Muslim.

i. The Prophet said that the one who plays chess and then goes directly from there to offer his prayers is like a person who did *wudhu* (ablution) with the pus and blood of the swine before saying his prayers.

ii. Caliph Ali said that chess is gambling of the non-Arabs.

iii. Abu Moosa Ash'ari said that chess is not played by anyone but the sinful.

It may be added here that playing chess has been declared permissible by Imam Shafi'i. However, Thanvi who is a Hanafi has stated that Imam Shafi'i had allowed it only in his earlier writings.

Apart from the afore-mentioned customs and socio-cultural practices, the DMM has also criticized many other norms of the mainstream Muslim society. Actually, this has been a continuous and ongoing process through which the DMM has kept itself distinctly apart from the majority of the Pakistani Muslims via its contradiction of the norms and values of the latter. As the scope of the DMM narrowed down over time to make it more of a countercultural than a political or religious movement, the range of the mainstream customs and practices condemned by the DMM got broadened. For example, the DMM in later years condemned other practices such as celebration of anniversaries like birthdays, exchange of greeting cards on occasions like *eid* or New Year and wearing trouser pants and jeans.

The DMM has also opposed television watching on the ground that pictures are *haram*. Internet is generally opposed because of the pictures as well as for its potential use for obscenity. As a matter of fact, the DMM has condemned all such popular customs and practices by declaring them as un-Islamic on one pretext or the other e.g *bida'*, *shirk*, *tashabbuh bil kuffar*, forbiddance of fixing dates and rituals to mark some event etc. Such use of religious rulings against the norms and practices of the mainstream society apparently makes the DMM look like a religious movement while pushing to the background its true countercultural spirit. It may not be out of place to mention here that the Deobandis have not contradicted the values and practices of just the popular folk Islam generally represented by the Barelwis. They have, in fact, also condemned all other Muslim sects and groups present in Pakistan i.e. Ahle Hadith, Shias and Jamaat-e-Islami. A brief description of the Deobandi condemnation of these Muslim groups is given at ***Appendix I.***

The Deobandis have also deplored officially-recognized practices of celebrating national days like Independence Day, Pakistan Day, May Day, Defence Day, Quaid-e-Azam (founding father of Pakistan) Day, Iqbal (national poet) Day etc. This opposition of the DMM is an indirect subversion of the state. Similarly, the Deobandis have contradicted the established practices of flying the national flags at half-mast to mourn some tragic event or observing silence to remember the dead. This condemnation is again based on *tashabbuh bil kuffar*- a concept which the Deobandis employed almost invariably to decry the worldly norms of the Muslim society just like they applied the concept of *bida'* to denounce its religious norms. Recently, the Deobandis also condemned hunger strike as a political tool by declaring it as impermissible (Sahibzada, 2008, pp.33-35). Abdul Haq issued a *fatwa* that if there is a risk of losing one‟s life in hunger strike then it would be akin to suicide and hence *haram* (Haq, 2009, vol.ii, p.358). However, it is interesting to note that Deobandi leadership of JUH had supported Gandhi‟s *maran barat* (hunger strike till death) at the time of partition in 1947. In that sense, the DMM appeared to be more cooperative towards *kuffar* (non-believers) than towards those who allegedly embraced *tashabbuh bil kuffar*. This „intra-society‟ nature of DMM‟s opposition underlies its countercultural inclinations.

It has also been observed that as the countercultural character of the DMM gradually dominated the movement, the Deobandis also started criticizing the mainstream institutions and policies of the state. In this regard, they particularly opposed the

mainstream educational system mainly in order to defend their madaris. Many Deobandi *ulama* have also criticized democracy as un-Islamic system of governance. Despite that, the Deobandi party JUI has continued to participate in the electoral process without disowning the countercultural views of the movement. Recently, the Deobandi Taliban of Pakistan represented by *Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan* (TTP) openly declared democracy as un-Islamic (Dawn, 29 Dec. 2012). The TTP has not only killed those politicians who disagreed with its values but has also targeted the powerful military establishment because of the latter"s operation against the Taliban in Pakistan"s tribal areas, the hide-out of the latter.

Furthermore, the Deobandis have openly deplored the state policies vis-à-vis the role of women in the mainstream society. The DMM, just like the Afghan Taliban, wants women to be restricted to the boundaries of their homes. Similarly, the movement has tacitly opposed the state and society, which treat Shias as Muslims. Killings of Shias in Pakistan at the hands of banned Deobandi organizations like *Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan* and *Lashkar-e-Jhangwi* reflect the extremist nature of DMM"s countercultural course. Some reports have also linked the recent spate of attacks on *sufi* shrines to the extremist Deobandi organizations.

To sum it up, the Deobandi condemnation of the norms and practices of the mainstream society on the one hand and the use of force by them to impose their own socio-cultural and political values on the other, make nature of the countercultural tendencies in the DMM to be both anti-society as well as anti-state. The next chapter reviews the recent Deobandi literature to further highlight the current countercultural approach of the DMM vis-à-vis the established socio-cultural and political norms and practices prevalent in the present-day Pakistan

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7   DMM VERSUS MAINSTREAM SOCIETY: REVIEW OF DEOBANDI JOURNALS

'It is an entirely new and different reality that members of a counterculture bear in their minds and seek to embody in social islands that exist in the midst of the rationality of the dominant order'.

Kenneth Westhues in „Society‟s Shadow: Studies in the Sociology of Countercultures‟ (1972, p.34)

This chapter is the outcome of the first stage of fieldwork for this research that reviewed the recent Deobandi literature published by different madaris. The second stage involving interviews of Deobandi students shall be discussed in the next chapter. The current chapter explores the extent to which the trends identified in the previous chapters are also manifest in the content of the journals published by the DMM in Pakistan. The objective of this review is to look for countercultural trends in the DMM vis-à-vis the mainstream Muslim society in Pakistan during the last two decades. This review spotlights DMM‟s viewpoint on four themes: popular customs and practices; politics; education; and role of women in society.

For this review, following three prominent monthly journals published by big madaris were selected to represent three of the four provinces of Pakistan (no well-recognized journal from Balochistan province has been published long enough for inclusion in this research).

  i. *Al-Qasim* (named after one of the founders of the DMM, Muhammad Qasim)
       Published by *Jamia Abu Hurairah*, Nowshehra, Khyber Pukhtunkhwah Province

 ii. *As-Sayyanah* (The Protection)
       Published by *Jamia Ashrafia*, Lahore, Punjab Province

iii. *Bayyinat* (The Clear Proofs, named after chapter 98 of the Quran, Al-Bayyinah)
       Published by *Jamia-tul-ulum-ul-Islamiyah*, Karachi, Sindh Province

As regards the publishing madaris, *Jamia Abu Hurairah* is located in the small town of Khaliqabad in district Nowshehra. It is managed by Abdul Qayyum Haqqani, a renowned Deobandi scholar who graduated from *Jamia Haqqania* of Akorra Khattak in the same district. Following the footsteps of his alma mater, Haqqani‟s madrassah kept close links with Pakistan‟s military establishment in connection with „jihad‟ in

Afghanistan. *Al-Qasim*, the journal of this madrassah, edited by Haqqani himself, published pro-jihad articles especially in favour of the Taliban. When the Taliban came into power in Afghanistan, this journal preached a Taliban-style government in Pakistan and developed a large readership among the Deobandis all over Pakistan. Presently, the circulation of Al-Qasim is about 7,000 copies per month. *Jamia Abu Hurairah* has also been linked to extremist Deobandi organizations. In 2003, when the Musharraf government banned militant organizations, the police conducted a raid on this madrassah in search of some Deobandi extremists. Since then, it seems to have lost the support of the military establishment and its journal started aggressive criticism of Musharraf regime after that incident. Otherwise, *Jamia Abu Hurairah* had earlier opted to affiliate itself with Musharraf government‟s Madrassah Education Board established in 2001 with the objective of ensuring registration of all madaris as well as prescribing a syllabus for worldly subjects (Candland, 2008, pp.105-07).

Jamia Ashrafia of Lahore, on the other hand, is a relatively moderate Deobandi madrassah in the sense that it has never been linked to any militant or jihadi organization. Named after Ashraf Ali Thanvi (1863-1943), this madrassah was established in 1947 by Mufti Muhammad Hassan, a disciple of Thanvi. Since Hassan‟s death in 1961, it is being headed by his son, Mufti Obaidullah. There are ten branches of this madrassah in Lahore with an enrolment of about 4,500. According to the website of this Jamia, a four-year religious course has also been launched for the graduates of mainstream educational institutions with the objective of bridging „the gap between the secular and Islamic streams of education‟. The journal of this *madrasssah*, *As-Sayyanah* is edited by Wakil Ahmad Sherwani and its monthly circulation is 2,000. This journal takes inspiration from the teachings of Ashraf Thanvi whose writings it regularly publishes on topics like role of women, reform of custom and education. As compared to other two selected journals, As-Sayyanah publishes articles on the political issues far less frequently.

Jamia-tul-ulum-ul-Islamiyah in Binouri Town of Karachi is one of the biggest Deobandi madrassah in Pakistan with thirteen branches in the city. According to the website of this madrassah, total enrollment is about 12,000 and students from more than 60 countries have so far studied at this Jamia since its inception in 1954. This madrassah was established by Maulana Yousaf Binouri (1908-1977), a graduate of Darul Ulum Deoband. Several prominent Deobandi scholars were associated with this

madrasssah. These included Mufti Rasheed Ahmed (1928-2002), Yousaf Ludhianvi (1932-2000) and Nizamuddin Shamzai (1930-2004). Till 1970s, this madrassah was mostly associated with anti-Qadyani movement. During 1980s, it also became involved in the anti-Shia campaign as well as „jihad‟ in Afghanistan. It was also associated with extremist and militant Deobandi organizations like SSP, LeJ and JeM. The leader of JeM, Azhar Masood was a graduate of this madrassah. This seminary also enjoyed close links with the military establishment of Pakistan as well as the Afghan Taliban till 2003 when Musharraf government distanced itself from militants by proscribing several Deobandi extremist groups (Hussain, 2007, pp.65-83). The journal of this madrassah, *Bayyinat*, is edited by Maulana Abdur Razzaq Sikander. Its monthly circulation is about 4,000. Its Arabic version is also published under the title of Al-Bayyinat. Apart from glorifying the *ulama* of its parent madrassah, this journal has published articles against Shias and Qadyanis on the one hand and against mainstream customs, education and politics of Pakistan on the other.

Based on a thorough review of the contents of the above-mentioned three journals for the period 1993-2012, the coverage of topics can broadly be divided into three categories: i) preaching of Hanafi Islam through articles on interpretation of Quran, Hadith and *fiqh*; ii) promotion of the DMM through essays on the performance of Deobandi madaris, achievements of Deobandi *ulama* and rise of the Deobandi Taliban in Afghanistan; and iii) opposition of the mainstream society with respect to folk Islam, popular custom and practices, education, politics and role of women. This chapter shall discuss only those writings of the said journals that are concerned with the third category. This review of recent Deobandi literature has been presented primarily through an ad verbum approach. The objective of this discussion is to highlight and understand the current countercultural mindset of the Pakistani Deobandis in the light of their own words.

7.1   DMM versus Popular Customs and Practices

Although there was a consensus among the three selected journals with regard to condemnation of various popular custom and practices, *As-Sayyanah* covered these issues more than the other two journals mainly owing to its strict adherence to the teachings of Ashraf Thanvi whose views in this regard have already been discussed in the previous chapter. The following discussion taken from the said journals reiterates the countercultural tendencies of the DMM identified in the previous chapters.

7.1.1 On Milad-un-Nabi (Prophet's Birth Celebrations)

Articles against this popular practice of folk Islam were published by the selected journals every year during or before Rabiul Awwal, the Islamic month during which the Prophet was born. Occasionally, same articles were repeatedly published to voice Deobandi disapproval of various activities associated with *Milad* events. The general approach of such articles was to condemn *Milad* in the light of the writings of the past Deobandi scholars. Sometimes, such original writings were just re-printed. For example, Ashraf Thanvi"s views were regularly published in *As-Sayyanah* on various subjects including *Milad*.

The selected journals criticized the practice of *Milad* on various grounds. For instance, the ordinary Muslims who participated in *Milad* meetings were condemned for their lack of commitment to Islam. Their love for the Prophet was also brought into question. One article stated, "We have seen most of the *Milad* meetings to be completely devoid of love [for the Prophet]. The worshippers of *Milad* are seen raising bamboo shoots and placing cloth over these and providing light and electricity [for *Milad* meetings] while in the meantime they ignore the obligatory prayers. And they also don"t support beards. May I ask gentlemen! is it the appearance and condition of a lover of the Prophet?" (Thanvi, 2001b, pp.20-24). Another article questioned, "Is the distribution of sweetmeat worth a few rupees, the only right of the Prophet [on us]?...Do you consider the Prophet to be a professional *pirzadah* [son of a spiritual leader] who would become happy over a little sweetmeat and be satisfied with a little amount of *nadhr* [gift]. Let"s ask for forgiveness and protection from God. Remember! The Prophet is not happy with such lovers" (Thanvi, 2011, pp.12-24).

The practice of celebrating Prophet"s birthday was also linked to the Hindus and Christians and even Shias. According to Thanvi (2003, pp.14-21), "To observe a particular day for a prophet or a saint is a custom derived from the Hindus and *mushriks* [polytheists]…There is no origin [in Islam] of remembering or observing a day…This is a mere custom taken from the Hindus and the Christians and it is *haram* due to resemblance with them". Muawiyah (2003, pp.30-32) observed, "Holding processions on [Prophet"s birthday] has no origin in Islam. Rather, this practice resembles with that of Shias [who hold processions in Muharram]".

7.1.2 On Celebration of Eid (Annual Religious Festival)

There are two *eids* celebrated by Muslims every year. One at the end of the fasting month, Ramadhan called *eid-ul-fitr* and the other in the month of *hajj* (pilgrimage) called *eid-ul-adhha*. The former is celebrated as a reward and thanksgiving for the fasting while the latter commemorate the sacrifice of Prophet Abraham (PBUH) who surrendered to God"s testing command to slaughter his son but before he could act, God replaced his son with a lamb. Muslims mark that event by slaughtering animals and distributing meat among the friends, relatives and the poor on the 10th day of Dhul Hijjah (12th month of Islamic calendar). In Pakistan, the two *eids* are also marked by activities like exchanging greeting cards and gifts, wearing new dresses, meeting friends and families, cooking and distributing special dishes among the friends and neighbours.

These Pakistani practices associated with *eids* were constantly condemned by the selected Deobandi journals every year before the arrival of these occasions. In one essay, the traditional practice of cooking sweet vermicelli (*sawiyyan*) was denounced just because it had become a custom. According to Thanvi (2012, pp.18-36), „On the day of *eid-ul-fitr*, preparing [sweet] vermicelli has become a stipulated practice. One justification for the origin of this practice is that it does not take a lot of effort to cook and hence allows enough time for other chores on *eid* day. [However], later on, it became a custom to send this sweet dish to friends. This has been justified in the light of the Hadith, which encourages giving away gifts on happy occasions…Although such a gift on happy occasion in itself increases love among people, but by God sending such a gift as custom increases malevolence…A gift sent as part of a custom is impermissible".

Other practices related to *eid* like sending greeting cards and wearing new dresses were also condemned. Rauf (2011, pp.44-53) observed, „Undoubtedly, God has declared *eid* to be a day of happiness for the Muslims. It is also supported by the *Shariah* that one should wear the best available dress on this day. However, numerous activities of extravagance and prodigality [like buying new clothes, new shoes, new household things, costly greeting cards etc.], which have been considered customary part of *eid* have nothing to do with religion and *Shariah*". Exchange of *eid* greeting cards was particularly declared un-Islamic because: it has become a custom; it leads to waste of money; and many cards carry pictures that are *haram*. According to Rauf (2000, pp.26-

31), „*eid* cards invoke so many wrongs and sins that the Muslims must avoid buying and sending these cards".

It may be added here that the practice of celebrating completion of Quran during the last nights of Ramadhan before the *eid-ul-fitr* was also disapproved by the Deobandi journals. According to one essay by Thanvi (1994, pp.7-18), „To light lamps on the day of completion of the Quran in Ramadhan is a *bida'*. People say that this practice shows grandeur of Islam. We say why it is necessary to show grandeur of Islam only in Ramadhan. You should rather always light numerous lamps in other months as well". He further declared that „if sweetmeat [on the completion of the Quran in Ramadhan] is purchased from one man's money, then its objective is [about] pretentiousness, prominence, popularity and pride. If that is purchased by collecting donations from many people, they must have been coerced [by shaming or daring] to donate". It is interesting to note here that the Deobandis themselves run their madaris through public donations.

7.1.3 On Events Related to Marriage and Death

The Deobandis opposed such events not only for being un-Islamic but also for the extravagance associated with them. One article stated that „the real reason behind the present disarray in [Pakistani] society is its remoteness from religion and strict following of [un-Islamic] customs and socio-cultural practices…Simplicity is absent [these days] in marriage ceremonies…As for the customs and practices regarding the death, it has been observed that people have to even borrow to carry out those rituals [of death]. And there are all kinds of absurd practices going around. We have made the marriage a source of [financial] destruction rather than construction [of a new family. Similarly], death of a person leads to the [financial] death of the whole family [because of expenditure on rituals]" (Kafeel, 2000, pp.52-54).

Another article even questioned the pious intentions of those who held various activities for the *isal-e-sawab* (transfer of merit) for their dead. Qadir (2012, pp.34-38) observed that on the occasion of *qul* or third day of death, „it is pretended as if all the activities [like reciting Quran, supplication, offering food etc.] are being carried out for the *isal-e-sawab* of the dead. However, the reality is contrary to it because all this is done [as a custom] to avoid criticism and rebuke from other people as well as to unveil pharisaic and pretentiousness".

The Deobandis also denounced many other widespread practices observed to display sorrow and grief, For example, Agha (2009, pp. 41-43) declared, „There is no place in Islam for the modern-day anti-*Shariah* and customary observance of grief over death like declaring black day, observing silence, wearing black arm-bands and placing flags on half-mast etc. This is, in fact, a *taqlid* of western civilization by the Muslims. All these practices are impermissible and against the *Shariah*‟.

As for the popular practices regarding shrine visiting, Bhatti (2010, pp.35-41) maintained that showing respect to the graves by „kissing them and bowing before them is absolutely *haram*. Similarly, the objective of construction of grand buildings for the shrines of the saints is also about showing respect to the graves. This type of respect for the saints is *haram* in the *Shariah*‟.

7.1.4 On Sports and Entertainment

For sports activities, Al-Qasim adopted the most aggressive approach among the three selected journals. Its criticism was mostly published in the backdrop of Taliban‟s rise in Afghanistan. At that time, the hardline Deobandis apparently tried to wean off the Pakistani youth from sports to jihad. The editorial of *Al-Qasim* claimed, „Ninety per cent of Pakistanis are busy in sports matches. It is a waste of time and money…It is time for jihad…Make this nation a *mujahid* nation. Don‟t engage them in cricket football and hockey…Make the daughters of the nation aware of the need for jihad. Don‟t teach them the lessons of obscenity and vulgarity by involving them in sports…When they [girls] move their feet and hands in the sports arena to play cricket, football, hockey and volleyball, the exhibition of their body parts creates an uncontrollable sexual desire in young men‟ (Haqqani, 1999a, pp.2-4).

At around the same time, Pakistani youth was also criticized for their involvement in other entertainment activities. Khan (1999, pp.38-41) observed, „If you want to find our young man, find him in parks and sports grounds, in cinema halls and theatre, in VCR centres and video game clubs. Find him in markets and restaurants…He is totally unaware of basic tenets of Islam. He can never disengage himself from these futile activities to offer five obligatory daily prayers‟.

As regards music, all the three journals frequently castigated it as un-Islamic. It may be pointed out here that different types of music are very popular among the Pakistanis. The youth mostly listens to the Bollywood and pop songs. Folk music comprising of classic poetry in local languages is part of the rural culture. Further, folk Islam allows *sufi* music in the form of *qawwali*, which is frequently performed on the shrines of several great saints. However, Deobandi Islam strictly declares music of every type to be *haram* and even *kufr*. One article in *Bayyinat* pronounced, „These days, songs are broadcast from radio, TV etc. It is impermissible and *haram* to listen to such music. Because of that [music], every person has some kind of hypocrisy; faith is no more there in the hearts of the people; and modesty and demureness have gone missing. There is no worth for others" respect and regard. Fear of God has vanished…Listening to music is *haram* and sinful, sitting for it is *fisq* [open disobedience of God] and enjoying it is a kind of *kufr*" (Mukhtar, 1995, pp.11-15).

Another article in *As-Sayyanah* adopted even stricter approach by declaring that „if the listeners [of music] enjoy the songs, they reach to the level of *kufr*. If a listener is married, his *nikah* [marriage registration] becomes invalid and it becomes obligatory for him to renew his *nikah*…If you want to free yourself from the satanic trap of the non-believers, then cleanse yourself from the curse of songs [music]" (Saeed, 2002, pp.26-30). It may be relevant to add here that Deobandi Abdul Haq (2009, vol.i, p.194) issued a *fatwa* declaring that if a Muslim considers music and dance to be legitimate and *halal* then he will be excommunicated from Islam.

Furthermore, all three journals frequently published articles against pictures, TV and internet, which are part and parcel of the Pakistani society. Pictures and photography were opposed mainly on the ground that these resembled idol-making practice of pre-Islamic era. According to Aslam (2008, pp.41-44), „There is only a difference of time [era] between photography and sculpture. At one time, it was idol-making. Today, it is the era of photography. There is only one single declaration about these two practices: both are *haram*". Similarly, Darkhawasti (2012, pp.59-61), declared that „a picture whether hand-painted or made with camera or some other equipment, is like an idol. Drawing a portrait of others or getting one"s own portrait drawn, photographing others or getting oneself photographed, keeping a picture at home or in the pocket, all are declared *haram* by consensus in our pure *Shariah*".

The pictures were also castigated for being part of the western culture. Hussaini (1993, pp.47-49) observed, „Western culture is totally a culture of pictures. Our interest in photography and its worth and respect among us is because we have been cowed by the western civilization. Painting, etching and sculptor in Hindu, Buddhist and all other old *jahiliyya* [ignorant of divine guidance] civilizations have been closely associated with *shirk* and idol-worship on the one hand and sin and obscenity on the other".

Use of photographs even for the propagation of Islam was considered forbidden by Ahmed (2008, pp.37-43) who stated that „we are bound to propagate and disseminate Islam via those methods and sources through which Islam reached us. One popular method and source is *tabligh* [proselytizing] and teaching. Another method is writing and publishing. Many instruments and resources have been used for both these methods. However, there is not a single instance to show that a picture has been seen or shown with regard to the defence and survival of Islam…Television and other visual [picture-based] instruments are themselves a collection of wrongs. Using a wrong to eradicate another wrong is not permissible at all".

Television was declared a curse and evil for the society. One article proclaimed that „watching TV and VCR etc. is an evil sighting. [Our] elders have declared that keeping a TV in the house is worse than raising seventy pigs [forbidden animals for Muslims]" (Rehman, 2001, pp.49-52). Another article concluded that „every television play ends up focusing on love affair with the [underlying] message for young boys and girls that they should not waste their time in suffocation [of social and religious restrictions] and go ahead with full expression of their pent up emotions" (Muawiyah, 2000, pp.29-30).

President of Deobandi *Wifaqul Madaris Al-Arabiyya* (WMA), Salimullah Khan (2008, pp.17-25) wrote, „I want to invite your attention to the *fitnah* [evil trial] of modernism [i.e. TV] because of which we are turning away from the path of our forefathers. For example…Mufti Rasheed Ahmed [Deobandi scholar] launched a movement against television. As a result of that, numerous people broke their TV sets…but now his followers are turning away from the path of their antecessors and a [sinful] demand is being made that TV channels may be launched to condemn the *kufr*". Similarly, Naseem (2009, pp.60-63) declared that watching „TV, dish etc. even for a good and religious purpose is not permissible in the *Shariah*".

Rauf (2011, pp.44-53) believed that „TV is a collection of many malefactions and sins. That is why it is not permissible to watch television even for a religious or educational programme". A Deobandi *fatwa* in this regard declared that „propagation of Islam through wrongful and forbidden means [TV, video etc.] is impermissible…Further, a Quranic lesson, religious speech or some other religious scene recorded in a video cassette shall after all be shown on the same television [channel] where prostitutes and dancers are prancing and corrupted impersonators are disseminating obscenity [at the same time]" (Haq, 1996, pp.57-63).

The Deobandis believed that the state was responsible for spreading these „evils" in the society. Ludhianvi (1994, pp. 3-19) lamented that „the religion and ethics of the nation are being spoiled under the guardianship of the government. Earlier, movie songs of the radio and other sources of obscenity were operating under the government protection. Then, the curse of the television was imposed on the country and each and every home was converted into a cinema house. Later, VCR was promoted. Now, a fourth step has been taken and the floodgate to the obscenity of the whole media has been opened through dish antenna".

Internet was also criticized but with far less frequency and intensity as compared to television. The reason might be the fact that many Deobandi madaris and their umbrella organization WMA run their own websites. The major criticism of internet was about its potential to spread obscenity among the youth. Qasmi (2007, pp.31-35) observed that „a flood of vulgarity and obscenity has arisen [through internet] and the youth is especially at risk".

7.1.5 On Other Customs and Practices

Deobandi journals disapproved many prevalent practices in Pakistan by linking them with the western culture. For example, the use of Gregorian calendar was rejected in an article published in Al-Qasim, which declared that „the names of the days of the week in the western calendar, which are commonly used in Pakistan, represent *shirk* and *kufr* [owing to their Greek and Roman origins and] has no justification in Islam (Bukhari, 1999, pp.23-25). Similarly, Soomro (2005, pp.46-47) castigated the new year celebrations by stating that „the new year of the Muslims does not start on first January but on the first day of Muharram [first Islamic month]…Alas, Muslims also follow the

footprints of the Christians [in celebrating New Year on first January] and invite the wrath of God due to this *taqlid* of the west".

The Deobandis have also criticized the prevailing practices regarding men"s clothing. In Pakistan, men in rural areas and small towns mostly wear *shalwar kamiz* while in big cities western dresses like pant, shirt, coat, neck-tie as well as jeans are also popular. The DMM has opposed the western dresses by linking them with Christianity. For example, Bukhari (2002, pp.21-22) declared that „wearing a neck-tie is *haram*…Christians wear tie as a symbol of cross around their neck. They [thus] approve of Christianity and oppose Islam". Even in *shalwar kamiz*, the Deobandis opposed having collars and cuffs in the *kamiz* (long shirt) on the context that these originated in the west. Renowned Deobandi scholar, Taqi Usmani (2002, pp.37-40) wrote in *As-Sayyanah*, „Our [Deobandi] elders used to wear *kurta* [long shirt] without cuffs. It is appropriate for a man to dress like his elders. And thank God it is my routine to wear such *kurta* [without cuffs]. However, wearing a shirt with cuffs is not against *Sunnah* because the Prophet did wear a shirt with tight sleeves". It is interesting that the Deobandis have preferred their own norms and customs despite having a different precedent in the *Sunnah*.

Further, the Deobandis have opposed the huge majority of Pakistani Muslims for not using a cap or turban to cover their heads. Mufti Abdul Qawi (2011, pp.27-32) wrote in *Al-Qasim*, „Nowadays, wearing a cap [by men] is considered by the modern educated class as bizarre as bare-headedness was considered some years ago. This is the result of the efforts of modern civilization i.e. the sole Jewish civilization of the world called globalization. Therefore, it is proved that this modern day fashion [of not covering one"s head]…is un-Islamic and despicable".

While criticizing the lifestyle of modern-day Pakistanis, one article in *Bayyinat* concluded that „western culture means *taqlid* of western nations and their lifestyle [including] fashion, dress, [habits like] eating, drinking, moving around, meetings, greetings and addressing…*Ulama* should highlight Islamic culture and lifestyle and adopt the golden rules of their ancestors" (Muhammad, 2009, pp.41-49). An article by Yousaf Binouri tried to explain the Islamic culture by stating that „Islamic diction is stranger to the word *saqafat* [culture], which is not at all mentioned in the Quran, Hadith and other repertoire of Islamic knowledge…In English, the word culture was

employed to refer to civilization and lifestyle. Our literati translated it as *saqafat* and since then this ambiguous word has been used without any clear interpretation and meaning. Everyone has tried to define its meaning according to his own taste. These days, it [the word culture] is generally used to refer to the scenarios associated with dance, vulgarity and obscenity… If this [Pakistan] is an Islamic country and its citizens are Muslims, then there can be only one culture for all of them i.e. teachings of the Quran and the pious path of the Prophet‟ (2012, pp. 3-12).

It may be recalled here that mainstream society of Pakistan is quite tolerant and flexible about the west. According to a survey report by University of Michigan‟s Centre for Social Research (2013), only 30% Pakistanis were worried about the western cultural invasion. On the contrary, 26% agreed with the desirability of having a western political model for Pakistan and 89% believed that their country would be better placed if it had western technology. Similarly, the report declared that Pakistanis showed highest level of religious tolerance among the seven Muslim majority nations included in the survey. Other countries were Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Turkey. According to that survey, 99% Pakistanis disapproved of any attacks on U.S. citizens working in Islamic countries and 97% disagreed with the idea of prohibiting the non-Muslims from practicing their religion. An overwhelming majority of Pakistanis (90%) actually believed that non-Muslims should enjoy equal rights with Muslims.

Apart from the above-mentioned popular customs and practices, the Deobandi journals also very strongly condemned the Shia practices of mourning the death of Imam Hussain. Such practices are otherwise well-respected by the followers of folk Islam who themselves observe the 10th of Muharram as a day of mourning. However, the writings in the selected journals declared the practices of Shia Muslims in the month of Muharram as *bida'* and *shirk* as shown by the following excerpts.

i. „There is no recognition in the *Shariah* of doing *matam* [Shia practice of hitting oneself to feel the pain of the martyrs of Karbala] even in Shia *madhab*. These are neither *fardh* [obligatory] nor *wajib* [necessary], neither *Sunnah* nor *mustahab* [recommended]…Even if it is worship for them [Shias], can‟t this worship be carried out individually? Is there a condition to do it in congregation?..If *matam* and mourning [by Shias] are restricted to the boundary walls of their places of worship, then the country would be saved from many

difficulties. Several problems including traffic [blockades] shall be solved and protection of life and property of the citizens shall be ensured" (Haidri, 2009, pp.46-49).

ii. „Narrating the martyrdom of Imam Hussain is in itself true and right. But: since it has been associated with the first ten days of Muharram; since its objective is also to enhance the grief [which is impermissible in the *Shariah*]; and since it is the practice of *Ahle-Bida'* [those who follow wrongful innovation] to hold a meeting exclusively for Imam Hussain; therefore, it is obligatory to avoid participation in such meetings because of resemblance to Shias. Otherwise, it would be considered a great sin" (Quddus, 1991, pp.23-27).

iii. „The way *taziyah* [Shia mourning procession carrying replicas of monuments of martyrs of Karbala] is observed (in the subcontinent) is unprecedented. Even in Iran, which is a special home for Shias, it [*taziyah*] is not observed…*Taziyah* is a *bida'*…*Taziyah* is *shirk*" (Karim, 1998, pp.33-42).

iv. „All… *bida'* practices in the month of Muharram are either impermissible, *haram* or big sins…We should seek forgiveness [and protection] from these and should endeavour with our lives to eradicate all such *bida'*, customs and absurd practices" (Halim, 1998, pp.51-57).

The vision of the DMM in this regard was discernible in an article by Haqqani (1998a, pp.32-34) who reported that „Shias in Afghanistan shall not be allowed [by the Taliban] to openly carry out the customs, practices and mourning meetings and processions".

To conclude this section, one may infer that the opposition by the Deobandis of several popular customs and practices of the mainstream Muslim society in Pakistan as mentioned in the selected journals, clearly indicate towards the countercultural nature of Deobandi Islam. Further, it is not only the frequency of the coverage of such topics but also the intensity of the views in this connection, which emphasized the countercultural character of the DMM. For the Deobandis, „It is obligatory for each Muslim, man and woman, to get ready for the eradication of the queer customs and practices and make an effort from both heart and body to ensure that not a single custom survives…The one who opposes customs and practices is a saint and a favourite slave of God" (Thanvi, 2001a, pp.15-18).

7.2 DMM versus Mainstream Political System

As mentioned in previous chapters, the Deobandis have long been dreaming to establish an Islamic state, which can be governed under their own version of Islam. However, with the passage of time that political vision of the DMM was dominated by its countercultural vision that was more concerned with opposing the beliefs and practices of the Muslims of the subcontinent than establishing a separate Islamic state. By the time of partition, the DMM was already grappled by its countercultural vision and the Deobandi *Jamaiat Ulama-e-Hind* opposed the creation of Pakistan despite the fact that there was an inherent possibility for the Deobandis to revive their old political vision by supporting the idea of Pakistan.

After the creation of Pakistan, the small group of the Deobandis who had belatedly supported the Partition, tried to resurrect their political vision by looking for a place for themselves in the politics of the new country. However, they were soon pushed aside by the mainstream political parties, which promoted the idea of a democratic Pakistan. Presently, there is an overwhelming support for democracy in Pakistan. According to the afore-mentioned survey of University of Michigan (2013), Pakistanis prefer a stable, non-military, non-religious government while simultaneously showing support for *Shariah*. Despite being socially conservative with a strong attachment to religious norms, their political preference was decidedly democratic. The said survey reported that 88% Pakistanis believed that democracy is an ideal form of government and 90% supported a democratic political system for their country. On the other hand, only 33% thought that it was good to have an Islamic government and only 18% agreed with the idea of a strong head of government who did not bother with parliament and elections.

The review of the selected journals shows that the Deobandis in Pakistan have shown little respect for the mainstream political system and leadership. In fact, they generally show a kind of disdain and derision towards democracy as well as the political leaders of Pakistan. It was quite remarkable to note that the father of the nation, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who is always mentioned by Pakistanis through his title of Quaid-e-Azam (the greatest leader), was simply referred to as Mr. Jinnah or Jinnah Saheb by the Deobandi writers.

The following discussion about the views expressed in the three Deobandi journals gives a glimpse of the countercultural vision of the DMM with respect to the mainstream political system of Pakistan.

7.2.1 On Democracy

Despite the fact that Deobandi JUI has long been participating in the electoral politics of Pakistan, the DMM scholars writing in the selected journals rarely supported the concept of democracy. On the other hand, most of them considered democracy as contradictory to Islam. Ashraf Ali Thanvi was quoted in *As-Sayyanah* to state that „there is no such thing as democratic government. Islam only teaches about an individual‟s government. [It is true] that the faults in governance for which democracy was introduced are of course likely to occur in an individual‟s government as well. But these [faults] could certainly occur in a democracy... [as well, because] if the opinion of an individual can be wrong then the opinion of a group of people can also be wrong…Therefore the principle of making a decision by the majority voting is totally wrong‟ (Zafar, 2003, pp.pp.50-52).

Similarly, Qasmi (2002, pp.14-17) observed in *Al-Qasim* that „in actuality, democracy means severing the values, lifestyles, circumstances, civilization and culture of the people from their faith and religion and thus making them secular instead of regular [with *Shariah*] in the name of societal discipline and people‟s government. The purpose of this democracy is to set up a common system behind which the wily of the world could establish their dictatorship all over the planet. A system with such ideology and goal shall definitely come into a clash and conflict with the system of God, ultimately leading to a battle‟. Further, the president of *Wifaqul Madaris* was also quoted to declare that „democracy is against the *Shariah*‟ (Zahid, 2007, pp.4-9).

This lack of faith in democracy was aptly reflected in another article published in *Al-Qasim*, which chose to condemn the democratic system in a very harsh manner. It stated, „He who fits the die-casting of democracy, shall turn out to be the one who is two-faced in personality and character, duplicitous in views and vision, double-dealer in social and societal attitudes, Janus-faced in ethics and actions, deceitful in intentions and promises and a confirmed hypocrite in his words and promises…On the chessboard of our country, our political leaders have changed their colours like chameleons owing to their cunning, duplicity and guile. Whenever they came into power, they promoted dictatorship and fascism in the name of democracy…The system of democracy is ideal for their stratagem‟ (Athar, 2000, pp.7-10).

One essay by renowned Deobandi scholar, Mufti Shafi in *As-Sayyanah* denounced the concept of electoral politics by declaring that „the game, which is played in elections in the name of democracy whereby this short-lived ambiguous honour [election success] is achieved through the use of all the evil resources of aggression and physical force… The better way for this [election] is that no one should declare himself a candidate. Rather a group of Muslims should nominate a person who is considered to be commensurate with the job" (Shafi, 2007, pp.5-10). One editorial of *Al-Qasim* also condemned the electoral process in the following words, „We neither feel happy about the holding of elections nor do we feel the need to mourn their delay because we already know the final [ruinous] fruit of this garden [elections and democracy]…We shall request our readers and political leaders that before entering this election [in 2008], they should think of coming out of it [i.e. boycotting it]" (Haqqani, 2008a, pp.3-5).

As they declared democracy un-Islamic, the Deobandi scholars believed that an Islamic system could only be implemented after getting rid of democracy. Muawiya (2008, pp.42-45) observed in Bayyinat, „Since 14 August 1947 [Independence Day of Pakistan], democracy is the reason for the lack of implementation of an Islamic system in the state, which was achieved in the name of Islam. Until we get rid of democracy, the rich would continue getting richer and the poor, the poorer… As Mufti Shafi said that it is an out-and-out requirement of the natural system of the universe that the responsibility of the system of government should lie with a single authoritative person who can actually be called *ameer* [commander]. And the *hall-o-aqd* [loosening and fastening] of government affairs should belong to him and his obedience should be binding on all the people… [In democracy,] there is no authority of the *ameer* and other opinion leaders and experienced persons vis-à-vis the majority"s opinion. That is one fault [of democracy], which in itself holds hundreds of other faults".

It may be added here that while the Deobandis have given the power of *hall-o-aqd* to the *ameer*, the term *ahl al-hall wal-aqd* is generally used to refer to those qualified to elect or depose a caliph on behalf of the Muslim community. In modern Islamic political thought, this term is commonly equated with parliament.

7.2.2 On Political Leadership

Al-Qasim criticized the mainstream political leadership far more aggressively than the other two journals, which preferred to condemn the policies rather than the personalities of the rulers. Hoping for a Taliban-style government in Pakistan, editor of *Al-Qasim* wrote, „Why we have supposed that our land has become infertile and that no righteous and just leader can be born here? Why have we concluded that only someone returning from Harvard and Cambridge can change our fate?..There are numerous pearls under the depth of *ummah*‟s ocean [i.e. *ulama*]. They just need a little time before being pushed to the shore‟ (Haqqani, 2009b, pp.3-8).

Editor of *Al-Qasim* tried to discredit the whole lot of politicians by stating that „Pervez Musharraf, Zardari, Leghari, Nawaz Sharif, Chaudhry Shujaat, Jamali, Pervez Elahi, Sheikh Rasheed, Sher Afgan, Asfandyar, Shaukat Aziz [whole top political leadership except religious leaders] fall into same category as far as the ideological foundation of the country is concerned. Expecting loyalty and hope from such people is the contempt of hope itself. We don‟t know the criteria on which the people elect such leaders who own bungalows at every health resort; and for whom New York is at just a distance of two arms‟ (Haqqani, 2008b, pp.3-6).

The Deobandi vision for change was also very different from that of the mainstream society, which looks for changes to strengthen the democratic system. One article observed, „You say that system should be changed. We also say that system should be changed. Then what is the hurdle? In your view, there are technical and legal hurdles but for us there are individual and personal hurdles [i.e. politician are bad persons]‟ (Haqqani, 2009a, pp.3-6). Another article concluded, „don‟t just change the *nizam* [system]; change the *imam* [leader] as well. A system is just a reflection of the leader‟ (Haqqani, 2008c, pp.3-6).

7.2.3 On Taliban

All the three journals presented the Afghan Taliban in a very positive light mainly because the latter followed the Deobandi Islam. Further, the madaris publishing the *Al-Qasim* and *Bayyinat* had maintained close ties with Taliban through teaching the Afghan students and providing recruits for Afghan „jihad‟. Owing to this connection, the said journals gave far more coverage to the Taliban as compared to *As-Sayyanah*, whose madrassah maintained no links with the Taliban. Despite that, the articles in the latter journal were still very supportive to their fellow Deobandis in Afghanistan. For

example one article in As-Sayyanah showed optimism about Taliban‟s success in imposing *Shariah* in Afghanistan. It explained that the „Taliban have always kept their objectives focused on two things; one, establishing peace and two, imposition of the *Shariah*. As far as peace is concerned, there are no two opinions that the Taliban succeeded in establishing an exemplary peace…As for the imposition of the *Shariah*, the Taliban are distinct from different other groups that ruled Kabul in the sense that the former entered Kabul owing to their own power rather than through some power-sharing mechanism. That is why, they are free to make their own decisions and thank God, they possess the true spirit and fervour to do that‟ (Abbasi, 2001, pp.42-55).

Articles in the other two journals, particularly *Al-Qasim*, were quite upbeat about the Taliban and hoped for the replication of their system in Pakistan. These journals gave credit to Deobandi madaris for training the Taliban. One article claimed, „Madaris are the garrisons of the Taliban. These are the training centres of the Taliban. These are the factories of the Taliban where the latter are manufactured. From there, they leave, holding the flag of the *Shariah*, to fight a great battle against the enemy…If [the Pakistani leadership] wanted to solve the Kargil dispute [with India], they should not have gone to [President] Clinton. If they had [simply] placed the dirt of Mullah Omar‟s feet in their eyes as kohl, then by God the problem would have been solved‟ (Athar, 1999, pp.7-9).

Another article stated that „Islamic revolution in Afghanistan is the discernible outcome of madaris…The movement for the protection of Islamic prophetic knowledge, which was launched by Darul Ulum Deoband a century ago has now come to the fore in Afghanistan in the form of domination of Islam, implementation of the *Shariah* and establishment of peace. Before the Taliban, Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif were the centres of vulgarity, nudity and obscenity. But these [same] cities looked like a gathering of proselytizers as soon as these were conquered [by the Taliban]‟ (Haqqani, 1998c, pp. 11-12).

As the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, the role of madaris was re-interpreted. In the wake of deteriorating law and order situation in Karachi, the editorial of *Al-Qasim* suggested that „the Taliban (students) of Karachi‟s madaris can establish peace in the city…May God enable us to follow the Taliban of Afghanistan‟ (Haqqani, 1998b, pp.2-4). Similarly, TTP was expected to play a bigger role in implementing Afghan Taliban‟s system in Pakistan. One article claimed as early as 1998, „Now, *Tehreek-e-*

Taliban [Pakistan] shall not be restricted to Waziristan [tribal area] alone. It shall be introduced throughout the country. We have before us the ideal of Afghanistan‟s Taliban…Immediate steps have been taken against VCR, vulgar movies, video cassettes, video games as well as against obscenity [in Waziristan]‟ (Haq, 1998, pp.6-8).

7.2.4 On Foreign Policy

Almost all the articles of the selected journals in this regard focused on condemnation of the United States. Afghanistan was treated as a domestic issue and the U.S. invasion in that country was opposed as if it was an intervention in Pakistan. On the other hand, there was hardly any criticism of the traditional rival of Pakistan, India, despite the fact that the two countries have fought four wars since independence in 1947. This soft approach of Pakistani Deobandis towards India can be understood in the context of DMM‟s origin as well as presence in that country. It is perhaps because of this soft approach that Pakistan‟s military establishment preferred Ahle Hadith LeT over the Deobandis in its proxy war against India. The Deobandi militants, on the other hand, were mostly diverted towards Afghanistan

As for the anti-U.S. stance of the Deobandi journals, this approach was adopted well before the rise of the Afghan Taliban. In 1995, an article in *Bayyinat* expressed, „In fact, the standard of good and bad in Pakistan at the official level is that what is considered right by America is good and what is declared bad by America is bad and that‟s all! America and its protégé lobby is afraid of that „atomic bomb‟ [*mujahideen*] manufactured in madaris that has written a golden chapter in history by fighting with their lives as a frontline force in Afghan jihad. Now, the danger for the U.S. is that the same „atomic bomb‟ may not pulverize America just like [it did] the Soviet Union‟ (Khalid, 1995, pp.51-55).

Deobandi criticism against the U.S. became extremely aggressive after the fall of the Taliban government in 2001. A *fatwa* in this regard was signed by 88 *ulama* and was published in *As-Sayyanah* (November, 2001, pp.61-62), which proclaimed that „it is obligatory for each Muslim that he should provide as much support as possible to this jihad against the U.S in Afghanistan‟. Since then, Pakistan‟s support to NATO forces in Afghanistan has consistently been castigated by the Deobandi journals. Ajiz, (2010, pp.19-22) wrote in *Al-Qasim* that Pakistan „must immediately come out of America‟s war [in Afghanistan] and must stop the logistic support for the U.S. Furthermore, talks

should be held with the people of Waziristan in order to put out the fire started by America".

The anti-U.S. approach of the DMM is so strong that the Deobandis might be ready to review their soft approach towards India if the U.S. would play some role in improving the Pak-India relations. For example, the editorial of *As-Sayyanah* after the Kargil War between Pakistan and India in 1999 opined, "Although Pakistan might have suffered a lot because of its traditional clash with India, there have been some benefits as well. Acquiring of nuclear capability is, in fact, the outcome of that tussle [with India]...Now, instead of solving the real problems of the two countries, the U.S. is tightening its noose around us by giving an impression of friendship or at least normalization of relations [between India and Pakistan] by referring to the evanescence of the justification for our defence programmes. That is why America has shown an utmost anxiety and haste for a truce [after Kargil] between the two countries" (Zahid, 1999, pp.3-6).

In short, the foreign policy vision of the DMM can be summarized in the words of an excerpt from the editorial of *Al-Qasim*, which stated that "while guiding His Muslim slaves about foreign policies, God has forbidden them in the Quran from holding friendship and relations with non-Muslims. [But] in this regard, we are still taking steps and making decisions in the light of the information and directions given by the U.S." (Haqqani, 2002, pp.3-4). However, it may be pointed out here that the DMM seemed so obsessed with its anti-U.S. approach that there was hardly any article in the Deobandi journals to emphasize Pakistan's friendly relations with Muslim countries.

7.2.5 On Pakistan's Origin

It is an historical fact that the DMM and its political party JUH had opposed the idea of Pakistan. Only a small faction of Deobandi *ulama* under the leadership of Shabbir Ahmad Usmani had supported the creation of a new country for Indian Muslims. Usmani was a disciple of Ashraf Ali Thanvi, who kept himself aloof from politics. It may be noted that Usmani openly supported the Pakistan movement at its peak in 1945 while Thanvi died in 1943 well before that movement had gained momentum. However, one of the Deobandi journals, As-Sayyanah, which follows the teachings of

Thanvi, tried to create an impression as if Thanvi was the ideologue of Pakistan movement. In an attempt to confound the history, one article claimed that „before getting a nod of approval from Thanvi, [All India] Muslim League was just a body without soul. It had no voice among the masses…The credit for the success of Muslim League as well as establishment of Pakistan goes to these people [*ulama*]‟. The article further twisted the history for the image-building of the DMM when it stated, „Although it is a common understanding that the idea of Pakistan was first presented by Allama Muhammad Iqbal in 1930…However, if one looks closely [at history], this idea was first of all revealed by God on the blessed heart of the 14th century *mujaddid* [reviver] of this *ummah*, Ashraf Ali Thanvi…He once said in 1928, "my heart yearns that there should be a piece of land with a pure Islamic government where all laws and rules etc. should be issued in line with the orders of the *Shariah*"…In the present turbulent times, it is not expected from the people who control media that they would unveil the real reasons and motivations behind the establishment of Pakistan‟ (Thanvi, 2001, pp.11-25).

As-Sayyanah regularly published such misleading articles every year on Pakistan Day (23 March) and Independence Day (14 August) to obscure the historical truth regarding the overall Deobandi opposition to the creation of Pakistan. It is interesting to note that one prominent Deobandi scholar of Thanvi family, Tanvirul Haq Thanvi (2013) wrote an essay in Urdu daily *Jang* whereby he clearly stated that Ashraf Thanvi did not have even a distant connection with Pakistan movement.

As regards the other two journals, they at least did not try to take credit for the creation of Pakistan. However, some articles in those journals tried to distort the history by defining the objectives of Pakistan from the Deobandi perspective. For example, an article by the founder of *Jamia Binouria* in *Bayyinat* declared that the „actual objectives of Pakistan‟s foundation were the: implementations of Islamic law in this country; establishment of a pious society; elimination of evil acts and obscenity; protection from the flood of vulgarity and nudity coming from God-less countries; eradication of aggression and enmity, ensuring for each person a life of satisfaction and contentment under the Islamic system of justice and equity; and taking care of the destitute‟ (Binouri, 1997, pp.3-5). Similarly, an editorial of *Al-Qasim* observed that „Pakistan is an ideological state. There is *kalama-e-tawhid* [Islamic declaration of monotheism] in its foundation and its status is like a mosque‟ (Haqqani, 1999b. pp. 53-56).

7.2.6 On Vision for Pakistan

All the three journals expressed that an Islamic system should be implemented in Pakistan. However, there was hardly any article published in this regard to give the contours and details of that system. After the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, there were some suggestions for an Islamic revolution through jihad to impose Taliban-style rule. For example, one article in *Al-Qasim* proposed that „Jihad is the spirit of the Islamic domination as well as the need of the hour. *Jamia Abu Hurairah* [Nowshehra] shall also become a military garrison just like Darul Ulum Deoband" (Farooq, 1998, pp.44-45). Another article declared that „Armed jihad has become inevitable for Islamic revolution [in Pakistan]" (Rehman, 1999, pp.36-37).

After the fall of Taliban rule, Caliphate system was recommended for Pakistan. Iqbal (2007, pp.59-60) observed in *Bayyinat* that „the only reason behind all our [social and political] ills, is the lack of Caliphate system…We are already aware of the [bitter] fruits of the democratic efforts. That road leads to somewhere else…In a Caliphate, all efforts are made under [the guidance] of a *khalifa* and there is a singular common direction of the endeavours of the whole *ummah*. [Unlike the present scenario] it is not that some people are sacrificing their lives through suicide attacks while a huge majority is living a comfortable, carefree and luxurious life that is far removed from religious thought and objectives".

It was noted that almost all the suggestions for an Islamic system were put forward in the context of condemnation of the existing political system. One article in As-Sayyanah concluded that „In [our] dear country Pakistan, Islam has never been implemented. Rather, every new ruler has been propagating adoption of an irreligious and secular lifestyle…Today circumstances have proven that the doubts expressed by that *qalandar* [ascetic saint i.e. Hussain Madni of DMM] at the time of Pakistan's creation were correct. [Madani vehemently opposed creation of Pakistan and condemned it to be an *istadraj*- a term used for a situation when God gives fortunes to some disobedient people despite being displeased with them]" (Ali, 2005, pp.26-33).

An editorial in As-Sayyanah declared that „The war has not ended after the establishment of Pakistan. Rather, there has been a change of battleground. Earlier our war was with the Hindus and the British, who did not want a state to be established in

the name of Islam. After winning that battle, the second stage of the war started whereby we have to fight with those people who do not want implementation of Islam in this country" (Zahid, 1994, pp.40-53). It may be added here that this is again a distortion of history because in actuality Deobandis and their party JUH had joined the Hindus to oppose the creation of Pakistan.

Although the selected journals did not put forward any explicit idea about their vision for Pakistan as an Islamic state, one could still infer that such a state would be far removed from a modern democratic country. According to an article in *Bayyinat*, JUI leader Mufti Mahmood (1919-1980) had once declared that „*Jamiat Ulma-e-Islam* believes that inclusion of non-Muslims in the structure and composition of Islamic legislation is interference in religion and a joke with Islam. Such composition of legislature, which includes non-Muslims as members, cannot be called an Islamic legislature at all and a constitution that allows it cannot, in any case, be called an Islamic constitution" (Karim, 1993, pp.17-31).

In view of the consistent support and praise for the Taliban rule in Afghanistan, it appears that DMM"s vision for Pakistan is not much different from that rule. Further, DMM also hopes to lead such Taliban-style system in Pakistan through its *ulama*. An editorial of Al-Qasim expressed that hope by stating that „it is our hearty desire that the leadership of this purified country should be held by those who deserve it because of their piety, devoutness and other such qualities [a reference to the *ulama* of madaris]" (Haqqani, 1999b. Pp. 53-56).

7.3 DMM versus Mainstream Educational System

The DMM, since its inception, has been obsessed with the protection of their madaris against the intervention by the state. The Deobandi obsession in this regard has consistently been touching the boundaries of paranoia. However, the DMM did not challenge the mainstream educational system until after 1980s - a period that saw a surge in Deobandi madaris in the wake of Afghan „jihad". As the number of Deobandi madaris and students increased remarkably, so did their self-confidence and pride. This not only allowed them to successfully resist the state intervention in madaris but also criticize the mainstream educational system vis-à-vis their own madaris.

As mentioned earlier, as the scope of the DMM had gradually narrowed down to make it behave like a countercultural movement, the canvas of its conflict with the

mainstream society broadened. Soon, it was not just the popular customs and socio-cultural and spiritual practices of the Muslim society that were castigated by the DMM. In fact, with the passage of time, the Deobandis had also started condemning the mainstream political and educational systems of Pakistan. The following discussion about the views of Deobandi journals spotlight the countercultural mindset of the DMM vis-à-vis about the mainstream education pursued by the Pakistani society. It may be added here that there was a complete consensus among the selected journals in this regard.

7.3.1 On the Status of Madaris

The Deobandis consider their madaris to be superior to the mainstream educational institutions. These madaris were declared as the direct descendents of Prophet‟s tradition. One article in *Bayyinat* stated that „a madrassah is a true successor and a caliph of the Prophet, which is working for the proselytizing and education of your religion. Therefore, anyone who holds even very little true love for the Prophet must have love and interest for these madaris too. Every person who wants to gauge his love for the Prophet can estimate it by measuring his love for madaris… because these madaris are the deputies of the Prophet and according to the sages a deputy and his boss are to be treated in the same manner‟ (Ambethvi, 1995, pp.17-18).

Another source of that pride was their belief that worldly knowledge was inferior to the religious education. An editorial of *Al-Qasim* declared, „Some intellectuals of the nation are directing to accept social sciences as a replacement of traditional sciences [*ulum-e-naqlia*]. They have forgotten that traditional sciences are permanent. Islamic sciences cannot change till *qiyamah* [Day of Resurrection]. The original source of knowledge is the revelation from God and the Beloved of God [i.e. the Prophet]. The Quran and *Sunnah* cannot be validated through the western knowledge of science and arts‟ (Haqqani, 2005, pp.8-11).

The Deobandis also maintained that madaris were the raison d'être for the survival of Islam in Pakistan. Kashmiri (2004, pp.31-35) wrote in *Al-Qasim*, „If the Islamic identity of Pakistan is still intact and if the religious prudency and vitality is still present among the people [of Pakistan], it is just because of the madaris. If the madaris were not there, the powers of *kufr* would have taken this country far away from Islam… Jihad in Afghanistan happened because of madaris and [consequently] the

Soviet Union was destroyed. It is because of the madaris that our ideological frontiers are being protected and defended".

Similarly, Abbasi (2001, pp.42-55) wrote in *As-Sayyanah* „If this system of madaris and mosque was not there, Islam and Islamic values in the subcontinent, just like in Spain, would have become a story of the past. [Likewise] the two-nation theory on whose basis the movement for Pakistan was launched and progressed would have become obsolete [without the madaris]. The foundation of the God-given country of Pakistan was provided by this same educational system of madaris and this state of Pakistan still exists on that theory. An effort to change this system of madaris is like destroying the two-nation theory as well as the foundation of Pakistan". It is an interesting line of argument by a Deobandi scholar in view of the fact that the DMM had actually opposed the two-nation theory and allied with Hindu-dominated Congress party before the partition and propagated United Indian Nationalism as was discussed in chapter 4.

The rise of Afghan Taliban to power provided an extraordinary boost to this sense of superiority among the Deobandi madaris. That confidence was clearly reflected in an article, which stated, „Some time ago, people used to consider the students and *ulama* of madaris as suspended organs of the society. People used to make fun [by saying] that madaris were centres of mere eating and drinking [for free]. Now, when the situation is different, realities have been unearthed [before the people]. The students and teachers of madaris have very recently provided a model of best peaceful system of government in Afghanistan. By establishing a comprehensive Islamic system in Afghanistan, the Taliban have shown a model of governance to those people who had considered that madris students and *ulama* were not worth anything and that their job was restricted to just mosque and madrassah" (Haq, 2004, pp. 38-47).

This peculiar sense of self-pride has not only made the DMM to declare its madaris as forts of Islam but also have faith in the survival of these institutions because of society"s dependence on them for guidance. Maulana Zahid-ur-Rashdi explained this symbiotic relationship between the society and madaris in an interesting manner. He opined in *Al-Qasim* that „madrassah is not a name given to a building or to stools and mats. Madrassah is [actually] about the connection between the *maulvi* [cleric] and the society. We *maulvis* give something to the society and also take something [back from

it]… If there is a doubt [in society] about prayer, [fasting, *zakat*, *hajj*, marriage or *halal* and *haram* etc.], that shall be removed by the cleric. This [aspect of] connection with the society is about „giving". Another connection is about „taking" [e.g.] if a person is facing some adversity in the family, he is told to offer some *sadaqah* [i.e. voluntary charity for the poor to ward off that adversity]. He would go to the market and buy a goat for *sadaqah* [and present that goat to madrassah for the poor students]… We don"t need to worry. It is a settled thing that we have to tell them *mas'ala* [religious solution] and we have to eat the goat as well. Until that connection between us and the society exists… madrassah cannot be closed even if America hangs itself upside down" (Rashdi, 2009, pp.11-13).

7.3.2 On the Practices of Mainstream Educational Institutions

One of the consequences of DMM"s pride in its madaris is that the Deobandis look down upon all other educational institutions where more than 95% of Pakistani children and youth are studying. The review of the Deobandi journals showed that the DMM considered the mainstream education in Pakistan to be un-Islamic as well as anti-Islamic. Various articles not only condemned the text but also the context of the mainstream education. Shakir (2002, pp.22-23) observed that „majority of the experts of the modern education is ignorant of their religion, oblivious to the love and obedience of their Prophet, uninstructed about the issues like cleanliness etc. given in their book, the Quran [and] unaware of the responsibilities and rights vis-à-vis the parents and the progenies".

Similarly, Yousaf Ludhianvi presented a very negative picture of modern educational system including girls" education. He declared, „Two benighted practices have become very much popular in this era; one is girls" education and other is the overall dissemination of [modern] education. If your [modern] education had inculcated ethics in the nation, I would have acknowledged that this education is a good thing… However, [I observe] that the higher the level of education of a person, the worse are [his] ethics… What else do you teach except for maligning the teachers, harassing the women and having love affairs with the girls belonging to noble families? Tell me, what else your colleges and universities teach apart from that" (Ludhianvi, 2009, pp.14-23).

The Deobandis also declared the uniforms of children in some mainstream schools as un-Islamic. Rehman (2003, pp.34-38) stated, „Neck-tie was a religious symbol of the Christians… We have started compulsory use of neck-tie for the junior and senior children in both government and private schools. … And they have [also] been forced to wear pants instead of eastern dress, *shalwar*". The mainstream system was also castigated for employing co-education and holding recreational events in educational institutions. One article in *Bayyinat* protested and demanded that „every kind of music, dance and recreation activities should be banned in all the public and private [educational] institutions [i.e.] schools, colleges and universities. The existing co-education system should be abolished. Every kind of vulgarity, obscenity and non-observance of *purdah* should be eliminated from educational institutions and all the resources and reasons for these [wrongs] should specifically be eradicated" (Binouri, 2012, pp.3-12).

7.3.3 On the Impact of Modern Education

The views presented in this sub-section are also linked to the DMM's sense of superiority about its madaris. However, the Deobandi criticism of the mainstream education discussed here was at the same time appeared to be an indirect defence to justify the existence and continuation of the madaris system in the wake of various madrassah reform efforts by the state. In their aggressive approach against the mainstream education system, the Deobandi journals employed a variety of arguments. One article in *Bayyinat* declared that the mainstream education promoted the western culture. It stated that „the biggest defect in this [mainstream] education is that its followers [ultimately] become strangers to their traditions and civilization, their code of ethics as well as their history. All those things, which are the foundations of the nationality, appear inferior in their eyes. They are submerged in the western civilization and customs. Their greatest skill is to imitate the west. Nowadays, they have turned into a sect, which is extremely threatening for the [overall] system of the nation" (Akhtar, 2009, pp.42-47).

Another article even alleged that the modern education promoted Christianity. According to Muhammad (2009, pp.41-49), „Modern sciences, which are concerned purely with the worldly affairs, were first introduced by Lord Macaulay [in the subcontinent]… Someone trained in these modern sciences does not remain a Muslim of any worth, even if at all he does not become a Christian… The root cause of all the

ills is this modern education. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the *ulama* that they should provide right guidance to the Muslims and make an effort to protect the children of the Muslims from this flood of apostasy [i.e. mainstream education]".

Mainstream educational system was also discredited by exaggerating some institutional weaknesses and governance issues. For example, Khalid (1995, pp.51-55) proclaimed that „there is no such thing as education left now in these government-supported [educational] institutions. From teachers to students, whole machinery of is involved in stark wrongdoings. Honesty and integrity are absent. They are proud to be phony Muslims. Due to their blind following of the west in [practicing] co-education, the new generation is falling into the dreadful ditch of obscenity and vulgarity… Now, the success in examinations depends upon wrongful recommendation, cheating in examination and nepotism".

At the same time, mainstream education was also presented as a threat to the Islam of the Pakistani youth. Ismail (1993, pp.31-36) observed „Modern [educational] institutions like schools, colleges and universities where worldly knowledge and skills… are imparted, have become almost like slaughterhouses for the religion, faith, ethics and character of the youth. Islam has vanished from every aspect of life [of the youth] including their presentation and demeanour, appearance and grooming, dressing and outfit, lifestyle and civilization as well as socializing and ethics etc." By creating a situation of „Islam in danger", the Deobandis presented their madaris as the final solution. Khan (1999, pp.38-41) opined in *Al-Qasim*, „In my view, the biggest reason for the destruction of the youth is the present archaic, useless, poisonous and slavish educational system… The only solution for this is the Islamic educational system [of madaris]".

7.3.4 On Comparison of Madaris and Modern Education

Most of the articles comparing the madrassah and modern education were written in the backdrop of government's efforts to reform the madaris system. The major objective of such articles was to over-emphasize the strengths of madaris while simultaneously undermining the mainstream education. Several of these articles employed the approach of over-generalization and exaggeration to present a pro-madaris scenario. Following excerpts from an editorial in As-Sayyanah is typical of such comparisons.

„Nowadays, these public sector [educational] institutions have become centres of political disputes and places of murder. One section of students is holding Kalashnikovs in their hands in place of books. On the contrary, thank God, the madaris stay clear of such destructive atmosphere. Here, the majority of the students are busy in studies and present a picture of decency. Most of the madaris are far ahead of the government institutions in terms of observing discipline and other best Islamic and eastern traditions [and values] like respect for the elders especially teachers. Madaris fundamentally function in the spirit of „knowledge for service‟ whereas government institutions promote the concept of „knowledge for employment‟… That is why a madrassah graduate generally does not become a victim of extreme disappointment due to economic hardships whereas incidents of even suicide have been occurring among the highly qualified youth of government institutions just because of unemployment‟ (Zahid, 2002, pp.3-10).

As regards the examinations, the Deobandis boasted of the transparency of their system while blaming the mainstream education of corruption and dishonesty. According to Zahid (2002, pp.3-10), „Examinations are held regularly both in the government [educational] institutions as well as in madaris… These examinations under Wifaq [Deobandi board] are held in an extremely organized manner. [Unlike the examinations held in mainstream educational system,] there are no wrongdoings like bribery, cheating and coercion in madaris‟. It may be pointed out here that examination and testing system for Deobandi madaris, is managed by a board of *ulama* who are not only Deobandis but are also running their own madaris. Same is the case with the madaris of other denominations, which run their own boards. All of them have resisted efforts by the government to remove this conflict of interest in order to improve quality of religious education. The government fears that if the board of a particular denomination administers the examination of its own students, it may be more lenient in assessing their performance (Fair, 2009, p.85).

The mainstream practice of commemorating and celebrating special days and events was opposed by the Deobandis. An article in this regard tried to present this Deobandi approach as the strength of madaris. Rehman (2003, pp.34-38) stated in Al-Qasim, „In madaris, no „day‟ [or anniversary] etc. is observed. Rather, students are given extra work on such „days‟ to keep them busy [and to ignore the „day‟]‟.

Further, modern education and mainstream society was identified with evil while madaris were portrayed as saviours of humanity. Ansari (2006, pp.34-43) wrote in *Bayyinat*, „No one can better accomplish the task of turning the humans into animals than school, college, university, television, newspaper, digest, movies, VCR, cable, dish antenna and computers etc… [This shows] that the genie, which converts humans into animals has come out of the bottle…If madaris were closed or even if they ignored their duties, it would not take long before the *qiyamah* arrives. Then, [God] shall Himself push this genie back into the bottle".

Apart from this indirect defence of their madaris, the selected journals regularly published articles by renowned Deobandi *ulama* to condemn efforts by the government to reform or even monitor their madaris. The language used in some of these articles was quite threatening. For example, Yousaf Ludhianvi wrote an editorial in *Bayyinat* in 1998 to warn the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in the following words.

„The government should think of taking any steps against these madaris only if it has decided to meet its own downfall. We hope that the people in power shall behave sensibly and allow the madaris to keep defending the ideological frontiers of the country in order to ensure the survival of the country and the continuation of their government" (Ludhianvi, 1998, pp-3-9).

Similarly, another article in *Bayyinat* challenged the government by stating that „these senseless rulers, who have been deceived by their temporary authority in power, should not clash with that greatest of powers [God] and His great angels [madaris people] because a conflict with these bastions of Islam is akin to a clash with [God]. And fighting a war with … [God]… brings humiliation and loss in this world and the hereafter" (Muhammad, 1998, pp.51-54).

7.4 DMM versus Role of Women in Society

The DMM has deplored the prevalent values and practices regarding the role of women in Pakistani society. In Pakistan, there is a complete consensus about the need for providing modern education to girls whereas the Deobandi journals categorically opposed it. According to the afore-mentioned University of Michigan"s survey, majority of Pakistanis even supported university level education for girls despite the fact that universities follow a co-education system. Similarly, Pakistani women in both

urban and rural areas are increasingly working outside their homes along with the men. On the other hand, the DMM has propagated a complete segregation and seclusion of women from the world outside their homes. Further, the Deobandi writings also discriminated against women on gender basis and condemned the practice of allowing women any leadership role in the society.

Following discussion on some excerpts from the three selected Deobandi journals exhibit the countercultural approach of the DMM vis-à-vis the role of women in mainstream Pakistani society.

7.4.1 On Women's Education

The Deobandi journals very aggressively opposed modern education for women. *As-Sayyanah* published a regular section titled *Islah-e-Khawateen* (Reform of Women), which included the views of Ashraf Ali Thanvi regarding the role of women. In one such article, Thanvi (2003a, pp.11-17) observed that „modern education is not about learning. It is ignorance in itself and is particularly harmful for the women. This education is even worse than ignorance. Ignorance carries fewer evils than those of this [modern] education… The example of girls is like a soft and weak wood, which when moulded and dried in a particular shape, would always stay that way. [Similarly,] when modern education is provided [to girls] and they are taught new ethics, new styles and manners, that new way of life sticks to their minds and they internalize it. Later, when they are grown ups, it is impossible to reform them… This knowledge, which is called modern education, is not at all appropriate for women".

In another essay, Thanvi (2003b, pp.17-21) went on to declare that „it is only ignorance that is appropriate for women. They should not be aware of the world and its evils. Only this [ignorance] is better for women and their safety lies in it… The true perfection of a woman lies in the fact that she should be ignorant of the whole world except for her husband and home… Therefore, teach religion to the women, but don"t teach geography, philosophy [etc.]. As regards newspapers and novels, these are a killer poison for women".

Thanvi was not only against the girls" schools but also opposed madaris for women. He was of the view that girls should be taught at their homes. He opined, „The present-day practice of educating females through girls" schools or women madaris is like a deadly

poison. I do not like madaris for women even when these are managed by religious scholars. I can say in light of my experience that [you should] never ever allow it [female education]. Otherwise, if you did not obey me, you will repent later on. So, abandon the [female] schools and madaris. Teach the women inside their homes. It is better if you teach [them] in Arabic, otherwise teach in Urdu… School education is extremely harmful for women. It creates among them the ideas of freedom, obscenity and hatred with *purdah*" (Thanvi, 2008a, pp.13-15).

According to Thanvi, girls should be selectively allowed to learn writing even when they were taught at their homes. He stated, „As regards [learning] how to write, that is neither obligatory nor *haram*. This should be recommended according to the nature of girls. If a girl is not apparently bold and have modesty and prudency, she may be taught how to write. There is no harm in it as it is required to meet the necessities of life. As for a girl who shows boldness and independence and if there is likelihood of some wrongdoing [on her part], she should not be taught how to write. It is better to avoid a wrongdoing than allow something, which is not obligatory. In such a scenario, she should neither be taught nor allowed to write" (Thanvi, 2008b, pp.13-16).

The Deobandi journals also appeared to defend the Afghan Taliban‟s decision to close girls‟ schools. An editorial in *As-Sayyanah* observed, „The Taliban have been alleged to stop women from acquiring knowledge [education]. First of all, these are just allegations, which have nothing to do with reality. Then, the question arises; which knowledge? That is an extremely important question, which needs comprehensive attention. Alas, the people who adopt and propagate this western concept [of women education] are present even among us. They are looking to acquire such type of freedom, which has brought down the human status of a woman by making her a sex symbol or sex worker. We have forgotten the status of a woman, which was granted to her by the God. That status holds the true bliss not only in the society but also in the hereafter… Do we need that kind of so-called [western] freedom, which would completely destroy the remaining values of society and deprive us of all that distinguishes us from other civilizations? No sensible person can reply to this question in affirmative" (Zahid, 2001, pp.3-6).

Although the DMM still follows the views of Thanvi regarding modern education for women, the movement gradually accepted the concept of madaris for girls. However, unlike their male counterparts, residential madaris for girls are still not permitted. A

fatwa in this regard was published in Bayyinat declaring that, „majority of the *ulama* have agreed that in modern times, there is an intense need of local [i.e. neighbourhood] and non-residential female madaris. The reason for that need is that those important benefits that could be achieved through their [women] education are being wasted just because of their ignorance [about Islam]…A minority of the *ulama* are against it [female madaris]. Their opposition is based on their cautious approach…As regards residential madaris where a *mahram* [an unmarriageable kin of opposite sex] cannot accompany the female students and the madaris where girls approach after some travelling as well as the madaris where arrangements for *purdah* are not possible; all such madaris are illegitimate and impermissible because of being sinful as well as violative of the *Shariah* and religious traditions" (*Fatwa* by Qadir, Dinpuri and Haq, 1998, pp.49-58).

7.4.2 On Purdah

Purdah is a Persian word, which takes two forms: physical segregation of the sexes; and the requirement that a woman should cover her body properly. This section focuses on the latter form, which defines an Islamic dress code for women. There are some differences about the definition of *purdah*. The Deobandis followed a strict definition of *purdah*, which requires women to cover their bodies from head to toe in the presence of those men who are not *mahram*. This definition is derived from a strict interpretation of a woman‟s *satr* or *awrah* (body parts that must be covered in public). According to that definition, whole body of a woman including her face, hands and feet should be considered as *satr*. An article in *As-Sayyanah* declared, „For a woman, *satr* starts from the hair of the head and goes down to her ankles. It is not allowed to expose any body part included in *satr* in front of a person who is not *mahram*. Even she is not allowed to uncover *satr* when she is alone" (Barkat, 2001, pp.25-28). On the other hand, majority of Pakistani Muslims accept the less strict interpretation of *satr* that includes whole body of the woman except her face, hands and feet. The latter viewpoint is supported by a Hadith of Abu Daud wherein the Prophet said that when a woman became adult, not any part of her body should be seen except her face and ankles (Tariq, 1998).

Justifying the inclusion of face in *purdah* and *satr*, one Deobandi *fatwa* in *Bayyinat* declared, „Observing complete *purdah* by a woman in line with the *Shariah* by covering her face before going outside her home is in exact accordance with the teachings of Islam… This [practice] in actuality presents before the world the

responsibility of Islam for the protection of the modesty and chastity [of women]. On the contrary, the practice of exposing the face to invite the male strangers to have a look [at it] contradicts the Islamic teachings and philosophy about modesty. This [practice] is not true Islam. Rather, it is the revival of the *jahiliyyah* [pre-Islamic era]" (Arif, Ali and Dinpuri, 2010, pp.53-64).

Qureshi (2008, pp.45-48) explained that ,the aim and objective of the Islamic commands on *purdah* is that Islam wants its followers to be protected from misguidance, obscenity, vulgarity and sexual anarchy. And those secret sexual desires [of men] that can be ignited by non-observance of *purdah* by women should not be allowed to run amok".

The Deobandis believe that women should not leave their homes except in unavoidable circumstances. An article in *As-Sayyanah* declared, ,It is a command for a woman that if she has to go outside her home due to some extraordinary need, then she has to cover her whole body from head to toe with a big shawl or *burqa*. Some part of that shawl should also cover the face so that men may know that she is a noble and pious woman and hence they may lower their gaze out of chastity" (Barkat, 2001, pp.25-28).

The Deobandis also held a strict view with regard to the age at which girls should start observing *purdah*. According to Thanvi (2007, pp.14-19), a girl has to observe *purdah* ,from non-*mahram* male kin from the age of seven and in case of strangers, even before the age of seven… It is *haram* to expose head, arms and lower legs etc. in the presence of non-*mahram*". On the other hand, Muslims generally believe that *purdah* is to be observed by the girls at puberty. It would be pertinent to add here that the mainstream Muslim society of Pakistan does not support the *purdah* definition of the DMM. According to the 2013 University of Michigan survey, only 3% Pakistanis approved the Deobandi dress code for *purdah* that was imposed by the Taliban in Afghanistan. About two-third Pakistanis supported such dress codes for women that allowed them to show their faces. In fact, 22% thought that it was up to a woman to dress as she chose.

7.4.3 On Equality for Women

The Deobandi journals envisaged a limited role for the women in the society by restricting them to the boundary walls of their homes. According to Rehman (2003, pp.23-33), ,A woman has just a few important jobs to perform i.e. pregnancy,

childbirth, breastfeeding and training of kids. God created woman so that through her, the number of *mujahideen* of Islam, *huffaz* [plural of *hafiz*- one who learns Quran by heart] as well as *ulama* is increased".

The journals declared gender equality to be an evil concept. One article in Al-Qasim stated, „These days, a new *fitnah* (evil trial) has arisen. People are bringing forward women to stand shoulder to shoulder with men" (Rehman, 2003, pp.23-33). An essay by Ashraf Ali Thanvi in As-Sayyanah pronounced that women are both physically and intellectually inferior to men. He asserted, „There is a natural difference between men and women, Women can never gain equality with men [because]: they are inferior intellectually; they have less tolerance; their physique and organs are weak and that is why they get weaker and older far earlier than men… A woman possesses less intelligence and the one who is less intelligent is liable to make mistakes in everything she does. Therefore, it is safe to place her under someone who is more intelligent [i.e. man]" (Thanvi, 2005, pp.15-19).

7.4.4 On Women Leadership

Since women were considered inferior to men, the DMM consequently opposed any leadership role for women in the society. Appointment of women as judges and police officers was strongly criticized by the Deobandi journals. Rehman declared this increasing participation of women in the Pakistani society as a *fitnah*. He observed, „If men are in police, women are also acting as police officers. Men are doing farming and so are women. Men and women both are acting as judges. Islam has given to women a great status but westernized people are not aware of it" (Rehman, 2003, pp.23-33).

There was consensus among the three journals under study that a woman cannot be a ruler of a Muslim country. Many articles and *fatawa* were published in this regard. One such *fatwa* was issued by Abdul Haq (2009, vol.ii, pp.296-97), who declared that Islam does not allow a woman to become a ruler and a female head of state is akin to punishment from God. However, the mainstream Muslim society of Pakistan still elected Benazir Bhutto twice in 1988 and 1993 to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan. In this regard, Yousaf Ludhianvi (1997, pp.3-7) declared in *Bayyinat* that „the rule by a woman is not correct either in the light of religion or of logic. However, when people do evil things, God condemn them by imposing on them a woman ruler [i.e. Benazir Bhutto in 1988]. In fact, God removed that woman ruler once and then imposed her

again on them [in 1993]. And then cast on them such a terrible suffering that was unprecedented in this country".

To conclude this chapter, the above review of the three well-recognized Deobandi journals clearly highlights the countercultural mindset of the DMM. This review also indicates that the DMM has not only contradicted the values and practices of the mainstream society but has also challenged some of the mainstream institutions and systems of the state. Keeping in view the historical perspective discussed in previous chapters, one may infer that the countercultural tradition of the DMM has stiffened during the recent years.

The next chapter compares the values and attitudes of the students of Deobandi madaris with those of the students of mainstream educational institutions.

8   US AGAINST THEM: COMPARISON OF MADRASSAH AND COLLEGE STUDENTS

'Islam cannot be implemented in the country until the difference between the Maulvi [madrassah graduate] and Mister [mainstream graduate] is not removed. The ulama want to implement Islam in the country whereas all other sections of the society and media are trying that it does not happen'.

Writing on the wall of a Deobandi madrassah in the Pakistani town of Burewala

This chapter is the outcome of the second stage of the fieldwork, which involved interviews of the students from the Deobandi madaris and mainstream educational institutions. The objective of this stage of fieldwork was to corroborate the findings of the first stage entailing the review of Deobandi journals. Therefore, the interviews in this stage mainly focused on the same four themes covered in the last chapter i.e. popular customs and practices, politics, education and role of women in Pakistani society. These interviews were semi-structured qualitative interviews, which involved 40 male students- twenty each from one Deobandi madrassah and a public sector post-graduate college in the town of Burewala, located in the southern district of Vehari in Pakistan‟s Punjab province. The students of the Deobandi madrassah who were selected for the interviews were in the final year of their graduation course i.e. *Dars-e-Nizami*. The selected madrassah was a moderate Deobandi institution, which encouraged its students to study mainstream education syllabus alongside the *Dars-e-Nizami*. The respondents from the Government Postgraduate College Burewala were also in the final year of their graduation. The purpose of selecting those Deobandi students who were about to graduate was to get some idea about the future leadership and vision of the DMM. Further, the respondents from both the madrassah and the college were residential students belonging to the small towns and villages surrounding the town of Burewala. These interviews were conducted during 2012. The ages of the respondents ranged between 20 and 24 years. An Interview Guide reflecting these themes is placed at *Appendix II*.

Before moving to findings of the interviews, it would be pertinent here to have a brief overview of Pakistan‟s education system. Education in Pakistan can be divided into two categories; mainstream and religious. Mainstream education is imparted through both public and private institutions, which operate at three levels; school, college and university. Schools mostly provide education up to matriculation or secondary level

(some schools go up to intermediate or higher secondary levels). Colleges generally provide education up to graduation level but some bigger colleges also offer post-graduate courses. At the universities, bachelors, masters as well as PhD courses are on offer. On the other hand, religious education is imparted only through madaris of various religious denominations where *Dars-e-Nizami* course is taught with some variations in the textbooks selected by each denomination. *Aliya* and *Alimiya* level degrees of these madaris are considered equivalent to bachelors and masters of mainstream education respectively. It may also be added here that mainstream education in Pakistan cannot be considered secular because Islamic Studies is taught as a compulsory course up to bachelor level.

As far as enrolment is concerned, there are about two million students in madaris (Candland, 2008, p.103), which make up around 4% of total enrolment at school levels. According to a 2003 report by Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC), a Karachi-based research institute, about 73% students are enrolled at public schools, which are also known as government or „Urdu medium" schools. Others are enrolled at private schools, which are referred to as „English medium" schools, even though not all of them truly use English as the medium of instruction. Although private schools are generally considered elitist, costly as well as urban-based, many of them are non-elitist and affordable while more than one third of them are situated in rural areas (Fair, 2009, pp.15-30). Elitist private schools are the ones based in the few big cities of Pakistan.

As for the enrolment trends by socio-economic status, SPDC (2003) suggested that the children belonging to the poorest families (with an annual income of less than 50,000 rupees) mostly attended madaris (43%) and public schools (40 %). Only about 18% of them went to non-elitist private schools. For the lower middle classes (income Rs. 50-100,000), the share was almost equally divided between madaris (30%), public schools (38%) and non-elitist private schools (30%). For upper middle classes (income Rs. 100-250,000), only 15% and 18% respectively attended madaris and public schools while 36% attended non-elitist private schools and 32% joined elitist private schools. As regards upper classes (income more than Rs. 250,000), elitist private schools were the first choice (66%), far above than their second and third choices i.e. madaris (12%) and non-elitist private schools (10%). Public schools were given the least priority by this class with only 3% enrolment.

A brief comparative analysis of the values and attitudes of madrassah and mainstream students showing the countercultural character of the DMM is given below.

8.1 Popular Customs, Values and Practices

There was a cognizable difference between the students of Deobandi madrassah and the college with respect to the popular customs and practices of Pakistani society. As expected, all the madrassah students opposed the popular customs and beliefs as well as socio-cultural and religious practices mentioned in the previous two chapters. On the other hand, all the college students more or less supported those customs and practices. Only one college student, whose family belonged to Ahle Hadith sect, disagreed about the practice of *chehlum* (prayers for the dead on 40th day of death). Otherwise, he acknowledged that all other popular customs and practices related to marriage and death (including *qul* prayers for the dead) and even shrine visits, were being followed by his family.

As regards the spiritual practices of the folk Islam, one remarkable finding was that while all the madrassah students except one, had taken *bay'ah* to the *ulama* belonging to Qadri, Naqshbandi and Chishti orders, none of them believed in the common spiritual practices of folk Islam in Pakistan. On the contrary, only two of the college students had taken *bay'ah* in some *sufi* order but all of them agreed with the popular spiritual practices of folk Islam discussed in Chapter 6.

As for identifying the differences between various religious sects in Pakistan, Deobandi madrassah students were quite clear in this regard and criticized all sects except for their own. One student proclaimed,

„The true and complete religion that has been followed since Prophet‟s time is represented by Deobandi Islam‟

Madrassah respondents believed that Deobandi sect was a moderate, middle-of-the-road sect as compared to Barelwi and Ahle Hadith sects, which were considered too permissive and too bigoted respectively. According to one student,

„Deobandi Islam is a complete code of life. It is on the virtuous path [*siratul mustaqeem*]. It adopts a moderate approach. It neither exceeds nor restricts the limits [of religion]".

There was a general agreement among the madrassah respondents that their major differences with the Barelwis were because of the *bida'* and *shirk* practices of the latter especially with reference to shrine visiting and deification of saints. However, they did not support use of violence to stop such practices. One student proposed that „this should not be done by force. The *ulama* should stop it by convincing the managers of the shrines to stop *shirk* practices or the government should ban such practices...on the pattern of Saudi Arabia".

Another madrassah student suggested a more radical approach by proposing the closure of most famous shrines to stop *shirk* in the society. As for the Ahle Hadith sect, the Deobandi students stated that the major reason for difference with the former was that they did not recognize *ijma'* (consensus) and *qiyas* (deductive analogy) as the sources of Islamic jurisprudence.

The views of the Deobandi respondents about Shia Islam were quite belligerent. All of them observed that Shias were outside the pale of Islam for showing disrespect to the Prophet's companions especially the first three caliphs. „The faith of Shias is not correct. Therefore, they deserve to be declared *kafir*", maintained one Deobandi respondent. Actually, there was a consensus among them on this.

Conversely, the college students were not clear about the differences between various sects and none of them actually considered that Shias were outside the pale of Islam despite the fact that some of them did agree that Shias were disrespectful to the Prophet's companions. A couple of them also mentioned that Shias were different and their faith was also not complete because of that disrespect. However, on the whole, the college students did not actually condemn any of the sects. They believed that there were minor differences among various sects including Shias. Their viewpoint can be summed up by the following words of one of the college students.

„There is not much difference [among sects]. All are Muslims. The spirit [of Islam] is the submission to God and prostration before Him".

As for celebrating and observing „days" and anniversaries like Mother's Day, Father's Day, Teachers' Day, Valentine's Day and birthdays etc., madrassah students, in line with their Deobandi tradition, categorically opposed all such practices. It may be added here that according to a DMM *fatwa*, birthday celebration is English custom and hence impermissible in the *Shariah* (Haq, 2009, vol.ii, pp.74-5). On the other hand, the college students did not find any harm in celebrating such days. Only a couple of them opposed the idea of Father's Day and Mother's Day on the ground that these were not valid for them because for Muslims, every day should be dedicated to the parents. However, none of them agreed with the idea of the Valentine's Day because for them it was un-Islamic since it was mostly focused on relationship between unmarried boys and girls, which was not permissible. However, they had no problem with the idea if it was practiced by married couples. As for celebrating birthday, there was a general observation by the college students that this practice was not being followed in the rural areas. In their view, the reason for that was most probably the poverty rather than any conflict with the idea of celebrating birthdays.

As far as TV and internet were concerned, all the Deobandi respondents opposed the use of these by emphasizing the potential of these media to disseminate evil in the society. A couple of Deobandi respondents agreed that „TV can be watched for getting useful information and news". However, they simultaneously contradicted themselves by saying that, „if female newscasters don't observe *purdah*, then TV-watching is not permissible". It is interesting to note that if the Deobandi definition of *purdah* is observed, then it would be impossible for women to appear on TV. Some Deobandi students also proposed censorship on TV to ban obscene and vulgar programmes.

It was observed that none of the Deobandi respondents was using TV or internet and only one of them reported that his family owned a TV set. On the other hand, the families of all the college students not only owned a TV set but almost all of them had used the internet at one time or another mostly for entertainment (music and movies etc.). Further, all the college students regularly listened to the music, which has been considered *haram* by the Deobandis.

The madrassah and college students also held contrasting views about dress code for men. All the college students informed that they occasionally wore jeans, pants and shirts and thought there was nothing un-Islamic in that dress. However, some of them

informed that they did not wear pants in their villages because that was still not popular in the rural areas. Conversely, Deobandi respondents thought that only *shalwar kameez* (national dress comprising of a long shirt and loose baggy trouser) was an Islamic dress. All of them condemned pants and jeans as un-Islamic dress. Their justification for this criticism was that pants or jeans evince the shape of the body parts because these are tightly attached to the skin. Similar argument was employed to condemn shirts. However, when asked if loose pants or shirt would be an Islamic dress, the madrassah students were still reluctant to consider it a permissible dress. Their overall viewpoint about pants is best represented by the following statement of a Deobandi respondent.

„If body parts become prominent in some dress, then it would be considered un-Islamic. Otherwise, it can be allowed. However, it should still be avoided because of resemblance with western people".

8.2 Political System

The interviews mainly focused on three areas i.e. system of government, foreign policy and the challenges faced by Pakistan. As for the system of government, madrassah students showed tergiversation about establishing a democratic system in Pakistan. None of them unmistakably supported democracy. Some of them rather condemned it. One Deobandi student declared,

„Democracy is not good. If one person [out of hundred] is right and 99 per cent are wrong then the wrong would prevail over the right, which is not a correct system".

Some of the madrassah students even advocated a caliphate system without knowing much about its implementation and functioning. „I think *khilafat* is a good system whereas democracy has many ills" pronounced one Deobandi student. However, he simultaneously remarked that circumstances and „resources are not apparently available to introduce *khilafat* here".

Another Deobandi student supported caliphate system while castigating democracy on the ground of human rights violations (which occur under Pakistan's weak democracy). He proclaimed,

„Democracy is not correct because human rights are not fulfilled under that system. *Khilafat* is right because it provides equality to all, small and big as well as white and black. The [political] leaders should be persuaded to introduce *khilafat*. But it should not be implemented by force".

All the Deobandi respondents emphatically endorsed a Taliban-style system in Pakistan. „Taliban system was the best. They have one caliph, Mullah Omar" commented one Deobandi student. „They established an Islamic system. I have not gone there but heard from our *ulama* who went there [in Afghanistan] and saw the system themselves" One of those *ulama* who were quoted by these students to praise the Taliban system included Commander Abdul Jabbar, leader of the Deobandi militant organization *Jaish-e-Muhammad* that has also developed close connections with the *Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan* (TTP). It may be added here that Jabbar had set up his own jihadi group named *Jamaat-ul-Furqan* that was involved in 2002 suicide bombings in Islamabad, Karachi, Murree, Taxila and Bahawalpur. He was arrested in 2003 for masterminding these attacks and his group was banned (Mir, 2004, p.33).

Conversely, all the college students supported a democratic system for Pakistan while simultaneously criticizing the shortcomings of the existing democratic set-up. They were also optimistic that things would improve with the passage of time. Therefore, they thought that democracy should be allowed to continue. However, at the same time, the majority of the college students believed that they also needed Islam alongside the democracy in Pakistan. Further, none of the college students supported a Taliban-style government in Pakistan. One of the students stated that „all the Taliban are the products of madaris. They go abroad for jihad and are also involved in terrorism. I consider the Taliban-style government to be an extremist system". A couple of them stated they had no idea about the Taliban government in Afghanistan.

On jihad, all Deobandi students were convinced that it is a religious obligation for the Muslims. On the whole, they agreed that jihad was to be launched against non-Muslims and that the activities of the militant organizations inside Pakistan could not be termed as jihad. They also opposed suicidal attacks in Pakistan but simultaneously supported such attacks in Afghanistan against the Americans. Despite opposing suicidal attacks inside Pakistan, some of the Deobandi students tried to justify such acts by the Taliban against the security forces of Pakistan. One student observed,

„If you interfere with some institution or group, that group has a right to defend itself. We [Pakistan] joined America to uproot the Taliban despite the fact that the latter were our supporters. We ignored the Quran, which tells us that Christians and Jews shall never be happy with you unless you adopt their religion".

He also opposed the army operation against the local Taliban in Northern Pakistan and stated that „the people, whose family members were killed, took up arms against our own army. They are now also carrying out suicidal attacks in desperation".

For madrassah students, jihad was currently going on in Afghanistan and Kashmir. When asked if Pakistani Muslims should participate in that jihad, their overall response was not unequivocal. Apart from a couple of them who readily agreed to the idea, others linked such jihad with the approval of the religious leaders or the consent of the government. As for the terrorist attacks inside Pakistan, most of the Deobandi students also believed that Pakistan"s enemies like the U.S. and India were behind such attacks. Contrariwise, the college students generally believed that such attacks were being carried out by Pakistani militants who had links with madaris on the one hand and with Afghanistan on the other. They also thought, not unlike the Deobandi students, that jihad was currently going on in Afghanistan and Kashmir. However, they opposed the idea that Pakistanis should participate in that jihad.

On the foreign policy issues, all the Deobandi students thought that Pakistan had no foreign policy of its own and was just following the dictates of the U.S. One student opined,
„We are not making our foreign policy ourselves. Our decisions are being made outside the country...in America".

Madrassah students were of the opinion that Pakistan should set itself free from the extraordinary influence of the U.S. and should take its decisions independently while exhibiting aggressive attitude towards the latter. In fact, most of them suggested that Pakistan should sever its ties with the U.S.

However, the Deobandi students interestingly showed a relatively soft stance vis-à-vis Pakistan"s long-time rival, India. They opined that instead of going to war, Pakistan

should solve all its problems with India including Kashmir through dialogue. The Deobandi students also suggested that Pakistan‟s foreign policy should give priority to the Muslim states over the western countries. Most of them were opposed to friendly relations with non-Muslim countries because according to them, „Quran and Hadith do not allow such relations‟. However, some of them agreed to have diplomatic ties with the non-Muslim states with the intention of spreading Islam in those countries.

When asked to explain the nature of relations with non-Muslim countries, one Deobandi student stated that we should work for spreading Islam in non-Muslim states. He declared,

„First of all, Islam should be offered to the non-Muslims. Those who agree shall embrace Islam. Those who disagree shall be asked to live under our Islamic rule because this world is meant for the Muslims. Non-Muslims must be told that they are to be ruled by us and either they should embrace Islam or prepare themselves to fight us. If they cannot fight, then they should accept our rule and pay *jizya* [a nominal tax for non-Muslims living under Islamic rule] as prescribed by Islam. We have to become strong enough to say all this to the non-Muslims [of the world]‟.

As regards the college students, they were not particularly critical of the U.S. However, they believed that Pakistan should have a balanced foreign policy and hold friendly ties with all countries including India and the U.S. Interestingly, none of them declared the U.S. to be their enemy, an attitude that was in stark contrast to the findings of the PEW Global Attitudes Project, which reported that 74% of Pakistanis considered the U.S. to be an enemy (PEW Report, 2012, p.1).

One interesting comparison between the madrassah and college students was about their image of and vision for Pakistan. When asked about the three biggest problems faced by Pakistan, almost all the madrassah students identified the energy crisis as the number one problem in Pakistan. That was in view of the long hours of electricity load-shedding during the summer of 2012 when the interviews were conducted. Apart from that, they were able to identify few other problems like unemployment, inflation, corruption, illiteracy, and nepotism. A couple of them mentioned spread of obscenity and evil as well as irreligious attitudes in the society

As for the college students, they identified a large variety of problems in this regard. However, the most common problem mentioned by them was terrorism and bad governance [especially of the then government led by President Zardari]. Their list of problems was quite exhaustive. It included the decline of the education system, sectarianism, poverty, illiteracy, corruption, poor law and order, unemployment, injustice, leadership crisis, lack of true democracy, civil-military conflict, energy crisis, inflation, lack of meritocracy, poor health infrastructure, nepotism etc.

The comparison of the two groups of the respondents in this regard show that Deobandi students were concerned with immediate and short-term problems and the scope of their vision was quite narrow as compared to the college students who were thinking at a far broader level. However, in terms of the solution to the identified problems, both groups were equally clueless.

The Deobandi respondents who overwhelmingly advocated an Islamic system were not clear about how to implement that system in Pakistan. Some of them thought that the *ulama* should become advisors to the government (not unlike the internal caliphs of Shah Waliullah‟s movement) and thus pave the way for implementing the *Shariah*. One of them gave the example of Ibn Abdul Wahhab of Nejd who had become advisor to a local Arab ruler and guided the latter to establish a *Shariah*-based government in the Arabia. Another student observed that establishing an Islamic government in Pakistan is „not possible in the presence of the current [mainstream] politicians. We, *ulama* should either convince them [politicians] or an Islamic government can be established through the graduates of madaris like Maulana Fazlur Rehman [head of Deobandi party, JUI]‟. Similarly, another student enunciated,

„In my view, the government system of the Taliban [in Afghanistan] is very good. However, that system should be introduced here through political means, not by force‟. Some Deobandi respondents approved of the Taliban approach to grab power by force before implementing the *Shariah*. One of them observed that „it is imperative to come into power for implementing Islamic system. The approach of Mullah Omar to come into power in Afghanistan was correct. It is permissible to take control of [the government for imposing the *Shariah*]‟.

Similarly, one of the Deobandi students praised the Taliban for controlling crime in Afghanistan. He remarked,

„Taliabn‟s system is very good. They established *hadd* [Islamic system of punishments]. When *hadd* is established, nobody commits a crime… [The Taliban approach] of coming into power through force is permissible‟.

Another Deobandi student suggested imposition of Taliban-style government through the madaris. He observed,

„Pakistan was established in the name of Islam. But Islamic system has not been implemented here. Since the Taliban implemented the Islamic system [in Afghanistan], it is our desire that their system should be introduced here as well. However, if the Taliban cannot come here themselves, then our madaris should come forward to implement Islam here‟.

8.3   Educational System

All the Deobandi students showed a peculiar sense of pride and superiority because of their religious qualification, which distinguished them form the mainstream society that received the worldly education. One madrasssah student claimed,

„The education we have received is exactly the same provided by the Prophet to his companions. Our education is actually the *Shariah* of the Prophet. Accordingly, we are leading exactly the same life that was lived by the Prophet and his companions. Therefore, in the final analysis, we shall definitely be successful‟.

This pride of the Deobandi students was not atypical of the countercultural non-conformists who believe themselves to have a moral edge on the mainstream society (Yinger (1982, p.30).

As regards the objectives of the madaris, there was a consensus among the Deobandi students that their institutions were working for spreading Islam and dissemination of the message of God to the people. They also believed that their institutions were playing a role in changing and reforming the society through the teachings of Islam. One remarkable finding in this regard was that despite all the pride in their religious

credentials, Deobandi students still believed that they could not get a better job without getting a degree of the mainstream education. That is why most of them were simultaneously studying „worldly" subjects to appear in university examinations as private candidates to acquire a bachelor's degree. A couple of them had already passed that examination. Majority of the Deobandi respondents believed that both the madaris and mainstream educational systems should continue but the madaris system should dominate the worldly educational system.

The college students also believed that the objective of madaris was to disseminate Islamic education. However, they did not mention that madaris were playing any role in spreading Islam or reforming the society. On the contrary, some of them believed that madaris were involved in spreading sectarianism and terrorism in the country. One college student opined,

„Some madaris are involved in Talibanization and are spreading extremism in the society. Madaris have also played a major role in sectarianism in Pakistan".

Similarly, another student pointed out that „there are some bad people in madaris who tell their students that if they killed other people, they would go to heaven". However, on the whole, the majority of the college students did not show very negative attitude about the education system of madaris and believed that these institutions should be allowed to continue alongside the mainstream education.

Another notable comparison was established when the respondents from both sides were asked to differentiate a typical madrassah student from the student of a mainstream educational institution. Here, the Deobandi students again brandished their pride and superiority over the mainstream students. One of the Deobandi students declared that madarassah students were the heirs of the Prophet. They believed that madrassah students held knowledge of Islam and they showed far more religious affinity in their lives as compared to students of worldly education. While disregarding the courses of Islamic Studies taught in the mainstream education, one of the madrassah respondents declared that „if Islamic Studies were enough, there was no need for God to send one hundred and seventy thousand [sic] prophets". Further, they distinguished themselves by observing that they had to play a role in spreading Islam in

the society whereas the college students could not do it because they lacked Islamic education and were mostly dominated by the worldly concerns.

The Deobandi students also considered the overall environment of their madaris to be more Islamic and pious where religion is actually practiced by the students while the mainstream educational institutions conversely have an atmosphere, which is devoid of Islamic values and practices. One of the Deobandi students strongly condemned the mainstream educational institutions while defending the madaris. He stated,

„People say that madaris are producing terrorists. They should tell us what [products] colleges have provided to the society? Madaris have at least produced *ulama* and *huffaz* [plural of *hafiz*, one who learns the Quran by heart]. What have an engineering university produced when the smallest of engineering work has to be completed through some foreign support and we have to import every product from the U.S. and China".

On the other hand, the college students described that dissimilarity between madrassah and mainstream students from a very different perspective and observed that madrassah students were completely distinct from the mainstream society in terms of their appearance, training and thinking. One of them stated that madaris „administration is run by the *maulvis* [clerics] who are not properly educated as they themselves are graduates of madaris. They are not aware of what is happening in the world. They have their own distinct world". Another student believed that „some *maulvis* were using the madaris and the Quran for financial gains. Such people were actually behind the sectarianism [in Pakistan]. In this process, they have pushed us far away from the religion". This viewpoint about the separation of the madaris from the spirit of Islam was also referred to by another student who observed,

„Madaris had existed for a long time. Earlier madaris were very much close to Islam. But these days, their situation has worsened a lot. Nowadays, they have links with terrorism and are involved in using weapons - a situation that has vitiated the society".

While agreeing that madrassah students had more knowledge about Islam, most of the college students observed that the former were far removed from the issues and realities of the mainstream society. Although majority of the college students gave credit to the

madrassah students for having a better understanding of the religious issues, some of them pointed towards the latter„s ignorance about science and other modern subjects. A majority of them agreed that because of this lack of knowledge about modern education, madrassah students were not capable of solving the problems faced by the society. One respondent stated,

„The madrassah people do not fit in the modern world. They are not fit for this age‟. Another student observed that madrassah graduates „were weak in logical thinking as compared to the college and university graduates‟.

Some of the college students criticized the madrassah students for their rigid and extremist views. One of them observed that owing to their intolerance, rigidity and unkind attitude towards the common people, the madrassah persons were worse than the ordinary Muslims of the society. (He made this statement in the light of his personal experience and observation of the attitude of his elder brother who was a madrassah graduate.) Another student criticized the environment of the madaris with respect to the treatment of young students. He himself had once studied at a Deobandi madrassah to learn the Quran by heart. He stated that he had witnessed in that madrassah that young students were being sexually abused by some teachers and senior students.

At the same time, a couple of college students appreciated the madrassah students on the ground that the latter were more focused on the hereafter as compared to the mainstream students who pursued a worldly and material approach.

8.4 Role of Women in Society

It was remarkable that respondents both from the madrassah and the college almost agreed on the definition of *purdah* for women. They believed that whole body along with the face of a woman should be covered for observing *purdah* outside her home. The only exception in this regard was that the Deobandi students also included the hands and feet of the women in their definition of *purdah* while some of the college students did not agree with the inclusion of hands and feet.

Despite this common ground on the definition of *purdah*, there were fundamental differences between the madrassah and college students about the role of women in the society. While the former believed that the only place for a woman was her home, the

latter thought that the women should be allowed equal opportunities alongside the men to play a role in the society. All the college students were of the view that women must get education and should also be allowed to work outside their homes. Contrarily, all the Deobandi respondents believed that women should not work outside their homes. However, they declared that girls may be provided education especially religious education. But they should observe *purdah* before leaving their homes for the purpose of education.

There was only one Deobandi respondent who was flexible on the idea of women working outside their homes. He observed the following.

„A woman can work outside her home while fully observing *purdah* and only when she has to interact with women, not men".

The overall viewpoint of the Deobandi respondents in this regard can be encapsulated by the following words of one of the madrassah respondents.

„It is not appropriate for women to work outside their homes. The Prophet said that men should work while the women should stay at home... [However], female education is permissible only if they go to those madaris where both students and teachers are female".

To sum it up, the above-mentioned interviews demonstrated that many values and attitudes of the Deobandi movement have come in conflict with the values and practices of the mainstream society in Pakistan. In other words, findings of these interviews verify the observations regarding the countercultural disposition the DMM mentioned in previous chapters. As such, the findings of the interviews of madrassah and college students are compatible with the hypothesis of this research and one may infer that the Deobandi movement in Pakistan still continues to behave in a countercultural manner in line with its origin and history.

CONCLUSION

Different scholars have interpreted the DMM from different perspectives. For some, it appeared to be an educational movement because it was based in madaris. Others considered it to be a religio-political movement as it had been dreaming to establish an Islamic state in the subcontinent. Still others thought that it was purely religious movement that was involved in teaching religion and producing *ulama* to revive and spread Islam. The Deobandis themselves generally believe that their movement was launched to protect Islam and its teachings, which were under threat after the rise of British rule in India.

This thesis has endeavoured to interpret the DMM from a countercultural perspective by highlighting the presence of countercultural trends and tendencies in its 150-year long history. The origin of the DMM is generally traced back to the 18th century movement of Shah Waliullah. That was a broad-based Islamic revivalist movement with three components i.e. intellectual, political and social. At the intellectual level, Waliullah‟s movement was originally a proponent of *ijtihad* as well as *tatbiq* (intellectual synthesis) of different viewpoints in Islam. The political component of that movement focused on the idea of establishing a model Muslim state in the subcontinent for the implementation of Islam. The social component of Waliullah‟s movement (which carried a relatively low priority and was largely considered as part of the political component) was mainly concerned with the purification of the norms and values of the Indian Muslims in the light of the practices of the early Islam in Arabia. Another minor aspect of the social component was the criticism of Shia Islam. But this was mostly under-emphasized as Waliullah tried to find a common ground between the Sunni and Shia Muslims.

When Waliullah‟s movement was passed on to the next generation of his family, its intellectual component suffered a setback owing to the absence of any scholar who could match the intellect and vision of the founder. Abdul Aziz, son of Waliullah could not manage to maintain the broad base of the movement. Gradually, the doors of *ijtihad* and *tatbiq* were closed down as the movement opted to go for the strict *taqlid* of Hanafi *madhab*. Further, the political component of the movement also took a backseat during that time owing to the decline of Muslim rule in India. Interestingly, this lack of intellectual and political rigour was compensated by the increased emphasis on the

social component of the movement by producing more literature to condemn the prevalent practices of the Indian Muslims. At the same time, anti-Shia sentiment and literature also got more prominence and acclaim in the movement.

By the time the control of the movement was handed over to the third generation of Waliullah family, the scope of the movement had further narrowed down. Under the leadership of Waliullah's grandson, Muhammad Ismail and his *shaikh*, Syed Ahmed, the movement's top priority was its social component with a strong emphasis on the condemnation of the popular customs and socio-cultural practices of the Indian Muslims. Aggressive opposition of Shia Islam also came to the foreground during that period. In fact, it was under the leadership of Ismail and Ahmed that the countenance of Waliullah's Islamic revivalist movement took a countercultural complexion.

When the founders of the DMM, Muhammad Qasim and Rasheed Ahmed tried to preserve and revive Waliullah's movement through the establishment of the Darul Ulum Deoband in 1866, the scope of the movement had been confined mostly to its social component, which was originally given the least priority by Waliullah himself. On the contrary, the condemnation of the values and practices of the mainstream Muslim society had become the major focus of the movement when it was resurrected at Deoband. Another important focus of the movement was the opposition of Shia Islam. The political component of the new movement was placed on the back burner in the face of the British rule in India. In other words, the DMM actually resurrected Ismail and Ahmed's movement rather than the original movement of Waliullah. As such, countercultural currents were present in the DMM from the time of its inception. This thesis studied the DMM at three levels to identify such countercultural trends and tendencies. At the first level, an historical approach was adopted to find such trends in the DMM at various points of time in its history. At the second level, modern Deobandi literature was reviewed to verify the presence of that countercultural approach in the movement during recent years. In this regard, a detailed review of writings in three selected Deobandi journals supported the findings of the first level of research. At the third level of research, interviews of students from a Deobandi madrassah and mainstream educational institution were conducted to compare their values and attitudes to further substantiate the findings of the first two stages of research. Based on the observations and findings of these three levels of research, this thesis infers that there have been enough countercultural trends and tendencies in the DMM to

suggest that this movement holds a countercultural character. However, in the words of Yinger, „to call something countercultural is not to applaud it or lament it". As such, this thesis does not propose to portray the DMM negatively. The major objective of this research is to develop a broader understanding of this movement by surveying it from a new angle. At the same time, this research in no way discounts the various existing interpretations about the nature of the Deobandi movement. In other words, this thesis does not suggest that the DMM is an exclusive countercultural movement. The major contribution of this research is the addition of the counterculture narrative in this regard. The inclusion of this narrative is expected to help develop a better and fuller understanding of the DMM especially in the areas of politics and sociology of Islam.

This thesis has primarily focused on drawing out the countercultural ideas in the Deobandi movement through the study of small samples of document survey and qualitative interviews. The future research in this regard may opt for larger samples and may also study the impact of the Deobandi counterculture on the Pakistani society. Furthermore, this thesis paves the way for other avenues of research on the Deobandi Islam. For example, future research in this connection might focus on a comparative analysis of the existing narratives about the interpretation of the DMM with the objective of identifying the predominant character of this movement. Another potential research direction is the comparison of the countercultural approach of the DMM with the views of other Muslim sects and groups within or outside Pakistan to further elucidate the Deobandi counterculture. Additionally, an important research prospect can be a detailed study of the *Tablighi Jamaat* (TJ) in the countercultural context. TJ, despite having an independent identity, still holds some connection with the DMM in Pakistan where most of the *Tablighi* missions are headed by the Deobandis, despite the official policy of TJ to avoid any link to a sect or sub-sect. Similarly, the mosques where these groups stay during proselytizing activities mostly follow the Deobandi school of thought. If TJ is proved to be actually following the Deobandi ideology, the presence of countercultural currents in the former would be of significant importance because of its huge following at the global level. Currently, TJ is active in at least 165 countries with an estimated membership range from 12 to 80 million (World Almanac of Islamism, 2013). At another level, this thesis also indicates towards the need for an exploratory research, which may allow the comparison of DMM's evolution in the sub-continental nations of Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, with a particular focus on its countercultural disposition.

At a broader level, the approach adopted by this thesis can be employed to study other religious movements particularly in the Muslim world. Similarly, this research approach also indicates towards the prospect whereby several modern global movements associated with environmental governance, free trade and neoliberalism etc. can also be studied in a countercultural context vis-à-vis mainstream societies in different parts of the world.

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DEOBANDI STANCE VIS-À-VIS MUSLIM GROUPS OTHER THAN THE BARELWIS

It is interesting to note that the DMM has not just condemned the Barelwi sect, which not only represents the largest proportion of Pakistani Muslims (more than 60%) but also defends the beliefs and practices of folk Islam followed by millions of Pakistani Muslims who claim not to belong to any particular sect. True to its countercultural nature, the DMM has denounced other Muslim sects of Pakistan like Ahle Hadith and Shias who respectively represent about 5% and 15% of Pakistanis. Similarly, the Deobandis have also castigated the Jamaat-e-Islami, which is not a sect as such but a group of followers of Maulana Maududi.

A. The DMM on Ahle Hadith

Ahle Hadith is a *ghair-muqallid* sect not much different from the *Salafis* of Saudi Arabia. In fact, the terms Ahle Hadith and *Salafi* are mostly used interchangeably. Ahle Hadith are also called Wahhabis because of their inspiration from the teachings of Ibn Abdul Wahhab (1703-1792) of Nejd.

The DMM has adopted a little softer approach in condemning the Ahle Hadith sect. This may be due to the fact that the forefathers of the DMM like Shah Ismail, Syed Ahmed and Rasheed Ahmed were influenced by the teachings of Ibn Abdul Wahhab, the founder of the *Salafi* movement in Arab. In fact, the Deobandi approach regarding the use of terms like *bida'*, *shirk* and *kufr* is also not much different from that of the *Salafis*. However, the DMM has kept its distinct identity intact by not only distancing itself from the Ahle Hadith but also by condemning them at the same time.

The major focus of DMM‟s criticism against the Ahle Hadith is the latter‟s *ghair-muqallid* approach in *fiqh*. A *ghair muqallid* is the one who does not exclusively follow any of the four *madhabs* of *fiqh*. The Ahle Hadith *ulama* have termed the concept of *taqlid* (following a particular Imam) as *bida'* on the ground that this practice started many centuries after the Prophet. The Deobandis on the other hand have disagreed with this and have argued that if the stance of Ahle Hadith is accepted, then it would mean that the whole Muslim *ummah*, except for the Ahle Hadith sect (which did not exist for about 13 centuries after the Prophet), has been on the wrong path due to *taqlid*. This

approach of Ahle Hadith has been criticized by the DMM as similar to the one adopted by Shias against the companions of the Prophet (Ludhianvi, n.d. p.29).

It has also been argued by the Deobandis that the Ahle Hadith are not truly *ghair-muqallid* in the sense that they do follow one *muhaddith* (expert of Hadith) or another. However, this is a weak argument because the Deobandis here have used the term *taqlid* in its literal meaning i.e. following. The religious term *taqlid* is actually applied to exclusive and strict following of one of the four schools of thought in *fiqh* i.e. Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki and Hambli. Ahle Hadith do not restrict themselves to any one of these *madhabs* and primarily follow the *Sahi* (authentic) Ahadith compiled by different *muhadditheen*.

The Deobandis have also denounced the Ahle Hadith on the ground that the latter show contempt and disrespect towards the person and teachings of Imam Abu Hanifa, whose *fiqh* is followed by the former (Ludhianvi, n.d. p.31). Another Deobandi criticism against the Ahle Hadith is that their approach towards *ijtihad* is very lenient because it tolerates unqualified Muslims who use their limited knowledge to interpret Islam. Ludhianvi (n.d. p.27) has declared Ahle Hadith a dangerous sect in the sense that the fundamental reason behind the rise of atheistic (*mulhid*) and misguided (*gumrah*) sects in Islam has always been the lack of *taqlid*.

Another point of DMM's ideological difference with the Ahle Hadith is that the latter, in its enthusiasm for *ijtihad*, sometimes even ignore *ijma'-e-ummat* (consensus of Muslim scholars) - a fundamental source of *fiqh*. Ludhianvi (n.d. p.31) has quoted two examples in this regard. One is about Ahle Hadith's declaration as *bida'* the practice of offering twenty *raka'* (units) in *taraweeh* (Ramadhan prayers) - a practice which was initiated by Caliph Umar and concurred by the *salaf-as-saliheen*.

Second, Ahle Hadith *ulama* have disagreed with the consensus of *salaf-as-saliheen* as well as the Imams of four *madhabs* regarding divorce. The Ahle Hadith believe that if a husband tells her wife three times in a single meeting that he is divorcing her, then it would be considered as one divorce and the marriage would stay intact until three divorces occur. On the other hand, the *ijma'* (consensus) in this regard is that three divorces would occur in that scenario and marriage would be over (Ludhianvi, n.d. p.32).

Ludhianvi has concluded that the approach of the Ahle hadith in these two examples, where they ignored the teachings of *sahaba*, is very similar to that of Shias. This is a very strong criticism in view of the fact that most of the Deobandis consider Shias to be *kafir*. However, Ludhianvi has not employed the Hadith regarding *tashabbu bil kuffar* (resemblance with non-believers) to condemn the Ahle Hadith. On the other hand, that Hadith has been repeatedly referred by him to castigate the popular practices of Sunni Barelwis, which he linked to Shias.

B. The DMM on Shia Muslims

Renowned Deobandi scholar Abdul Haq declared the Shias as *zandiq* (heretic) for believing their *imams* to be innocent (Haq, 2009, vol.i, p.387). He also explained that there are many sub-sects of Shias and if a sub-sect refuses to accept the ascendancy of Abu Bakr as first caliph or it holds a faith that third caliph Ali held a heavenly status like prophets or it believes that the Quran was altered after Prophet"s death, each of such Shia groups is undoubtedly *kafir*. His asserted that „it is illegitimate for Muslims to interact and develop relationship with such Shias or even attend their death prayers" (Haq, 2009, vol.i, p.386). In another *fatwa*, Haq (2009, vol.v, p.338) even pronounced it impermissible for Muslims to greet Shias and consume the meat of an animal that has been slaughtered by a Shia.

DMM"s castigation of Shia Islam is mainly based on the following three issues.

i. *Concept of Imamate*

According to Ludhianvi (n.d. pp.15-18), Shias believe that God sent Imams after the Prophet. These Imams are considered pure and innocent like the prophets. They hold the power to implement the *Shariah*. They can even suspend or cancel any order given in the Quran. There are twelve Imams in Shia Islam. That is why they are called *Athna Ashri* (Twelver) or *Imamia* Shia. Although there are many small sects in Shia Islam (e.g. Ismaili and Zaidi etc.), *Athna Ashri* are the largest group and are considered the mainstream Shias.

The Deobandis believe that this concept of Imamate was introduced by the Jews under the leadership of Abdullah ibn Saba, a hypocrite Muslim who presented himself as the supporter of Ali and propagated the right of the latter to become the caliph in place of Usman. The Deobandis consider this Shia concept of Imamate as a rebellion and conspiracy against Islam as well

as against the finality of the prophethood of Muhammad. They believe this concept to be the source of inspiration for all the false prophets like Mirza Ghulam Ahmed, founder of Qadiyani religion.

ii. ***Hatred and Enmity vis-à-vis Sahaba***

According to the Deobandis, Shias believe that all the companions (*sahaba*) of the Prophet who took *bay'ah* of Abu Bakr after Prophet"s death had become *murtad* (apostate), because the caliphate was the right of Ali who is the first of the twelve Imams of Shias (Ludhianvi, n.d. p.18). The DMM has castigated this Shia belief on the ground that such a belief would lead to negation of Islam because if *sahaba* are condemned as *murtad* then the fundamental sources of *fiqh* like Hadith, *ijma, qiyas* (deductive analogy) and *ijtihad* would be compromised because of the huge contribution of *sahaba* and their followers in this regard.

iii. ***Changes in the Quran***

According to the Deobandi literature, Shias believe that the Quran followed by the Muslims is not the actual Quran that was revealed to the Prophet. The present Quran does not include the verses, which supported the Imamate of Ali because Caliph Usman removed those verses during the compilation of the Quran. Shias are also said to believe that the complete version of original Quran is in the possession of their 12th Imam who is *ghaib* (absent) but alive for about 1200 years. He would appear before the world near the *qiyamah*- end of time (Ludhianvi, n.d. pp.20-21).

Shias, on the other hand, have come up with their own arguments to defend their position against the above-mentioned Deobandi criticism. Many Shia scholars have clearly declared that the current Quran is the final and true Quran. Similarly, they have refused to accept the Deobandi allegations regarding the concept of Imamate and declaring *sahaba* as *murtad*. However, the Deobandis have not accepted the viewpoint of Shia scholars who are in turn blamed to be lying in line with the Shia practice of *taqiyya* (religious dissimulation). According to Hassan Ja"afri, a renowned Shia scholar, *taqiyyai* is a legal dispensation, which allows a person to hide his religious beliefs in order to protect his life, respect and wealth (Akbar, 2010, p.297).

Based on the condemnation of Shia beliefs on the afore-mentioned three issues, the Deobandi *ulama* and their predecessors have always denounced the Shia Islam. Shah Waliullah and Shah Abdul Aziz strongly condemned Shia beliefs especially their

concept of Imamate. Then, Muhammad Ismail and Syed Ahmed stopped by force the Shia practices like *taziyah* of *Muharram*. Later, Muhammad Qasim and Rasheed Ahmed, the founders of the DMM, also castigated these Shia beliefs. However, none of these *ulama* tried to categorically declare Shias as non-Muslims. But as the ambit of the DMM gradually became more parochial, the views of the Deobandis became more rigid and brazen.

This situation became worse after the rise of Shia Islam in the wake of Iranian revolution and the simultaneous exposure of the Deobandis to the Afghan „jihad‟ against the Soviets. Then the DMM‟s approach regarding Shias became more aggressive and extremist. It was actually in this backdrop that Manzoor Naumani, a renowned Deobandi scholar issued a *fatwa* in December 1987 declaring Shias as *kafir* (non-believer). That *fatwa* was endorsed by hundreds of prominent Deobandi *ulama* in both India and Pakistan. Maulana Wali Hassan, Deobandi Grand Mufti of Pakistan, issued a separate *fatwa* in this regard whereby he wrote, „*Athna Ashri* Shias are *kafir*. Their marriage with Muslims is *haram*. Muslims should not participate in funeral prayers of Shias. An animal slaughtered by a Shia is not *halal* for the Muslims. It is not permissible to bury Shias in the graveyard of Muslims. In short, Shias must be treated as non-Muslims‟ (Hassan, 1988).

Since 1980s, several extremist Deobandi organizations have been established whose major objective has been to get Shias declared non-Muslims just like the Qadiyanis. Since then, the Deobandis have been actively involved in sectarian clashes with Shias. Both sects support their own armed groups and militant organizations. Thousands of Muslims have died in these sectarian clashes, which continue to date. Most of the sectarian militant groups have been banned by the government without much improvement in the situation. Such groups either continue to operate under ground or re-organize them under new names. The killing strategies of Shia and Deobandi organizations are different. Shias generally target a particular Deobandi scholar or leader who is considered to enjoy wide influence over the people. The Deobandis, on the other hand, kill not only Shia scholars but also ordinary Shias.

In places like Balochistan, banned Deobandi organizations, Lashkar-e-Jhangwi (LJ) and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) have indiscriminately killed the people travelling in Iran-bound buses on the understanding that such buses were supposed to carry Shia pilgrims. Similarly, hundreds of Hazara Shias have been killed by LJ in Quetta. In

Karachi, where banned groups are not allowed to operate, extremist Deobandis have re-organized themselves under the name of Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ) – a term, which was generally used for the Barelwis until very recently.

C. The DMM on *Jamaat-e-Islami*

The DMM has been opposing Maulana Maududi and his party *Jamaat-e-Islami* (JI) well before the partition of India. The Deobandis believed that: Maududi was not a good Muslim; his writings were sub-scholarly; he was disrespectful to the prophets and *sahaba* especially Caliph Usman; he created a lot of *bida'* in Islam and hence mutilated the spirit of Islam (Pirzada, 2000, p.101). These views were shared by prominent Deobandi *ulama* like Hussain Madni, Kifayatullah, Qari Tayyab, Mufti Shafi and Zafar Usmani. Mufti Mahmood of JUI once ruled Maududi as „outside the pale of Islam and „an American agent" (Pirzada, 2000, P. 102).

Later on, Deobandi scholars in Pakistan like Abdul Haq also condemned Maududi for showing disrespect and indiscretion towards Prophets, *sahaba* and Imams as well as for latter"s hauteur about his own views and *ijtihad* (Haq, 2009, vol.i, pp.404-08). In the light of the *fatawa* by past DMM leaders like Hussain Ahmed Madni and Ahmed Ali Lahori, Abdul Haq considers Maududi and his Jammat Islami to be misguided (*gumrah*). He further declares Maududi to be undesirable and damaging for the Muslims who then must stay away from the latter"s ideas.

Ludhianvi (n.d. pp.122-83) in a long commentary has condemned the philosophy and teachings of Maududi on the following grounds.

i. ***Ghair Muqallid Approach***

Maududi strictly opposed the concept of *taqlid* and even described it as wrongful and sinful for an educated person. However, his non-*taqlid* is different from Ahle Hadith whose major emphasis is on the Quran and Hadith. Maududi, however, has differentiated between Hadith (narrative of the words, deeds or tacit approvals of the Prophet) and *Sunnah* (practices of the Prophet). He has put more emphasis on *Sunnah* than Hadith. Ludhianvi has vehemently opposed this approach of Maududi and has placed him in the same league as that of Ghulam Ahmed Pervaiz and Mirza Qadiyani, whose followers have been declared non-Muslims.

ii. ***Disrespect towards Prophets and Sahaba***

The Deobandis have condemned the writings of Maududi on the ground that he used same language to describe prophets and *sahaba* that is generally used to describe ordinary people and worldly rulers. This lack of reverence on the part of Maududi has been declared by the Deobandis to be similar to that of Shias. It is interesting to note that Muhammad Ismail, one of the forefathers of the DMM, also used similar language for prophets and saints to highlight the concept of *tawhid*. But, he was defended by the Deobandis when the Barelwi *ulama* launched a scathing criticism against him.

iii. ***Anti-Tasawwuf Approach***

Maududi has strongly opposed the concept of *tasawwuf* and spirituality in Islam. He condemned the practice of *tasawwuf* by likening it to the addiction of opium and criticized all Muslim scholars including Deobandi forefathers like Shah Waliullah and Muhammad Ismail who were alleged to have failed in keeping their movements uncontaminated from the ‚disease of *sufism'* (Maududi, n.d. p.146).

Against this criticism of Maududi, the Deobandis have not only defended their forefathers but also the institution of *tasawwuf* itself. It is interesting that in opposing the views of Maududi, the Deobandis have gone to the extent of accepting that concept of *tasawwuf* (Ludhianvi, n.d. p.163), which they had earlier opposed to condemn the folk Islam represented by the Barelwis and other Muslims of the subcontinent. DMM‟s approach in its criticism against Maududi‟s views about *tasawwuf* is actually not much different from the one Barelwis adopted against DMM‟s views about the practices of folk Islam.

iv. ***Political Islam***

Maududi like Egyptian Ikhwan ul Muslimeen believed that Islam was fundamentally a political movement and establishing an Islamic rule was actually like worship (*ibadat*). He went to the extent of stating that obligatory prayers, *zakat* (Islamic tax) and *hajj* (pilgrimage) are in fact those practices that prepare a Muslim for the actual *ibadat* of establishing Islamic rule (Ludhianvi, n.d. p.160).

The Deobandis, on the other hand, have divided Islam into different compartments like faith, worship, conduct, socialization and politics. They have condemned this sole focus of Maududi on political Islam as a

dangerous mistake and intellectual deviation that has undermined other vital pillars of Islam.

Apart from the above issues, the DMM has also criticized Maududi on the ground that he did not learn Islam from any established scholar or institution (*madrassah*) and hence could not develop proper understanding of the religion. Further, he was too much influenced by the modern world to present Islam in its original configuration. Therefore, he introduced such type of changes and reforms in Islam, which could satisfy the modern minds. In this regard, he was not much different from those Muslim scholars who try to find compatibility of Islamic system of governance with modern democracy (Ludhianvi, n.d. pp. 181-83).

INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. Greetings and Introduction

2. Brief information about the research and its objectives.

3. Verbal consent of the interviewee

4. Personal information about the interviewee (Name, age, place of residence)

5. How do you look at the cultural values and customs in Pakistan especially with respect to marriage, death, birthday events, dress etc.? Are these values in conflict with Islam?

6. Do you watch television and use internet? If not, why?

7. What do you think about the political system in Pakistan and what, in your opinion, is the best system of governance and how can it be introduced in Pakistan?

8. What do you think about the education system in Pakistan and how do you compare the *madaris* with the mainstream education system?

9. What are your views about *sufism*/spiritualism in Islam? How do you look at the practice of visiting shrines of saints?

10. What are your views about the suicidal attacks and bomb explosions in Pakistan?

11. What do you think about the current status and role of women in Pakistani society?

12. What are your views on Pakistan's foreign policy especially with reference to India, Afghanistan, Europe, the U.S. and the Muslim world?

13. What are the three biggest challenges faced by Pakistan and what solutions do you recommend?

14. What are the major differences between *madrassah* and college students?

GLOSSARY OF ISLAMIC TERMS

Adhan: call for the daily prayers. The person who calls the *adhan* is called a *Mu'adhin* who calls the *adhan* five times a day before Muslims are to perform their daily *salah* (prayer). The *adhan* is composed of specific words and phrases to be recited loudly in the Arabic language so that the neighbours can recognize the time schedule for the prayers.

Alim (plural *ulama*): a man of knowledge, a scholar, especially in the sciences of Islam

Ahl al-hall wal-aqd: literally „the people of loosing and binding" i.e. the *ulama* (scholars), leaders and army commanders who make binding decisions for the community

Amr bil Maroof wa Nahi an il Munkar: promotion of good and prevention of evil, a duty for all Muslims prescribed in the Quran

Ameerul Momineen: commander of the believers. This title is given to the Islamic leaders.

Arafa: a plain 15 miles to the east of Makkah. One of the essential rites of *hajj* is to stand on Arafa on the 9th of Dhul-Hijjah, twelfth month of the Islamic lunar calendar.

Ashura: the 10th day of Muharram, first month of the Muslim lunar calendar. It is highly desirable day to fast.

Athna Asharis: the „Twelvers" or mainstream Shias who believe in twelve Imams

Ayah (plural *ayaat*): a verse of the Quran. It literally means a „sign"and also refers to the signs one sees in the Creation.

Barzakh: literally partition or barrier, usually it means the life in the grave, which is a partition between the life on earth and the life in the Hereafter.

Bay'ah: literally means the striking together of the hands of two contacting parties to ratify a contract, it is an act of swearing allegiance to a spiritual or political leader.

Bayyinah (plural *bayyinat*): a piece of evidence, which is clear and demonstrates the truth; the testimony. Such clear demonstrative evidence reinforces belief.

Bid'a: „innovation" in Muslim ritual practice or beliefs, changing the original practice of the Prophet, something introduced into Islam after the formative period

Darul Harb: abode of war, a territory under the hegemony of unbelievers, which is hostile to the Muslims living in its divine

Darul Islam: abode of Islam, the Muslim nation

Dhikr: remembrance of God. It commonly refers to invocation of Allah by repetition of His names or particular formulae.

Deen: religion in general; the life transaction (literally the debt between two parties); the way of life and the system of conduct based on recognizing God as one's sovereign and commiting oneself to obey Him.

Dua: Making supplication to Allah.

Eid: The word *Eid* is an Arabic name to mean a festivity, a celebration, a recurring happiness, and a feast. In Islam, there are two major *Eids* namely the feast of Ramadhan (*Eid-ul-Fitr*) and the Feast of Sacrifice (*Eid-ul-Adhha*). The first *Eid* is celebrated by Muslims after fasting the month of Ramadhan as a matter of thanks and gratitude to Almighty Allah. It takes place on the first day of Shawwal, the tenth month of the lunar calendar. The second *Eid* is the Feast of Sacrifice and it is to be celebrated for the memory of prophet Ibrahim trying to sacrifice his son Isma'il (Ishmael). This *Eid* lasts for four days between the tenth and the thirteenth day of Dhul-Hijjah.

Faqih: a Muslim jurist. a person who is an expert on Islamic jurisprudence (law) i.e. *fiqh*.

Fardh: an obligatory act of worship or practice as defined by the Islamic law i.e. *Shariah*. Doing the *Fardh* is considered as a good deed while not doing it is declared a bad deed or a sin.

Fatwa (plural *fatawa*): an authoritative, advisory statement on a point of law

Fiqh: the science of Islamic jurisprudence and application of *Shariah*. The meaning of the word *fiqh* is understanding, comprehension, knowledge, and jurisprudence in Islam. A jurist is called a *faqih* who is an expert in matters of Islamic legal matters. The most famous scholars of *fiqh* in the history of Muslims are the founders of the four schools

of thought in Islam: Imam Malik, Imam Ash-Shafi'i, Imam Abu Hanifah, and Imam Ahmad.

Fisq: deviant behviour, leaving the correct way or abandoning the truth, disobeying Allah; immoral behaviour

Fitnah: The word *fitnah* comes from an Arabic verb which means to „seduce, tempt, or lure". There are many shades of meaning, mostly referring to a feeling of disorder or unrest. Variations of the word *fitnah* are found throughout the Qur'an to describe the trials and temptations that may face the believers. The term has also been used to describe divisions which occurred in the early years of the Muslim community. In modern usage, it is used to describe forces that cause controversy, fragmentation, scandal, chaos, or discord within the Muslim community, disturbing social peace and order.

Ghaib: the Unseen, un-manifest, that which is hidden from the eyes whether or not it is perceived by the heart: or it can be something which is beyond any sort of perception, such as the future.

Gog and Magog: two evil empires or nations mentioned in the Quran and Hadith in connection with the Final Hour

Hadith: Reports on the sayings and traditions of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)

Hajj: pilgrimage to Makkah. A Muslim is to perform *hajj* at least once in his/her life, if means and health allow. There are rules and regulations and specific dress to be followed. It is to take place during the last month of the lunar calendar called the month of *Dhul Hijjah*.

Hajr-e-Aswad: the black stone set in one corner of the *K'abah* in Makkah, which the pilgrims are supposed to kiss during *tawaf* (circumambulation) of *Ka'bah*

Halal: something that is lawful and permitted in Islam.

Halaqah: a circle of people gathered for the purpose of study of Islam

Haram: something which is unlawful or prohibited in Islam. Doing the *haram* counts as a bad deed and not doing it counts as a good deed.

Hijaz: the region along the western seaboard of Arabia in which Makkah, Madinah, Jeddah and Taif are situated

Ijma': consensus particularly of the people of knowledge among the Muslims on matters of *fiqh*

Ijtihad: the exercise of independent judgment in Islamic law. Attempting to uncover Allah's rulings on issues in light of sources of the Shariah i.e. Qur'an, *Sunnah, ijma', qiyas*.

Imam: a leader, especially in prayer. Imam is a religious leader. Any person who leads a congregational prayer is called an Imam. A religious leader who also leads his community in the political affairs may be called an Imam, an Ameer, or a Caliph.

Iman: faith and trust in Allah.

Islam: submission to the will of Allah, the way of life embodied by all the Prophets, given its final form in the guidance brought by Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Islam is an Arabic word the root of which is *silm* and *salam*. It means among others: peace, greeting, salutation, obedience, loyalty, allegiance, and submission to the will of the Creator of the Universe.

Ismailis: the „Sevener" Shia followers of Ismail, son of Imam Ja'far Sadiq. They assert that Ismail completed the cycle of seven Imams after which the era of hidden Imams began and the latter send out emissaries. They believe that if Imam is not manifest (*qa'im*), then his emissary or proof (*hujjah*) must be manifest

Jahiliyyah: literally meaning ignorant, it refers to the pre-Islamic era that existed in Arabia. It is a combination of views, ideas and practices that totally defy and reject the guidance sent down by God through His Prophets.

Jihad: It is an Arabic word the root of which is *jahada*, which means to strive for a better way of life. It is a struggle, particularly fighting in the way of Allah to establish Islam.

Jinn: invisible, non-human creatures created by God from smokeless fire. They are spiritual beings that inhabit the heavens and the earth.

Jizyah: a protection tax payable by non-Muslims as a tribute to a Muslim ruler traditionally 4 dinars or 40 dirhams per year.

Ka'bah: the first house of worship built for mankind. It was originally built by Adam and later on reconstructed by Abraham an.d Isma''il. It is a cubed shaped structure based in the city of Makkah to which all Muslims turn to in their five daily prayers.

Kafir: (plural *kuffar*) a person who rejects Allah and his messenger Muhammad (PBUH). The opposite is believer or *momin*.

Khanqah: also called *zaviyah*, a place where seekers of Allah live and meet

Kufr: disbelief; to cover up the truth; to reject Allah and refuse to believe that Muhammad is his messenger

Madhab: a school of law founded on the opinion of a *faqih*. The four main schools are now Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbli. There are also other *madhabs* which have ceased to exist: the Awza'i, Zahiri, Jariri (from Ibn Jarar at-Tabari) and the *madhab* of Sufyan ath-Thauri. The Shias also designate their *fiqh* as the Imami or Ja'fri *madhab* after Imam Ja'far Sadiq.

Madrassah (plural *madaris*): a traditional place of study and learning

Madinah: the first city-state that came under the banner of Islam. It is where the Prophet Muhammad''s mosque and grave are situated.

Mahram: A *mahram* refers to the group of people who are unlawful for a woman to marry due to marital or blood relationships. These people include: i) Her permanent *mahrams* due to blood relationship and those seven are: her father, her son (who passed puberty), her brother, her uncle from her father''s side, her brother''s son, her sister''s son, and her uncle from her mother''s side; ii) Her *Radha'i mahrams* due to sharing the nursing milk when she was an infant, and their status is similar to the permanent seven *mahrams*; iii) Her (in law) *mahrams* because of marriage and they are: her husband''s father (father in law), her husband''s son (step son), her mother''s husband (step father), and her daughter''s husband.

Makruh: abominable, reprehensible but not unlawful in the *Shariah*. Not doing the *Makruh* counts as a good deed and doing it does not count as a bad deed.

Milad or *Maulud* or *Maulid*: a time, place or the celebration of the birth especially that of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), who was born on the 12th of Rabi ul Awwal (third month of Muslim calendar) in 571 CE.

Minbar: steps on which the Imam stands to deliver his *khutba* or sermon

Mubah: permissible, permitted, something for which there is neither reward nor punishment. It is also called *ja'iz*.

Mujaddid: renewer, restorer of the *Deen*; it is said that one comes every hundred years or so.

Muqallid: one who practices *taqlid*, not performing *ijtihad* but instead following the legal opinion already arrived at by a *mujtahid*

Mufti: someone qualified to give the legal opinion or *fatwa*

Muharram: the first month of the Muslim lunar year

Munafiq: a hypocrite, someone who outwardly professes Islam on the tongue but inwardly rejects Allah and His Messenger

Mureed: disciple, the one who is stripped of his will (*iradah*) and hands himself over to his *shaikh* or *murshid* i.e. spiritual guide

Murtad: an apostate from Islam, a recanter

Mustahab: what is recommended but not obligatory in acts of worship in the *Shariah*

Mushrik: a polytheist, someone who commits *shirk* by ascribing partners to Allah

Muslim: someone who follows the way of Islam, not abandoning what is obligatory while keeping within the bounds set by Allah and following the *Sunnah* as much as possible

Muzdalifah: a place between Arafa and Mina where the pilgrims returning from Arafa spend a night in the open

Nafl or *Nafila*: supererogatory or voluntary act of worship

Pir: Persian for *murshid*, a spiritual guide

Purdah: (Persian: curtain) a religious and social practice of female seclusion prevalent among some Muslim communities in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. It takes two forms: physical segregation of the sexes and the requirement that women cover their bodies so as to cover their skin and conceal their form.

Qabr (plural *qubur*): grave

Qadhi: a Judge qualified to judge all matters in accordance with the *Shariah* and to dispense and enforce legal punishments

Qawwali: *sufi* singing in Urdu and Persian

Qiblah: the direction Muslims face during *salah* (prayer) that is towards the Ka"bah in Makkah

Qiyamah: Day of Judgment, arising of people at the Resurrection

Qiyas: logical deduction by analogy, reaching a legal decision on the basis of evidence (a precedent). *Qiyas* is one of the four main fundamental principles utilized for reaching a judgment. Other three are Quran, *Sunnah* and *ijmah*.

Ramadhan: the month of prescribed fasting for the Muslims. It is 9th month of Muslim calendar.

Riba: usury, which is *haram* in all its forms since it involves obtaining something for nothing through exploitation

Sadaqah: non-obligatory alms, charitable giving in the cause of Allah. Fasting in Ramadhan is one of the five pillars of Islam (other fours are *Shahadah* i.e. declaring that there is no God except Allah and Muhammad is His Prophet, praying five times a day, paying *zakat* and performing *hajj*).

Sahabah (singular *sahabi*): literally companions, the Muslims who saw the Prophet at least once

Sahih: healthy and sound with no defects, a term used to describe an authentic Hadith

Salah: the prayer particularly the five daily obligatory prayers i.e. Fajr (Dawn), Zuhr (Noon), Asr (Afternoon), Maghrib (Sunset), and Isha" (Late Night). There are non-obligatory prayers as well. *Salah* is an Arabic word to mean a spiritual relationship and communication between the creature and his Creator

Sama': a listening session, listening to *sufi* music, poetry about Allah so that the heart may open

Satr (*awrah*): the private parts of the body of person, which it is indecent to expose in public. For men, this is from the navel to the knee. For women, it is all of her body except the hands, feet, and face.

Shaikh: in *Sufism*, the spiritual teacher who guides one from knowledge of one"s self to the knowledge of one"s Lord

Shariah: literally the road, legal modality of a people based on the revelation of their Prophet. The final *shariah* is that of Islam.

Shia: literally a party or faction, specifically the party who claim that Ali should have succeeded the Prophet as the first caliph and that the leadership of the Muslims belonged to his descendants

Shirk: the unforgivable wrong action of worshipping something or someone other than Allah or associating something or someone as a partner with Him

Sirat-e-Mustaqeem: literally the straight path, the path that the Prophet demonstrated to the mankind by way of the Quran; the path that leads to the Paradise

Suffah: a raised platform that was used by the Prophet as a welcoming point for newcomers or destitute people. It was the verandah of his mosque

Sufi: a Muslim mystic.

Sunnah: literally the customary practice of a person or group of people. It has come to refer to the practice of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and to the first generation of Muslims.

Surah: a chapter of the Qur"an. There are 114 chapters in Quran, each of which is called a *surah*.

Sunni: the main body of Muslims who recognize and accept the first four caliphs of Islam

Tabi'un: the Followrs, the second generation of early Muslims who did not meet Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and learned the *deen* of Islam from his companions (*sahaba*)

Tabi' ut tabi'een: Followers of the Followers, the generation after the *tabi'un* who did not meet any of the *sahaba*

Tafseer: commentary and explanationsof the meanings of the Quran

Tajweed: the art of reciting the Qur"an in accordance with the rules of **Nutq,** pronunciation and intonations and giving each consonant its full value

Taqiyya: concealment of one‟s views to escape persecution. It was obligatory for the secret agents of some of the more extreme Ismaili Shia groups.

Taqlid: imitation, following the opinion of a *mujtahid*, without considering the evidence (*daleel*)

Tarawih: prayers at night in the month of Ramadhan

Tasawwuf: Arabic term for *sufism*, the science of the journey towards the Lord

Tawhid: the doctrine of Allah‟s oneness. It is the basis of Islam.

Tawaf: the circumambulation of the Ka‟bah seven times, usually done during *umrah* or *hajj*.

Tawassul: to seek the assistance of a person of virtue in praying to Allah

Taziyah: Shia performance of mourning to mark the death of Imam Hussain, grandson of the Prophet

Ulama (singular *alim*): the learned, knowledgeable people in Islam

Ummah: the body of Muslims as one distinct community

Wahdatul Wajud: unity of being. There is only One Self which is manifested in multiplicity. Allah is one in His *zaat* (being), *sifaat* (attributes) and *af'aal* (functions). There is only One Entity in existence and multiplicity appears through relations between non-essential entities. In other words, there is no true existence except for Allah.

Wahdatush Shahud: unity of consciousness, unity of direct witnessing. This concept holds that Allah and His creation are entirely separate and there is a true existence of creature and universe, which are separate from Allah.

Walimah: a feast accompanying the wedding to be arranged by the groom‟s family

Waqf (plural *Auqaf*): pious trust, an unalienable endowment for a charitable purpose that cannot be given away or sold to anyone

Wudhu: ritual washing to be pure for the prayer (*salah*)

Zakat or *Zakah*: compulsory wealth tax paid on certain forms of wealth: gold and silver; staple crops; livestock and trading goods. It is to be used in eight categories for welfare of the society that are mentioned in the Qur‟an, namely: the poor, the needy,

the sympathizers, the captives, the debtors, the cause of Allah, the wayfarers, and for those who are to collect it.